JUDGMENT SURINDER SARUP, J.-This revision petition has been filed under Section 24 (5) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the concurrent orders of the learned Rent Controller (1), Shimla dated 30.9.1994 and the Appellate Authority, Shimla, dated 15.9.1997 whereby eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the premises in dispute has been ordered on the ground of bona fide personal necessity. 2. The premises in dispute is known as Fontaine Bleu Villa, situated in Shimla. Out of this building, the respondent-landlady applied for eviction of the petitioner-tenant from a portion consisting of two rooms, kitchen, store, W.C., bath and glazed Varandah. The eviction was sought on the ground of bona fide requirement of the entire building, referred to above, for her own use and occupation as also for her family consisting of herself, her husband, three children i.e. one son and two daughters and aged father-in-law. Besides her family members, she had also employed two servants who were residing with her. Her husband was posted as Deputy Inspector General of Police, Mandi at the relevant time, while the children were studying in schools at Shimla. Since the job of her husband was transferable, therefore, she intended to settle her family permanently in Shimla. With that object in view, she purchased the building for the purpose of residence. She had been delivered possession of the building which was in occupation of the tenants Le. Miss E. Masih and K.B. Vaidya. Another tenant was Krishan Chand Sharma who was also residing in the said building. She had separately filed an eviction petition against Krishan Chand Sharma. At the time of filing of the eviction petition in the present proceedings, the respondent-landlady with her family was residing in the Government accommodation allotted to her husband. However, on his transfer outside Shimla, the Collector (Estate Officer) had passed the eviction order against him from the said Government accommodation. An appeal had also been filed by her husband against that eviction order. On this plea, the respondent-landlady applied for eviction of the present petitioner-tenant from the said portion of the premises in dispute. She also took the ground of non-payment of rent on the plea, that the tenant was in arrears of rent from 1.5.1981 to 31.8.1988 at the rate of Rs. 110/- per month alongwith interest thereon, total amounting to Rs. 12,910.70. Hence, the eviction petition. She also took the ground of non-payment of rent on the plea, that the tenant was in arrears of rent from 1.5.1981 to 31.8.1988 at the rate of Rs. 110/- per month alongwith interest thereon, total amounting to Rs. 12,910.70. Hence, the eviction petition. 3. In his written statement, the present petitioner i.e. tenant took as many as 16 preliminary objections which are not necessary to be reproduced here as they form part of the record. On merits, it was pleaded by him that the premises in dispute, more particularly, the portion thereof against which eviction was sought, were not bona fide required by the respondent-landlady for her own use and occupation as also for her family. According to the written statement, her husband is posted at Shimla. It was denied that the father-in-law of the respondent-landlady was residing with her there. It was further pleaded that other accommodation in the building in question which has fallen vacant, is more than sufficient for her personal requirement. It was further alleged that the respondent-landlady was residing comfortably in the accommodation allotted to her husband in Shimla. As regards the arrears of rent, the plea of the petitioner was that he has paid the entire rent upto-date as he has already deposited the same in the Court of Rent Controller (3), Shimla. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues :— (1) Whether the demised premises are required by the petitioner bona fide for personal use and occupation, as alleged? OPP. (2) Whether the respondent is in arrears of rent, as alleged? OPP. (3) Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the petition, as alleged? OPR. (4) Whether the petition has been filed with mala fide, as alleged? OPR. (5) Whether the petition is not maintainable, as alleged. OPR. (6) Relief. 5. Ultimately, he decided issue No. (1) which is crucial issue in favour of the landlady i.e. respondent holding that the demised premises were required by the landlady bona fide for her personal use and occupation. Issue No. (2) was decided in the negative, while issues No. (3) to (5) were also decided in the negative i.e. in favour of the landlady-respondent. On these findings, the eviction order was passed in the manner aforesaid. 6. Issue No. (2) was decided in the negative, while issues No. (3) to (5) were also decided in the negative i.e. in favour of the landlady-respondent. On these findings, the eviction order was passed in the manner aforesaid. 6. The appeal filed by the petitioner-tenant having being dismissed by the Appellate Authority, Shimla, he has come up in the present revision petition. 7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant Shri Kuldip Singh, Advocate and the learned Counsel for the respondent-landlady Shri M.M. Vaid, Advocate. It may be mentioned here that arguments have been addressed by the learned Counsel for the parties at length on various dates, as is evident from the record. 8. Shri Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant in support of his argument urged that there was no bonafide requirement of the portion in occupation of the petitioner-tenant. He has taken me through the entire evidence on record, both oral and documentary. Indeed, he has taken this Court through the pleadings of the parties. According to him, the evidence led by the parties clearly indicates that the eviction petition has been filed with an ulterior motive by her and that she does not genuinely required the portion of the premises in dispute, which is in occupation of the petitioner as a tenant. According to him, the portion already lying vacant in the said premises is sufficient for the need arid residential requirement of the landlady-respondent. In support of his arguments, Shri Kuldip Singh has led great stress on the fact that the premises in dispute consists of three storeys having four separate and independent units. He has further stressed that there is no plea at all in the eviction petition that the landlady-respondent intends to make any alteration etc. in the premises in dispute to suit her need and requirement. He has also given much emphasis on the combined reading of the pleadings of the landlady-respondent and her evidence which indicates that she does not require the portion of the premises in dispute in occupation of the petitioner as a tenant, bona fide. 9. In order to appreciate the contentions of Shri Kuldip Singh, the reasons given in the impugned order of both i.e. the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority are germane and relevant. 9. In order to appreciate the contentions of Shri Kuldip Singh, the reasons given in the impugned order of both i.e. the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority are germane and relevant. In this connection, it needs o be mentioned that the petitioner-tenant had moved an application for additional evidence before the Appellate Authority to prove that the father-in-law of the landlady-respondent has since died and as such, there was one member less in her family for whom the disputed portion of the premises was required for residential purpose. In her reply, the landlady-respondent had admitted about the death of her father-in-law, therefore, this ground became infructuous. The second ground on which the application for additional evidence had been filed was that the landlady-respondent had purchased the land in village Mehli which has since been included in the municipal limits of Shimla town. This fact was not denied in her reply, but she denied that she has constructed a house on the site purchased by her in the said village, which was the allegation of the petitioner. 10. After giving the reasons, which in the considered view of this Court are good and sufficient, the learned Appellate Authority rejected the application for additional evidence and rightly so. 11. Before the Appellate Authority, the petitioner-tenant was not able to prove that any house has been constructed by the landlady-respondent on the plot purchased in village Mehli which has since become part of the Shimla town. Therefore, his plea of alternative accommodation rightly failed. Moreover, as per settled law, it is for the landlord/landlady to decide how and in what manner he/she should live and he/she will be the best Judge of the residential requirement. 12. Then again the other contention raised by Shri Kuldip Singh that the portion of the premises in dispute already lying vacant, possession having been taken by the landlady-respondent from the earlier tenants after getting them evicted is more than sufficient for her and her family need and requirement, is also untenable. It is the admitted case of the parties that the husband of the landlady-respondent Shri T.R. Mahajan is a Senior Police Officer from the IPS. Cadre and now he is posted at Shimla. It stands to reason that he and his family members i.e. the landlady-respondent and their children would be used to live in comfortable and spacious accommodation. It is the admitted case of the parties that the husband of the landlady-respondent Shri T.R. Mahajan is a Senior Police Officer from the IPS. Cadre and now he is posted at Shimla. It stands to reason that he and his family members i.e. the landlady-respondent and their children would be used to live in comfortable and spacious accommodation. It naturally follows that the landlady-respondent requires the entire premises in dispute for her own use and occupation as residence alongwith her family members. 13. Viewed in the above context, it is not for the petitioner-tenant to dictate or spell out what would be the sufficient accommodation for the landlady-respondent. From the evidence led by her, she has been conclusively able to prove her honafide need and requirement of the portion of the premises in dispute in occupation of the petitioner as tenant. 14. Shri Kuldip Singh has also argued that since admittedly the husband of the landlady-respondent is now a Senior Police Officer stationed at Shimla, there is no apprehension that he will be posted out of this place and, therefore, the Government accommodation in his occupation and his family members including the landlady-respondent is sufficient for their need and requirement. There is a fallacy in this argument also, in as much as if the landlady-respondent wants to reside alongwith her family members, in her own premises, rather than the Government accommodation, neither the law nor the Court can compel her to do so otherwise. Moreover, as held by the Apex Court in the case reported as Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. M/s. Traders and Agencies (1997 (1) RCJ 395) that it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. 15. In fairness to Shri Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant, he has cited a number of rulings in support of his submissions referred to and considered in detail hereinbefore they may be briefly noticed. 16. In Smt RewelKaurv. Mahinder Singh (1985 (2) RCJ 165), it was held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court that on the facts of that case the plea taken in the ejectment application that the accommodation presently with that landlady was insufficient, was not proved on the record. 16. In Smt RewelKaurv. Mahinder Singh (1985 (2) RCJ 165), it was held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court that on the facts of that case the plea taken in the ejectment application that the accommodation presently with that landlady was insufficient, was not proved on the record. On the facts of that case, it was held that the landlady has failed to make out a case for her own use and occupation. It is manifest that the said decision is distinguishable on facts from the present case. 17. In Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina (1985) 1 SCC 251, the Apex Court held that while deciding the question regarding requirement of landlord, all factors, including that eviction would render the tenant homeless should be considered by Court, whether it is the requirement of the statute or not. It was held that filing of the petition after purchasing the property, on facts of that case, did not indicate bonafide requirement. No doubt, in the present case, the landlady-respondent applied for eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the portion in his occupation in the premises in dispute soon after purchasing the same. However, as already discussed above and as rightly held by the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority on appreciation of evidence, her need and requirement is genuine in the present case. 18. In Smt Mastu Devi v. Shri Harish Chander (1980 (2) RCR 488), a learned Single Judge of this Court held under the provisions of the Act that when the landlady filed a petition for ejectment, despite a portion in the same building lying vacant, her need was not bonafide. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, as discussed above, this authority is not applicable. 19. In Shri Rattan Chand Jain v. Shri Charan Singh (1978 (1) RCR 265), it was held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court that the rule that landlords statement regarding personal requirement should ordinarily be accepted is no longer a correct view inasmuch as his statement cannot be accepted unless there is element of need and not mere desire. On the facts of the present case, this Court has already formed the opinion that there is a clear element of need of the landlady-respondent and it is not a case of mere desire, therefore, this authority is also not applicable. 20. On the facts of the present case, this Court has already formed the opinion that there is a clear element of need of the landlady-respondent and it is not a case of mere desire, therefore, this authority is also not applicable. 20. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. In the present case, both the Courts below i.e. the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have meticulously gone into the evidence led by the parties. Indeed, the same has been discussed and analysed in the proper perspective threadbare in the impugned judgments. Thus, neither there is any ground nor any scope for interference by this Court in exercise of its re visional jurisdiction. In this context, certain authorities cited by Shri M.M. Vaid, learned Counsel for the landlady-respondent may be referred to with advantage. 21.. In Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh, (1995) 4 SCC 201, it was held by the Apex Court that where statute provides for right of appeal as well as discretionary remedy of revision, it intends to create two jurisdictions different in scope and content, then discretionary jurisdiction of revision can be invoked only when appellate order suffers from material impropriety, perversity and illegality. In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the scope of revisional power of the High Court under Section 15 (6) of the Haryana Rent Control Act and on the facts of that case, it was held that where the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority on appreciation of evidence found that the tenant has ceased to occupy the tenanted premises and shifted to a house purchased by him in the name of his wife, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction erred in taking a different view and setting aside the concurrent finding. In the present case, also in view of the appreciation of the evidence by both the Courts below in its right perspective and the right conclusion drawn by them, no ground whatsoever has been made out for interference in the present revision petition. 22. In Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kailyard Sulochana and others, (1993) 1 SCC 499, the Apex Court dealing with the scope of revisional power under Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act upon the High Court held that such Court has no jurisdiction to re-appreciate evidence. 22. In Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kailyard Sulochana and others, (1993) 1 SCC 499, the Apex Court dealing with the scope of revisional power under Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act upon the High Court held that such Court has no jurisdiction to re-appreciate evidence. The provisions of the Kerala Rent Control Act in this behalf being pari materia with the revisional provisions of the Act in the present case, this authority fully applies. To the same effect are the decisions of the Apex Court in Rai Chand Jain v. Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla, (1991) 1 SCC 422 and Dev Kumar (died) through LRs v. Swaran Lata (Smt) and others, (1996) 1 SCC 25. 23. No other point has been urged nor any arises in the present case. 24. For the reasons recorded above, this revision petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Counsels fee is quantified at Rs. 2,000/-. Revision petition dismissed.