ORDER Dharmadhikari, J. -- 1. Learned Single Judge C.K. Prasad J. in the course of hearing of this appeal of the accused persons against their conviction under Section 306 r/w Section 498-A of IPC found that the legal question of applicability of the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act against the husband on allegation of abetment of suicide by a woman not legally married to him is a question of law of importance. He has, therefore, referred that legal question for decision by a larger Bench and that is how on the orders of Hon'ble the Chief Justice, the said question referred by Single Judge has been placed before us for consideration and decision. 2. At the outset, we may state that we are confining our decision to a purely legal question posed to us and leave the matter for decision on merits by the appropriate single Bench on the basis of opinion expressed by us. 3. We heard the matter at sufficient length on 13.8.98 but as after careful deliberation, we found that the legal question involved is of great public importance and would have far reaching effect on all pending, and future cases, we thought it fit to hear the Advocate General of the State and Senior Members of the Bar. On behalf of the appellant-accused, we have heard Shri Surendra Singh and for the State Shri Dilip Naik, Addl. Advocate General. We listed the matter for the second time and heard also Shri S.C. Datt, Senior Advocate and Shri S.L. Saxena, Advocate General as amicus curie. 4. The provision which has come-up for consideration and interpretation before us is Section 113-A of the Evidence Act reads as under :-- Sec. 113-A -- "Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman-- when the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband." 5. Senior Advocates Shri S.C. Datt and Shri Surendra Singh, submit that Section 113-A of the Evidence Act being part of Penal statute, strict construction has to be placed on the words and language employed in Section 113-A of the Act. It is submitted that the heading of the Section makes it clear that it provides raising of a presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. It is also pointed out that the words used in Section 113-A of the Evidence Act such as 'woman', 'her husband', or 'any relative of her husband', 'within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage' and the repeated use of words 'her husband' or 'relative of her husband' are clear enough to convey the legislative intent that the presumption can be drawn against the husband in case of suicide by a legally married woman. Such presumption cannot be raised when there is no legally valid marriage between the so called husband and the woman who is alleged to have committed suicide. Reference in this connection is made to other Penal provisions brought on statute book by amending Penal Code and the Evidence Act by the Criminal Law (2nd Amendment) Act, 1983. Specific reference has been made to Sections 125 CrPC, 304-A, 306, 498-A of the IPC and Section 50 of the Evidence Act. 6. Shri Surendra Singh placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and another (AIR 1988 Supreme Court 644) in which construing provisions in Section 125 CrPC, the word 'wife' has been interpreted to mean only 'legally wedded wife' as is understood in personal law applicable to the parties. Reference is also made to the decision in Kanwal Ram and others v. The Himachal Pradesh Administration [ AIR 1966 SC 614 (V 53 C 116)] which was concerning offence under Section 494/109 of IPC and decision of Sikkim High Court concerning offences u/S 497, 498 IPC in case of Chandra Bahadur Subba v. State and another ( 1978 CrLJ 942 ). 7. We have also heard Shri S.L. Saxena, learned Advocate General who has laid much emphasis on the heading of the Section in which the expression used is 'married woman'. 7. We have also heard Shri S.L. Saxena, learned Advocate General who has laid much emphasis on the heading of the Section in which the expression used is 'married woman'. It is submitted by him that in the body of the Section there is deliberate omission of use of word 'wife' and everywhere the word used is 'woman' and 'her husband'. It is submitted that keeping in view the aim and object of the legislation to prevent and bring to book the offences against woman, the word 'husband" and 'marriage' has not to be given a strict legal meaning to mean a 'legally wedded woman' or 'wife'. The submission made by the Advocate General is that the language of the Section has to be given a general meaning. If the person charged of the offence is husband in relationship with the woman, who is victim of the crime, the presumption u/S 113-A is attracted. Advocate General, therefore, insisted on this Court that such construction should be placed on the provision which would best advance the legislative intent of bringing to book offence by a person against a woman in relationship of marriage with him whether valid or not strictly and legally valid. He referred to Black's Law Distrionary and words Phrases Permanent Edition Vol. 26-A in support of his submission that word 'marriage' can be given a general meaning in a statute. 8. In the course of nearing, on the question of proof of validity of marriage, reference has been made by the counsel appearing to the provisions of Section 50 of the Evidence Act. Section 50 of the Evidence Act reads as under :-- "Sec. 50. 8. In the course of nearing, on the question of proof of validity of marriage, reference has been made by the counsel appearing to the provisions of Section 50 of the Evidence Act. Section 50 of the Evidence Act reads as under :-- "Sec. 50. Opinion on relationship, when relevant -- When the Court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one person to another, the opinion, expressed by conduct as to the existence of such relationship, of any person who, as a member of the family or otherwise, has special means of knowledge on the subject, is a relevant fact: Provided that such opinion shall not be sufficient to prove a marriage in proceedings under the India Divorce Act, 1869 (4 of 1869) or in prosecutions under Section 494, 497 or 498 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860)." The above Section 50 of the Evidence Act makes opinion expressed by conduct as to the existence of relationship of one person to another, a relevant fact. Such opinion evidence, however, as has been expressly laid down is insufficient to prove a marriage in proceedings under Indian Divorce Act and in prosecutions under Sections 494, 495, 497 or 498 of the IPC. See the proviso below Section 50 quoted above. It is pertinent to note that Section 113-A of the Evidence Act has been introduced by Criminal Laws Amendment Act No. 46 of 1983 with effect from 25th of December, 1983 but no corresponding amendment has been introduced to proviso below Section 50 to include Section 304-B, 306 and 498-A of IPC for excluding opinion evidence in proof of relationship of one person to another in relation to the last mentioned offences. We shall later on discuss whether such omission of amendment in proviso below Section 50 of the Evidence Act is a deliberate act or inadvertence of the legislature. 9. We find no difficulty in holding that on the plain language of Section 113-A, the presumption cannot arise in case of suicide by a woman who was mere concubine, or mistress, a prostitute, a casual visitor or a woman engaged in an illicit affair with a person who is accused of the offences, as none of them can claim any relationship based on marriage. This would answer a very interesting and the theoretical situation based on imaginary and possible facts posed by learned counsel Shri Surendra Singh. He gave an illustration thus :-suppose a woman "W" is legally- wedded wife of 'A' but has developed illicit relationship with another married person 'B' and occasionally and frequently lives with both of them. She is later on found to have committed suicide. In relation to' such suicide, the question posed is; the presumption u/S 113-A should be raised against 'A' or 'B' and seven years period from the date of marriage is to be reckoned from which date? No doubt there is a possibility of such situation in present day society. Obviously, since the woman is only a visitor to the person outside the wedlock and is carrying on an illicit affair with the latter, no presumption can be raised against a person who is not her husband. The presumption may arise against her husband if there is a nexus with him of any alleged cruel treatment meted out by him to the woman. Presumption u/S 113-A can be raised only when there is evidence of cruelty towards the woman. 10. The period of seven years is to be reckoned from the date of marriage. In order to attract the provision of presumption, there should be evidence of marriage. It is not necessary that such marriage should strictly be valid in accordance with the personal law of the parties. In our considered opinion, there is no reason not to raise 'presumption against a person in relation to suicide by a woman if that woman has undergone some marriage ceremony with that person and treats that person to be her husband. In order to attract the provision, the relationship of husband and wife has to be seen only from the angle of the wife who is the victim of the crime. If the woman who is the victim had undergone a marriage ceremony with a person whom she had been treating as her husband, the presumption must be raised. In this respect, the aims and objects for which the Penal provisions were amended by Criminal Laws Amendment Act, No. 46 of 1983 be seen: "Statement of Objects and Reasons -- The increasing number of dowry deaths is a matter of serious concern. In this respect, the aims and objects for which the Penal provisions were amended by Criminal Laws Amendment Act, No. 46 of 1983 be seen: "Statement of Objects and Reasons -- The increasing number of dowry deaths is a matter of serious concern. The extent of the evil has been commented upon by the Joint Committee of the Houses to examine the working of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Cases of cruelty by the husband and relatives of the husband which culminate in suicide by, a number of hapless woman concerned, constitute only a small fraction of the cases involving such cruelty. It is, therefore, proposed to amend the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only with cases of dowry deaths but also cases of cruelty to married women by their in-laws. 2. The following are the changes which are proposed to be made :-- (i) The Indian Penal Code is proposed to be amended to make cruelty to a woman by her husband or any relative of her husband punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extent to three years and also with fine. Wilful conduct of such a nature by the husband or any relative of the husband as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide of cause grave physical or mental injury to her, and harassment of woman by her husband or any relative of her husband with a view to coercing her or any after relative to meet any unlawful demand for property would be punishable as cruelty. The offence will be cognizable if information relating to the commission of the offence is given to the officer in charge of a police station by the victim of the offence or a relative of the victim of the offence, or in the absence of any such relative, by any public servant authorised in this behalf by the State Government. It is also being provided that no Court shall take cognizance of the offence except upon a police report or a complaint made by the victim of the offence or by her father, mother, brother, sister or by father's or mother's brother or sister or with the leave of the Court by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption (vide clauses 2, 5 and 6 of the Bill). (ii) Provision is being made for inquest by Executive Magistrate and for post mortem in all cases where a woman has within seven years of her marriage, committed suicide or died in circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that some other person has committed an offence. Post mortem is also being provided for in all cases where a married woman has died within seven years of her marriage and a relative of such woman has made a request in this behalf (vide clauses 3 and 4 of the Bill). (iii) The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is being amended to provide that where a woman has committed suicide within a period of seven years from he date of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative other husband (vide clause 7 of the Bill). 3. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects." Underlining for inviting pointed attention and supplying emphasis 11. The above quoted objects and reasons make it amply clear that the relevant provisions have been introduced in the penal laws for prevention and punishment of offences against married women. Presumption is raised against the husband in case of suicide by the woman married to him because offences of cruelty by husbands against the wives are committed within the four walls of houses and most often they are unknown to outsiders. Providing such presumption in the Evidence Act was found necessary against the husband as direct evidence of such crimes is rarely available. The presumption which arises against the husband in case of suicide by wife is dependent on existence of evidence of cruelty and the same is rebuttable by direct or circumstantial evidence in defence by the husband. 12. Learned counsel for the accused insists that this Court should place a strict construction on the Penal statute and the words 'marriage' and husband' should be construed strictly to mean 'a valid marriage' and 'a legally wedded husband.' It is submitted that if the marriage between the parties is not valid in accordance with the personal law applicable to them, no presumption u/S 113-A can arise. The general principle of statutory interpretation as noted by learned author Justice G.P. Singh. The general principle of statutory interpretation as noted by learned author Justice G.P. Singh. J. in his book on Statutory Interpretation 6th Edition page 533 is that statutes relating to offences or imposition of penalty are to be strictly construed. In the further pages of the same commentary at p.535, the learned author has quoted the following opinion of learned Justice James in a Privy Council case Dyke v. Elliot 1872 LR 4 PC 184. p. 191 : "No doubt all penal statutes are to be construed strictly, that is to say, the Court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used, and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip; that there has been casus omissus; that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been included if thought of. On the other hand the person charged has a right to say that the thing charged although within the words, is not within the spirit of the enactment. But where the thing is brought within the words, and within the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be construed like any other instrument, according to fair common sense meaning of the language used, and the Court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in the language of a penal statute, where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in the same language in any other enactment." The above passage, as has been noted by learned author, has found approval of the Supreme Court in M. Narayan Nambiar v. State of Kerala AIR 1963 SC 1116 , in Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1976 SC 1929 and in State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas AIR 1980 SC 593 . There is ample authority as noted above, for holding that it is not an inflexible rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly. But they can be construed to interprete the language used in it in a comprehensive manner to best effectuate the intention of the legislature which can be gathered from the aims and objects of the legislation and the subject matter contained therein. But they can be construed to interprete the language used in it in a comprehensive manner to best effectuate the intention of the legislature which can be gathered from the aims and objects of the legislation and the subject matter contained therein. In this respect, this Court attaches great value and importance to the fact that in proviso below Section 50 of the Evidence Act, the legislature by amendment has not inserted Sections 498-A and 304-B, 306 of IPC to exclude admission of opinion evidence in the matter of proof of relationship of marriage between the parties, concerning those offences. 13. We cannot subscribe to the view as expressed on behalf of the accused that omission to correspondingly amend proviso below Section 50 of the Evidence Act was an inadvertence of the legislature. Such an. argument cannot be accepted, as no presumption can be raised against the legislature that while enacting law or introducing an amendment to such a law it was oblivious or forgetful of the existing law on the subject. Similar argument was rightly repelled by learned single Judge of Andhra Pradesh, High Court in a decision reported in Vadde Rama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( 1990 CrLJ 1666 ) by observing thus :-- "Mr. Padamanabha Reddy, the learned counsel submitted that Ss. 304-8 and 498-A, IPC are new incorporations and by oversight the Parlian1ent has not correspondingly amended the proviso to S. 50 of the Evidence Act by excluding prosecutions under Ss. 304B and 498A in terms of S. 50. This argument cannot be countenanced for the simple reason that their is a presumption against the legislature that it enacts laws with a complete knowledge of all existing laws pertaining to the same subject and the failure to bring in the corresponding amendment to S. 50 of the Evidence Act indicates that the intent was not to repeal existing legislation. For this proposition of law, it is relevant to notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Council v. T.J. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 1561 para (9). There dealing with the question of implied repeal, the Supreme Court held : 'It is undoubtedly true that the legislature can exercise the power to repeal by implicatioI1. But it is an equally well settled principle of law that there is a presumption against an implied repeal. There dealing with the question of implied repeal, the Supreme Court held : 'It is undoubtedly true that the legislature can exercise the power to repeal by implicatioI1. But it is an equally well settled principle of law that there is a presumption against an implied repeal. Upon the assumption that the legislature enacts laws with a complete knowledge of all existing laws pertaining to the same subject the failure to add a repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal existing legislation." 14. Direct evidence of marriage between person charged and the victim of the crime is not always available. S. 50 of the Evidence Act, therefore, would permit the prosecution to lead opinion evidence. If such evidence shows that relationship of husband and wife existed between the person accused and the victim of the crime, there is no reason or logic not to raise presumption against the person-accused on the plain language of Sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act. 15. The Supreme Court decision in the case of Yamunabai Anantrao v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and another (supra) which arose on provisions u/S 125 CrPC and Kanwal Ram and others v. The Himachal Pradesh Administration (supra) based on provisions u/S 494 of IPC are distinguishable. The provisions considered therein are not at all comparable with the provisions in Sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act and S. 498-A of Penal Code. In the case of Yamunabai (surpa), the words 'wife' and 'divorced wife' used in the Section have been construed to include only a legally wedded wife and a divorcee from such lawful marriage. Such interpretation on a provision dealing with obligation of husband to maintain his lawfully wedded wife is understandable. The provision has been construed as not placing any legal obligation on the husband to maintain any woman not lawfully married to him. The provision u/S. 125 CrPC is a law against vagrancy and does not deal with any offence. 16. Similarly, the case of Kanwal Ram (supra) arising out of an alleged offence u/S. 494 of IPC is also distinguishable. One of the essential ingredients of offence of bigamy is undergoing ceremony of second marriage during existence of a valid first marriage. For proof of such offence factum and validity of first and observance of ceremony of second marriage assume importance. One of the essential ingredients of offence of bigamy is undergoing ceremony of second marriage during existence of a valid first marriage. For proof of such offence factum and validity of first and observance of ceremony of second marriage assume importance. Opinion evidence u/S. 50 of the Evidence Act is expressly excluded by its mention in proviso to the main Section. 17. After giving our careful and thoughtful consideration to the question posed and having seen the provision from different angles as projected before us by the parties, we have formed an opinion that the provision under consideration has to be construed in a manner as to best advance the objects of the law and to suppress the mischief that it intents to achieve. As has been pointed out above the provision brought by amendment to Penal Statute is with the object of effectively dealing with the increasing crimes by husbands against married women and to bring to book such offences for deterrent punishments. Strict proof of marriage in accordance with the personal law of the parties is neither clearly nor impliedly intended by Sec. 113-A. Nor such intention can be gathered from the aims and objects of the Bill which was brought to amend the penal laws. The anxiety of the legislature to effectively meet the increase in offences against married women by their husbands and relatives is apparent from the provision. The law being on the subject of offence against woman, the relationship of marriage has to be seen from the angle of the woman who was the victim of the crime. If the woman who was the victim of the crime, during her lifetime, had treated the person to whom she was married; as her husband, there is no reason why the presumption u/S. 113-A be not raised against the husband, may be that the woman was married to the accused under a bigamous or unlawful marriage not recognisable by personal law of the parties. 18. The above interpretation does not in any manner militate against the requirement of limit of seven year's period of marriage for raising presumption. For the purpose of attracting presumption u/S. 113-A of the Evidence Act, proof of existence of a marriage is in essentiality but not its validity as understood under the persoI1allaw of the parties. 18. The above interpretation does not in any manner militate against the requirement of limit of seven year's period of marriage for raising presumption. For the purpose of attracting presumption u/S. 113-A of the Evidence Act, proof of existence of a marriage is in essentiality but not its validity as understood under the persoI1allaw of the parties. A marriage in any form under which the woman, who was the victim, had treated the accused as her husband, would be the starting point for reckoning the period of seven years under the said provision to raise a presumption. 19. After having carefully considered the scope and ambit of Sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act, we are of the opinion that from the plain language with the words employed in it, prima facie the section would not include case of suicide by a woman who has undergone no marriage with the person-accused and is merely leading an adulterous life with him, as a concubine or a mistress, a prostitute, or a mere frequent or occasional visitor to his place in course of an illicit relationship with him. The reason is obvious that to attract the provision of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, existence of marriage and seven years period are two necessary pre-requisites for raising a presumption against the husband. 20. We do not find any justification, from the language and words employed in the Section to exclude from its ambit case of a suicide by a woman who had undergone a bigamous or polygamous marriage. Such marriage of the woman is contemplated by the provision and it need not be strictly a valid marriage in accordance with the personal law of the parties. The presumption raised u/S. 113-A merely shifts the onus of rebuttal on the husband. The provision raising such presumption is aimed at effectively preventing arid dealing with offences of such cruelty against the married women which have led them to suicide. We find no apparent reason to exclude from the purview of the Section a relationship arising from re-marriage or a bigamous marriage which may not be strictly valid for want of observance of necessary formalities or rituals under the personal law of the parties or any prohibition in such law. 21. We find no apparent reason to exclude from the purview of the Section a relationship arising from re-marriage or a bigamous marriage which may not be strictly valid for want of observance of necessary formalities or rituals under the personal law of the parties or any prohibition in such law. 21. We, therefore, hold that Sec. 113-A of the Evidence Act would cover within its purview suicide by a woman irrespective of the fact of her marriage being perfect, imperfect, valid or invalid under the personal law applicable to the parties. In our opinion, invalidity of marriage, for purpose of raising presumption u/S. 113-A, is wholly irrelevant as it is the offence which has to be brought to book and punished. If a woman, who has undergone a kind of marriage, legal, customary or otherwise is proved to have been subjected to cruelty by a man whom she had been treating as her husband and/or his relatives, and is found to have committed suicide, that would give rise to the presumption and such husband can have no defence that the presumption may not be raised against him because his marriage with the woman was not lawful being not in accordance with the personal law of the parties. The words used in the Section 'Married' and 'husband', in our opinion have to be given a general meaning to effectuate the aims and objects of the provision and cannot be assigned a strict legal meaning as understood in the personal law applicable to the parties. As we have stated above the relationship between the accused and the woman has to be understood and construed from the point of view of the woman who is alleged to have been subjected to cruelty and is the victim of the crime. The marriage relationship from point of view of the accused is wholly irrelevant and not at all in contemplation of the legislature. All valid, as well as bigamous or polygamous or less formal marriages, customary or otherwise are, therefore, included within the purview of this Section. 22. We do not find that in construing so we are either reading something into the provision or stretching its language. All valid, as well as bigamous or polygamous or less formal marriages, customary or otherwise are, therefore, included within the purview of this Section. 22. We do not find that in construing so we are either reading something into the provision or stretching its language. In dealing with such offences against women which have led to their suicide, there is no reasonable basis of justification to give a differential treatment to a victim who is a legally wedded wife and to other woman who, although married, is not strictly married in accordance with the personal law applicable to the parties. The presumption is raised in offence of cruelty by husband against married woman which has led to suicide by her. The provision deals with the offences and not with the personal law of the parties on marriage and divorce. 23. Let the case be now placed before the learned Single Judge for decision of the appeal on merits.