M.Ramakrishna,C.J.-- The appellant, the Interim Lalung (Tiwa) Autonomous Council represented by its Chief Executive Councilor, was the petitioner in Civil Rule No.3441 of 1996 before this Court. In the writ petition the petitioner sought for issuing a writ of Mandamus not to re-constitute/dissolve the existing Interim Lalung (Tiwa) Autonomous Council for the reasons set out in the petition. Learned Single Judge after hearing learned counsel on both sides, by an order made on 31st March'98 held that there was no case made out for issuance of a writ of Mandamus as prayed for and dismissed the petition with the following directions: "In that view of the matter, this writ application shall stand dismissed. But it is made clear that as it was done in other cases, the election to the Body shall be held within a period of 8 (eight) months. Earlier stay order shall stand vacated." 2. It is this order which is called in question in this appeal for the grounds taken therein. 3. We have heard Mr. B.K.Das, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. P.G Baruah, learned Advocate General, appearing for the State in the admission stage. Before we refer to the legal arguments advanced by Mr. Das, let us refer to the salient aspects of the case which are as follows : 4. It is not dispute that the virtue of an Ordinance issued by the Governor of Assam on 13th July'95 necessary powers were conferred upon the competent authority to constitute the Interim Executive Council to Lalung (Tiwa) Autonomous Council within the State of Assam, hereinafter referred to as the 'Autonomous Council'. It is also not in dispute that by virtue of the said power, by an order made on 25th July'95 the Governor constituted an Interim Body nominating 28 persons at the first instance and later on he added 2 more making the total numbers 30. 5. While this Interim Body was exercising powers under the Ordinance which later on came to be repealed by an Act known as Lalung (Tiwa) Autonomous Council Act, 1985, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', the Interim Body was exercising power for all purposes till the writ petition was presented before this Court. Apprehending dissolution of this Body for one reason or the other, the petitioner approached this Court seeking the above relief. 6. Learned Single Judge held against the writ petitioner rejecting the prayer. 7. Apprehending dissolution of this Body for one reason or the other, the petitioner approached this Court seeking the above relief. 6. Learned Single Judge held against the writ petitioner rejecting the prayer. 7. Mr. Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, with a view to make out a case, argued the following two points: (1) that by virtue of section 13 of the Act, hereinafter referred to as the Assam Act 13 of 1995, the Lalung (Tiwa) Autonomous Council Act 25/95 itself came into force on 13th July, 1995 and, therefore, the power exercised by the Interim Body can be traced to the Act. Section 80 of the Act confers enough power to nominate 6 persons. Therefore, there is nothing illegal in the view of the learned Single Judge that as on the date of constitution of the Interim Body by the Governor, the action taken by the competent authority under section 80 nominating persons beyond four Executive .Councilors is one without authority of law is not correct. Again the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge based upon the above observation cannot sustain in .law. Therefore, Mr. Das, learned senior counsel, maintained that the conclusion of the learned Single Judge requires reconsideration by the appellate Court and relief must be granted to the appellant. Countering this argument of Mr. Das, Mr. PG Baruah, learned Advocate General appearing for the State, however, argued that sub-section (3) of section 1 making the Act coming into force by retrospective effect on 13th July'95 is only with a view to validate the action taken by the competent authority before the Act came into force. Therefore, the intendment of the Legislature was not as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant with a view to give relief to the appellant. The other submission of Mr. Baruah is that once the Court holds that the action taken by the competent authority constituting the Interim Body itself is one without authority of law then the view taken by the learned Single Judge was right and the same is well founded and, therefore, the appellate Court need interfere with the order under appeal. 8. Baruah is that once the Court holds that the action taken by the competent authority constituting the Interim Body itself is one without authority of law then the view taken by the learned Single Judge was right and the same is well founded and, therefore, the appellate Court need interfere with the order under appeal. 8. In view of the arguments advanced by learned counsel on both sides referred to above, the following points arise for consideration at this stage in this appeal: (1) Whether the appellant was able to make out a case to grant relief to enable the Interim Body to continue against the view taken by the learned Single Judge ? (2) Whether the appellant was able to make out a case that the action taken by the competent authority nominating 30 persons under section 80 read with section 6 of the Act can be said to be valid ? 9. In order to appreciate the argument of Mr. Das, learned senior counsel, let us examine the intendment of section 80 of the Act. Section 80 of the Act is in parimateria with section 80 of the Ordinance which came to be repealed and the same reads as follows : "The Govt. shall as soon as possible, take steps for the constitution of an Interim Body Lalung (Tiwa) Executive Council by nomination until the General Council is constituted under this Act. The Interim Executive Council shall, in addition, look after the duties of the Village Councils till the same are constituted under this Act." 10. The concept underlying this section 80 abundantly makes it clear that an Interim Body is required to be constituted until such time when election takes place in accordance with law. Therefore, the power is conferred upon the competent authority to constitute Interim Body until general council functions under the Act, Thus the Governor had necessary power to constitute the Interim Body in terms of section 80. Section 6 of the Act reads as follows : "6. (1) The General Council shall consists of 30 (thirty) members of which 26 (twenty six) shall be directly elected and 4 (four) shall be nominated by the Government from amongst the groups of communities residing in the Council, area and not otherwise represented in the General Council. Section 6 of the Act reads as follows : "6. (1) The General Council shall consists of 30 (thirty) members of which 26 (twenty six) shall be directly elected and 4 (four) shall be nominated by the Government from amongst the groups of communities residing in the Council, area and not otherwise represented in the General Council. (Out of 30 seats 15 seats be reserved for Lalung community and out of 15 reserved seats, at least 3(three) seats shall be reserved for women.) (2) The Members of Parliament and the Members of the Legislative Assembly, Assam belonging to Scheduled Tribes Reserved Constituencies of the Council Area shall be ex-officio members of the General Council." Sub-section (4) provides as under : "(4) The elected members of the General Council shall at the first meeting after the election, for the purpose of constitution of the Executive Council, elect ' from amongst themselves, in the manner prescribed. (i) One member to be the Chief Executive Councilor who shall also be the President of the General Council, and (ii) Three Executive Councilors. Section 7 deals with the term of the office which reads as under: "7.(1) The term of the office of the General Council shall be five years from the date of the first meeting as appointed by the Government after the election of the members, unless dissolved earlier under section 68." 11. Sub-sections (2) and (3) lay down certain conditions in regard to elected persons to hold office when he ceased to be a member. 12. By a careful consideration of the provisions of section 80 read with section 6 of the Act it is made clear that the Genera! Council shall consist of 30 members of which 26 shall be directly elected and 4 shall be nominated by the Government from amongst the groups of communities residing in the Council area and not otherwise represented in the General Council. It goes to show that the competent authority (Governor) can nominate 4 persons out of 30 and 26 shall be directly elected. 13. Dealing with the power of the competent authority to constitute the Interim Body under section 80 the Court will have to consider as to whether the competent authority (Governor) can nominate all the 30 persons for the purpose of Interim Body. This is the real question required to be examined for granting relief to the petitioner-appellant. 14. 13. Dealing with the power of the competent authority to constitute the Interim Body under section 80 the Court will have to consider as to whether the competent authority (Governor) can nominate all the 30 persons for the purpose of Interim Body. This is the real question required to be examined for granting relief to the petitioner-appellant. 14. At para 3 of the judgment the learned Single Judge observed that as on the date of the nomination the action taken by the competent authority was one without authority of law. Referring to this aspect of the matter, Mr. Das, learned senior counsel argued that regard being had to the provisions of sections 6 of the Act, the Act has come into force w.e.f. 13th July'95. Sub-section (2) of section 82 lays down as follows : "(2) Notwithstanding such repeal anything done or any action taken under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act." 15. Mr. Das, learned senior counsel wants the Court to understand that when we consider sub-section (3) of section 1 read with section 82 of the Act whatever action taken on 25th July' 95 must be taken as valid under the above provisions of law. If that is so, according to him, the observation of the learned Single Judge in this context is uncalled for. With a view to appreciate the argument of Mr. Das we extract this provision of law. It lays down as follows : "It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 13th day of July'95." 16. We have made it clear to begin that the power exercised by the Governor was not under the Act, inasmuch as, on 25th July'95 there was no Act as such. On the other hand, the power was conferred upon the Governor by the Ordinance. Now although the Act has came into force with effect from 13th July'95, by virtue of the issuance of the notification enforcing the Act, the Ordinance came to be repealed indirectly. As an abundant caution the Legislature incorporated sub­section (3) of section 1 giving effect to the Act from 13th July'95 only with a view to validate the action taken under the Ordinance not with a view to give the Act retrospective effect. This is the general principle under the statute in common parlance. As an abundant caution the Legislature incorporated sub­section (3) of section 1 giving effect to the Act from 13th July'95 only with a view to validate the action taken under the Ordinance not with a view to give the Act retrospective effect. This is the general principle under the statute in common parlance. It is not made explicit that the Act has been given retrospective effect it is only implicit. Therefore, the Court will have to find out as to whether 25th July'95 when the competent authority constituted the Interim Body whether that body had the power or authority to nominate all 30 persons instead of confining his power to nominate only 4. 17. The argument of Mr, Das in this context is that even though the competent authority has nominated all 30 persons, since sub-section (2) of section 82 of the Act validate the action taken by the competent authority retrospectively in view of sub-section (3) of section 1, the Court must record finding upholding such action taken by the Govt.. It is not possible to concede to this submission of Mr. Das. Therefore, we have to examine as to whether the view taken by the learned Single Judge in holding that as on the date when the Interim Body was constituted by the competent authority on 25th July'95 whether that action was found to be competent and valid. Dealing with the view expressed by the learned counsel assigning reasons to do so, it is seen by careful consideration of the -order of the learned Single Judge that the action of the Govt. in nominating all 30 persons instead of confining his power under section 6 of the Act to nominate only 4 was not justified. It is in this context that the learned Single Judge made the observations as above. 18. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has not been able to persuade us to take a different view from the view expressed by the learned Single Judge on this behalf. 19. We do not see any justification to set aside the order of the learned Single Judge. 20. In view of the foregoing, we do not see any merit in this appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed. 21. 19. We do not see any justification to set aside the order of the learned Single Judge. 20. In view of the foregoing, we do not see any merit in this appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed. 21. Before parting it is necessary to observe that the learned Single Judge observed in the course of the order that the election shall be held within a period of eight months. We asked Mr. PG Baruah, learned Advocate General, as to whether the Government requires eight months time for the election in terms of the provisions of law. He fairly submits that the Court may observe that the election shall be held within a reasonable time. We are of the view that 8 weeks time would be reasonable to enable the Government to hold the election in accordance with law. Therefore, the order of the learned Single Judge is modified to that extent. There shall be a writ of Mandamus to the State of Assam to hold the election within a period of 8 weeks from the date of receipt of this order. Ordered accordingly. Parties shall bear their own costs.