C. M. Nayar, J. ( 1 ) THE present petition is directed against the judgment dated March 30, 1993 passed by Additional Rent Controller, Delhi whereby the eviction petition of the petitioner filed under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as `the Act ) was dismissed. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is the owner of the property bearing No. K-8, Kailash Colony, New Delhi. Respondent was inducted as a tenant on the entire ground floor except one room 5 x 5 shown in colour blue in the site plan comprising of three bed rooms, one study room, one kitchen, one front verandah and lawn etc. It is alleged that in August, 1984 the respondent handed over vacant and peaceful possession of a room and bath room along with rear passage going from the main gate to the petitioner. The premises were let out to the respondent for residential purposes for the residence of B. N. Khandelwal, Secretary of the respondent company at the relevant time. The eviction petition was moved as the premises were required by the petitioner for her bona fide need for her residence as well as for the residence of her family members. The family comprised of herself, her husband, son S. K. Kakkar, his wife and two children. The petitioner has two other sons Shri Rajinder Kumar Kakkar and Dr. J. K. Kakkar who visit the petitioner along with their family members. There is also a married daughter and her family and it is stated that they also visit the petitioner and their need has to be kept in view while assessing the plea of bona fide requirement. The accommodation in possession of the petitioner is only one bed room with bath and store on the ground floor and one bath room and kitchen on the first floor. ( 3 ) THE petition was contested by the respondent to controvert the allegations of the petitioner and it was stated that the petition was not maintainable and the same had been filed for eviction of the respondent from a part of the tenanted premises. The husband of the petitioner had expressed the desire to raise the construction on the roof in May, 1988 and the tenant B. N. Khandelwal did not object to the commencement of the said construction. The husband of the petitioner had expressed the desire to raise the construction on the roof in May, 1988 and the tenant B. N. Khandelwal did not object to the commencement of the said construction. It is further alleged that on June 3, 1988 the petitioner, her husband and her two sons namely, Satinder Kumar Kakkar and Rajinder Kumar Kakkar with a show of force entered into one of the rear bed rooms in occupation of B. N. Khandelwal and forcibly pushed their household goods in the said room despite resistance and protests. The petitioner along with her family members committed trespass and occupied the rear bed room with the attached bathroom. The necessary civil and criminal proceedings were commenced by the respondent as a consequence of the alleged action of the petitioner and her family. It was next pleaded that the premises were not required by the petitioner for herself and her family members as they were settled and have been residing in their own house at A-31, Defence Colony, Meerut. The daughter-in-law of the petitioner is employed as a teacher in Meerut and is residing there. The petitioner had never resided in the property in question. The son of the petitioner Satinder Kumar Kakkar along with his family members also resided in Meerut. The other son of the petitioner Rajinder Kumar Kakkar is employed in Meerut and any question of his being posted at Delhi does not arise. Dr. J. K. Kakkar also son of the petitioner is permanently stationed in Shimla. The petitioner s husband retired more than two decade ago and since then has settled in Meerut. Therefore, in view of the above facts the need of the petitioner and her family is neither genuine nor bona fide. ( 4 ) THE petitioner filed replication and reiterated the averments in the petition. The learned Additional Rent Controller examined the pleas of the parties and held as follows: (A) There is no dispute between the parties regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant. The respondent has not controverted the allegation that the petitioner is not the landlady of the premises in dispute. (B) the premises were let out to the respondent for residential purposes only. (C) The petitioner has failed to prove that the premises in dispute are required by her bona fide for residence for herself and for her family members dependent upon her. (B) the premises were let out to the respondent for residential purposes only. (C) The petitioner has failed to prove that the premises in dispute are required by her bona fide for residence for herself and for her family members dependent upon her. ( 5 ) THE learned Additional Rent Controller rejected the pleas of the petitioner that she required the premises bona fide for her own use as well as for the family members dependent upon her. The basis of the finding can be traced to the following paragraph from the judgment which may be reproduced as follows: "she has failed to explain to the Court when she intended to occupy the premises at Delhi. Admittedly, petitioner was residing at Meerut where her husband was also residing after his retirement. In the cross-examination, AW1 has admitted that his father was employed in Army and had retired from there in the year 1963-64. He has admitted that prior to retirement, immediately, he was residing in Meerut. He has further admitted that after the retirement his father lived at Meerut for about 25 years. So, the petitioner was the proper person to explain the circumstances compelling her to occupy the portion in the property in question, for her residence. Normally, the person residing in a particular station for the last about 25 years and having roots at a particular place is not expected to shift to another place without any sufficient reason. The petitioner has failed to explain the compelling circumstances to shift to the property in question when the accommodation in the property in question was not available to her for immediate occupation. The accommodation available to her admittedly at the time of occupation was not sufficient to her needs. The petitioner and her husband over the age of 75 years are not expected to shift to Delhi from Meerut all of a sudden, particularly, when admittedly the other son of the petitioner, Rajinder Kumar Kakkar who was earlier a Consolidation Officer in U. P. has joined Bar at Meerut after his retirement. Wife of the other son of the petitioner, i. e. Sateyender Kumar Kakar is admittedly employed as a teacher and she is residing there alongwith her two children at Meerut. Wife of the other son of the petitioner, i. e. Sateyender Kumar Kakar is admittedly employed as a teacher and she is residing there alongwith her two children at Meerut. Admittedly, the other son of the petitioner i. e. J. K. Kakar is having his own house at Meerut at A-31, Defence Colony, which is in occupation of the wife and children of the other son of the petitioner i. e. Sateyender Kumar Kakar. So, if all the family members of the petitioner are residing at Meerut or at Shimla, there was no possibility of the petitioner and her husband to shift to the property in question when there was no reasonable accommodation available to them at any point of time. " FURTHER it was held as follows: "the petitioner in the petition has not alleged that she decided to shift to Delhi because of the employment of his son, S. K. Kakar at Delhi. It could have been a good ground for the petitioner to reside alongwith his son at Delhi, but the petitioner has failed to prove thathe shifted to Delhi because of the employment of his son, S. K. Kakar in Delhi. The petitioner in the petition has not alleged since when his son, S. K. Kakar is in service at Delhi. She has not stated the detail or particulars of employment of his son, S. K. Kakar at Delhi. The respondent in the written statement had controverted regarding employment of S. K. Kakar at Delhi, so, it was imperative for the petitioner to prove S. K. Kakar to be in service at Delhi. From the perusal of the evidence led by the petitioner, I am of this view that the petitioner has failed to prove S. K. Kakar to be in service in Delhi and if so, since when. " ( 6 ) THE Court next laid emphasis that the petitioner had not produced any document, whatsoever, to prove herself to be residing in the portion of the property in question and in this background her need was held to be not bona fide. The non-vacation of the accommodation in her possession at Meerut was also considered fatal and an order of eviction was declined. The non-vacation of the accommodation in her possession at Meerut was also considered fatal and an order of eviction was declined. The following finding was recorded by the Court: "under the circumstances it cannot be said that the petitioner has proved that the accommodation in her possession at Meerut has been vacated by her or her husband and if so when. This fortifies the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner and her husband are still residing in the premises at Meerut. The story of the petitioner to be on rent at Meerut does not appeal to mind. In the cross examination, this witness has admitted that the house at A-31, Defence Colony is owned by his brother, Dr. J. K. Kakar. He has further admitted that his wife and children are residing in the said accommodation. It is strange that the petitioner and her husband will occupy the rented accommodation when their own son, J. K. Kakar is having his own accommodation at Meerut i. e. A-31, Defence Colony and the same is occupied by the wife and children of his other son only. This fact rather goes against the petitioner. It shows that the son of the petitioner, S. K. Kakar is not dependent upon the petitioner for residence. At Meerut, the son of the petitioner, S. K. Kakar did not reside with the petitioner which is apparent from the fact that the parents of AW1 were residing on rented accommodation while the family members of AW1 were residing in the accommodation at A-31, Defence Colony. Had, S. K. Kakar been dependent upon the petitioner for residence, he would have resided with the petitioner and her husband in the premises in her occupation. He would not have resided separately in another accommodation owned by his brother, J. K. Kakar in A-31, Defence Colony it shows that the son of the petitioner, S. K. Kakar is dependent for residence not upon the petitioner but on his brother. In the petition, the petitioner has not alleged that at Meerut all of them were residing together in a joint family. Since, the petitioner and her husband were residing on a rented accommodation and the family members of S. K. Kakar were residing in another accommodation at A-31, Defence Colony. It is clear that there was no joint family of the petitioner with his son. Since, the petitioner and her husband were residing on a rented accommodation and the family members of S. K. Kakar were residing in another accommodation at A-31, Defence Colony. It is clear that there was no joint family of the petitioner with his son. So, the shifting of the petitioner to Delhi simply that his son, S. K. kakar is employed here does not appeal to mind as at Meerut itself they were not residing together. So, the explanation given by the petitioner to shift to Delhi because of the employment of his son, S. K. Kakar does not appeal to mind. " ( 7 ) LASTLY, the Additional Rent Controller has highlighted the fact that the tenanted premises were always let out and the petitioner was merely intending to get the premises vacated for higher rent. Paragraph 16 of the judgment may be reproduced as below: "in view of my above said discussion, I am of this view that the petitioner has failed to prove that the premises in dispute are required bona fide for residence for herself and for her family members. On the other had, AW1 has categorically admitted that the property in dispute has remained on rent with tenants. He has admitted that in the year 1967 to 1969, one P. C. Mehta was a tenant in the premises in dispute on a monthly rent of Rs. 650. 00. He has further admitted that after P. C. Mehta, the property in dispute were let out on a monthly rent of Rs. 700. 00 to one P. J. Vachanai. He has further admitted that thereafter one A. T. Dudani was a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 750. 00. One Mr. Y. V. Sulpekar was a tenant at the rate of Rs. 950. 00. He has further admitted that one S. H. Raman was a tenant at the rate of Rs. 1200. 00 from 1979 to 1981. It shows that the petitioner has always let out the property in dispute on enhanced rent. Since, the rent in the locality have gone up, the intention of the petitioner is to get the premises in dispute vacated and re-let the same on higher rent cannot be ruled out. 1200. 00 from 1979 to 1981. It shows that the petitioner has always let out the property in dispute on enhanced rent. Since, the rent in the locality have gone up, the intention of the petitioner is to get the premises in dispute vacated and re-let the same on higher rent cannot be ruled out. " ( 8 ) IT is evident from the pleadings that the petitioner and her husband at the time the impugned order was passed on March 30, 1993 were about 75 years of age. The family comprised of herself, her husband, son, daughter-in-law and two children, two other sons who are alleged to be staying at Meerut and Shimla and a married daughter. The learned Controller has primarily highlighted the fact that the petitioner has not proved that she intended to shift to Delhi as she was comfortably based in Meerut and if all the family members are residing at Meerut or Shimla, there was no possibility of the petitioner and her husband to shift to the property in question. It was further held that the petitioner and her husband who are over the ages of 75 years were not expected to shift to Delhi from Meerut all of sudden particularly when, admittedly, other son of the petitioner Rajinder Kumar Kakkar who was a Consolidation Officer in U. P. joined Bar at Meerut after his retirement and the wife of another son Satinder Kumar Kakkar was, admittedly, employed as teacher in Meerut where she was residing with her husband and two children. ( 9 ) THE reading of the findings as REFERRED TO to above will show that the Additional Rent Controller has clearly mis-directed himself in making the assessment of petitioner s requirement on an erroneous basis and against the settled principles of law applicable in such cases. It has been clearly held that actual shifting is not necessary so long the desire to shift is bona fide. ( 10 ) THE judgment as reported in Prativa Devi (Smt) v. T. V. Krishnan (1996) 5 Supreme Court Cases 353 has often been cited to reiterate the proposition that the landlord was the best judge of his residential requirement. The claim could not be brushed aside merely on the ground that she was staying in another town. Paragraphs 2,3 and 4 of the judgment may be reproduced as follows: "2. The claim could not be brushed aside merely on the ground that she was staying in another town. Paragraphs 2,3 and 4 of the judgment may be reproduced as follows: "2. The proven facts are that the appellant who is a widow, since the demise of her husband late Shiv Nath Mukherjee, has been staying as a guest with Shri N. C. Chatterjee who was a family friend of her late husband, at B-4/20, Safdarjang Enclave, New Delhi. There is nothing to show that she has any kind of right whatever to stay in the house of Shri Chatterjee. On the other hand, she is there merely by sufferance. The reason given by the High Court that the appellant is an old lady aged about 70 years and has no one to look after her and therefore she should continue to live with Shri Chatterjee, was hardly a ground sufficient for interference. The landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own. The High Court is rather solicitous about the age of the appellant and thinks that because of her age she needs to be looked after. Now, that is a look out of the appellant and not of the High Court. We fail to appreciate the High Court giving such a gratuitous advice which was uncalled for. There is no law which deprives the landlord of the beneficial enjoyment of his property. We accordingly reverse the finding reached by the High Court and restore that of the Rent Controller that the appellant had established her bona fide requirement of the demised premises for her personal use and occupation, which finding was based on a proper appreciation of the evidence in the light of the surrounding circumstances. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant however relies on the following observations made by a learned Single Judge (T. P. S. Chawla,j.) supposed to be based on the decision of this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant N. Patel to the effect: "i think, the true test is whether, on an overall and reasonable view, it can be said that the landlord has suitable accommodation `available for his use . In deciding this question one should certainly have regard to the fact that the landlord has no legal right to the other accommodation, but that is only a factor and not the end of the matter. " ( 11 ) THESE observations proceed on a misunderstanding of the ratio of the decision of this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai case. The High Court was in error in laying down that the test is availability of alternative accommodation and not the legal right to such occupation in adjudging the bona fides of the claim of the landlord under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act. The decision of this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai case does not lay down any such proposition. On the contrary, this Court reversed the judgment of the Bombay High Court which proceeded upon that basis. In that case, the first floor was in occupation of the mother of the appellant as a tenant and the question was as to the availability of the Truth Bungalow which was given on leave and licence to one Dr. Bharucha. The High Court came to the conclusion that the requirement of the appellant for the ground floor of the demised premises was not reasonable and bona fide since the appellant was in juridicial possession of the Truth Bungalow. This Court in allowing the appeal observed: (SCC p. 668, para 8) "now, it is true that when premises are given on leave and licence, the licensor continues, from a juridical point of view, to be in possession of the premises and the licensee is merely given occupation and therefore, strictly speaking the High Court was right in observing that the Truth Bungalow, which was given on leave and licence to Dr. Bharucha, was in the possession of the appellant. " ( 12 ) THE Court then pointed out: (SCC p. 668, para 8) "but for the purpose of determining whether the requirement of the appellant for the ground floor premises was reasonable and bona fide, what is necessary to be considered is not whether the appellant was juridically in possession of the Truth Bungalow, but whether the Truth Bungalow was available to the appellant for occupation so that he could not be said to need the ground floor premises. If the Truth Bungalow was in occupation of Dr. If the Truth Bungalow was in occupation of Dr. Bharucha on leave and licence, it was obviously not available to the appellant for occupation and it could not be taken into account for negativing the need of the appellant for the ground floor premises. " WE accordingly overrule the decision of the Delhi High Court in Sat Pal v. Nand Kishore as not laying down good law. 4. In the premises, the judgment of the High Court disallowing the appellant s claim cannot be supported. In considering the availability of alternative accommodation, the Court has to consider not merely whether such accommodation is available but also whether the landlord has a legal right to such accommodation. The appellant had established her bona fide personal requirement of the demised premises under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act and her claim could not be disallowed merely on the ground that she was staying as a guest with a family friend by force of circumstances. " ( 13 ) THE learned Additional Rent Controller has, prima facie, based his findings on the assumption that the petitioner was comfortably residing in Meerut and there was no need for her to shift to Delhi particularly when she and her husband were 75 years of age and other family members were residing in Meerut. This is prima facie an erroneous conclusion which cannot be supported in law as it was open for the petitioner to choose his own place of residence and it is not necessary for her to prove the factum of actual shifting from Meerut to Delhi. The Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Assurance Co. Ltd. 76 (1998) Delhi Law Times 1 (SC) set aside a judgment of this Court where the learned Judge rejected the plea of bona fide requirement by holding that "in any case it is the admitted position that respondent is staying comfortably at Calcutta and there is no threat to the occupation of the said flat by her and her family members. " Secondly, the finding that "the original cause of action on which the petition was founded viz. " Secondly, the finding that "the original cause of action on which the petition was founded viz. the respondent/landlady shifting to Delhi along with her husband who was setting up an office, ceased to exist after the death of her husband" taken as a factor for declining to grant eviction on bona fide requirement was set aside by the Supreme Court in the above said judgment. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment which are of relevance may be reproduced as follows: "14. The crux of the ground envisaged in Clause (e) of Section 14 (1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unncessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. 15. Facts such as the cordial relationship between a landlord and her daughter-in-law or that he is comfortably residing in the present building are not relevant in judging the bona fides of the claim of the landlord. Otherwise it would appear that landlord can think of residing in his or her own residential building only when cracks develop in the relationship between him and his other kith and kin. " ( 14 ) THE law is, therefore, well settled that the landlord is entitled to assert that he requires his property for his own use and occupation. The Rent Controller is not entitled to proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. In the present case, the actual shifting of the landlady from Meerut was not necessary so long as the desire to shift was bona fide. The Rent Controller is not entitled to proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. In the present case, the actual shifting of the landlady from Meerut was not necessary so long as the desire to shift was bona fide. The facts as enumerated in the earlier part of the judgment will clearly establish that the landlady intended to use the tenanted premises for her residence as well as for the residence of her family members dependent upon her. During the course of arguments it was also stated by learned counsel for the petitioner that the premises are lying vacant and no officer of therespondent company is residing therein. This was not refuted by learned counsel for the respondent. He, however, has contended that the premises are being used by the watch and ward staff as the petitioner has made it impossible for an officer of the company to reside in the same. The facts of the present case will establish that the Additional Rent Controller has formulated his own criteria to deny the remedy of eviction as provided under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act to the petitioner and it will be open for this Court to reverse the same as findings suffer from unreasonableness and jurisdictional error. The relevant provisions of clause 14 (1) (e) of the Act cannot be interpreted as to mean that if the landlord has any other house elsewhere, he cannot seek recovery of possession of the tenanted property for which proceedings for eviction have been initiated. The Supreme Court has held that an order of eviction can be passed in such circumstances in the case of Sarla Ahuja (supra ). ( 15 ) IN view of the above reasons, the petition is allowed and the Order dated March 30, 1993 passed by the Additional Rent Controller is set aside. The decree of eviction is passed under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act in favour of the petitioner. The decree, however, shall not be executable before the expiry of six months from today. There will be no order as to costs.