Manmohan Sarin, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant, Smt. Rama Puri has preferred TO this Regular First Appeal against the decree for possession, passed by the Additional District Judge, in the suit of possession instituted by the respondent, in respect of premises at WH-41, Block B in Rewari Line, Industrial Area, Mayapuri, New Delhi. ( 2 ) THE facts in brief are: (I) The appellant was inducted in the premises vide a Licence Deed dated 25th May, 1984, in terms of which the appellant was given the user of one hall and WC on the ground floor on licence basis for 11 months at a fee of Rs. 2,000. 00 per month. A subsequent Licence Deed dated 1st April, 1985 for a period of 11 months was executed between the parties, which gave to the appellant the use of one room on the mezzanine floor in addition to the premises in use at an increased fee of Rs. 2625. 00 for 11 months. (ii)The appellant admittedly has also executed, along with the Licence Deeds dated 25th April, 1984 and Ist April, 1985, undertakings by way of affidavits to the effect that she was only a licensee and had no right, title or interest in the property. (iii) The respondent/plaintiff called upon the appellant to stop the user of the premises on expiry of the renewed agreement period on 28th February, 1986. At the appellant s request, the respondent claims that he allowed her to use the premises till 31st March, 1986. The respondent also sent a registered notice dated 18th March, 1996, calling upon the appellant to remove all the machinery etc. installed in the premises. No reply to the said notice was given. The respondent filed a suit for possession as the appellant continued with her user of the premises. ( 3 ) PLEADINGS were completed. Issues were framed and evidence was led. The appellant and the respondent both examined themselves. Issues in the case were re-framed as under on 3rd February, 1987 and 2nd November, 1987:- (1) Whether the defendant is only a licensee in respect of the suit property as alleged by the plaintiff? OPP. (2a) Whether the suit is not properly valued for purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction and proper Court fee has been paid? OPD. (2b) Relief. OPP. (2a) Whether the suit is not properly valued for purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction and proper Court fee has been paid? OPD. (2b) Relief. ( 4 ) THE learned Additional District Judge, by the impugned judgment has decreed the suit for possession holding that the appellant was a mere licencee and not a tenant on the basis of the terms of the licence deed and other documents and attendant circumstances. The appeal was admitted to hearing on 14th September, 1988 and the operation of the impugned judgment and decree was stayed. Vide order dated 6th February, 1989, the appellant was directed to deposit the arrears of licence fee/rent w. e. f. 1st October, 1987 @ Rs. 2625. 00 per month and continue to pay the same in future by 15th of the next succeeding month. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Additional District Judge has not given due weightage to the fact that the appellant was in exclusive possession and control of the premises and not considered the attendant circumstances in the correct perspective. As per the appellant, the installation of heavy machinery financed through the State Financial Corporation and hypothecation of stocks with State Bank of India for the purpose of the appellant s business of electrostatic power coating were factors which were indicators that the transaction between the parties was of a lease and not a licence. It was further argued that the transaction in substance was a Lease and, therefore, the mere form of a Licence Deed did not matter. It had been executed as a Licence Deed to avoid possible objections of the DDA, since the lease in perpetuity by DDA did not permit transfer of possession to a third party. As the perpetual lease granted by the DDA had not been proved on record, reference is sought to be made to standard clause 4 (a) of the standard terms, which contains a prohibition on the sale/transfer or parting with possession of the whole or any part of the industrial plot, without consent of the Lessor. Further, such consent is not to be given for a period of 10 years unless exceptional circumstances exist. Reliance was also placed on Clause 11 of the Licence Deed. Further, such consent is not to be given for a period of 10 years unless exceptional circumstances exist. Reliance was also placed on Clause 11 of the Licence Deed. in terms of which in case of any objection by DDA to the running of business by the Licencee, it would indemnify the Licensor for any damage or loss and to vacate the premises in case DDA did not permit the carrying on of the business. It was urged that the Licence Deed was entered into only to avoid problems with DDA. The learned counsel further urged that the Additional District Judge erred in not accepting the categorical assertion of the appellant that she was in exclusive possession and the respondent did not have one key to lock with him. ( 6 ) IT is now fairly well-settled by a catena of judicial decisions that whether the agreements between the parties create the relationship of landlord/tenant or merely that of a licensor and licencee, the decisive consideration is the intention of the parties. Exclusive possession is, of course, an important consideration but not conclusive. The decision also turns upon the interpretation and construction of the terms and conditions of the agreements. The transaction is a lease if it grants an interest in the premises and it is a licence if it gives only a personal privilege. As noted above, the intention of the parties as reflected and gathered from the agreement terms and the attendant circumstances is the crucial test as to whether it was a lease or licence. Reference in this connection is invited to Associate of Hotels of India Ltd. Vs. R. N. Kapoor ( AIR 1959 SC 1262 ), Mr. Vayallakath Muhammodkutty Vs. LLLikkal Moosakutty (JT 1996 (6) SC 665) and Rajdhani Chit Fund Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mukesh Maheshwari (67 (1997) DLT 493 ). ( 7 ) IN the instant case the agreements in question are described as Licence Deeds. The agreement in specific terms provide that it is only a licence that is being granted and no interest in the property is being created. Besides, it is extremely significant that the first deed was executed on 25. 5. 1984 and in pursuance of which the appellant was put in occupation of the premises. An undertaking by way of affidavit was executed alongwith this deed. It is on a subsequent date, i. e. on 1. 4. Besides, it is extremely significant that the first deed was executed on 25. 5. 1984 and in pursuance of which the appellant was put in occupation of the premises. An undertaking by way of affidavit was executed alongwith this deed. It is on a subsequent date, i. e. on 1. 4. 1985 that the second deed with additional accommodation being included is executed alongwith an undertaking while the appellant was already in occupation. It is, thus, evident that the appellant, who was already in occupation could not have been pressurised or coerced into executing a document which did not reflect the real intention of the parties. The parties were fully aware of what they were executing and the same appears to have been voluntarily done. ( 8 ) THE undertaking by way of affidavit executed subsequently leaves no doubt that the transaction between the parties is of a licence and the appellant had only the right of user of the premises. In terms of the licence deed, the licensor is in complete control and possession of the premises. Undertakings also stipulated that in the event of any objection by the DDA to carrying on of business, the licensee would vacate the same and the licensor would have full authority not to permit the licensee to enter the premises. No interest in the property or tenancy was created. ( 9 ) AS regards the appellant s contention that the Rent Deed was not executed with a view to avoid problems with the DDA, there is no evidence lead as to any pending proceedings against the respondent by the DDA or any notice to the respondent from the DDA. There is only the bald statement of the appellant to the effect that the "plaintiff had to face some formalities with the DDA and, therefore, I should sign the licence deed and the same would have no adverse effect on him. " This statement itself shows that the appellant had willingly and voluntarily executed the Licence Deed. Besides, no such suggestion was put to the respondent in the cross-examination. There is also merit in the contention that the ten year period during which the consent for leasing or transfer was required under the perpetual lease deed dated 27. 11. 1972 had expired when the first licence deed was executed on 25. 11. 1984. Besides, no such suggestion was put to the respondent in the cross-examination. There is also merit in the contention that the ten year period during which the consent for leasing or transfer was required under the perpetual lease deed dated 27. 11. 1972 had expired when the first licence deed was executed on 25. 11. 1984. It is also significant that the appellant did not, prior to the filing of the suit, raise the plea of being a tenant in response to the notice dated 18. 3. 1986. As regards appellants contention that the respondent did not have the key and the appellant was in exclusive possession, is contrary to the terms of the agreement. Besides, the respondent deposed to prove that a lock was fixed by him outside the suit premises of which one key was kept by him and the other key given to the appellant so that appellant did not face any difficulty in entering the premises. The respondent also served a notice dated 12. 6. 1987, on the appellant protesting against putting up a new lock to which no reply was received. The appellant s contention that she was in exclusive possession cannot be accepted. ( 10 ) FROM the foregoing it is clear that the relationship between the parties was that of a licensor and licensee, as reflected by the terms of the Licence Deed and the undertakings and borne out by the attendant circumstances. The learned Additional District Judge was, therefore, right in reaching the same conclusion and decreeing the suit of the respondent for possession. ( 11 ) THE appeal is without merit and is dismissed.