This is an application under section 401 read with section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short CrPC) against the judgment and order dated 7,4.92 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Karimganj, in Criminal Revision No.9(l)/90 allowing the revision petition of the opposite party. 2. The facts briefly are that on 1.9.89, the petitioner filed an application under section 125, CrPC, stating therein that a marriage was solemnised between the petitioner and the opposite party as per Muslim Shariat on 13 Chaitra, 1389, BS. In the said petition, she alleged, inter alia, that the opposite party maltreated her and ultimately in the month of Baisakh, 1391, BS, drove her out of the house of the opposite party when she was pregnant. The petitioner then took shelter in her father's house and a girl baby was born to her. The opposite party did not provide for the maintenance either to the petitioner or to the said girl baby. On the other hand, the opposite party married again and was maintaining conjugal life with another woman. In the said petition, the petitioner further stated that at the time of marriage Mohr of Rs. 10,0007- was taken from her father and relatives gave presentation worth Rs. 11,209.50 In the said petition, the petitioner further stated that she had no source of income and her father's financial condition is very bad and that the opposite party was financially very sound and had sufficient landed property. On these facts as stated in the petition, the petitioner prayed for an amount of Rs.300.00 for herself and an amount of Rs.200.00 for the girl baby as maintenance allowance. She also made a prayer that the Mohr and the Jesmels be released from the opposite party. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, entertained the said petition under section 125, CrPC and issued notice to the opposite party. The opposite party .however, did not file any objection or written reply to the said petition under section 125, CrPC which was numbered as MR Case No. 169/89. In support of her case, the petitioner gave her evidence. In the evidence, she inter alia, stated that after one year of the marriage, the opposite party drove her out of his house and later sent a Talaqnama. The Talaqnama was exhibited as Ext 3 and the signature of the opposite party was exhibited as Ext 3 (a). In support of her case, the petitioner gave her evidence. In the evidence, she inter alia, stated that after one year of the marriage, the opposite party drove her out of his house and later sent a Talaqnama. The Talaqnama was exhibited as Ext 3 and the signature of the opposite party was exhibited as Ext 3 (a). In her evidence the petitioner further stated that Mohr was fixed at Rs.l 0,0007-and that the value of gifts and presentation in the marriage was Rs. 11,209.50 but the said gifts and presentations (Jesmel) were not returned. A list of such gifts and presentations (Jesmel) was exhibited as Ext 2. The petitioner also stated in her evidence that the opposite party did not give maintenance during Iddat period nor any maintenance for the baby and that the opposite party has cloth business at Kalkalighat and owns 15/20 bighas of agriculture land. In course of cross examination, the petitioner admitted that out of sum of Rs.10,000.00 fixed as Mohr at the time of marriage, Rs.4000.00 has been paid to her. She further admitted in the cross-examinatipn that she took a loan of Rs.30,000/- from the Allahabad Bank four years ago for business of tailoring and she has a sewing machine. No question, however, was put by the opposite party at the time of cross-examination which would indicate that the opposite party disputed the factum of divorce as evidenced by the Talaqnama, Ext 3 and his signature, Ext 3 (a). No evidence was also adduced by the opposite party in the said case before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj. On the basis of the evidence, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, by his judgment and order dated 3.1.90 passed in MR Case No.169/89, allowed the case on contest with a cost of Rs.100.00 and held that the petitioner was entitled to get maintenance allowance to the rate of Rs.100.00 per month during the Iddat period and that her child was also entitled to maintenance of Rs. 100.00 per month. By the said judgment and order, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, also held that the petitioner was entitled to get unpaid Mohr money and the value of Jesmels amounting to Rs. 11,209.50. 3. 100.00 per month. By the said judgment and order, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, also held that the petitioner was entitled to get unpaid Mohr money and the value of Jesmels amounting to Rs. 11,209.50. 3. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order dated 3.1.90 of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, the opposite party filed Criminal Revision No.9(l)/90 in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Karimganj, contending, inter alia, that the divorce between the petitioner and the opposite party had not been established and that the proceedings before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, for maintenance, unpaid Mohr money and the Jesmels money from the opposite party were not maintainable in law. By the impugned judgment and order dated 7.4.92, the learned Sessions Judge, Karimganj, held, inter alia, that the application of the petitioner under section 125, CrPC, was totally silent that she had been divorced and that since the petitioner had not claimed any. relief consequent to divorce, her application was not maintainable under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, under which the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had granted reliefs to the petitioner after recording his findings that the petitioner and the opposite party were divorced. The learned Sessions Judge further held that had the application been made by the petitioner that she had been divorced and then a claim been made for maintenance for Iddat period, payment of unpaid Mohr and delivery of properties, the opposite party would have defended himself by filing written statement. The Sessions Judge . further held that it is only at the time of her evidence that the petitioner first time asserted that she had been divorced and thus the opposite party suffered prejudice and that the procedure adopted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was in gross violation of law and there was serious miscarriage of justice. On these findings, the learned Sessions Judge, Karimganj, came to the conclusion that the proceedings in the instant case were not maintainable in law and that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, commited grave error of law in passing the impugned order and accordingly, set aside the judgment and order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order dated 7.4.92 of the learned Sessions Judge, Karimganj, the petitioner has filed this revision petition. 4. Mr. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order dated 7.4.92 of the learned Sessions Judge, Karimganj, the petitioner has filed this revision petition. 4. Mr. MHR Borbhuiya, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that even though in the application under section 125, CrPC, the petitioner did not state that there had been a divorce between the petitioner and the opposite party, at the time of giving her evidence, she produced before the Court the Talaqnama executed by the opposite party which was marked as Ext 3 and the signature of the opposite party was marked as Ext 3 (a). Mr. Rajborbhuiya contended that the aforesaid Talaqnama would show that there had in fact been divorce between the petitioner and the opposite party and that the petitioner was entitled to the rights given to her by the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and relief was granted accordingly by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj. He contended alternatively that assuming that the petitioner was not entitled as a divorcee under the said Act of 1986 for the unpaid Mohr money of Rs.6,000/- and the Jesmels of Rs.l 1,209.50, she was entitled to maintenance both for herself and for her child under the provisions of section 125, CrPC, and in case the learned Sessions Judge, Karimganj, was of the view that the proceedings under the Act of 1986 were not available to the petitioner, he should have affirmed the judgment and order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj in so far as it directed payment of maintenance to the petitioner and her child. 5. Mr. AB Choudhury, learned counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand, sought to sustain the impugned judgment and order dated 7.4.92 of the Sessions Judge. He argued that there was no whisper in the application under section 125, CrPC filed by the petitioner that there was a divorce between the petitioner and the opposite party and in the instant case the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, could not have gone into the question of divorce. He argued that there was no whisper in the application under section 125, CrPC filed by the petitioner that there was a divorce between the petitioner and the opposite party and in the instant case the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, could not have gone into the question of divorce. He further submitted that the proceedings under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 were maintainable only when there is a divorce between a Muslim woman and her husband and in the instant case since the petitioner's case before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, was not that she was a divorcee, none of the reliefs under the provisions of the said Act were available to the petitioner. He further submitted that the proper course in the present case would be to remand the matter back to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, for recording of his findings on the question of divorce after giving due opportunity to the opposite party. 6. Section 2 (a) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, defines a 'divorced women' as "a Muslim woman who married according to Muslim Law, and has been divorced by, or has obtained divorce from her husband in accordance with Muslim Law". Therefore, once it is established before the Court that a Muslim woman who married according to Muslim law has been divorced or has obtained divorce from her husband in accordance with Muslim law, she would be entitled to the substantive and procedural rights under the said Act of 1986, Thus as to whether the proceeding under the said Act would be maintainable or not would not depend on whether in the petition filed before a Court a statement has been made that the petitioner is a Muslim divorced woman, but will depend upon as to whether in fact the Muslim woman who has filed the petition is a 'divorced woman' as defined in the said section 2 (a) of the Act of 1986. Where, therefore, a Muslim woman approached the Court with a petition for some reliefs under the said Act of 1986, the said petition cannot be thrown out by the Court only on the ground that in the petition she has not stated that she was divorced woman as defined in section 2'(a) of the said Act of 1986, if, in fact she was divorced woman. I am of the considered opinion, that the learned Sessions Judge, Karimganj, has committed a grave error of law in coming to the conclusion that the petition filed by the petitioner before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Karimganj, claiming some rights and reliefs under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, was not maintainable merely on the ground that in the petition filed by the petitioner before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Karimganj, she had not made a statement that she was Muslim divorced woman and that at the time of leading evidence she come out with a story for the first time that she was divorced by the opposite party. 7. The learned Sessions Judge, Karimganj, however, may be right in holding that if a statement is not made by the petitioner that she was a divorced woman, the opposite party may be prejudiced inasmuch as he may not have notice of the case of the petitioner that she was adivorced woman. But on the facts of the each case, the Court has to find out as to whether, in fact, the opposite party has been prejudiced by absence of a statement in petition filed before the Magistrate that she was divorced woman. In the instant case, it is true that the petitioner in her application before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, had not stated that there had been a divorce between the petitioner and the opposite party. In fact, the label of the application would show that the application was one under section 125, CrPC. But in course of evidence she produced before the Court a Talaqnama executed by the opposite party and the said Talaqnama was exhibited as Ext 3 and the signature of the opposite party was exhibited as Ext 3 (a). There is nothing in the cross-examination or in the evidence of the petitioner to show that the opposite party disputed the said Talaqnama (Ext 3) or his signature on the said Talaqnama (Ext 3 (a). That apart, after the evidence of the petitioner was over, the opposite party did not choose to lead any evidence whatsoever to dispute the fact of divorce by the said Ext 3 or to dispute his signature in the said Ext 3 (a). That apart, after the evidence of the petitioner was over, the opposite party did not choose to lead any evidence whatsoever to dispute the fact of divorce by the said Ext 3 or to dispute his signature in the said Ext 3 (a). All these go to show that the opposite party has in fact accepted the position that he had executed the Talaqnama and divorced the petitioner and that there was no dispute whatsoever between the petitioner and the opposite party with regard to the factum of divorce. On these peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as stated above, it is difficult to hold that the opposite party was in any way prejudiced by the fact that the petitioner in her application before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Karimganj, did not make a statement that there was a divorce between the petitioner and the opposite party. Further, it is settled law that a mere label on the application filed before that Court cannot take away the jurisdiction from that Court, if it has such jurisdiction under the law nor can such label on an application vest jurisdiction on a Court which has no such jurisdiction under the law. Hence, the fact that the petition of the petitioner before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, had the label of a petition under section 125 CrPC cannot take away the jurisdiction of the said Magistrate to grant to the petitioner reliefs under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 8. For the reasons stated above, I set aside the judgment and order dated 7.4.92 of the learned Sessions Judge, Karimganj, in Criminal Revision No.9(l)/90 and allow the opposite party three (3) months time to comply with the judgment and order dated 3.1.90 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karimganj, inMRCaseNo.169/89.