JUDGMENT 1. This second appeal by one of the three defendants (No.1) filed under Section 100 of the CPC is directed against the Judgment & decree dated 31.1.85, passed by 1st Addl. District Judge Mandsaur, in Civil Appeal No. 62-A/83, in affirmance of the judgment & decree dated 23.9.83, passed by 1st Addl. Civil Judge, Class-II Mandsaur, in Civil Original suit No. 596-A/80, decreeing suit of plaintiffs-respondents (No.1 to 4) for ejectment of the defendants from a non-residential accommodation on the ground as specified under clause (t) of Section 12(1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act (for short 'the Act'). 2. Admission of this appeal has been procured on following substantial questions of law :- (1) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Court below has erred in holding that suit for eviction was maintainable in face or the agreement Ex.D-2 ? (2) Whether the document Ex.D-2 requires registration? (3) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the suit was liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of the wife of Gaurishankar ? (4) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Court below has erred in holding that the defendant was not entitled to proportionate deduction in rent when the plaintiff had installed a Gumti on a part of the leased premises? (5) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Court below has erred in holding that, a case for eviction on the grounds specified in Sec. 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 was made out even though the plaintiff Kamal Kishore was not examined? 3. I have heard Shri G.M. Chafekar, learned senior counsel appearing with Shri S.S. Samvatsar for the appellant and Shri V.K. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 to 4. None has, however, appeared for respondents No.5 & 6, who were co-defendants No.2 & 3 in the trial Court. 4. Questions No.1 & 2 are inter-related and the only point pressed before me is that the tenancy in question was for indefinite period and as such for life time of the appellant-tenant and so long he continued to pay rent regularly no action for his eviction was maintainable in law. 4. Questions No.1 & 2 are inter-related and the only point pressed before me is that the tenancy in question was for indefinite period and as such for life time of the appellant-tenant and so long he continued to pay rent regularly no action for his eviction was maintainable in law. Reliance in this behalf is placed on three decisions, namely : (i) Bavasahed (AIR 1954 Bombay 257), (ii) Chapsibhai (AIR 1964 Bombay 287) & (iii) VP. Sinha (AIR 1971 Allahabad 297). As against it, Shri Jain, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 would apply notwithstanding any contract and an action fix eviction on the grounds specified under Section 12(1) of the Act is maintainable even during subsistence of contractual tenancy. Reliance has been placed on a Supreme Court decision in Shi Laxmi (1994)2 SCC 671 . 5. Having considered rival contentions of the learned counsel as also decisions cited by them 1 am convinced that the questions are liable to be answered against the appellant. 6. There is no dispute as to the execution of the receipt Ex.D/2 which, amongst other things, recites ^^nsrs fdjk;s nqdku buls [kkyh fdlh Hkh n"kk esa ugha djkmaxk vkSj u fdjk;k gh c<+kmaxkA** It was thus argued that the landlord while letting out the suit accommodation clearly agreed not to get the suit accommodation vacated from the appellant so long as the later continues to pay the rent. However, in the instant case provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act are applicable and Section 12 of the Act provides that notwithstanding any thing to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds specified in that Section. In Shri Laxmi (supra) the Apex Court in the context of similar provision of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 held that the Rent Control Act would apply notwithstanding .any contract and so even during subsistence of contractual tenancy, it is open to landlord to resort to the proceedings under the Rent Act. In Shri Laxmi (supra) the Apex Court in the context of similar provision of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 held that the Rent Control Act would apply notwithstanding .any contract and so even during subsistence of contractual tenancy, it is open to landlord to resort to the proceedings under the Rent Act. In para 14 of the judgment their Lordships observed: "It is not correct to hold that the Rent Control Act is a beneficial enactment only to the tenant" It was, thus, held that it is beneficial enactment not for tenants alone, but for landlords as well. 7. It must be and is accordingly held that notwithstanding the contract (Ex.D/2) the suit by the plaintiffs-respondents for eviction under the provisions of the M.P. Act of 1961 was maintainable. 8. Question No.3 relates to non-joinder of necessary party to the suit and it was averred that first wife on late Gaurishankar, the original landlord is alive and that she is a necessary party to the suit. However, the Court below in para 17 of its judgment has held as a fact that the said first wife of late Gaurishankar was not seen or heard alive by the persons concerned for last 30 years preceding the tiling of the suit. The Court thus presumed and rightly that she is not alive. Even otherwise the suit by other heirs of the deceased Gaurishankar was maintainable. It is well settled that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any other owner and so the absence of other co-owners will not dis-entitle a co-owner from maintaining an action for eviction when the other co-owners do not object to the same. (See AIR 1976 SC 2335 and AIR 1977 SC 1599 ). Full Bench of this Court in Harbansh ( 1990 JLJ 97 ) has also taken the same view. I, therefore, find myself in full agreement with the appellate Court below that the said first wife of late Gaurishankar was not a necessary party to the suit and the suit by other heirs of late Gaurishankar was maintainable. 9. Coming to Question No.4, it is not disputed that the respondents plaintiffs have put in a Gumti on a part of the leased premises. 9. Coming to Question No.4, it is not disputed that the respondents plaintiffs have put in a Gumti on a part of the leased premises. However, the Court below has held as a fact that the Gumti was put by the plaintiffs with the consent of the appellant/defendant and that there was no agreement for reducing the rent. Under the circumstances the Court below was justified in holding that the defendant was not entitled to proportionate reduction in rent. 10. Question No. 5 relates to the bona fide requirement of the plaintiffs-respondents. The eviction was sought for the need of plaintiffs-respondents No.3 & 4 namely Radheshyam & Kamalkishore. It is true that Kamalkishore was not examined in evidence. However, plaintiffs-respondents No.1 Ramkunwarbai, No. 2 Gopal and No. 3 Radheshyam appeared in the witness-box to depose of the said need. Both the Courts below, on appreciation of the evidence led by the plaintiffs as also the evidence adduced by the defendant, have concurrently held that the need of the plaintiffs was genuine and that they were not possessed of any other accommodation of their own in the town suitable for that purpose. In the instant case, it is obvious that the issues whether the respondents required the shop in dispute for the purpose of starting business of respondents No. 3 & 4 and whether they are not possessed of any alternative suitable accommodation of their own, are essentially issues of fact. Their determinations did not involve any question of law. It must, therefore, be held that the findings by the Courts below on those issues are findings of fact not open to interference in second appeal. Merely because one of the plaintiffs Kamalkishore was not examined in evidence the evidence of other plaintiffs cannot be brushed aside and the findings of fact arrived at concurrently by the two Courts below cannot be termed as perverse. I, therefore, answer this question No.5 also against the appellant. 11. This appeal, thus jails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee as per schedule, if certified.