Judgment :- 1. These two Second Appeals arise out of a common judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, dated 11.4.1985 in A.S. Nos. 161 and 162 of 1984 confirming the judgment of the learned Principal District Munsif, Erode, in O.S. No. 1629 of 1980 and O.S. No. 257 of 1983 dated 6.4.1984. The plaintiffs in O.S. No. 1629 of 1980 and the defendants in O.S. No. 257 of 1983 being the same individuals, are the appellants in the above Second Appeal. 2. O.S. No. 1629 of 1980 was filed by the appellants herein contending that plaintiffs 1 and 2 are brothers, third plaintiff being the mother of plaintiffs 4 and 5 and elder sister of the sixth plaintiff. According to the plaintiffs there was a North-South itteri on the eastern side of the lands of the plaintiffs and the land of plaintiffs 1 and 2 is on the south and the lands of the plaintiffs 3 to 6 are on the North. According to the plaintiffs, there is an East-West itteri running in between these lands and there was a fence on the northern boundary of the property belonging to plaintiffs 1 and 2 which was marked as A B in the plaint plan and the said fence was in existence for more than 80 years. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 have been enjoying the lands up to this fence and there is a fence marked as C D in the plaint plan on the southern end of the land which belongs to plaintiffs 3 to 6. The said fence is also in existence for many years and Karuppanna Gounder, the husband of the third plaintiff settled that property on plaintiffs 3 to 5 under a document dated 24.1.1973. On the south eastern corner of his land, the sixth plaintiff had put up a salai and using the same for thithering his cattle. According to the plaintiffs, people used to walk through the east-west itteri and nobody has taken any carts or other vehicles through the said itteri at any time. The breadth of the itteri was 7 feet. The plaintiffs further plead that defendants 1 to 5 were owning lands on the west of the sixth plaintiff and the north of the suit itteri, and further north of it, the sixth defendant was owning lands. The breadth of the itteri was 7 feet. The plaintiffs further plead that defendants 1 to 5 were owning lands on the west of the sixth plaintiff and the north of the suit itteri, and further north of it, the sixth defendant was owning lands. Further, in view of the misunderstandings, defendants 1 to 6 were taking measurement in the itteri and had planted some stones at a distance of 7 feet south of A B fence and 4 to 5 feet on the aorth of C D fence. The defendants were also proclaiming that they will demolish the existing boundary fence and encroach the cultivable lands up to the points where they have planted stones and thus widening the existing itteri. Therefore, the plaintiffs plead that the defendants had no right to do so. Hence the suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from cutting or destroying the fences along A B and CD as marked in the plaint plan. 3. In the written statement filed by the second defendant the plaint plan was disputed and the width of the East-West itteri according to the defendants, was reduced into half. The defendants would further plead that it was utterly false to say that the fence along AB and CD fence have been in existence for past many years. The claim of the plaintiffs that they and their predecessors in title have been cultivating the lands up to the said fence was also incorrect. According to the defendants, the East-West cart track was in existence for reaching the lands of the defendants and it was 20 feet in broad near BD and 15-1/2 feet broad on the western end. The defendants further claim that they and their predecessors in title have been openly, continuously and uninterruptedly taking their carts through the said itteri all these years and they have perfected the said right by prescription. The defendants also plead that after the advent of the Lower Bhavani Project in view of the stagnation of water and poor maintenance the old fence had fallen into ruins and became completely extinct. The defendants also plead that after the advent of the Lower Bhavani Project in view of the stagnation of water and poor maintenance the old fence had fallen into ruins and became completely extinct. About 1-1/2 years prior to the filing of the suit, dispute arose between the parties and in view of the said enmity the plaintiffs had in one night put up A B and C D fence thus encroaching upon the said cart track, immediately the defendants had protested and threatened to take action. It is further stated that thereupon the plaintiffs agreed to restore the cart track to its original position. But however, about 10 days prior to the filing of the suit, the plaintiffs agreed to restore the cart track after the lands are measured and the encroachments actually fixed. But the plaintiffs have rushed to the Court and filed the suit. In fact, earlier a firka surveyor had also measured the lands and fixed boundary lines. 4. O.S. No. 257 of 1983 was filed by the defendants in the first suit praying for a declaration that they are entitled to use the carl track by taking their men, cattle and carts along the same and for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from obstructing such user and also for a mandatory injunction to direct the defendants to restore the cart track to its original position. 5. The plaintiffs in the suit contended that they are entitled to one acre and 14 cents of lands in Survey No. 289/4 and the remaining other half belongs to plaintiffs 3 to 5 and the sixth plaintiff was entitled to one acre and 20 cents of land in Survey No. 289/C. Defendants 3 to 6 are the owners of Survey No. 289/D and defendants 1 and 2 are the owners of S.F. No. 291. On the eastern side of the said Survey numbers there was a public road which runs north to south and on the East-West cart track branches from the said public road proceeding westwards and reaching the lands of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs and their predecessors in title have been using the said cart track for many years openly and uninterruptedly. The plaintiffs had perfected easement by prescription. According to the plaintiffs originally an old fence existed on both sides of the suit cart track. The plaintiffs and their predecessors in title have been using the said cart track for many years openly and uninterruptedly. The plaintiffs had perfected easement by prescription. According to the plaintiffs originally an old fence existed on both sides of the suit cart track. After the advent of the Lower Bhavani Project in view of the stagnation of water and poor maintenance the said fences had fallen. The breadth of the cart track was 20 feet at A B and 15-1/2 feet at C D. Because of the disputee the defendants with a bad motive had put up new fences along with A B and C D thus encroaching the seven feet at point A and 5 feet at point D. Hence the suit. 6. According to the defendants in the said suit while reiterating their pleadings in O.S. No. 1629 of 1980 they would also contend that the suit was barred by limitation and that the plaintiffs ought to have filed the suit for mandatory injunction within one year from the alleged encroachment and alteration of the cart track. According to the plaintiffs, suit itteri proceeded towards west from the North to South of a public road and it is not a cart track. In none of the documents of title measurement of the cart track has been given and there are fences on both sides of the itteri and the Commissioner had in fact, noted the physical features and the contention that after the advent of Lower Bhavani Project the old fence has become extinct, was also incorrect. The breadth of the itteri as claimed by the plaintiffs was also incorrect and they had not put up fence along A B and C D in July, 1978. The further contention of the plaintiffs that the defendants had agreed to restore its original position was also denied as well as the contention that firka surveyor has measured the land and fixed the boundary lines. 7. On a consideration of the said pleadings and the evidence both oral and documentary, the learned Trial Judge found in favour of the defendants in O.S. No. 1629 of 1980 holding that the suit itteri was being used by defendants for the purpose of taking carts and other vehicles and as such the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 1629 of 1980 were not entitled to an injunction as prayed for by them. On the basis of the said findings the learned Trial Judge decreed the suit in O.S. No. 257 of 1983 and granted a decree for mandatory injunction also, directing the defendants in the said suit to restore the suit itteri to a width of 10 feet by removing the fences and the trees within the itteri. On appeal also the Appellate Court agreed with the findings of the learned District Munsif and rejected both the appeals filed by the appellants herein. Hence the above two Second Appeals. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants would mainly contend as follows:— (a) The findings of the Courts below as regards the existence of cart-track and the right of the respondents to use the cart-track are unsustainable. (b) The defendants/respondents have pleaded that they were entitled to the use of the itteri as a cart-track both as an easement by prescription and easement of necessity cannot be sustained inasmuch as both the rights were inconsistent. 9. On the findings rendered by both the Courts below, as regards the existence of the cart-track and the findings relating to the respondents have not exercised their right over the suit itteri to take their cattle, cart, vehicles etc., such findings being pure questions of fact based on appreciation of evidence, it is not possible for this Court to interfere with the said findings. The appellant has not shown how the said findings can be set aside under the grounds available under Section 100, C.P.C. 10. As regards the objection with reference to inconsistent pleas, learned counsel for the appellant relies on a judgment of this Court reported in I.L.R. (1997) 3 Madras 1425 (Nanjammal v. Marappa Gounder). Subramani, J. in dealing with the facts of the case in paragraph No. 9 of the judgment has made a passing observation that the very claim by prescription and necessity was inconsistent. Such an observation cannot be quoted out of the context as if to mean that a party would be non-suited if either an alternate plea or even a concurrent plea is raised. It would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Such an observation cannot be quoted out of the context as if to mean that a party would be non-suited if either an alternate plea or even a concurrent plea is raised. It would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. For instance if a party has acquired an easement of necessity in terms of Section 13 of the Easements Act and he has also continued to exercise it for more than 20 years as required under Section 15 of the Act, there is no reason why he should be deprived of claiming both the easementary rights. Both the rights are parallel and independently available to a party and there can be no question of any inconsistency in the pleadings. Even in the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned Judge has not held that such a plea would by itself, result in non-suiting the plaintiff. In fact, the learned Judge had considered both the pleas of the plaintiffs on their merits and held against the plaintiffs. Moreover, in the present case, even though in the written statement the claim of easement by prescription as well as of necessity has been raised, the defendants/respondents had restricted in their evidence only to the right of easement by prescription and both the Courts have also rendered their findings mainly on the basis of the claim of easement by prescription only. Therefore, I am unable to sustain the said objection. 11. The only substantial question of law raised by learned counsel for the appellants pertains to the plea of limitation prescribed under Section 25 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 25 of the Limitation Act is as follows:— “25. Acquisition of easements by prescription - (1) Where the access and use of light or air to and for any building have been peaceably enjoyed therewith as an easement, and as of right, without interruption, and for twenty years, and where any way or watercourse or the use of any water or any other easement (whether affirmative or negative) has been peaceably and openly enjoyed by any person claiming title thereto as an easement and as of right without interruption and for twenty years, the right to such access and use of light or air, way, watercourse, use of water, or other easement shall be absolute and indefeasible. (2) Each of the said periods of twenty years shall be taken to be a period ending within two years next before the institution of the suit wherein the claim to which such period relates is contested. (3) Where the property over which a right is claimed under Sub-Section (1) belongs to the Government that Sub-Section shall be read as if for the words “twenty years” the words “thirty years” were substituted”. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants also relics on a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1920 Madras 541 = L2 L.W. 713 (Nachiparayan v. Narayana). Several other judgments were also relied upon by both sides in support of their mutual contentions that the limitation of two years as specified under Section 25(2) of the Limitation Act would be a bar for the present suit or not. Both the learned counsel were also at pains to contend in support of their respective claims that the injury caused to the aggrieved party related to a wrong or not which could be described as a continuous wrong in terms of Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Section 23 of 1908 Act). 13. It is not necessary to venture into a discussion on the above issues as well as the rulings relied upon by both sides inasmuch as the statutory provision pertaining to the applicability of Section 25 (2) of the Act is very clear. The crux of the point raised by learned counsel for the appellants is that the suit is barred by period of limitation of two years as envisaged under Section 25(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The said contention has no relevance at all having regard to the fact that Sections 2 5 and 26 of the said Act cannot apply to an area to which provisions of Indian Easements Act are extended or made applicable to. In this context Section 29(4) is very clear and is to the effect that Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of “easement” in Section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act 1882, may for the time being extend. This is the position ever since the advent of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. This is the position ever since the advent of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. Limitation Act 1871 introduced for the first time, provisions relating to easement under Sections 27 and 28 corresponding to Sections 26 and 27 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and Sections 25 and 26 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Prior to the enactment of Indian Easementts Act, the provisions contained in Limitation Act, 1871 and the Limitation Act, 1877 governed the field and after the provisions of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 came to be enacted, the provisions of the said Act were initially extended only to the Provinces of Madras, Central Provinces and Coorg. Subsequently, stage by stage the provisions of the Easement Act were extended to other areas also but however, had not been extended to all the areas in the country. In fact, before the Limitation Act, 1963 was enacted, in view of rectifying the anomalous position, the Law Commission recommended that the provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Limitation Act be repealed and the Easements Act, 1882 be extended to all the States. But however as the Law of Easement related to the rights in or over the land, being a subject for the State Legislature, it was not possible for the Indian Parliament to extend the applicability of Easements Act to those parts of India to which it did not extend. In those circumstances, the Parliament had specifically made it clear under Section 29(4) of the Limitation Act, 1963 that the provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will not apply to the areas to which (Easements Act, 1882 had been made applicable. In the said circumstances I am unable to entertain the objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellants on the basis of Section 25(2) of the Limitation Act. 14. With the result, there are no merits in the above Second Appeals and both the Second Appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs.