Raj Kaur Randhawa v. Kinetic Gallery — 1998 DIGILAW 968 (MP)

ORDER 1. This is plaintiff s revision. It is filed against the order dated 4th of April, 1998, passed by the IXth Additional District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 27-A/96. The trial Court required the applicant to pay the deficit of court-fee on Rs. Three Lakhs within one month of the date of the order in exercise of its powers under Order 7 Rule II (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. In order to understand the nature of controversy, regarding the payment of court-fee, between the parties to this revision, it is imperative to consider the allegations in the plaint for determining the nature of reliefs claimed by the applicant. The question of pecuniary jurisdiction and in given cases the question of payment of court-fee are intimately and inextricably connected with allegations in the plaint. It is often found that the real reliefs claimed as per body of the plaint are not reflected in the prayer clause. Therefore, the Courts, as a rule, determine the question of pecuniary jurisdiction and the payment of court-fee by reading the plaint as a whole instead of confining themselves to the prayer clauses. These principles are so well established that it is not necessary to cite any authority on the point. It would, however, proper to point out that in the case of S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S.Rm.Ar.Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245 , the proposition aforesaid was conceded so far as the court-fee is concerned. The suit in that case was governed by the provisions of Section 7 (iv) of Court-Fees Act. In view of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Court is to be determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 (iv) of Court Fees Act. However, no departure can be made from the principle aforesaid of reading the plaint as a whole even in those cases where the plaintiff seeks a relief requiring payment of fixed court-fee but puts his own value on the relief involved for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction. 3. The applicant claimed that sub-dealer of two companies since 1988 (i) Kinetic Honda Motor-Cycles authorising her to sell and service motor-cycles manufactured by the company (ii) She is also sub-dealer of mopeds and machines, manufactured by the Kinetic Engineering Ltd. It is sister concern of the forum. 3. The applicant claimed that sub-dealer of two companies since 1988 (i) Kinetic Honda Motor-Cycles authorising her to sell and service motor-cycles manufactured by the company (ii) She is also sub-dealer of mopeds and machines, manufactured by the Kinetic Engineering Ltd. It is sister concern of the forum. She was then authorised to sell and service Mopeds and Machines manufactured by the Kinetic Engineering Ltd. The applicant claimed that pursuant to the authorisation made by the two aforesaid companies, she opened a show-room for Kinetic Honda Motor-Cycles and Mopeds and Machines in the year 1988. It is stated in the plaint that the respondents No.2 and 4 are the authorised dealers of the aforesaid companies. Out of the aforesaid defendants only defendant No.2 has been arrayed as the non-applicant No.2. It is alleged in the plaint that the non-applicant No. 1 was claiming that it was authorised as a sub-dealer of the aforesaid companies. In this act it was aided by the non-applicant No.2. It is further alleged that, when the applicant came to know about the intention of the non-applicant, she wrote a letter to Kinetic Honda Company. By letter dated 16.9.1996, the aforesaid company confirmed the fear of the applicant that the non-applicant No.1 was not appointed a sub-dealer by the company. The non-applicant No.1 persisted in its illegal activities and, therefore, she was compelled to file the suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The applicant prayed in her plaint that she be declared the authorised sub-dealer of both the companies aforesaid and the non-applicant No. 1 is not authorised to run a show-room in the capacity of sub-dealer of the aforesaid companies. The second relief claimed was that the Court may pass a decree of permanent. injunction restraining the non-applicant No.1 from running the show-room established by it infront of her show-room and further restraining it from servicing the Honda Motor Cycles and Mopeds and Machines manufactured by the aforesaid two companies. A further prayer was for directing the defendants No.2 to 4, the authorised dealers to check the non-applicant No.1 from servicing aforesaid bicycles. The applicant stated in paragraph 5 of the plaint that the cause of action for the relief of declaration arose in the month of June 1996 when the non-applicant No.1 started its activities for establishing a show-room of two companies. The applicant stated in paragraph 5 of the plaint that the cause of action for the relief of declaration arose in the month of June 1996 when the non-applicant No.1 started its activities for establishing a show-room of two companies. The 'cause of action' for permanent injunction arose finally when the non-applicant No. 1 established the show-room. The applicant, accordingly, stated valuation of her suit for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction and court-fees as per paragraph 6 of the plaint. It shall be profitable to reproduce paragraph 6 of the plaint as follows :- "6. That for purpose of court fees and jurisdiction, the suit is valued at Rs. three lack for declaration being the cost of show-room and at Rs. 300/- for permanent injunction. The appropriate court-fees as required i by the Court Fees Act are being paid." 4. The learned counsel for the applicant argued that the relief of declaration was independent of the relief of injunction. The applicant was entitled to pay fixed fee of Rs. 30/- under Article 17 (iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. For the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction, the applicant has given Rs. three lacs as the value because it was the cost of the show-room. The relief of declaration was unrelated to the relief of permanent injunction, as it arose subsequent to the relief of declaration. The cause of action for relief of declaration arose in June 1996 and for permanent injunction arose in September, 1996. Both the causes of action were unrelated and independent. The relief for permanent injunction should be treated as an independent relief. The value of that relief was only worth Rs. 300/- to the applicant and accordingly, under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act 1870, Rs. 30/- were paid. The Court-below erred in holding that the relief of permanent injunction was a relief consequential to relief of declaration. Therefore, the impugned order demanding court-fees on Rs. three lacs be set aside. 5. The learned counsel for the non-applicants supported the impugned order saying that the relief of permanent injunction directly flowed from the relief of declaration and, therefore, the valuation put by the applicant for the purpose of jurisdiction could not be different from that for purpose of court fee. three lacs be set aside. 5. The learned counsel for the non-applicants supported the impugned order saying that the relief of permanent injunction directly flowed from the relief of declaration and, therefore, the valuation put by the applicant for the purpose of jurisdiction could not be different from that for purpose of court fee. The valuation put by the applicant should be accepted for the purpose of court fees as was done by the trial Court. The applicant was, therefore, bound to pay the court fee on that valuation of Rs. three lacs. 6. Section 8 of Suits Valuation Act prescribes that suits other than those mentioned in paragraphs 7 (v), (vi) (ix) and clause (d) of paragraph (x), where the court fees is payable ad valorem under the Court Fees Act, the value or relief mentioned in the plaint for the purpose of court fees shall be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, any suit falling within paragraph (iv) of Section 7 would be governed by Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act and valuation put by the plaintiff on the relief claimed by a plaintiff for the purpose of court-fee shall also govern the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, trying the suit. In cases falling within paragraph (iv) of Section 7, a plaintiff is entitled to put his own valuation. The Courts normally accept the valuation put by the plaintiff if it is not too low or high. The liberty of a plaintiff to value the relief is respected ordinarily, unless, he puts an arbitrary valuation which is wholly unrelated to relief claimed by the plaintiff. Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act gives a guideline for valuing a suit under Section 7 (iv) for the purpose of court fees and pecuniary jurisdiction and under Article 17, Schedule (II) for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction in respect of land or an interest in land. It says that in a suit involving a relief in respect of land or interest in land if the State Government has framed rules under Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act then valuation for aforesaid relief under Section 7 (iv) (c) for court fees and jurisdiction and under Article 17 of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act would not exceed the maximum payable under these rules. In the State of M.P. rules framed by Notification No. 1041, dated 28th September, 1911 as amended by the Notification No. 7777/303-V, dated 12th April. 1924 (see Laccho and another v. Keshavlal and another, 1976 MPU 484, at paragraph - 6), the Rule 2 (a) (1) of the aforesaid Rules was framed for determining the value of land for the purpose of jurisdiction in respect of suits mentioned in paragraph (v), (vi) and (x), clause (d) of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act. However, Jhese rules do not cover the land which is not agricultural and, therefore, not assessed to land revenue. In absence of any rule in respect of land, which is not liable to be assessed to land revenue, Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act would not be attracted as there are no rules framed under Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act. Therefore, in a suit claiming relief in respect of land or interest in land not liable to be assessed to land revenue, the value has to be put by plaintiff which should be actual value of the relief. It cannot be too high or too low. Normally, value of an immovable property is its market value. 7. The controversy between the learned counsel for the parties is narrow. The counsel for the applicant says that it is governed by Article 17 (iii) of Schedule II for relief of declaration and under Section 7 (iv) (d) for the relief of permanent injunction. The counsel for the non-applicants, on the other hand, says that the suit is governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) i.e. the relief of permanent injunction directly flows from the relief of declaration. However, in the opinion of this Court, the dispute relating to court fee and pecuniary jurisdiction cannot be solved in this manner. This Court is of the view that it cannot be said axiomatically that in cases governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act only a plaintiff is required to value the relief according to market value of immovable property. Even in cases falling under Section 7 (iv) (d) of the Act, it may be necessary to value the relief of permanent injunction in accordance with the market value of the property affected by the permanent injunction. Even in cases falling under Section 7 (iv) (d) of the Act, it may be necessary to value the relief of permanent injunction in accordance with the market value of the property affected by the permanent injunction. It may be noted that the words in the last two sub-paragraphs of paragraph 7 (iv) of the Court-fees Act are equally applicable to 7 (iv) (a), 7 (iv) (c), 7 (iv) (d) and 7 (iv) (f). The words are as follows :- "......... according to the amount of which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal (with a minimum fee of forty rupees). In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought." Therefore, be it a suit for declaration and consequent permanent injunction covered by Section 7 (iv) (c) or a suit for permanent injunction under Section 7 (iv) (d) the real mode of valuation is to value the relief sought. How does the plaintiff value the relief sought? In case of consequential permanent injunction or permanent injunction; the mode of valuation of that relief should not necessarily change. A plaintiff would not be entitled to value the relief of permanent injunction simplicitor less than the relief of declaration and consequential injunction in respect of same property, if the value of the relief to the plaintiff be the same. The correct test was laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Badrilal Bholaram v. State of M.P. and another, reported in 1963 JLJ 674 = 1963 MPLJ 717, at page 719, paragraph 7, as follows :- "7. While the plaintiff is at liberty to value the relief claimed in suits governed by the various clauses of sub-section (iv), including those for a declaration with the consequential relief of injunction, this Court has consistently held that he cannot be allowed to put on arbitrary value and that, if he does so and the Court considers that it is too low or unreasonable in what it bears no relation to the right litigated, it may require him to correct the valuation...." The Division Bench quoted Motiram v. Dauzat, ILR 1938 Nag. 558 as follows: "It is not, in our opinion, the value of the thing affected that settles the I value of the relief sought. 558 as follows: "It is not, in our opinion, the value of the thing affected that settles the I value of the relief sought. It is the value of the relief sought which has to be determined." . and stated further in paragraph 9 at page 720 : "9. ........ We agree that there are cases where there is a difference between the value of the thing affected by the action and the value of the relief sought in respect thereof. But we are of the view that, speaking generally, where the relief sought itself has a real money value which can be objectively ascertained, that value is the value of the relief and any other value ascribed to it is arbitrary and unreasonable............." It would be apparent that what has to be valued is the relief and not the thing affected. The general rule is if the relief sought has a real money value which can be objectively ascertained then the plaintiff can value the suit in accordance with that value. We have to apply the aforesaid principles to the case in hand. It is obvious that relief of declaration in favour of the applicant is directly and inextricably related with the relief of permanent injunction in this case. The applicant wants to claim that she is the sub-dealer of two companies and consequently, the non-applicant No. 1 is liable to be restrained to run the how-room established by him infront her show-room. The relief of permanent injunction flows from the relief of declaration. They are not unconnected in such manner that each could be called an independent relief. The Court disagrees with the learned counsel for the applicant that merely because the non-applicant No. 1 established a show-room in the month of September, 1986, the cause of action for permanent injunction stood postponed. The cause of action began to be operative the moment, the non-applicant No. 1 started his unauthorised dealership. The establishment of show-room was merely a manifestation of his activities. This Court, therefore, agrees with the trial Court as well as with the learned counsel for the non-applicant No.1 that the suit is governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act. However, this finding would not sustain as would be shown in the sequel, the ultimate result. The establishment of show-room was merely a manifestation of his activities. This Court, therefore, agrees with the trial Court as well as with the learned counsel for the non-applicant No.1 that the suit is governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act. However, this finding would not sustain as would be shown in the sequel, the ultimate result. Even if the applicant was required to put a valuation to relief of permanent injunction, it is the same relief she was required to value as in case under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act. Therefore, the real question to be asked in this case is if the value of the suit of the applicant for Rs. three lacs really determines the value of relief of declaration and permanent injunction. The question is if the relief clause (h) is capable of valuation in terms of money. In the opinion of this Court, it is not. It is difficult to understand how the applicant valued the suit at Rs. three lacs assuming it to be the suit claiming an independent declaration. The relief of declaration that the applicant is the authorised sub-dealer could not be valued at Rs. three lacs unless it was disclosed in the plaint that the value of sub-dealership was worth Rs. three lacs. It appears to this Court that sub-dealership is an intangible right. Its money value to the applicant would be the likelihood of the profits to be earned by the applicant and not by any other arbitrary mode. Similarly, the relief of permanent injunction would commensurate with the profits likely to be earned by the applicant if the non-applicant is allowed to run his show-room. Again the relief of permanent injunction is incapable of valuation. Since this Court has already held that the relief of permanent injunction in Section 7 (iv) (c) of Court-fees Act has to be looked into for determining the court-fees, this Court comes to the conclusion that the appellant was entitled to put his own value of Rs. 300/- on the relief of permanent injunction. The relief of declaration or the relief of injunction are in no way related to any land or interest in the land. The relief of permanent injunction is very general requiring the non-applicant No.1 not to run any show-room of two companies at Jabalpur. 300/- on the relief of permanent injunction. The relief of declaration or the relief of injunction are in no way related to any land or interest in the land. The relief of permanent injunction is very general requiring the non-applicant No.1 not to run any show-room of two companies at Jabalpur. It can be said that running of show-room by the non-applicant No.1 has cast a cloud on the title or right of the applicant to run the sub-dealership alone. It is the applicant, who can value the cloud. It appears that the applicant has artificially inflated her right to Rs. three lacs. In the opinion of this Court, the higher value of Rs. three lacs would be excessive and inflated. The lower value of Rs. 300/- claimed in respect of permanent injunction appears to be correct and the same should be accepted as the relief under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act, is incapable of valuation. In this connection, it would be profitable to recall the observation of a Division Bench case. Those remarks were made in respect of suit for declaration. They are equally applicable to the case of valuation in case of Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act, as would be clear from the guideline of Section 4 of Suits Valuation Act. In the case of Pundlik and others v. Ramsukhibai and others, reported in AIR 1951 Nagpur 218, Vivian Bose, C.J., speaking for the Division Bench stated as follows, at page 223, paragraph 42 :- "(42) We are left therefore with O. 7 R. 1, Civil P.C. and with S. 15. The former requires a plaintiff to state the value of the subject-matter of the suit for purpose of jurisdiction and S. 15 requires that the suit be instituted in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Therefore, what we have to determine is, what is the value of the subject-matter when there are no specific rules to determine the value artificially? ....." It was held in that case that :- ".......... All we can say is that the subject-matter of the suit here is a cloud. It is not the property, or is it the decree. The Financial Commissioner's order was not a competent order which the plaintiffs were bound to set aside because we have already held that the order was without jurisdiction. All we can say is that the subject-matter of the suit here is a cloud. It is not the property, or is it the decree. The Financial Commissioner's order was not a competent order which the plaintiffs were bound to set aside because we have already held that the order was without jurisdiction. Therefore it is only a cloud, and the only person who can value that cloud is the plaintiff, and provided his valuation is not outrageous one way or the other his valuation must, in our opinion, be accepted." In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the suit is governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act. The right of permanent injunction directly flows from the right of declaration. Therefore, the applicant could put his value for the relief of declaration and permanent injunction. Since the relief claimed is in respect of an intangible right, it is incapable of valuation. However, the applicant has valued the relief of permanent injunction at Rs. 300/-. This value should be accepted for the purpose of court fees and permanent injunction. The valuation of Rs. three lacs put by the applicant is totally arbitrary and exaggerated and, therefore, the applicant may be asked to delete the same. 8. As a result of aforesaid discussion, this revision succeeds and is allowed. The order demanding court fees on Rs. three lacs in hereby set aside. The case is remitted to the trial Court and it shall decide the suit further in accordance with law, subject to objection to its pecuniary jurisdiction suo motu or otherwise.