Judgment : Bhattacharya, J. : This first appeal is at the instance of a defendant in a suit for eviction and is directed against judgment and decree dated April 29, 1994 passed by the learned Judge, 9th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No. 487 of 1971. 2. The respondents herein filed the aforesaid suit for declaration that the firm "Chowdhury and Company" stood dissolved on and from 30th December, 1968 and for accounts and also for a decree for a sum of Rs. 1,800/- being arrears of six monthly profits. During the pendency of the aforesaid suit an amendment was made and by virtue of the said amendment the respondents prayed for declaration that the appellant was in permissive occupation as a licensee under Sukumar Dawn during his life time and after his death under the plaintiffs for 10 years from August 11, 1967 ending with August 11, 1977. By the said amendment the respondent further prayed for recovery of possession of the suit property after eviction of the appellant therefrom. The case made out by the respondent in the aforesaid suit was, inter alia, as follows : (a) Sukumar Dawn, the father of the respondents had been carrying on a business in "Oil-Mao Stores" in a shop-room being No. 48, Bertram Street, West Range, Sir Stuart Hogg Market within the Police Station, Taltola and he was a recorded occupier of the said shop-room having obtained a licence from Corporation of Calcutta. (b) Slump having set in the said business, sometime in the year 1967 he intended to take up a new business of suit cases, steel trunks, bandbags and travelling requisites as was carded on in the said market by the neighbouring shop-keepers. (c) With that end in view, the said Sukumar Dawn decided to take the appellant as a partner in his new business as the appellant had experience in such type of business. (d) Accordingly, on August 11, 1967 a Deed of Partnership was executed and registered by the said Sukumar Dawn and the appellant thereby embodying the terms of the proposed partnership. (e) According to the terms, after formal sanction for the change of business was obtained from Corporation of Calcutta, the said co-partnership business would be carried on under the name and style of "Chowdhury and Company" and would be jointly managed by both of them. (e) According to the terms, after formal sanction for the change of business was obtained from Corporation of Calcutta, the said co-partnership business would be carried on under the name and style of "Chowdhury and Company" and would be jointly managed by both of them. It was further stipulated that share of Sukumar Dawn in the business would be 87% and that of appellant would be 12 % but in lieu of his share of profiles, the said Sukumar Dawn would be entitled to receive a monthly sum of Rs. 300/- by way of fixed profits of the said partnership by the first week of every month and the appellant would be entitled to all the profits of the said business. It was further provided that after the expiry, of 10 years or on earlier dissolution of the said partnership, the appellant would not have any claim or interest in the said shop-room and the said Sukumar Dawn would be free to carry on business of his own choice. (f) On December 30, 1968 the said Sukumar Dawn died leaving the respondents as his legal heirs and representatives and as such on the death of said Sukumar Dawn, the said partnership business stood dissolved and the appellant had no right to carry on the said business in the said shop-room. (g) During the continuance of the partnership, Sukumar Dawn drew his share up to June 1968 and as such a sum of Rs. 1,800/- being fixed share of profits from July 1968 to December 1968 was payable by the appellant. 3. The appellant contested the aforesaid suit by filing written statement thereby denying material allegations made in the plaint and the defence of the appellant was inter alia as follows :- (a) The suit was bad for defect of parties. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation being the owner of the stall was a necessary party. (b) The appellant was in fact the owner of the business viz. "Chowdhury and Company" and the transaction between the appellant and Sukumar Dawn creating alleged partnership and delivering possession of the said stall to the appellant was void. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation being the owner of the stall was a necessary party. (b) The appellant was in fact the owner of the business viz. "Chowdhury and Company" and the transaction between the appellant and Sukumar Dawn creating alleged partnership and delivering possession of the said stall to the appellant was void. The said Sukumar Dawn being age-worn and having want of capital and assets in his business, decided to transfer the stall to the appellant against monetary consideration to be paid by the appellant and the appellant in his turn decided to carryon the business dealing in suit cases, hand bags and travelling requisites in the said stall upon investment of his own capital independent of the said Sukumar Dawn. (c) The respondents did not inherit any interest in respect of the stall from their predecessor who was a licensee thereof during his life time and the said licence being neither renewed nor heritable, the respondents were not entitled to evict the appellant. 4. In the said written statement the appellant further made a counter claim thereby praying for decree against the respondents for declaration that the appellant was the sole owner of the business of manufacturing and dealing in hand bags, travelling requisites etc. In the said stall and that the respondents bad no right in respect of the said business and prayed for permanent injunction restraining the respondents, their men and agents from interferring with the possession of the appellant in the said stall and claiming any interest therein. 5. It will not be out of place to mention here that prior to the institution of the instant suit, the appellant filed a suit being Title Suit No. 285 of 1970 in the City Civil Court at Calcutta against the respondents and also against Calcutta Municipal Corporation Authority thereby praying for declaration that the respondents had no right in the business carried on in the shop-room and for permanent injunction restraining the municipal authority from mutating the Dame of the respondents in place of Sukumar Dawn and also restraining the present respondents from taking possession of the business or the shop. 6. The aforesaid suit filed by the present appellant was ultimately dismissed by the learned Trial Judge by his judgment and decree dated December 23, 1978. 7. 6. The aforesaid suit filed by the present appellant was ultimately dismissed by the learned Trial Judge by his judgment and decree dated December 23, 1978. 7. Being dissatisfied with the said judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge the appellant herein preferred an appeal being F. A. No. 338 of 1979 before this Court which wall ultimately dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court on March 18, 1986 with the observation that the alleged partnership deed between Sukumar Dawn and the appellant was a void one in view of restriction of transfer of a stall as embodied in Section 449 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. 8. The suit filed by the respondents was ultimately decreed by the learned Trial Judge by the judgment and decree impugned in the instant appeal. It may be mentioned here that while decreting the aforesaid suit, the learned Trial Judge held that in view of the fact that the appellant's earlier suit had been dismissed and the said decision had been affirmed by this Court in first appeal, the said decision is res judicata in the instant suit and as such the defence of the appellant has no leg to stand and in the circumstances the appellant must be held to a trespasser in the suit property. Thus, the learned trial Judge by the judgment and decree impugned in the instant appeal passed a decree for recovery of possession of the shop-room in favour of the respondents. 9. Mr. De, the learned Advocate appearing in support of the instant first appeal has fairly conceded before us that in view of the earlier decision of this Court in the appeal arising out of the suit filed by the appellant the position of the appellant is no better than that of a trespasser. However, Mr. De contends that although the appellant is a trespasser in the eye of law, at the same time the respondents are not entitled to get any relief in the instant case filed by them. According to Mr. De, the hop-room being undisputedly owned by Calcutta Municipal Corporation, in absence of the said owner no decree for recovery of possession can be granted in favour of the respondents. Mr. According to Mr. De, the hop-room being undisputedly owned by Calcutta Municipal Corporation, in absence of the said owner no decree for recovery of possession can be granted in favour of the respondents. Mr. De further contends that a licence granted by Calcutta Municipal Corporation is not heritable and a. such on the death of Sukumar Dawn the respondents have inherited nothing in the suit property and therefore cannot maintain a suit for eviction of the appellant. The last contention of Mr. De is that the appellants having obtained possession of the suit property by virtue of a void document which was very much known to both the parties the respondent was not entitled to get possession from the appellant. 10. Mr. Dasgupta, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents on the other hand has opposed the contention of Mr. De and has submitted that in a suit for eviction of a licensee, the owner of the suit property is not at all necessary party as no relief has been claimed against the owner. Mr. Dasgupta further contends that from Ext. 3 (series) filed in the instant case it would appear that after the death of Sukumar Dawn the respondents have been recognised as licensee by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation by accepting rent from them. Mr. Dasgupta further contends that in the earlier suit the appellant having prayed for permanent injunction restraining Calcutta Municipal Corporation from mutating the names of the respondents as licensee but having failed, the said decision is binding not only against appellant but also against Calcutta Municipal Corporation. Therefore, according to Mr. Dasgupta, the appellant cannot argue that alter the death of Sukumar Dawn the respondents have no right to maintain a suit for eviction of the appellant whose status is no better than that of a trespasser. 11. In this connection it may be mentioned here that the learned Trial Judge although passed a decree for recovery of possession but the prayer for account against the appellant was refused and as such the respondents have preferred a cross-objection before this Court thereby claiming mesne profit and account from the appellant from the death of Sukumar Dawn till recovery of possession. 12. After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties and after going through the materials on record. In our opinion, the first contention raised by Mr. De has no force. 12. After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties and after going through the materials on record. In our opinion, the first contention raised by Mr. De has no force. In a suit for eviction of a licensee, the owner of the suit property is not at all a necessary party. It is now well settled that in view of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, a licensee cannot dispute the title of the licensor at the time of induction of the suit property. Mr. De wanted to argue that though under Sec. 116 of the Indian Evidence Act he is not entitled to dispute the title of Sukumar Dawn at the time of induction but he can very well dispute the derivative title of the respondent in the suit property by way of inheritance from Sukumar Dawn. In support of such contention Mr. De referred to a decision reported in (1) 1979 (1) RCJ page 580. There is no dispute with the proposition that the derivative title from the inductor can be challenged. Therefore, taking aid of the aforesaid decision Mr. De could very well argue that the respondents are not the heirs of Sukumar Dawn. But he is not disputing the said fact. Once a person has been inducted in a suit property and after such induction if the inductor dies, his heirs are entitled to file a suit for eviction of the licensee. Therefore, in our opinion, the aforesaid decision relied upon by Mr. De has got not application to the fact of the present case. It is now well settled that in a suit by an owner even against a trespasser, on the death of such trespasser his heirs are required to be substituted because the right to sue survives upon the heirs and as such it cannot be accepted that the heirs of the original inductor cannot maintain a suit for eviction of the licensee inducted by the original licensor. 13. The second contention raised by Mr. De is also, in our opinion, devoid of any merit. It is now well settled that in a suit for eviction a licensee or a tenant, the original owner of the property is not at all a necessary party. Mr. De relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in (2) Mrs. Qaiser Jahan v. Md. De is also, in our opinion, devoid of any merit. It is now well settled that in a suit for eviction a licensee or a tenant, the original owner of the property is not at all a necessary party. Mr. De relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in (2) Mrs. Qaiser Jahan v. Md. Yawoo reported in 1982(2) CLJ 143 , in support of his contention that owner of a land is a necessary party. In the aforesaid case as cited above an owner of a property tiled a suit for eviction of his tenant. 1he tenant took the plea that he was a thika tenant in respect of the suit property and after the promulgation of Calcutta Thika Tenancy Regulation and Acquisition Act, 1981 he had become direct tenant under the State of West Bengal. In such a case, a plea was taken that the State of West Bengalis a necessary party. Under the said circumstances a Division Bench of this Court held that the right of the owner in the thika tenanted land having been vested in State of West Bengal and the defendants having claimed direct tenancy under State of West Bengal in accordance with the provision of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1981, the State of West Bengal was a necessary party. In our opinion, the said decision cannot have any application to the fact of the present case. In this case as indicated above Mr. De has admitted that the status of his client is no better than that of a trespasser in view of the earlier Division Bench decision between the same parties. 14. Thus, in our opinion, even if a person has been inducted by one who is not owner of the property, in a suit for eviction on revocation of licence, the original owner is not at all necessary party. In this connection reference may be made to the following decisions as relied upon by Mr. Dasgupta appearing on behalf of the respondents viz. (3) Bagal Tanti & Ors. v. Ram Ranjan Saha & Ors., AIR 1976 Calcutta page 13 ; (4) Santilal Jain v Avtar Sing, AIR 1985 SC 857 . 15. Therefore, in our opinion, in the instant case Calcutta Municipal Corporation is not at all a necessary party. Dasgupta appearing on behalf of the respondents viz. (3) Bagal Tanti & Ors. v. Ram Ranjan Saha & Ors., AIR 1976 Calcutta page 13 ; (4) Santilal Jain v Avtar Sing, AIR 1985 SC 857 . 15. Therefore, in our opinion, in the instant case Calcutta Municipal Corporation is not at all a necessary party. In this connection it may be mentioned here that although, In our opinion, Calcutta Municipal Corporation is not at all necessary party in the instant suit, it may be pointed out that it has been conclusively proved by Ext. 3 (series) that the Calcutta Municipal Corporation has accepted the respondents as licensee after the death of Sukumar Dawn in terms of Section 449 read with Rule 60 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. Thus, there is no merit in the submission of Mr. De that after the death of Sukumar Dawn the respondent has not inherited any interest in the suit property. 16. As regards the third contention raised by Mr. De it may be mentioned here that in the year 1967, the deed of partnership was executed by Sukumar Dawn and the appellant. Subsequently this Court in the first appeal arising out of the suit filed by the appellant held that the said partnership is void being hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act. Thus, in our opinion, in view of the Section 65 of the Contract Act, the respondents are entitled to get back possession of the suit shop where the appellant was inducted by virtue of a contract which has been subsequently held to be void. The decision of the Apex Court in (5) Kuju Collieries Ltd. v. Jharkhand Mines Ltd & Ors. reported in AIR 1974 SC 1892 as cited by Mr. De, in our opinion, has got no application to the fact of the present case. In the aforesaid case, a mining lease was executed by the respondent in favour of the predecessor-in-Interest of the appellants on receiving a sum of Rs. 80,000/-. The said lease being contrary to Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 was found to be void ab initio. Having failed to obtain possession pursuant to the said lease, the plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for recovery of possession in terms of the lease deed and in the alternative for recovery of Rs. 80,000/- paid by appellant. 80,000/-. The said lease being contrary to Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 was found to be void ab initio. Having failed to obtain possession pursuant to the said lease, the plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for recovery of possession in terms of the lease deed and in the alternative for recovery of Rs. 80,000/- paid by appellant. The Courts below held that the plaintiff was already in the business of mining and bad the advantages of consulting its Lawyers and Solicitors. So there was no occasion for the plaintiff to have been under any kind of ignorance of law. In such a fact the Apex Court held as follows ;- "But where even at the time when the agreement is entered into both the parties knew that if was not lawful and therefore, void, there was no contract but only an agreement and it is not a case where it is discovered to be void subsequently. Nor is it a case of the contract becoming void due to subsequent happenings. Therefore, Section 65 of the Contract Act did not apply." 17. In the instant case, the agreement was given effect to and the predecessor of the respondents got his dues in terms of the agreement upto June 1968. Subsequently a Division Bench of this Court in F.A. No. 338 of 1979 declared the said agreement as void as a result of which the respondents herein prayed for necessary amendment of plaint as stated earlier. Thus the decision in Kuju Collieries case (supra) is of no assistance to the appellants. In this connection reference may be made to a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in (6) The Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Raajmala Saheb Chowhanji reported in AIR 1978 SC 1147 wherein the Supreme Court held that in a case where the predecessor company of L.I.C. had entered into a void contract, the corporation was legally bound to return the benefit received under such Contract to the party from whom such benefit was received under Section 65 of the Contract Act. The question as to whether or not the transaction was ultra vires the statute of the predecessor company was wholly irrelevant because that was the reason why the contract was void and not a ground for exempting the corporation from its liability to pay. In (7) D. L. F. United Pvt. Ltd. v. Pt. The question as to whether or not the transaction was ultra vires the statute of the predecessor company was wholly irrelevant because that was the reason why the contract was void and not a ground for exempting the corporation from its liability to pay. In (7) D. L. F. United Pvt. Ltd. v. Pt. Prem Raj & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 805 the Apex Court reiterated the proposition that mutual advantages gained have to be restituted on a contract being or becoming void. 18. Thus, all the points raised by Mr. De having failed, we dismissed the appeal. We affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge and dismiss the instant appeal. 19. As regards cross-objection filed by the respondents, in our opinion, the same should succeed. The learned Trial Judge having found that the position of the appellant was that of a trespasser, and in view of the admitted fact that the appellant is in wrongful possession suit property as a trespasser. in our opinion, this is a fit case where the respondents are entitled to get a decree for mesne profit in terms of Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure it may be mentioned here that during the pendency of the suit, the appellant was appointed as Receiver over the business carried on in the suit property. After the dismissal of the suit when this appeal was filed, this Court passed an order permitting the appellant to continue as Receiver in terms of the order of appointment earlier made in the suit. Thus, the appellant is at present in occupation of the business on the suit property as a Receiver. As per order earlier passed, the appellant had deposited a sum of Rs. 20,000/-. Since the property is in possession of the appellant as a Receiver and we have found that the appellant has got no right to remain in possession. we direct the appellant to hand over possession of the suit property in favour of the respondent within three months from date. It may be mentioned here that as per agreement between the parties, which has been declared to be void by this Court, except the furniture mentioned in the body of the agreement, all the stock-in-trade belongs to appellant and as such he is entitled to remove the stock in-trade of the business. It may be mentioned here that as per agreement between the parties, which has been declared to be void by this Court, except the furniture mentioned in the body of the agreement, all the stock-in-trade belongs to appellant and as such he is entitled to remove the stock in-trade of the business. However, we make it clear that although we are directing the appellant to hand over possession of the suit property to the respondents, we are not discharging him unless account is furnished in the Court below which gave him formal appointment. The learned Trial Judge therefore is directed to proceed with the investigation under Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure for ascertaining the mesne profit from the date of death of Sukumar Dawn till the date of a1sumptlon of charge by the appellant as Receiver. The learned Trial Court will also permit the respondents to withdraw the amount of profit that has accrued while the business was under the management of the Receiver. While taking account from the Receiver, the amount of Rs. 20,000/- deposited by the Receiver as per order of this Court should be adjusted. 20. With the aforesaid observation the appeal is dismissed and the cross-objection filed by the respondent is allowed. There will be however no order as to costs. Meena, J. : I agree.