Honble SHETHNA J.–These 14 appeals have been filed by the Union of India against the judgment dated May 20, 1994 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, disposing of 14 appeals under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 against the awards of the learned Civil Judge, Sri Ganganagar passed during the years 1990-1991 enhancing the amounts of compensation, interest and solatium. Since the facts and law involved in all these special appeals are similar, we propose to dispose of all these appeals by a common judgment. (2). The facts relevant for the disposal of these appeals are not disputed. In the year 1977, about 2000 bighas of agricultural land was acquired by the Union of India for the purpose of defence. Notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Rajas- than Land Acquisition Act (in short, the Rajasthan Act) were issued. Possession of the land was taken on May 27,1977. The Land Acquisition Officer, Hanumangarh gave awards on March 27/29, 1979. References under Section 18 of the Rajasthan Act were made at the instance of the claimants in the year 1979. However, in the case of Sulochana, reference was made after about a year and appeal no. 26/91 Union of India Vs. Sulochana was filed against the award. In the case of Jagroop and Gorjya, references were made after about 4 years and against the awards, the Union of India filed appeals No. 81/91 Union of India Vs. Jagroop and Appeal No. 23/91 Union of India Vs. Gorjya. Replies were filed by the Union of India. The claimants produced oral and documentary evidence. Neither, the Union of India nor the State of Rajasthan produced any evidence in the Court. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned Civil Judge, Sri Ganganagar enhanced the amounts of compensation besides awarding interest @ 15 % per annum and solatium @ 30% under Section 23(2) of the Act. He also awarded amounts @ 12 % under Section 23(1A) of the Act as amended by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act 68 of 1984). (3). The Union of India filed 14 appeals against the awards given by the learned Civil Judge, Sri Ganganagar, The appeals were heard by a learned Single Judge of this Court and dismissed vide judgment dated 20th May, 1994. (3). The Union of India filed 14 appeals against the awards given by the learned Civil Judge, Sri Ganganagar, The appeals were heard by a learned Single Judge of this Court and dismissed vide judgment dated 20th May, 1994. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment dated 20th May 1994 passed by the learned Single Judge, the Union of India has filed these 14 D.B. Special Appeals under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. (4). The first contention of the learned counsel for the Union of India is that in the cases giving rise to appeals no.26/91 Union of India vs. Sulochana, No.81/91 Union of India Vs. Jagroop & ors. and no.23/91 Union of India Vs. Gorjya, decided by the learned Single Judge, references were made by the claimants after 1/4 years of the awards given by the Land Acquisition Officer, and, therefore, the references were not maintainable and the learned Civil Judge, Sri Ganganagar had no jurisdiction to entertain the references and the learned Single Judge has committed an error by dismissing the appeals filed by the Union of India. (5). A perusal of the judgment of the learned Single judge shows that in the case of Sulochana, reference was in fact made on April 16,1980 and it was referred to the Land Acquisition Officer, Hanumangarh in May, 1983. The learned Single Judge also noticed that in all the three cases, namely of Sulochana, Jagroop and Gorjya references were made beyond the period of six months from the date of awards given by the Land Acquisition Officer. The learned Single Judge observed that the Land Acquisition Officer had not issued any notice to the claimants under Section 12(2) of the Rajasthan Act and the claimants were also not present before the Land Acquisition Officer on the dates the awards were given by him. It was further observed by the learned Single Judge that in his statements to the Court sent under Section 19 of the Rajasthan Act in all the three cases mentioned above, particulars of the notices served upon the parties, dates on which copies of the awards were delivered and dates on which statements regarding awards were served upon the interested persons were not given. Section 18(2) of the Rajasthan Act required that the application for the reference could be made within six weeks of receipt of the notice of the Collector or within six months from the date of the Collectors award whichever period earlier expired. The expression ``six months from the date of the Collectors award were interpreted in Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer (1). The decision given in Harish Chandras case (supra) was considered by the Honble Apex Court in State of Punjab vs. Mst. Quisar Jehan Begum (2). The Honble Supreme Court observed :- ``That a literal and mechanical construction of the words ``six months from the date of the collectors award occurring in the second part of clause `b of the proviso would not be appropriate and `the knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the expression ... used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. Their Lordships further observed :- ``It seems clear to us that the retio of the decision in Harish Chandras case, 1962-1 SCR 676 : ( AIR 1961 SC 1500 ) (supra) is that the party af- fected by the award must known it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. (6). Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. (6). The learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the fact that the Land Acquisition Officer had not given any notice under Section 12 (2) of the Rajasthan Act to the claimants nor the claimants were present on the dates on which the award was given by the Land Acquisition Officer and in the statements sent to the Court under Section 19 of the Rajasthan Act, particulars of the notices were on the parties, the dates on which copies of the awards were delivered and dates on which statements regarding awards were served on the interested persons had not been given and that in the case of Jagroop and Gorjya, affidavits filed in support of the applications for condonation of delay were unrebutted and unchallenged and in the case of Sulochana, the application for reference was containing the date 20th April, 1979 and the first and last order sheet dated April 16, 1980 of the file of the Land Acquisition Officer, Hanumangarh, mentioned that the reference be sent to the District and Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar, held that the references in the three cases mentioned above were rightly entertained by the lear- ned Civil Judge. (7). We have carefully considered the reasons given by the learned Single Judge and we find ourselves in agreement with the conclusion that the references made in the case of the Sulochana, Jagroop and Gorjya were not barred by limitation and the learned Civil Judge was justified in entertaining them. (8). The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the learned Civil Judge committed an error by enhancing the rate of compensation from Rs. 8,000/- per bigha to Rs.9,000/- per bigha and the order of the learned Civil Judge, Sri Ganganagar as well as the decision of the learned Single Judge are contrary to law. In the awards, the learned Civil Judge observed that the land of Nathu Ram situated in the same area was also acquired under the same notification and same award (dated March 29, 1979) was given by the Land Acquisition Officer, Hanumangarh. Appeals no. In the awards, the learned Civil Judge observed that the land of Nathu Ram situated in the same area was also acquired under the same notification and same award (dated March 29, 1979) was given by the Land Acquisition Officer, Hanumangarh. Appeals no. 82/82, and 85/82 were filed by the claimants against the award of civil court and by judgments dated November 11, 1983 and November 21, 1983, this Court enhanced the rate of valuation of the land from Rs. 8,000/- to Rs. 9,000/- per bigha. The learned Single Judge has given cogent and satisfactory reasons for taking the view that enhancement of compensation from Rs.8,000/- to Rs.9,000/- per bigha by the learned Civil Judge was justified in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and two decisions of this Court. In these special appeals, we do not find any justification to interfere with the findings of the learned Single Judge. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is rejected. (9). The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 as amended by central Act No. 68 of 1894 were not applicable in these cases as the awards were given by the Land Acquisition Officer, Hanumangarh before April 30, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill in the House of People) and as such solatium @ 30% and interest @ 15% could not be granted by the learned Civil Judge. This contention was also raised before the learned Single Judge, but it was rejected by the learned Single Judge, in view of the decision given by the Honble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Filip Tyago De Gama (3) and the provisions contained in Section 56 of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, which came into force with effect from January 3, 1987. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the scope of Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act has been considered by a Constitution Bench in K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala (4) and in view of the ratio of the decision given by the majority, the learned Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to grant solatium @ 30% and interest @ 15%. (10). (10). The learned counsels for the respondents has submitted that the view taken by the learned Single Judge, cannot be said to be unreasonable or perverse in view of the reasons given in the judgment and in any case the view taken by the learned Single Judge was in accordance with the decision of the Honble Supreme Court given in Union of India vs. Filip Tiago De Gama (supra) and this Court would not be justified in setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge in these special appeals. (11). On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents have submitted that the provisions of sub-section (1A) of Section 23, sub-section (2) of Sec- tion 23 and Section 28 as amended by Central Act No. 68 of 1984, apply to the 14 cases from which these 14 special appeals have arisen and that the awards given by the learned Civil Judge, Sri Ganganagar and the judgment of the learned Single Judge dismissing the appeals filed by the Union of India, are legally right and these 14 special appeals have no merit, therefore, they deserve to be dismissed. (12). In view of the submissions made on behalf of the parties, following questions arise for determination :- (1) Whether the provisions of Section 23(1A), sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment)Act, 1984 (Act No. 68 of 1984) are applicable to cases in which the award was given by the Land Acquisition Officer before 30th April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition(Amendment)Bill 1982 in the House of the People), but the reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was disposed of by the Civil Court after 24th September, 84 (the date on which the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act no. 68 of 1984) came into force ? (2) Whether the provisions of Section 56 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as inserted by the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 (Rajasthan Act no. 68 of 1984) came into force ? (2) Whether the provisions of Section 56 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as inserted by the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 (Rajasthan Act no. 8 of 1987), which is deemed to have come in force on 3rd January, 87, apply to the cases in which the award was given by the Land Acquisition Officer before 30th April, 82, but the reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was disposed of by the civil court after 24th September, 84 and possession of land had been taken before 30th April, 82 ? (3) Whether the awards given by the Civil Court and the judgment given by the learned Single Judge in 14 appeals, deserve to be quashed and set aside and the 14 special appeals filed by the Union of India deserve to be allowed ? QUESTION NO. 1 : (13). The Land Acquisition(Amendment) Act 1984 (Act no.68 of 1984), made some important amendments in the provisions contained in Sections 23 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. For the purpose of disposing of these 14 appeals the relevant changes brought about by the Act No. 68 of 1984 are as given below :- (1) Sub-section (1A) was added below sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Principal Act. Sub-section (1A) reads:- ``In addition to the market-value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum on such market-value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Explanation-In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court shall be excluded. (2) In sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Principal Act the words ``fifteen per centum were substituted by the words ``thirty per centum were substituted by the words ``thirty per centum. Sub-section (2) of Section 23 after amendment made by Act no. (2) In sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Principal Act the words ``fifteen per centum were substituted by the words ``thirty per centum were substituted by the words ``thirty per centum. Sub-section (2) of Section 23 after amendment made by Act no. 68 of 1984 reads:- ``In addition to the market-value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market-value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. (3) In Section 28 of the Principal Act, the words ``six per centum were substituted by the words ``nine per centum and a proviso was also added. Section 28 after amedment made by Act 68 of 1984 reads:- 28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation. If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation as in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court : Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry. (4) Section 28 A was inserted by Act No. 68 of 1984. Section 28 A reads :- ``28-A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the court. (4) Section 28 A was inserted by Act No. 68 of 1984. Section 28 A reads :- ``28-A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the court. -(1) Where in an award under this part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court : Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation to the applicants. (3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2), may be written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Section 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18. Act No. 68 of 1984 also contained Section 30, which reads:- ``30. Transitional provisions. Act No. 68 of 1984 also contained Section 30, which reads:- ``30. Transitional provisions. -(1) The provisions of sub- section (1A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, - (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the princi- pal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982, (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amedment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People), in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date ; (b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the princi- pal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act. (2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act. (3) The provisions of Sections 34 of the principal Act, as amended by Section 20 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied,also to, and in relation to,- (a) every case in which possession of any land acquired under the principal Act had been taken before the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People), and the amount of compensation for such acquisition had not been paid or deposited under Section 31 of the principal Act until such date, with effect on and from that date; and (b) every case in which such possession has been taken on or after that date but before the commencement of this Act without the amount of compensation having been paid or deposited under the said Section 31, with effect on and from the date of taking such possession. (14). I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both the parties and tried to go through the decisions given by the Honble Supreme Court. (15). In K.Kamlajammanniavaru vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (5), the Honble Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by the Central Act No. 68 of 1984, were applicable to awards given by the Collector or the Special Judge, between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September, 1984 and to the appeals arising from such awards. (16). Their Lordships considered the provisions of Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act (Act No.68 of 1984). Their Lordships observed :- ``We are unable to agree with Shri Bhats submission. It is worthwhile remembering at this juncture that awards made by the Collector under Section 11 and by the Court on described as awards in the Land Acquisition Act, while further appeals are provided to the High Court and the Supreme Court. The new section 23(2), of course, necessarily applied to awards made by the Collector or Court after the commencement of the Act, that is, after September 9,1984 which was the date on which the Act received the assent of the President. The Bill which ultimately became the Amendment Act was introduced into Parliament on April 30, 1982. Parliament obviously desired to give effect to the amended Section 23(2) from the date of introduction of the Bill. The Bill which ultimately became the Amendment Act was introduced into Parliament on April 30, 1982. Parliament obviously desired to give effect to the amended Section 23(2) from the date of introduction of the Bill. So the amended provision was expressly made applicable by Section 30(2) to awards made by the Collector or Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 also. A natural corollary was that the new provisions should apply to orders made by the High Court or by the Supreme Court in appeals against such awards, that is, awards made between April 30 1982 and September 24,1984. Parliament did not intend and could not have intended that whatever be the date of the award, however ancient it may be, solatium would stand enhanced to `thirty per centum if an appeal happened by chance of accident to be pending on April 30, 1982. Surely it was not the intention of Parliament to reward those who kept alive the litigation even after several years. If it was the intention of Parliament to make the amended Section 23(2) applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation wherever they be pending, the words ``30th day of April 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 in the House of the People and before the commen- cement of this Act in Section 30(2) would become meaningless. It is clear that Parliament wanted the amended Section 23(2) to have very limited retrospectivity. It made the provisions applicable to awards made after April 30, 1982 and before September 24, 1984 also and further to appeals to the High Court (sic and) the Supreme Court arising from such awards. In this view we see no force in the submission of Shri Bhat. All the appeals are dismissed. (17). The ratio of the decision given by the Honble Supreme Court in the above mentioned case was to the effect that the provisions of Section 23(2) as amended by the Amending Act of 1984 were applicable to awards given by the Land Acquisi- tion Officer and the Civil Court, during the period between 30th April, 1984 and 24th September, 1984 and to the appeals arising from such awards, but the said provisions were not applicable to cases where awards were given by the Land Acquisition Officer and the Civil Court before 30th April, 1984. (18). (18). The decision given by the Honble Supreme Court in K. Kamalajamman- varu vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra) was considered by a three Judges bench of the Honble Supreme Court in Bhag Singh & Ors vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh (6). The facts of the case were that the notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on October 19, 1974 in respect of more than 10,000 bighas of land, which was likely to be needed for the purpose of a cantonment. The Land Acquisition Collector, thereafter, issued a notice u/s 9 of the Act and required persons interested to submit there claims for compensation for acquisition of their interest in the land. The claims submitted by various claimants (including the appellants) were considered by the Land Acquisition Collector and award was made on October 9, 1975. Claimants being aggrieved by the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector, sought references u/s 18 of the Act. The Additional District Judge, Bhatinda heard the references and in respect of some land enhanced the rates of compensation. The claimants were still dis- satisfied with the award made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and they preferred appeals to the High Court. On an appeal, the learned Single Judge of the High Court enhan- ced the amount of compensation by awarding the rate of Rs. 72,600 per acre for the first belt and Rs.25,000 per acre for the second belt and in addition, directed that the claimants shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum and solatium at the rate of 15% on the enhanced amount of compensation. The order awarding enhanced compensation was however made subject to the claims put forward in the memoranda of appeal preferred by the claimants and the Court fee paid on such claims. The appellants did not pay the requisite Court fee on the enhanced amount of compensation and therefore, they could not get the benefit of the order of the learned Single Judge. They accordingly preferred a Letters Patent Appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court and the other claimants also being dissatisfied with the order made by the learned Single Judge preferred Letters Patent Appeals to the Division Bench. They accordingly preferred a Letters Patent Appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court and the other claimants also being dissatisfied with the order made by the learned Single Judge preferred Letters Patent Appeals to the Division Bench. The Division Bench of the High Court, by an order dated December 8, 1982 affirmed the Judgment of the learned Single Judge in regard to the rate of compensation for the land situate in first belt but so far as the land situate in the second belt was concerned, it enhanced the rate or compen- sation to Rs.38,720 per acre. The Division Bench however restricted the benefit of the enhanced compensation only to those claimants who had made payment of proper court fee. The result was that the letters patent appeal of the appellants was dismissed, though according to the view taken by the Division Bench the appellants were entitled to the enhanced amount of compensation for acquisition of their land. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the appellants preferred special appeal before the Honble Supreme Court. (19). Regarding the denial of compensation on account of non payment of deficit Court fee, the Honble Supreme Court held that the Division Bench as well as the learned Single Judge should have allowed the appellants to pay up the deficit Court fee and compensation at the higher rate or rates determined by them. (20). Regarding the payment of solatium awarded to the appellants, the appellants contended before the Honble Supreme Court that in view of Section 30(2) of the Act No. 68 of 1984, they were entitled to solatium @ 30% per annum of the compensation ultimately awarded to them instead of 15% per annum awarded by the Division Bench as also interest at the rate of 9% instead of 6% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation. The Honble Supreme Court considered it necessary to adjudicate upon the validity of the contention raised by the appellants and considered the provisions of Section 23 (2) before the amendment as well as after the amendment brought about by the Central Act No. 68 of 1984, in view of the provisions of Section 30(2) of Act No. 68 of 1984. The question arising for determination before the Honble Supreme Court was as to what is the extent to which retrospective effect is given by the provision enacting in Section 30(2). The question arising for determination before the Honble Supreme Court was as to what is the extent to which retrospective effect is given by the provision enacting in Section 30(2). Does it make the amended provisions in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 appli- cable only to cases where an award is made by the Collector or Court after 30th April, 1982 but the proceedings by way of appeal were pending in the High Court or the Supreme Court on April 30, 1982 and were disposed of subsequent to that date. The decisions given in K. Kamalajammanniavaru vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra) and State of Punjab vs. Mohinder Singh (7) were considered by their Lordships and in view of the fact that in the latter decision given in the case of Mohinder Singhs case (supra), there was no discussion of the provision enacted in Section 30(2) (Act No. 68 of 1984), nor the decision given in K. Kamalajammanniavarus case (supra) was considered, their Lordships considered the question as to what would be the position if Section 30(2) (of Act No. 68 of 1984) were not en- acted and the amendments in Section 23(2) and Section 23 were effective only from the date on which they were made, namely September 24, 1984 when the amending Act received the assent of the President and was brought in to force. (21). Their Lordships observed that if at the date of commencement of the Amending Act, any proceedings for determination were pending before the Collec- tor u/S. 11 of the Act or before the Court u/S. 18 of the Act, the amending Section 23(2) and Section 28 would be applicable to such proceedings. Their Lordships observed :- ``If at the date of the commencement of the Amending Act, any proceedings for determination of compensation were pendig before the Collector under Section 11 of the Act or before the Court on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would admittedly be applicable to such proceedings. This much indeed was conceded by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents and even in Kamala jammanniavarus case it was accepted to be the correct position. Chnnappa Reddy. J. speaking on behalf of the Court in Kamalajammanniavaru case observed (SCCp.584). This much indeed was conceded by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents and even in Kamala jammanniavarus case it was accepted to be the correct position. Chnnappa Reddy. J. speaking on behalf of the Court in Kamalajammanniavaru case observed (SCCp.584). ``The new Section 23(2), of course, necessarily applied to awards made by the Collector or Court after the commencement of the Amending Act. But if an award were made by the Court on a reference under Section 18 prior to the commencement of the Amending Act. But if an award were made by the Court on a reference under Section 18 prior to the commencement of the Amending Act and an appeal against such award were pending before the High Court under Section 54 at the date of commencement of the Amending Act, which provisions would the High Court have to apply in deciding the appeal and determining the amount of compensation: the amended provisions in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 or the unamended provisions. The answer can only be that the High Court would have to apply the provisions in the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28. The appeal against the award would be a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18 and when the High Court hears the appeal, it would in effect and substance be hearing the reference and while determining the amount of compensation, it would have to give effect to Sections 23 and 28 as it finds them at the date of decision of the appeal. When Section 23 sub-section (1) provides that in determining the amount of compensation the Court shall take into consideration matters spe- cified in the various sub- clauses to the market value of the land the Court shall in every case award a sum of 15 per centum of such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition, the mandate of these two sub-sections must apply equally whether the Court is hearing a reference or the High Court is hearing an appeal against an award made by the Court. The amended provisions in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would therefore have to be applied by the High Court in determining the amount of compensation. The amended provisions in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would therefore have to be applied by the High Court in determining the amount of compensation. The same position would obtain where an appeal against an award has been decided by the High Court prior to the commencement of the Amending Act and an appeal against the order of the High Court is pending before the Supreme Court at the date of commencement of the Amending Act or is filed after such date. The Supreme Court also while deciding the appeal and determining the amount of compensation would have to take into account the amen- ded provisions in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28, because when the Supreme Court decided the appeal and determines the amount of compensation, it would have to comply with the mandate contained in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28. Thus the amended provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would apply in determination of the amount of compensation where proceedings are either pending at the date of commencement of the amending Act or are filed subsequent to the date, whether before the Collector, or before the Court or before the High Court or the Supreme Court. (22). After considering the position, which would have been if Section 30 of the Act No.68 of 1984 were not enacted, their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court considered the effect of the provisions contained in Section 30 of the Amending Act (Act No. 68 of 1984). Their Lordships observed :- ``Now, as we have already pointed out above, the Amending Act came into force with effect from September 24, 1984 but the Bill which ultimately became the Amending Act was introduced in Parliament on April 30, 1982. Parliament obviously desired that the amended provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 should be given effect from the date of introduction of the Bill in Parliament and therefore enacted Section 30 sub-section (2) making the provisions of the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 applicable to and in relation to ``any award made by the Collector or court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award... after the 30th day of April 1982... after the 30th day of April 1982... and before the commencement of this Act, that is, the provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 should be applicable in determination of compensation where proceedings before the Collector or the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court were pending on April 30, 1982 or were commenced after that date, even if such proceed- ings had finally terminated before the enactment of the Amending Act and no proceedings were pending before the Collector or the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court at the date of enactment of the Amending Act. If the proceedings had not finally concluded before the enactment of the Amending Act and were pending on that date in the High Court or the Supreme Court, the amended provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would apply on their own terms in determining compensation. But by virtue of Section 30 sub-section (2), the amended provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 were made applicable also where the proceedings were pending on April 30, 1982 or were commenced after that date even though they might have finally come to an end before the enactment of the Amending Act: Of course, if the proceedings had finally terminated on or before April 30, 1984, the amended provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would not possibly be intended to apply to the determination made in such proceedings. This was clearly the intendment of Parliament in enacting Section 30 sub-section (2). (23). Their Lordships affirmed the view taken by the three Judges Bench in Mohinder Singhs case and expressed disagreement with the view taken by the two Judges Bench in Kamalajammanniavarus case so far as the applicability of amended Section 23(2) and Section 28 to the appeals pending before the High Court and the Supreme Court were concerned. (24). A careful reading of the decision given by the two Judges Bench in Kamalajammanniavarus case (supra) and three Judges Bench in Bhag Singhs case (supra) clearly show that the view taken in Kamalajammanniavarus case that the amended provisions of Section 23(2) and Section 28 would apply to cases in which the reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was pending before the Civil Court, was not over ruled by the three Judges Bench. (25). (25). In Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh (8), Five Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 30 (2) and 15 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No. 68 of 1984), on a reference made by a two Judges Bench of the referred to the Honble Supreme Court. The question of law five Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court was whether under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984, the claimants are entitled to solatium @ 30% of the market value irrespective of the dates on which the proceedings were initiated or the dates on which the awards had been passed ? After considering the provisions of Section 30(2) of the Amending Act, 1984, their Lordships observed:- ``In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well to be clear that the aw- ard made by the Collector referred to here is the award made by the Collector under Section 11 of the parent Act, and the award made by the Court is the award made by the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the parent Act on a reference made to it by the Collector under Section 19 of the parent Act. There can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by Section 30(2) in respect of an award made by the Collector between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended by Section 30(2) to the case of an award made by the Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984, even though it be upon reference from an award made before April 30, 1982. (26). After considering the applicability of the amended provisions of Section 23(2) and Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the awards made by the Collector u/s 11 and awards made by the Civil Court u/s 23, between April 23, 1982 and September 24, 1984, their Lordships considered the next question as to what is the meaning of the words ``or to any order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court on appeal against such award ? After consider the provisions of Section 30(2) of the Amending Act of 1984, their Lordships observed :- ``The Amendment Act has not been made generally retrospective with effect from any particular date, and such retrospectivity as appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the parent Act and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provisions concerned. Since it is necessary to spell out the degree of retrospectivity from the language of the relevant provision itself, close attention must be paid to the provisions of Section 30(2) for determining the scope of retrospective relief intended by Parliament in the matter of enhanced solatium. The learned Attorney General is also right when he points out that it was never intended to define the scope of the enhan- ced solatium on the mere accident of the disposal of a case in appeal on a certain date. Delays in the superior Courts extend now to limits which were never anticipated when the right to approach them for relief was granted by statute. If it was intended that Section 30(2) should refer to appeals pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984, they could well refer to proceedings in which an award had been made by the Collector from anything between 10 to 20 years before. It could never have been intended that rates of compensation and solatium applicable to acquisition proceedings initiated so long ago should now en- joy the benefit of statutory enhancement. It must be remembered that the value of the land is taken under Section 11(1) and section 23(1) with reference to the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1), and it is that date which is usually material for the purpose of determining the quantum of compensation and solatium. Both Section 11(1) and Section 23(1) speak of compensation being determined on the basis, inter alia, of the market value of the land on that date, and solatium by Section 23(2), is computed as a percentage on such market value. (27). Both Section 11(1) and Section 23(1) speak of compensation being determined on the basis, inter alia, of the market value of the land on that date, and solatium by Section 23(2), is computed as a percentage on such market value. (27). After considering the decisions given in Mohinder Singhs case (supra) and Bhag Singhs case (supra) their Lordships observed :- ``We think that what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an awa- rd of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. The word `or is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under Section 30(2) is sought to be extended. If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates. If the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. (28).In view of the conclusions reached by their Lordships, the law laid down in Mohinder Singhs case and Bhag Singhs case was over ruled and the law laid down in Kamalajammanniavarus case (supra) was affirmed. (29). In Union of India vs. Filip Tiaggo De Gama (supra), a two Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court again considered the provisions of Section 30(2) of the Act No. 68 of 1984 and the amended provisions of Sec. 23(2) as well as the provisions of Sec. 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. (30). The facts of the case of Filip Tiago De Gama were that the notification u/S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the land of the respondents was published on October 26, 1967 and declaration u/S. 6 was published on February 23, 1968. The Land Acquisition Officer made his award determining compensation on March 5, 1969. (30). The facts of the case of Filip Tiago De Gama were that the notification u/S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the land of the respondents was published on October 26, 1967 and declaration u/S. 6 was published on February 23, 1968. The Land Acquisition Officer made his award determining compensation on March 5, 1969. On a reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Civil Court made its award on May 28, 1985 (i.e. after September 24, 1984, the date of assent to Amending Act 68 of 1984) enhancing the rate of compensation and also granting solatium at 15 per cent. The claimant preferred appeal before High Court for further enhancement of compensation and also granting of solatium at 30 per cent u/s 23(2) as amended by Amending Act 68 of 1984. The High Court accepted the appeal and granted three reliefs : (1) compensation @ 12 % of the market value from the date of notification u/s 4 till the date of possession or the date of award, whichever was earlier, was granted, (2) interest @ 9% for the first year from the date of taking over possession and thereafter @ 15% per annum till the date of deposit of payment was awarded and (3) 15% solatium, in addition to 15% already granted to the claimant was also awarded. Union of India did not raise objection to the grant of second relief as the claimant was entitled to interest u/s 28 of Act. The challenge was only against the first and third of the said reliefs, which were evidently given under the amended Sections 23(1-A) and 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. (31). The Honble Supreme Court first considered the question of solatium awarded u/S. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. Their Lordships held that the deci- sion given in Raghubir Singhs case (supra) had set at rest the controversy as to the entitlement of higher solatium to cases pending as on the date of commencement of the Amending Act. Their Lordships observed :- ``In stating thus, the decision has set at rest the controversy as to entitlement of higher solatium to cases pending as on the date of co- mmencement of the Amending Act. Sec. 23(2) was held to apply to awards made in between April 30, 1982 and Sept. 24, 1984. Their Lordships observed :- ``In stating thus, the decision has set at rest the controversy as to entitlement of higher solatium to cases pending as on the date of co- mmencement of the Amending Act. Sec. 23(2) was held to apply to awards made in between April 30, 1982 and Sept. 24, 1984. Obviously they must be awards in acquistion commenced prior to the said dates. The award may be of the Collector or Court one or the other must receive 30 per cent solatium on the market value of the land. More important, that the higher solatium could also be given by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeals against such award. (32). Since the facts of Filip Tiago De Gamas case were slightly different, their Lordships observed :- ``But these decisions do not solve the problem presented here. The award with which we are concerned does not fall within the intergnum i.e. between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. To repeat the facts : the acquisition commenced on October 26, 1967 when the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published. On March 5, 1969 the Collector made the award and on May 28, 1985 the reference Court made the award. Both the awards, thus apparently fall outside the period prescribed under Section 30(2). (33). The award given by the Land Acquisition Officer was before April 23, 1982 and the award given by the Civil Court was after September 24, 1984. It was contended before the Honble Supreme Court by the counsel for the Union of India that Sec. 30(2) of the Act No. 68 of 1984 was not applicable to the case, and therefore, the applicability of Section 23(2) as amended by Act No.68 of 1984 was ruled out. The first contention was based on Section 30(2) and the second on the ground that Sec.23(2) with its isolated splendour is not retrospective in operation. It was thus submitted by the learned counsel for Union of India that the claimants case could not be saved for higher solatium either under Transitional Provisions or by amended Section 23(2) of the Act and it has gone both ways. (34). Their Lordships held that Section 23(2) by itself has no retrospective operation appear to be justified, as Section 23(2) forms part of a scheme of deter- mining compensation for land acquired under the Act. (34). Their Lordships held that Section 23(2) by itself has no retrospective operation appear to be justified, as Section 23(2) forms part of a scheme of deter- mining compensation for land acquired under the Act. It provides 30 per cent solatium on the market value of the land in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. The market value of the land is required to be determined at the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) . It cannot be determined with reference to any other date. Their Lordships therefore, held that Section 23 (2) by itself was not retrospective in its operation. The five Judges Bench in the decision given in Raghubir Singhs case (supra) had laid down the law that Section 30(2) of the Amending Act (Act No.68 of 1984) was applicable to all awards given by the Land Acquisition Officer or by the Civil Court between 30th April, 1982 and September 24, 1984 and also to the appeals filed before the High Court and the Supreme Court against the award given between above dates. In the case of Filip Tiago De Gama, the Land Acquisition Officer gave award before September, 1984 as was the case before their Lordships, injustice would result to the claimants. Their Lordships observed :- ``The criticism that the literal interpretation of Sec. 30(2), if adhered to would lead to unjust result seems to be justified. Take for example two acquisition proceedings of two adjacent pieces of land, required for the same public purpose. Let us say that they were initiated on the same day-a day some time prior to April 30, 1982. In one of them the award of the Collector is mad on September 23, 1984 and in the other on September 25, 1984. Under the terms of Section 30(2) the benefit of higher solatium is available to the first award and not to the second. Take another example : the proceedings of acquisition initiated, say, in the year 1960 in which award was made on May 1, 1982. Then the amended Section 23(2) shall apply and higher solatium is entitled to. But in an acquisition initiated on September 23, 1984 and award made in the year 1989 the higher solatium is ruled out. This is the intrin- sic illogicality if the award made after September 24, 1984, is not given higher solatium. Then the amended Section 23(2) shall apply and higher solatium is entitled to. But in an acquisition initiated on September 23, 1984 and award made in the year 1989 the higher solatium is ruled out. This is the intrin- sic illogicality if the award made after September 24, 1984, is not given higher solatium. Such a construction of Section 30(2) would be vulnerable to attack under Article 14 of the Constitution and it should be avoided. We, therefore, hold that benefit of higher solatium under Section 23(2) should be available also to the present case. This would be the only reasonable view to be taken in the circumstan- ces of the case and in the light of the purpose of Section 30(2). In this view of the matter, the higher solatium allowed by the High Court is kept undisturbed. (35). Thus, their Lordships held that if the award was given by Land Acquisition Officer or the Civil Court after 24th September, 1984, the case would be covered by Sec. 30(2) of the Amending Act 1984 and the amended provisions of Sec. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act would apply and higher solatium @ 30% would be payable. (36). The second question which was considered by their Lordships was whether the claimant was entitled to additional amount of compensation provided u/S. 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act. Since, the provisions of Sec. 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act were not considered in Kamalajammannivaru vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra), Bhag Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh (supra) and Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh (supra), their Lordships considered the provisions of Section 23(1-A), as inserted by Amending Act 1984. Their Lordships observed :- ``The objective words used in this sub-section are similar to those that are used in Section 23(2). It enjoins a duty on the Court to award the additional amount at 12 per cent on the market value of the land for the period prescribed thereunder. But this again is a part of the scheme for determining compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act. It also operates on the market value of the land acquired. It is plainly and distinctly prospective in its operation of notification under Section 4(1). But the legislature has given new starting point for operation of Section 23(1A) for certain cases. But this again is a part of the scheme for determining compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act. It also operates on the market value of the land acquired. It is plainly and distinctly prospective in its operation of notification under Section 4(1). But the legislature has given new starting point for operation of Section 23(1A) for certain cases. That will be found from Section 30 sub- Section (1) (a) and (b) of the Transitional Provisions. (37). After considering the provisions of Section 30(2), their Lordships observed :- ``Entitlement of additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) depends upon pendency of acquisition proceedings as on April 30, 1982 or commencement of acquisition proceedings after that date. Section 30 sub-section (1) (a) provides that additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on April 30, 1982 in which he has not made the award before that date. If the Collector has made the award before the date then, that additional amount cannot be awarded. Section 30 sub-section (1) (b) provides that Section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to every acquisition proceedings commenced after April 30, 1982 and between September 24, 1984. The final point to note is that Section 30 sub-section (1) does not refer to Court award and the Court award is used only in Section 30 sub-section (2). (38). In view of the conclusions arrived at by their Lordships, it was also held that the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 did not apply to the case of Filip Tiago De Gamas case, because the award had been passed by the Collector prior to April 30, 1984 and Section 30(1)(a) of the Amending Act of 1984 did not cover those cases, in which the Civil Court had given award after 30th April, 1982. (39). In Union of India vs. Zora Singh & Ors. (9), a three Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court again considered the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In that case, Notification u/S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was published on May 10, 1979 and the Notification u/Sec. 6 was published on March 27, 1981. The Special Land Collector made and declared his award of compensation on March 31, 1981 i.e. prior to April 30, 1982. In that case, Notification u/S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was published on May 10, 1979 and the Notification u/Sec. 6 was published on March 27, 1981. The Special Land Collector made and declared his award of compensation on March 31, 1981 i.e. prior to April 30, 1982. The claimant filed reference application u/s 18 of the Act, which was decided by the District Judge after September 24, 1984 in 1985-86. Additional compensation was awarded u/S. 23 (1-A). The High Court upheld the grant of benefit u/S. 23 (1-A). In appeal before the Honble Supreme Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant Union of India that right to get additional amount u/S. 23(1-A) was available only in cases where the Collector made his award after April 30, 1982 being the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People, whereas the case before their Lordships, the Collector had made his award before that date. (40). The decisions given by the Honble Supreme Court in Kamalajammannivaru vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (supra), Bhag Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh (supra), Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh (supra) and Union of India vs. Filip Tiago De Gama (supra) were considered by the Honble Supreme Court in this case. Regarding the nature of rights created by Sec.23 of the Principal Act, their Lordships observed :- ``A perusal of the provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 makes it clear that the said sub-section deals with substantive rights and it confers a substantive right to claim the additional amount calculated as set out in the said sub- section in the circumstances set therein. Similarly, sub-section (2) of Section 23 also confers a substantive right on the claimant to a higher solatium. Under the well settled rules of interpretation, the said provisions of the said Act being substantive in nature, can have only prospective application unless the language in which the provisions are couched, read in the context, shows that the intention of the legislature was to give retrospective effect to them. Under the well settled rules of interpretation, the said provisions of the said Act being substantive in nature, can have only prospective application unless the language in which the provisions are couched, read in the context, shows that the intention of the legislature was to give retrospective effect to them. The language of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 shows that a duty is cast on the Court to award an amount calculated as stated therein in additional to the market value of the land acquired for the period commencing from the date of the publication of the Section 4 Notification to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession, whichever is earlier. (41). Regarding the meaning of the expression `award, their Lordships observed :- ``The expression `award used in Sec.23(1-A) suggests that the intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of the said sub-section applicable to cases where the Collector had yet to make his award of the trial Court hearing the reference under Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act had still to make its award after the coming into force of the said sub-section on September 24, 1984. The expression `award is to be distinguished from the expression `decree and hence, it appears that in the absence of any contrary or inconsistent provision in the said Act, the provisions of sub-section, would not come into play where the award had been made by the Collector earlier as well as by the reference Court, but on the date of coming into effect of the said sub-section, an appeal from the said award might have been pending in a Court. In that case, the Court would not be `awarding any amount but would be making a `decree for an amount. (42). After taking into consideration the provisions of Section 30 of the Amend- ing Act (Act No.68 of 1984), their Lordships observed :- ``By reason of the provision of Section 30 (1)(a) of the Amendment Act of 1984, the provisions of section 23 (1-A) of the said Act were, by a deeming provision, made also applicable to every proceeding for the acquisition of land under the said Act, where the Collector had not made his award by April 30, 1982. On a correct interpretation of the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) read with Section 30 (1) (a) of the Amendment Act of 1984, an additional amount calculated in the manner indicated in Section 23(1-A) is also payable in those cases, where the Collector had not made his award on or before April 30, 1982, even in cases where the Court might have made its award before September 24, 1984. It is true that the aforesaid construction we are giving to the provisions of Section 23(1-A) and Section 30(1) (a) will, in a sense limit the benefits strictly conferred by Sec. 30(1)(a) to only those cases where the Collector as well as the Court have made their respective awards between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984, but in our view that cannot be held as that is the result of the plain grammatical construction of the clear language used in the relevant provisions. We are of the opinion that we would not be justified in giving an unduly restric- ted meaning to the provisions of Section 23(1-A) unwarranted by the plain language of that sub-section as appears to have been done in th case of Union of India vs. Filip Tiaggo De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, discussed more particularly hearinafter, in order to give a wider meaning of the provisions of Section 30(1)(a). Section 23(1-A) refers clearly to the duties of the Court. As we have already pointed out, the Court is defined by Section 3(d) as the Principal Court of original jurisdiction, except in the circumstances set out in the said sub-section, which would be the Court having jurisdiction to decide the reference u/s 18 of the said Act. There is, therefore, no warrant to read in the place of the word `Court in Section 23(1-A), the word `Collector. Moreover, the decision of such a Court determining compensation is regarded as an award under the said Act. In the light of these provisions, there is no warrant to give an unduly restricted mea- ning to Section 23(1-A) of the said Act, as pointed out above. (43). Moreover, the decision of such a Court determining compensation is regarded as an award under the said Act. In the light of these provisions, there is no warrant to give an unduly restricted mea- ning to Section 23(1-A) of the said Act, as pointed out above. (43). Regarding the view taken by a two Judges bench of the Honble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Filip Tiago De Gama (supra) as to the scope of Section 23(1-A) of the Principal Act, their Lordships observed:- ``The view taken by the Division Bench is that, as the Collector had made his award before April 30, 1982, then the additional amount referred to in Section 23(1-A) could not be awarded. This view has been on th basis that sub-section (1) (b) of Section 30 of the said Act provides that the provisions of Section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to every acquistion proceeding commenced after April 30, 1982, irres- pective of the fact whether the Collector has made award on or before September 24, 1984, and that sub-section (1) of Section 30 does not refer to Court award and the Court award is used only in sub-section (2) of Section 30. We find that on the plain language of Section 23 (1-A) itself, which we have set out earlier, the duty was cast on the Court to award an additional amount calculated as prescribed therein which would mean that it is directed to be awarded by the Court, namely, the reference Court, in all cases which are pending before that Court on September 24, 1984. Sub- section (1) (a) of Section 30 undoubtedly lays down that the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Act are also made applicable to all proceedings for the acquisition of any land under the said Act pending on April 30, 1982, where no award had been made by the Collector before that date. At first glance this would appear to suggest that the additional amount referred to in Section 23 (1-A) could not be awarded where the Coll- ector had made his award before April 30, 1982. But this provision cannot be allowed to cut down the benefits available to the claimants on a plain reading of Section 23(1-A). This is clear from the use of the word `also in the opening part of Section 30(1). But this provision cannot be allowed to cut down the benefits available to the claimants on a plain reading of Section 23(1-A). This is clear from the use of the word `also in the opening part of Section 30(1). In our opinion, the view taken by the bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court in that case cannot be accepted as correct as it is too narrow and unduly cuts down the operation of the benefit conferred under the plain language of Section 23(1-A) of the said Act. As far as the provisions of Section 30(2) are concerned, we do not feel that we are called upon to interpret the same in this decision. In our view, there- fore, the said decision cannot be accepted as good law in so far as it lays down that in order to bring the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the said Act in to play the Collector must have made his award after April 30, 1982. (44). Regarding the law laid down by the five Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh (supra), which was rendered by a constitution bench of this Court comprising five learned Judges runs in no way counter to the view taken by their Lordships and in fact it land support to the view which their Lordships were taking. Their Lordships, therefore, held that in the case before the Honble Supreme Court as the reference Court made the award after September 24, 1984, the benefits of the provisions of Sec. 23(1- A) was available to the claimant as held in the impugned judgment. The appeal filed by the Union of India was dismissed with costs. (45). In K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala & Ors. (10), a constitution bench of the Honble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 23(1-A) as inser- ted by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No. 68 of 1984). The matter was placed before the Constitution Bench as a Division Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala & Ors. (supra) referred the matter to a Larger Bench to consider the correctness of the decision in Union of India vs. Zora Singh (supra). The matter was placed before the Constitution Bench as a Division Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala & Ors. (supra) referred the matter to a Larger Bench to consider the correctness of the decision in Union of India vs. Zora Singh (supra). The Constitution Bench considered whether the bene- fit u/S. 23 (1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act was restricted to matters referred in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 or to be awarded in every case where reference was pending before the reference Court on 24.9.84, being the date of commencement of th Amending Act of 1984 irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector. The Cons- titution Bench further considered whether the interpretation of amended Section 23(2) and Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act. Honble Mr. Justice P.B. Sawant delivered a separate judgment deciding from the view taken by the majority of the three Judges. The majority judgment (of three Honble Judges namely Honble Mr. Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah, C.J., Honble Mr. Justice S.C. Agarwal and Honble Mr. Justice S.P. Bharucha) was delivered by Honble Mr. Justice S.C. Agarwal. Honble Mr. Justice R.M. Sahai delivered a separate judgment dissenting from the view taken by the majority. (46). It would be proper to refere the law laid down in the judgment delivered on behalf of three Honble Judges. Regarding the relationship between the provisi- ons of Section 23(1-A) of the Principal Act and Section 30(1) of the Amending Act and the provisions of Sec. 23(2) of the Principal Act as amended and Sec. 30(2) of the Amending Act, their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court observed :- ``Section 23(1-A) of the Principal Act and Section 30(1) of the Amending Act are inter-related and have to be read together. Similarly Sec- tion 23(2) of the Principal Act, as amended, and Section 30(2) of the Amending Act have to be read together. Though, sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 30 of the Amending Act are differently worded the construction that is placed on one set of provisions as a bearing on the construction of the other set. (47). Similarly Sec- tion 23(2) of the Principal Act, as amended, and Section 30(2) of the Amending Act have to be read together. Though, sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 30 of the Amending Act are differently worded the construction that is placed on one set of provisions as a bearing on the construction of the other set. (47). Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court considered the earlier decisions given in the case of Kamalajammannivaru vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra), Bhag Singh vs. Union of India (supra), Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh (supra), Union of India vs. Filip Tiago De Gama (supra) and Union of India vs. Zora Singh (supra) and several judgments of the High Court. Before the Honble Supreme Court, learned counsel appearing for the claimants urged that Zora Singhs case (supra) lays down the correct law and that in view of Section 23(1-A) of the Principal Act in every case which was pending before the reference Court on 24th September, 1984, the date of commencement of the Amending Act, the Court has to award the additional amount as prescribed in sub-section (1-A) of Sec- tion 23 and that this obligation is irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector. It was further submitted that this construction does not involve giving retrospective effect to the provisions of sub- section (1-A) introduced in Section 23 of the Amending Act for the reason that provision cannot be held to be retrospective only because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from events antecedents to its passing. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for Union of India and other counsel appearing for the States on the other hand urged that since the amendment introduced in Section 23 by insertion of sub-section (1-A) imposes an obligation to pay an additional amount by way of compensation, it can only apply to proceedings for acquisition which are initiated subsequent to the coming into force of the Amending Act ant it can only operate prospectively. According to the learned counsel retrospectivity to a limited extent has been given to the said provisions under sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Amending Act and except in cases falling within the ambit of sub-section (1) of Section 30, the benefit of additional amount by way of compensation under sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 cannot be granted in acquisition proceedings which had commenced prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act. (48). After considering some decisions, in which the principles of interpretation were laid down, their Lordships observed :- ``The provisions of Sec. 23(1-A) have to be construed in the light of the aforementioned principles. If thus construed, it would be evident that u/S. 23(1-A) an obligation to pay an additional amount by way of compensation has been imposed. Such an obligation did not exist prior to the enactment of the said provision by the Amending Act. If the said provision is applied to the acquisition proceedings which commenced prior to its enactment and an additional obligation in the matter of payment of compensation is imposed for such acquisition, the effect would be that the said provision would be operating retrospectively in respect of transactions already past. We are there- fore, unable to agree with the view expressed in Zora Singh that Sec. 23(1-A) would only operate prospectively and will not have retrospective operation if it is construed as applying to proceedings which were pending before the reference Court on the date of the commencement of the Amending Act and in which the reference Court makes the award after the commencement of the Amending Act. (49). Their Lordships considered the question whether any indication has been given by the Parliament that Section 23(1-A) will have retrospective operation so as to be applicable to acquisition proceedings which were commenced prior to the date of the enactment of the said provision. (49). Their Lordships considered the question whether any indication has been given by the Parliament that Section 23(1-A) will have retrospective operation so as to be applicable to acquisition proceedings which were commenced prior to the date of the enactment of the said provision. After considering the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Principal Act and Section 30 of the Amending Act, their Lordships held that Parliament has given clear indication to its intention in this regard Section 30(1) of the Amending Act and since the express provisions is contained in Section 30(1) of the Amending Act indicating the intention of the Parliament as to extent to which the provisions of Section 23(1-A) would apply to pending proceedings there is no scope for speculating about the said intention of Parliament by reading Section 23(1-A) in isolation without reference to Section 30(1) of the Amending Act. Their Lordships further held that for the purpose of ascertaining whether and if so to what extent the provisions of sub-section (1-A) introduced in Section 23 by the Amending Act are applicable to proceedings that were pending on the date of the commencement of the Amending Act it is necessary to read Sec. 23(1-A) along with the transitional provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Sec. 30 of the Amending Act. (50). In para no. 73 of the judgment their Lordships observed :- ``Merely because the provision regarding scope of the retrospectivity in regard to pending matter is contained in a separate provision and is not found in the amended provision would not justify treating the said provisions independent of each other. The provisions contained in Section 30 of the amending Act are to be treated as an integral part of the amended provisions in the principal Act to which they relate. (51). In para no. 74 of the Judgment, their Lordships observed :- ``If sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 is construed in the light of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Amending Act, there is no escape from the conclusion that Section 23 (1-A), by itself, has no application to proceedings which had commenced prior to the enactment of the Amending Act and the applicability of the said provision to the pending proceedings is governed exclusively by sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Amending Act. A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Amending Act shows that it divi- des the proceedings for acquisition of land which had commenced prior to the date of the commencement of the Amending Act into two categories, proceedings which had commenced prior to 30.4.1982 and proceedings which had commenced after 30.4.1982. While, clause (a) of Section 30(1) deals with proceedings which had comm- enced prior 30.4.1982, Clause (b) deals with proceedings which commenced after 30.4.1982. By virtue of Clause (a), Section 23 (1-A) has been made applicable to proceedings which had commenced prior to 30.4.1982 if no award had been made by the Collector in those proceedings before 30.4.1982. It covers (i) proceedings which were pending before the Collector on 30. 4.1982 wherein award was made after 30.4.1982 but before the date of the commencement of the Amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made by the Collector after the date of the commencement of the Amending Act. Similarly, Section 30(1) (b) covers (i) proceedings which had commenced after 30.4.1982 wherein award was made prior to the commencement of the Amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made after the commencement of the Amending Act. It would thus, appear that both the clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 cover proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of the commencement of the Amending Act and to which the provisions of Section 23(1-A) have been made applicable by virtue of Section 30(1). If Section 23(1-A), independently of Section 30(1), is applicable to all proceedings, which were pending on the date of the commencement of the Amending Act, clause s(a) and (b) of Section 30(1) would have been confined to proceedings which had commenced prior to the commencement of the Amending Act and had concluded before such commencement because by virtue of Section 15, the provisions of Section 23(1-A) would have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the Amending Act. There was no need to so phrase Section 30(1) as to apply the provisions of Section 23(1-A) to proceedings which were pending before the Collector on the date of the commencement of the Amending Act. There was no need to so phrase Section 30(1) as to apply the provisions of Section 23(1-A) to proceedings which were pending before the Collector on the date of the commencement of the Amending Act. This only indicates that but for the provisions contained in Section 30(1), Section 23 (1-A) would not have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the Amending Act. (52). In view of the law laid down by the majority of the Bench (decision of three Honble Judges), it must be said that the benefit u/S. 23(1-A) of the Land Ac- quisition Act, 1894, can be given in those cases in which the proceedings for acquisition had been commended after 30th April, 1982 and in cases in which the proceedings for acquisition were initiated before 30th April,82, but the award by the Collector was given after 30th April,82. (53). In State of Punjab vs. Awatar Singh (11), a two Judges Bench of the Hon- ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 (as amended by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No. 68 of 1984). Their Lordships observed :- ``It is now settled law of this Court in Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh and K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala that the Land Acquisition Amendment Act No. 68 of 1984 does not apply to the awards made by the civil court prior to introduction of the Land Acquisition Bill. Section 28 proviso and Section 23(2) as amended by Act 68 of 1984 would apply to an award made by the Collector or civil Court between 30.4.1984 to 24.9.1984 and have no application to pending appeals in the High Court or Supreme Court. Equally Section 23(1-A) does not apply to a notification under Section 4(1) published prior to 30.4.1982. Additional District Judge made an award in this case on 5.3.1973. The claimants are, therefore, not entitled to the payment of solatium at 30% and interest at 9% and 15% respectively under Section 23(2) of the Act and proviso to Section 28 of the Act on the enhanced compensation. Equally under Section 28 of the Principal Act the claimant was entitled to only 6% interest on the enhanced compensation from the date of taking possession. (54). In Umed Industries Land Development Co. & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. Equally under Section 28 of the Principal Act the claimant was entitled to only 6% interest on the enhanced compensation from the date of taking possession. (54). In Umed Industries Land Development Co. & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (12), a three Judges bench of the Honble Supreme Court reiterated the view taken by the Constitution Benches in Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh (supra), and K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala (supra). (55). In Khanna Improvement Trust vs. Land Acquisition Tribunal & Ors. (13), it was held that since the Collector had made the award prior to 30th April, 82 (the date of introduction of the Bill in Lok Sabha), the benefit of Section 23(1-A) as inserted by Amending Act 1984 (Act No. 68 of 1984) was not available to the claimant and therefore, the award of additional amount of 12% was illegal. (56). In Union of India vs. B.V. Saroja & Anr. (14), the view taken by the Constitution Bench in K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala (supra) was followed and it was held that since the award was made by the Collector on 15.9.76 (before 30th April, 82 the date of introduction of the Bill in the House of People), the benefit of Section 23(1-A) of the Principal Act as amended by Act no. 68 of 1984 was not available to the claimant. (57). In Special Tahsildar (LA) P.W.D. Schemes, Vijayawada vs. M.A. Jabbar (15), a two Judges bench of the Honble Supreme Court held that since the award had been made on 30th September, 83(after 30th April, 82, which is the date of introduction of the Bill in the House of the People), the claimant was entitled to additional amount for the period between the date of notification u/S. 4(1) and the date of award and not from the date of taking possession. (58). In S.A. Jain College Trust & Managing Society vs. State of Haryana & Ors (16) following the view taken in Union of India vs. B.V. Saroja (supra), it was held that the claimant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1-A) as amended by Act no. (58). In S.A. Jain College Trust & Managing Society vs. State of Haryana & Ors (16) following the view taken in Union of India vs. B.V. Saroja (supra), it was held that the claimant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1-A) as amended by Act no. 68 of 1984, but the award of 30% solatium on market value of the land and interest on excess compensation @ 9% for the first year from the date of taking of possession till payment of compensation was justified as the judgment of the High Court was delivered in 1985 after the commencement of the Act. (59). In Improvement Trust, Patiala vs. Land Acquisition Tribunal & Ors. (17), a two Judges bench of the Honble Supreme Court held that the additional benefit provided under Sec. 23(1-A) is independent of the escalation of solatium and inte- rest under Sec. 23(2) and 28 respectively. The claimants were held to be not entitled the benefit u/s 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act. (60). In State of Haryana vs. Shanti Prashad (18), a two Judges bench of the Honble Supreme Court followed the law laid down by the Constitution bench of the Honble Supreme Court in K.S. Paripoornans case (supra). The law laid down by the Constitution bench in Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh (supra) was also followed and it was held that the claimants were not entitled to additional benefit u/S. 23(1-A), Section 23(2) and Section 28 as amended by Act no. 68 of 1984 as the awards were made by the Collector and by the civil Court on a reference made u/S. 18 before 30th April, 1982. (61). In Hindusthan Paper Corporation vs. Shanta Prasad Gaur & Ors. (19), a two Judges bench of the Honble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Sec. 23 (1-A), 23(2) and 28 as amended by Amending Act 68 of 1984. In that case the no- tification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 3.7.79. The Land Acquisition Collector classified the land and awarded the compensation. On reference u/S 18, the reference Court enhanced the market value of the land which had been acquired while maintaining the classification of the land. In first appeal, the High Court by Judgment dated 31st January, 89 affirmed the award and decree of the reference Court. The Land Acquisition Collector classified the land and awarded the compensation. On reference u/S 18, the reference Court enhanced the market value of the land which had been acquired while maintaining the classification of the land. In first appeal, the High Court by Judgment dated 31st January, 89 affirmed the award and decree of the reference Court. The decree of the reference Court was made after the Amendment Act had come into force and therefore, the claimants were held to be entitled to statutory benefits of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. (62). In Municipal Committee, Bhatinda vs. Balwant Singh (20), a two Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 as amended by Act no. 68 of 1984. In that case, the award of the Collector was made on 20th March, 79 and the award of the reference court was made on 9th August, 82. It was held that the claimant was not entitled to additional amount under amended Section 23(1-A), but he was entitled to benefit of Section 23(2) and 28 as amended by Act no. 68 of 1984. The decision given in this case is in accordance with the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in Raghubir Singhs case (supra) and K. S. Paripoornans case (supra). (63). In Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. Sharanabasappa Shivayogappa Tyapal and Ors (21) it was held that the benefit of amended provisions contained in Section 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 as amended by Act no. 68 of 1984 was not available to the claimants as the award of the Collector and that of the reference court was made before 30th April, 82. In this case also, the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in Raghubir Singhs case (supra) and K.S. Paripoornans case (supra) was followed by the Honble Supreme Court. (64). In Special Land Acquisition Officer, Malaprabha Dam Project, Saundatti & Ors. Madivalappa Basalingappa Melavanki & Ors. (22), it was held that the claimants were not entitled to benefit of section 23(1-A), 23 and Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Central Act No. 68 of 1984 as the award of the reference court was made on 14.12.81 i.e. before the introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill 1982 in the House of the People on 30th April, 82. The facts of the case are noteworthy. The facts of the case are noteworthy. The Civil Judge made its award on 14.12.81 and enhanced the compensation determined by the Land Acquisition Officer was Rs. 3000 per acre to Rs. 15,000 per acre. On appeal u/s 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Second Additional District Judge, Belgaum by his common judgment dated 29.1.88 confirmed the same. The High Court by order dated 29.1.88 in Misc. Second Appeal No.44/85 and batch held that in determining compensation on the basis of the annual yield by application of 15 years multiplier would be illegal, as held in Special Land Acquisition Officer v. P. Veerabhadrappa (23). However, the learned Judge declined to interfere with the award on the ground that the land acquisition in this case was only of an extent of 38 gunthas and it was held that ``it is hardly appropriate to interfere with the award notwithstanding the discrenible blemish pointed out by the learned Government Pleader. The learned Judge of the High Court also complied the provisions of Sec. 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by Amendment Act no. 68 of 1984 holding that it would be subject to the result in Bhag Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh (supra). The Honble Supreme Court declined to interfere with the determination of compensation applying 15 years multiplier as the land involved in question was a small one, but observed :- ``XXX XXXX XXXX We are also not inclined to upset the wrong application of law. However, it would not operate as a precedent to any future case or other cases arising from the same notification. All cases need to be decided applying only 10 years multiplier. However, the claimants are not entitled to the benefits under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. It is settled law that if the claim is pending before the reference Court on or after coming into foce of the Amendment Act, viz. 24.9.1984, the Amendment Act gets attracted for pending claims during that interregnum. However, the claimants are not entitled to the benefits under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. It is settled law that if the claim is pending before the reference Court on or after coming into foce of the Amendment Act, viz. 24.9.1984, the Amendment Act gets attracted for pending claims during that interregnum. Since the award of the reference Court is of 14.12.1981 i.e. much prior to the date when the Land Acquisition Am- endment Bill was introduced, the claimants are not entitled to 30 per cent solatium on the enhanced compensation, additional amount @ 12 per cent per annum of the enhanced compensation from the date of award or taking over possession whichever is earlier and interest as provided in the proviso to Section 28 of the Act as amended under Act 68 of 1984 i.e. 9 per cent for one year and 15 per cent whichever is earlier. But the respondent-claimants are entitled to 15 per cent solatium on the enhanced compensation and 5 per cent interest per annum on the enhanced compensation as amended by the local Act, from the date of taking over possession till the date of deposit or pay- ment, whichever is earlier. (65). In Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. N.S. Takkalaki & Ors. (24), a two Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court held that the claimants were not entitled to additional amount u/s 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Act no. 68 of 1984, because the award of the Land Acquisition Officer had been made on 28th March, 80 i.e. before the introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982. (66). In State of H.P. & Ors. vs. Dharam Das (25) it was held that the claimants were not entitled to the benefit of Sec. 23(1-A), but they were entitled to the benefit of Sec. 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by Act no. 68 of 1984. (67). In Assistant Commissioner, Gadag Sub-division Gadag vs. Mathapathi Basavannewwa & Ors. (26), a two Judges Bench observed that the object of introducing Section 23(1-A) is to mitigate the hardship caused to the owner to the land, who has been deprived of the enjoyment of the land by taking possession from him and using it for public purpose, because of considerable delay in making the award and offering payment thereof. (26), a two Judges Bench observed that the object of introducing Section 23(1-A) is to mitigate the hardship caused to the owner to the land, who has been deprived of the enjoyment of the land by taking possession from him and using it for public purpose, because of considerable delay in making the award and offering payment thereof. It was further held that if the possession is taken earlier and notification is issued latter but the award is subsequently made, the owner or the claimant is entitled to the additional compensation from the date of taking possession till date of the award, though possession was taken before the notification u/S. 4(1) was published. The award by the Land Acquisition Officer in that case was made on 15.1.86 i.e. after coming into force of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. (68). In Major Pakhar Singh Atwal & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (27), it was held that the claimants were not entitled to the benefit of Sec.23(1-A), but they were entitled to solatium @ 30% on the enhanced compensation and interest at 9% from the date of taking possession for one year and thereafter at 15% till payment of additional compensation. In that case the notification u/s 4 was published on 1.8.75 and the award of the Collector was made on 27.1.77. The tribunal had given the award on 2.3.84. (69). In Jagdish Singh & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Anr. (28) the facts where that the award of the Collector was made on 11.4.80 and the Additional District Judge made his award on 9.2.82. It was held that the claimants were not entitled to benefit of Sec.23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 as amended by Act 68 of 1984. (70). In State of Kerala & Anr, vs. Betty w/o L.J. Mani & Anr. (29) it was held that Sec.23(1-A) cannot apply where award have already been made by the Collector before 30th April, 82 when the Amending Bill was introduced and Sec. 23(2) cannot apply where reference court award enhanced compensation before 30th April, 82 and High Court passed decree after commencement of the Amending Act on 24.9.84 and benefit u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984 cannot be granted by a Court when it had not enhanced the compensation. In this case, it was further held that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was not applicable to the State of Kerala and therefore, the Amending Act would be applicable only from the date on which the Amending Act came into force i.e. 24.9.1984 and therefore, the claimants are not entitled to benefits either u/s 34 or 28 as amended under Act 68 of 1984. (71). In Union of India vs. Jagdish & Ors. (30) it was held that the claimants were not entitled to benefit u/s 23(1-A) as Amended by Act 68 of 1984. The appeals filed by the Union of India were allowed. (72). In State of Kerala & Ors. Vs. T.K. Udaya Sankaran & Ors. (31), the award of the Collector and that of the reference court were made before 30th April, 82. It was held by two Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court that benefit of Sec. 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 as Amended by Act 68 of 1984 was not available to the claimants. (73). In Land Acquisition Officer, Punjab vs. Anudeep Kaur & Ors. (32), the award of the Collector was made on 30th July, 84 (prior to the introduction of Bill in Lok Sabha). A two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that the claimants were not entitled to additional amount under the Amended Section 23(1-A). (74). In Prem Nath Kapur & Anr. vs. National Fertilizers Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors. (33), the awards of the Collector and that of the reference Court were made prior to the commencement of the Amending Act 68 of 1984. It was held that the High Court had no power and jurisdiction to grant additional benefits and enhance solatium and interest under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The law laid down in Union of India Vs. Raghubir Singh (supra) and K.S. Paripoornan (II) vs. State of Kerala (supra) was followed. (75). In Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore vs. V.T. Velu & Ors. (34) the award of the Collector was made in 1976 and the award of reference Court was made on 30th June, 82. A two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that the claimants were not entitled interest and solatium u/S. 3(2) and 28 of the Land Ac- quisition Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984, but they were entitled to additional amount u/S. 23(1-A). (76). In Govt. A two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that the claimants were not entitled interest and solatium u/S. 3(2) and 28 of the Land Ac- quisition Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984, but they were entitled to additional amount u/S. 23(1-A). (76). In Govt. of A.P. vs. H.E.H., the Nizam, Hyderabad (35), it was held that the claimant was not entitled to additional amount u/S. 23(1-A), but he was entitled to solatium and interest u/S. 23(2) and 28 as amended by Act 68 of 1984. The Land Acquisition Officer made his award on 6.8.83 and the District Judge on reference u/S. 18 made his award on 31.3.86. The benefit of Sec.23(1-A) was denied to the claimant, because he himself was responsible for keeping the matter pending till the Amendment Act 1984 became operative. (77). In State of Kerala vs. M.M. Abdul Khader (36), a two Judges Bench held that claimants were not entitled to benefit u/s 23(1-A) as inserted by Amending Act 68 of 1984, because the award of the Collector was made on 21.4.80. (78). In State of Tamil Nadu & Ar. vs. Mahalakshmi Ammal & Ors. (37), it was held that claimants were entitled to benefit u/s 23(1-A)and interest u/s 28 of the Act as Amending Act 68 of 1984 as there was delay in giving the award. The Land Acqui- sition Collector made his award on 22nd September, 86 and further award was mad on 31st August, 90. (79). In Sita Devi vs. State of Haryana (38), the award of the Collector was made on 26.11.76 and the award of the reference court was made on 10.1.85. A two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that the claimant was entitled to solatium and enhanced compensation and interest under the Amended provisions under Sec.23(2) and 28 of the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984, but he was not entitled to additional amount u/s 23(1-A) as amended by Act 68 of 1984. (80). In Rafiq Mohammed vs. State of M.P. (39), the award of the Collector was made on 30th November, 63 and decree of the reference Court was passed on 22nd September 83. (80). In Rafiq Mohammed vs. State of M.P. (39), the award of the Collector was made on 30th November, 63 and decree of the reference Court was passed on 22nd September 83. A two Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court held that the claimant was not entitled to additional amount; u/s 23(1-A), but he was entitled to benefit of solatium and interest u/s 23(2) and 28 of the Act as Amended by Act 68 of 1984. The law laid down in Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh (supra) and K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala (supra) was followed. (81). In view of the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in the cases mentioned above, it is well established that the law down by the Constitution Bench in Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh (supra) as to the applicability of Sec. 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as Amended by Act 68 of 1984 and the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala (supra) as to the applicability of Sec. 23(1-A) as inserted by Amending Act 68 of 1984 has been consistently followed by the Honble Supreme Court. There is thus, no scope for any doubt or dispute as to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the two constitution Bench decisions mentioned above. (82). The cases in which the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer made its award prior to 30.4.1982 (the date on which the Amendment Bill was introduced in the House of the People), the benefit u/s 23(1-A) as amended by Act 68 of 1984 cannot be granted to the claimant. But, in such cases, if the civil Court made its award on reference u/s 18 after 30.4.82, the benefit of Sec.23(2) and 28 of the Act as Amended by Act 68 of 1984 would be available to the claimant. The crucial date in this behalf is 30.4.82 (the date on which the Amendment Bill was introduced in the House of the People). Needless to say that the case in which acquisition proceedings were commenced after 24th September, 84 (the date on which Central Act 68 of 1984 came into force, the benefit u/Sec. 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984 would be available. (83). The question no. 1 is decided accordingly. (84). Needless to say that the case in which acquisition proceedings were commenced after 24th September, 84 (the date on which Central Act 68 of 1984 came into force, the benefit u/Sec. 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984 would be available. (83). The question no. 1 is decided accordingly. (84). The second question to be decided in these appeals is whether the provisions of Section 56 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as inserted by the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 (Rajasthan Act no.8 of 1987), which is deemed to have come in force on 3rd January, 87, apply to the cases in which the award was given by the Land Acquisition Officer before 30th April, 82, but the reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was disposed of by the Civil Court after 24th September, 84 ? (85). The Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 (Rajasthan Act No. 8 of 1987) (to be referred hereinafter as the Rajasthan Amendment Act, 1987) inserted a new Section 57 for the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 56 reads:- ``56. Provisions consequential to the extension of this Act to the State of Rajasthan -(1) Consequent on this Act having been extended to the State of Rajasthan on the 24th day of September, 1984, hereinafter re- ferred to as the date of extension, the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (Rajasthan Act 24 of 1953), hereinafter referred to as the State Act, shall be deemed to have been repealed on the date of extension. (2) Where, in any proceeding under the State Act on the date of extension, the State Government, the Collector of the Court has, on or after the said date or before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987, done anything taken any action or made any order which is at variance with that as is provided in this Act, such thing, action or order, shall, subject to the other provisions of this section, be deemed to have been done, taken or made under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and such proceeding shall not be re-opened or reviewed or liable to be challenged on the ground of not being in accordance with the provi- sions of this Act. (3) All things done, actions taken or orders made in regard to acquisition of any land for the union, or after the date of extension and before the commencement of the Land Acquisition(Rajasthan Amendment) Act 1987 shall be deemed to have been done, taken or made under the direction of the Union. (4) Where, in any proceeding pending under the State Act, on the date of extension or instituted after the said date, a declaration u/S. 6 or an award under Section 11 has been made after any of the respective periods as specified in Section 6 or Section 11A, as the case may be has expired, the said period or the period, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have been extended up to the date of such declaration or award. In a proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition(Rajasthan Amendment) Act 1987, such period or periods shall be deemed to have been extended up to, and the de- claration or the award as the case may be shall be made within one year and two years respectively after such commencement. (5) When the Collector has, before taking possession of any land on or after the date of extension and before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 not tendered and paid eighty per centum of the compensation in accordance with sub-section (3-A) of Section 17, such possession shall not be liable to be challenged on that ground in any Court. The Collector shall not be liable to be challenged on that ground in any Court. The Collector shall in such a case tender and pay that amount within three months after such commencement. (6) Any person convicted and punished under that State Act before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 shall not be liable to enhanced punishment as provided in Section 46. (7) Notwithstanding anything otherwise contained in clause first of sub-sec. (1) of Section 23, in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded in a proceeding pending on the date of extension, the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the order under Section 4 of the State Act shall be taken into consideration. (7) Notwithstanding anything otherwise contained in clause first of sub-sec. (1) of Section 23, in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded in a proceeding pending on the date of extension, the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the order under Section 4 of the State Act shall be taken into consideration. (8) In a proceeding where the amount of compensation has been determined before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987, whether by the Collector or by the Court the amounts in addition to the market value of the land as specified in sub-section (1-A) and sub-section (2) of Section 23 shall be further paid, after adjustment of any sum paid earlier under the said sub-sections, by the Collector to the persons to whom compensation was payable or paid. These amounts shall be payable in every proceeding and in regard to every award as specified in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984). (9) Where, in the cases as specified in sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984) interest is payable or has been paid under Section 28 of Section 34, the amount of such interest shall be re-determined and paid after adjustment of any sum paid earlier under the said sections by the Collector at the respective rates specified in and in accordance with the provisions of the said sections as amended by the said Act. (10) In a matter where award has been made after the date of extention and Section 28-A is applicable, an application under the said section, if not made earlier, may be made within three months from the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987. (11) Notwithstanding the coming into force of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11 shall become applicable in the State of Rajasthan on the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987. (86). The Rajasthan Amendment Act, 1987 provides that it shall be deemed to have come into force on January 3, 1987. It means that the newly inserted Section 56 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall be deemed to have been inserted in the principal Act on 3rd January, 1987. (87). (86). The Rajasthan Amendment Act, 1987 provides that it shall be deemed to have come into force on January 3, 1987. It means that the newly inserted Section 56 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall be deemed to have been inserted in the principal Act on 3rd January, 1987. (87). A perusal of Section 56 added by Rajasthan Amendment Act, 1987 shows that Section 56 is deemed to have come into force on January 3, 1987. Sub-section (1) of Section 56 states that the Land Acquisition Act 1894 was extended to the State of Rajasthan on 24 th September, 1984, the date on which the Central Amendment Act No. 68 of 1984 came into force. For the purpose of deciding question no. 2 sub-section (8) and (9) of section 56 appear to be relevant. Sub-section (8) provides that in a proceeding where the amount of compensation has been determined before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987, whether by the Collector or by the Court the amounts in addition to the market value of the land as specified in sub-section (1-A) and sub-section (2) of Section 23 shall be further paid, after adjustment of any sum paid earlier under the said sub- sections, by the Collector to the persons to whom compensation was payable or paid. These amounts shall be payable in every proceeding and in regard to every award as specified in sub- section (1) and (2) of Section 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984). (88). The crucial question is whether the respondents were entitled to the be- nefit of 23 as amended by Central Act No. 68 of 1984 by virtue of the provisions contained in sub-section (8) of Sec. 56 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Raghubir Singhs case (supra) is to the effect that in a proceeding instituted under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, the benefit under sub-section (2) of Section 23 as amended by Amending Act of 1984 shall be payable to the claimant if the award by the Collector or by the Court on a reference u/S. 18 or by both was made after April 30, 1984 (the date on which the amendment Bill was introduced in the House of the People). The law laid down by the constitution Bench in K.S. Paripoornans case (supra) is to the effect that the benefit of Sec. 23(1-A) as amended by Central Act 68 of 1984 cannot be given to the claimants if the award of the Collector was made before 30th April, 1982 (the date on which the Amending Bill was introduced in the House of the People.) In sub-section (8) of newly inserted Sec. 56, the cut of date for the purpose of determining whether compensation under sub-section (1-A) and (2) of Sec.23 as amended by Amendment Act, 1984 is or is not payable is the date on which the Land Acquisition (Raja- sthan Amendment) Act 1987 came into force. The Rajasthan Amendment Act, 1987 came into force on January 3, 1987 and therefore, the cut of date as provided in sub-section (8) of Sec. 56 is 3rd January, 1987. (89). The first part of sub-section (8) of Sec.56 suggests that the benefit of sub-section (1-A) of Sec. 23 as well as the benefit of sub-section (2) of Sec. 23 of the Principal Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable to claimants in all those cases where amount of compensation had been determined by the Collector or by the Court before 3rd January, 1987. The second part of sub-section (8) of Sec. 56 however provides that these amounts shall be payable in every proceeding and in regard to every award as specified in sub-Sec. (1) and (2) of Sec. 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. The second part suggests that the benefits of sub-sec. (1-A) and (2) of Sec. 23 of the principal Act as amended by Amending Act 1984, to the claimants in whose cases the amount of compensation had been determined before 3rd January, 87 was further subject to the condition that the benefits under sub-sec. (1-A) and (2) of Sec. 23 was to be given in accordance with sub-sec.(1) and (2) of Sec.30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. (90). If the first part of sub-section (8) of Sec.56 is controlled by the latter part of sub-section (8) of Sec.56, it will have to be said that the benefit of sub-sec. (1-A) and (2) of Sec.23 of the principal Act as amended by Amending Act 68 of 1984 is subject to the conditions contained in sub-sec. (90). If the first part of sub-section (8) of Sec.56 is controlled by the latter part of sub-section (8) of Sec.56, it will have to be said that the benefit of sub-sec. (1-A) and (2) of Sec.23 of the principal Act as amended by Amending Act 68 of 1984 is subject to the conditions contained in sub-sec. (1) and (2) of Sec. 30 of the Amending Act, 1984, and therefore, the law as laid down by the Constitution Bench in Raghubir Singhs case (supra) and K.S. Paripoornans case (supra) would be app- licable notwithstanding that the cut of date in sub-sec. (8) of Sec- sec.56 is 3rd January, 1987. On the other hand, if it is held that first part of sub-sec.(8) of Sec.56 is not controlled by the later part of sub-sec. (8) of Sec. 56, then it will have to be considered whether the first part of sub-sec. (8) of Sec. 56 makes the provisions of sub-sec. (1-A) and (2) of Sec. 23 of the principal Act retrospective in their operation in view of sub- sec. (1) and (2) of Sec. 30 of the Amendment Act of 1984. (91). Sub-section (9) of Sec. 56 (as inserted by Rajasthan Amendment Act, 1987) provides that where in the cases as specified in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984) interest is payable or has been paid under Section 28 of Section 34, the amount of such inte- rest shall be re-determined and paid after adjustment of any sum paid earlier under the said sections by the Collector at the respective rates specified in and in accordance with the provisions of the said sections as amended by the said Act. (92). So far as the provisions of sub-section (9) of Section 56 are concerned, there is no difficulty in ascertaining the intention of the legislature behind sub-sec- tion (9) of Section 56 which appears to be to provide the mode of calculation in those cases in which the claimant is entitled to interest at a higher rate in accordance with the provisions of Section 28 as amended by the Amending Act 1984 (Act 68 of 1984). I have no doubt that in view of the words used in sub-section (9) of Section 56 of the principal Act, the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Ra- ghubir Singhs case (supra) applies. (93). The provisions of sub-section (8) of Sec. 56 require serious consideration. The Constitution Bench has held in K.S. Paripoornans case (supra) that the right to obtain compensation is a substantive right and therefore, the law relating to award of compensation, cannot be given a retrospective application unless the statute expressly provides for it. Had the legislature not enacted Sec. 30 of the Amending Act 1984, the benefit of sub- sec.(1-A) and (2) of Sec.23 and Sec.28 as amended by Amending Act 1984 would not have been applicable to cases in which the acquisition proceedings were initiated before 24th September, 1984 the date on which the Amending Act, 1984 came into force. Benefit of sub-sec. (1-A) and (2) of Sec. 23 and 28, as amended by Amendment Act 1984, was however extended to the claimants, whose cases were covered by Sec. 30 of the Amendment Act, 1984 and thus a limited retrospectivity was given to the amended provisions. The provisions of sub-sec. (8) of Sec. 56 do not purport to make any further amendment in Sec.23 and 28 of the principal Act. Sub-sec. (8), however provides that the grant of benefits under sub-sec. (1-A) and (2) of Sec. 23 would be available to the class of claimants referred to in this sub- section. The first part of sub-sec. (8) suggests that the benefits of sub-sec.(1-A) and (2) of Sec. 23 are available to all those persons in whose cases the amount of compensation had been determined before the com- mencement of the Rajasthan Amendment Act, 1987 i.e. before 3rd January, 1987, irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector and the Civil Court on a reference u/s 18 of the principal Act. The second part of sub-sec (2) however suggests that the benefit under the first part is further subject to the condition that the benefit should be payable in accordance with sub-sec. (1) and (2) of Sec. 30 of the Amending Act, 1984. (94). The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 came into force on 24th September, 1984. No amendment has been made in Sec. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 and therefore, the benefit of sub- sec. (1) and (2) of Sec. 30 of the Amending Act, 1984. (94). The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 came into force on 24th September, 1984. No amendment has been made in Sec. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 and therefore, the benefit of sub- sec. (1-A) and (2) of Sec. 23 can be given in accordance with the provisions of Sub-sec. (1) and (2) of Sec. 30 of the Amending Act 1984 and not otherwise. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the cases to which sub-sec. (8) of Sec. 56 applies must as of necessity be the cases which are squarely covered by sub-sec. (1) and (2) of Sec. 30 of the Amending Act, 1984. On a harmonious reading of both the parts of Sub-sec. (8) of Sec. 56, the intention of the legislature appears to be that the benefit of sub-sec. (8) of Sec. 56 should be extended to those cases in which the compensation had been determined by the Collector or by the civil court on a reference u/S. 18 before 3rd January. 1987 but subject to the conditions prescribed in sub-sec. (1) and (2) of Sec. 30 of the Amending Act, 1984, In other words, the legislative intention behind enacting sub-sec. (8) of Sec. 56 cannot be to repeal the provisions of Sec. 30 of the Amending Act, 1984 so as to make available the benefit of sub-sec. (1-A) of Sec. 23 available to persons in contravention of the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 30 and to make available the benefit under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 23 to claimants in contravention of the provisions contained in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 30 of the Amending Act, 1984. (95). For above reasons, we hold that so far as benefit under sub-section (1-A) of Sec.23 as amended by Amending Act of 1984 are concerned, the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in K.S. Paripoornans case (supra) applies to the persons whose cases are covered by sub-sec. (8) of Sec.56 and therefore, no claimant is entitled to the benefit under sub-sec. (1-A) of Sec.23 if the award had been made by the Collector before 30th April, 1982. So far as the benefit under sub-sec. (8) of Sec.56 and therefore, no claimant is entitled to the benefit under sub-sec. (1-A) of Sec.23 if the award had been made by the Collector before 30th April, 1982. So far as the benefit under sub-sec. (2) of Sec.23, as amended by Amending Act 1984 is concerned, the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Raghubir Singhs case (supra) is applicable, and therefore, only those claimants can be entitled to benefit under this sub-section in whose cases award by the Collector on/or the Civil Court on a reference u/s 18 was made after 30th April, 1982, the date on which the amendment Bill was introduced in the House of the People. (96). Since all the cases from which these 14 appeals have arisen, acquisition proceedings were commenced under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1953, it would be proper to find out to what extent the claimants are entitled to benefits of sub-sec. (1-A) and (2) of Sec. 23 and 28 as amended by Amending Act of 1984. (97). Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act provides that whenever th State Government considers it necessary or expedient to acquire land in any locality, needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose, it shall, by an order, published in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 45, require any officer subordinate to it and generally or specially authorised in this be- half, to enter upon or into any land in such locality, accompanied by his servants and workmen, if any and be one or more of the several acts mentioned in clauses (a) to (g). Sub-section (2) of Sec.4 requires that a copy of the notification shall be endorsed to the Collector to the District in which such locality is situated with the direction to take suitable action upon receipt of the report under sub-section (4). Sub-Section (3) provides that the officer making an entry under sub-section (1) shall at the time of such entry, pay or tender payment for all necessary damages to be done to the land entered upon or into and, in case of dispute as to the sufficiently of the amount so paid or tendered, he shall at once refer to dispute for the decision of the Collector, and such decision shall be final. (98). (98). Sub-section (4) provides that such officer shall send to the Collector a report on the result of the survey, as to the other operations described in or carried on under sub-section (1), as to the inquiries made thereunder and as to the particular land in that locality which may be acquired for the public purpose. Sub- section (5) of Sec. 4 provides that the Collector shall, upon receipt of such report, cause to be given to the head of the Government department at whose instance the order under sub-section (1) shall have been made and to all persons reported under clause (g) of sub-section (1) to be interested in the land proposed thereby to be acquired as being suitable for the public purpose, a notice in the prescribed form of the proposed acquisition; and a public notice to the like effect at convenient places on or near about the land proposed to be acquired. (99). Section 5 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act was omitted by Rajasthan Act No. 15 of 1960. Sub-section (1) of Sec. 5A provides that any person interested in any land, in respect of which a notice has been given under sub-section (5) of Section 4, as being proposed to be acquired for a public purpose or for a company may, within thirty days after the service of the public notice in the manner provided in Section 45 object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be Sub-section (2) of Sec. 5A provides that every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader shall after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under Section 4 sub- section (5) or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land to the State Government, containing his recommendations on the ob- jections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decisions of the State Government. The decision of the State Government on the objections shall be final. (100). The decision of the State Government on the objections shall be final. (100). Section 6 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act provides subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the State Government is satisfied, after con- sidering the report, if any made under Section 5 A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect in the prescribed from under the signature of a Secretary to Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notice given under Section 4, sub- section (5), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (where required) under Section (2); (101). It is further provided that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. (102). Sub-section (2) of Section 6 provides that every declaration shall be published in the official gazette and shall state the district or other territorial division in which the land is situated, the purpose for which it is needed, its appro- ximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected. (103). Sub-section (3) of Sec. 6 provides that the said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be and after making such declaration State Government may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appearing. (104). Sub-Section (4) of Sec.6 provides that upon the publication of the declaration under sub-section (1), the Collector shall (i) take order for the acquisition of the land so declared to be needed for a public purpose or for a Company, and (ii) cause a plan of such land to be prepared if no such plan shall have been already prepared u/s 4. (105). Sections 7 and 8 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act were omitted by the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Amendment and Validiation Act, 1966 (Rajasthan Act 22 1966). (106). (105). Sections 7 and 8 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act were omitted by the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Amendment and Validiation Act, 1966 (Rajasthan Act 22 1966). (106). Section 9 requires issue of notice by the Collector to the persons who were interested in the land. (107). Section 10 empowers the Collector to require and enforce the making of statements as to names and interests. (108). Section 11 empowers the Collector to proceed to enquire into the objec- tions (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given u/S. 9 to the measurements of the land and into the value of the land at the date of the publication of the declaration u/S. 6 and at the relevant date and to the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation. (109). Under Section 11 A, the government department of company is to be informed of and represented at the enquiry u/s 11.After conducting the inquiry u/s 11, the Collector is required to make an award. (110). Under Section 12, such award shall be filed in the Collectors office and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (111). Under sub-section (2) of Sec.12, the Collector shall give immediate notice of his award or the amendment thereof to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award or the amen- dment thereof is made. (112). Section 12-A provides for the amendment of award when permissible. (113). Section 13 deals with the adjournment of enquiry. (114). Section 14 provides the power to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses and production of documents. (115). Section 15 deals with the matters to be considered and neglected. (116). Section 16 provides that when the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vests absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. (117). (115). Section 15 deals with the matters to be considered and neglected. (116). Section 16 provides that when the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vests absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. (117). In Neel Kanth vs. Jaggannath Singh (40) it was held that the owner is divested and the title passes to the State Government, the moment possession of the land is taken over and not from the date when the Collector makes award u/S. 11 of the Act. The consequences of taking over the possession of the land u/S. 16 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act is firstly to divest the owner from title and possession and secondly, to invest the State Government with title and possession. Once, the possession of the land has been taken u/S. 16 of the Act, the land vests in the State Government and subsequent withdrawal of acquisition proceedings u/S. 48 is illegal and without jurisdiction. (118). Section 17 confers special powers in the case of urgency. (119). Section 18 provides that the State Government department on whose behalf or the company for which acquisition is being made or any person interested who has not accepted the award or the amendment thereof may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the amount of costs allowed, the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Sub-section (2) of Sec.18 provides that the application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award or amendment thereof is taken provided that every such application shall be made- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award or the amendment thereof, within six weeks from the date of the Collectors award or the amendment thereof, and (b) in other cases within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector u/S.12, sub-sec. (2) or within six months from the date of the Collectors award or the amendment thereof whichever period shall first expire. (120). (2) or within six months from the date of the Collectors award or the amendment thereof whichever period shall first expire. (120). Sub-section (3) of Sec. 18 provides that any order made by the Collector on an application made under this section shall be subject to revision by the High Court, as if the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Sec.115 of the Code. (121). The possession of the land, which was acquired by the State Government was taken on May 27, 1977 u/S. 16 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953. As soon as possession of the land had been taken u/s 16 of the Rajasthan Land Ac- quisition Act, 1953, the land vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances by virtue of the provisions contained in Sec. 16 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953. In Balwant Narayan Bhagde vs. M.D. Bhagwat & Ors. (41), their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and observed at page 1777 that once possession has been ta- ken, the land vests in the Govt. The provisions of Sec. 16 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 are identical to the provisions of Sec.16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court that as soon as possession of the land is taken by the Government u/S. 16, land vests in the Government free from all encumbrances, is applicable to the possession taken by the State Govt. u/S. 16 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953. (122). In these appeals it is necessary to consider whether the claimants are entitled to get the benefits of amendment made in Section 23 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by Central Act 68 of 1894 and the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987, in view of the fact that possession of the land had been ta- ken by the State Government on 27th May, 1977. (123). In Pratap & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan (42), the Honble Supreme Court considered the effect of amendment made in the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959 (Act 35 of 1959) by the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust (Amendment) (Act no. 29 of 1987). (123). In Pratap & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan (42), the Honble Supreme Court considered the effect of amendment made in the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959 (Act 35 of 1959) by the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust (Amendment) (Act no. 29 of 1987). At page 8 of S.C.C., their Lordships observed :- ``From the facts narrated hereinabove it is clear that the Central Act was extended to the State of Rajasthan only after the land in question had vested in the State Government with the publication of the notification under Section 52((1) on 10.10.1984. Once the vesting of the land in the State Government, free from all encumbrances, was completed the subsequent extension of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the State of Rajasthan and the amendments made by the Amending Acts to the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act becomes wholly irrelevant and of no consequence. Neither the amendments nor the extension of the Central Act can have the effect, in law or otherwise, of divesting the State of ownership of the land which had already been vested in it. (124). The law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court is to the effect that if the vesting of the land in the State Government, free from all encumbrances, was completed in accordance with the provisions of the State Act, the subsequent extension of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the State and the amendments made by the Amending Act, would be wholly irrelevant and of no consequence. In the instant appeals, the Land in respect of which acquisition proceedings were commenced by publication of notice u/s 4-A of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 was taken possession of by the State Government on 27th May, 1977 and, by virtue of the provisions contained in Sec. 16 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, the land vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances w.e.f. 27th May, 1977, the date on which possession of the land had been taken. Therefore, in view of the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court in Pratap & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan (43), subsequent extension of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the State of Rajasthan w.e.f. 24th September, 1984 and the amendment made in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 is of no consequence. Therefore, in view of the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court in Pratap & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan (43), subsequent extension of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the State of Rajasthan w.e.f. 24th September, 1984 and the amendment made in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1987 is of no consequence. We are therefore, of the opinion that the claimants were not entitled to any benefit u/s 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Central Act 68 of 1984. They were entitled to get compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953. (125). The learned Single Judge has placed reliance on the observations made by a three Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Filip Tiago De Gama (supra). The observations on which reliance has been placed by the learned Single Judge are contained in para 18 of the judgment (at page 285 of SCC). These observations were made while considering the scope of Sec.23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Act 68 of 1984. The provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Amending Act, 1984 were considered in paras 20 to 22 of the judgment. Their Lordships in para 22 held that the Collector had made the award on March 5, 1969 and April 30, 1982 there was no proceedings pending before the Collector and therefore, Sec.30(1) (a) was not attracted to the case and since the proceeding for acquisition commenced before April 30, 1982, Section 30(1) (b) was also not applicable to the case and the claimant was not entitled to additional amount provided u/s 23(1-A) as in- serted by Amending Act of 1984. In Union of India vs. Filip Tiago De Gama (supra), on which the learned Single Judge has placed reliance, the the Honble Supreme Court did not consider the question whether the benefits given by Central Act 68 of 1984 by making amendments in Sec.23 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act 1984 were applicable to cases in which the acquisition proceedings had been commen- ced under an State Act and the possession of the land had been taken and the vesting of the land in the State Government free from all encumbrances had been completed in accordance with the provisions of the State Act before the date on which Land Acquisition Act 1894 was extended to the State. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the view taken by the learned Single Judge, the in the appeals before him, the claimants who were entitled to benefits given under the Central Act 68 of 1984 were available to the claimants in view of the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Filip Tiago De Gama (supra). The grant of benefit by the learned Civil Judge to the claimants u/Ss. 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Act 68 of 1984 was impermissi- ble as the claimants were entitled to compensation under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 and not under the land Acquisition Act, 1984. To that extent, the order passed by the learned Civil Judge and the judgment given by the learned Single Judge in these appeals, must be quashed and set aside. (126). In Khanna Improvement Trust vs. Land Acquisition Tribunal & Ors. (44), their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court held that award of additional amount at the rate of 12% per annum on the enhanced compensation by the High Court u/S. 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act was clearly illegal as the controversy was covered by the judgment of the constitution Bench in K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala (supra). Their Lordships, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court granting additional amount u/S. 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. (127). For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the claimants in all these 14 appeals were not entitled to any benefit u/S. 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Act 68 of 1984. (127). For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the claimants in all these 14 appeals were not entitled to any benefit u/S. 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Act 68 of 1984. The learned Civil Judge has therefore, committed illegality by giving benefit of the above mentioned provisions to the claimants. Consequently, the award given by the learned Civil Judge on reference u/s 18 and the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge deserve to be quashed and set aside so far as the grant of benefits u/Ss. 23(1- A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Central Act 68 of 1984 is concerned. (128). Lastly, it was urged that since the award given by the learned Single Judge has been upheld by the learned Single Judge and substantial justice appears to have been done, the award as well as the judgment of the learned Single Judge may not be quashed and set aside. (129). We have carefully considered this argument. We are unable to accept the argument for the reasons given below :- (130). Right to obtain compensation for the land acquired by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act is substantive right as held by the Constitution Bench in K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala (supra). The claimants are therefore, entitled to obtain compensation in accordance with law in force and not otherwise. Award of compensation to the claimants under the Land Acquisition Act, is required to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Neither, the Land Acquisition Officer nor the Court have unbriddled power to grant compensation to the claimants according to their discretion. In other words, the powers of the Land Acquisition Officer and of the Court in the matter of award of compensation to persons, whose land has been acquired, are circumscribed by the provisions of the statute. Compensation awarded by the learned Civil Judge on reference u/s 18, if found to be impermissible according to law in force cannot be upheld. Any amount of compensation, which was impermissible according to law in force, must be held to be illegal and such illegal award of compensation cannot be upheld or approved on the ground that it would be proper to uphold the award, as substantial justice appears to have been done to the proties. Any amount of compensation, which was impermissible according to law in force, must be held to be illegal and such illegal award of compensation cannot be upheld or approved on the ground that it would be proper to uphold the award, as substantial justice appears to have been done to the proties. We are therefore, unable to accept the argument that even if the award of compensation u/Ss. 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was impermissible, the award should be upheld by this Court. Besides, the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court is binding on all the courts in India by virtue of the provisions contained in Article 141 of the Constitution. The decisions given by the Honble Supreme Court in the cases mentioned above clearly show that the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in Raghubir Singhs case (supra) and K.S. Paripoornans case (supra) has been con- sistently followed by the Honble Supreme Court in several cases. We, therefore, have no doubt in it that the law laid down by the Constitution Benches of the Honble Supreme Court in Raghubir Singhs case (supra) and K.S. Paripoornans case (supra) is binding on this Court and if the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court is not followed, the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution would be vio- lated. The argument that since we are hearing special appeals u/s 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, therefore, we should not interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge Unless the orders appears to be unreasonable or perverse, and therefore, in the instant case, we should not interfere with the finding of the learned Single Judge appears to ignore the fact if the view of law taken by the learned Single Judge, against whose judgment, the special appeals have been filed, is inconsistent with the view taken by the Honble Supreme Court, it is the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court, which is to be administered and not the law as interpreted by the learned Single Judge. (131). We are afraid, it is not within our jurisdiction to put our seal of approval on an interpretation of law made by the learned Single Judge which interpretation is not in consonance with the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court. (131). We are afraid, it is not within our jurisdiction to put our seal of approval on an interpretation of law made by the learned Single Judge which interpretation is not in consonance with the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in such cases the view taken by the learned Single Judge being inconsistent with the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court, the judgment of the learned Single Judge must be corrected by setting it aside, altering or modifying it as may be necessary. It is not necessary for us to define the expressions ``unreasonable or perverse in order to find out what we ought to do in compliance of the Article 141 of the Constitution. Once, we are satisfied that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is inconsistent with the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court, we have no choice. The law declared by the Honble Supreme Court must be administered as commanded by Article 141 of the Constitution. If an illegal order/judgment is to be set aside by the Honble Apex Court in a special appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, there is no reason why a Division Bench of this Court hearing a special appeal u/s 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 should not interfere with the order passed by a learned Single Judge if it is inconsistent with the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court. We, therefore, find no merit in the contention that while hearing special appeals u/S. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 we should not interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge unless order may be called un- reasonable or perverse. (132). The law declared by the Honble Supreme Court under Article 141 or the Constitution as to the interpretation of a statutory provision is applicable not only to those cases, which are instituted after the decision is given by the Honble Supreme Court, but is also applicable to the cases in which the decision was given by the lower court or any Tribunal before the decision given by the Honble Supreme Court. The law declared by the Honble Supreme Court cannot be avoided by application of the doctrine of prospective over-ruling. The law declared by the Honble Supreme Court cannot be avoided by application of the doctrine of prospective over-ruling. The doctrine of prospective over-ruling was considered by a 11 Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in L.C. Golak Nath & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (45), An page 818 At page 813 of the report, Honble Mr. Justice Subba Rao, C.J. Observed :- ``In India there is no statutory prohibition against the Court refusing to give retroactivity to the law declared by it. Indeed, the doctrine of res judicata precludes any scope for retroactivity in respect of a subject matter that has been finally decided between the parties. Fur- ther, Indian court by interpretation reject retroactivity to statutory provisions though couched in general terms on the ground that the affect vested rights. The present case only attempts a further extension of the said rule against retroactivity. Our Constitution does not expressly or by necessary implication sp- eak against the doctrine of prospective over- ruling. Indeed, Arts. 32, 141 and 142 are couched in such wide and elastic terms as to enable this Court to formulate legal doctrine to meet the ends of justice. The only limitation thereon is reason, restraint and injustice. Under Art.32, for the enforcement of the fundamental rights the Supreme Court has the power to issue suitable directions or orders or writs. Article 141 says that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts; and Art.142 enables or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. These articles are designedly made comprehensive to enable the Supreme Court to declare law and to give such directions or pass such orders as are necessary to do complete justice. The expression ``declared is wider than the words ``found or made. To process, declare is to announce opinion. Indeed, the latter involves the process, while the former expresses result. Interpretation ascertainment and evolution are parts of the process, while that interpreted, ascertained or evolved is declared as law. The law declared by the Supreme Court is the law of the land. To process, declare is to announce opinion. Indeed, the latter involves the process, while the former expresses result. Interpretation ascertainment and evolution are parts of the process, while that interpreted, ascertained or evolved is declared as law. The law declared by the Supreme Court is the law of the land. If so, we do not see any acceptable reason why it, in declaring the law in supersession of the law declared by it earlier, could not restrict the operation of the law as declared to future and save the transactions, whether statutory or otherwise that were effected on the basis of the earlier law. To deny this power to the Supreme Court on the basis of some outmoded theory that the Court only finds law but does not make it is to make ineffective the powerful instrument of justice placed in the hands of the highest judiciary of this country. As this Court for the first time has been called upon to apply the doctrine evolved in a different country under different circumstances, we would like to move warily in the beginning. We would lay down the following proposition : (1) The doctrine of prospective over-ruling can be invoked only in matters arising under our Constitution ; (2) it can be applied only by the highest Court of the Court i.e. the Supreme Court as it has the constitutional jurisdiction to declare law binding on all the courts in India; (3) The scope of the retroactive operation of the law declared by the Supreme Court superseding its earlier decisions is left to its discretion to be molded in accordance with the justice of the cause or matter before it. (133) Honble Mr. Justice Wanchoo in a separate Judgment observed at page 852 of SCR 1967(2) (supra) :- ``We must say that we are not prepared to accept the doctrine of prospective over-ruling. We do not know whether this doctrine would also be applied to amendments of ordinary laws. We find it difficult to visualise what would be the effect of this doctrine if it is applied to amendment of ordinary laws. We have so far been following in this country the well-known doctrine that courts declare law and that a declaration made by a court is the law of the land and takes effect from the date the law came into force. We have so far been following in this country the well-known doctrine that courts declare law and that a declaration made by a court is the law of the land and takes effect from the date the law came into force. We would on principle be loath to change that well known doctrine and supersede it by the doctrine of prospective over ruling. (134). In view of the observations of the Honble Supreme Court, it must be said that cases in which statutory provision, is required to be interpreted by the Court and the law which is to be declared by the Court is the law enacted by the legislature, unless the doctrine of prospective over-ruling is applied by the Honble Supreme Court itself, the declaration of law by the Honble Supreme Court must take effect from the date of enactment of the statute in question. The High Court and other inferior courts do not have any right to apply the doctrine of prospective over ruling, to a decision given by the Honble Supreme Court. Of course, if the Honble Supreme Court has it self applied the doctrine of prospective over-ruling to a declaration of law made by it and directed that the law declared by it would be followed in future cases only, the High Court and other inferior Court would have no jurisdiction to give a retrospective effect to the decision given by the Honble Supreme Court. In other words, the power to apply the doctrine of prospective over ruling, to the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court, vests in the Honble Supreme Court itself and not in the High Court or any other inferior Court or Tribu- nal. There is no merit in the view that the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh vs. State (supra) and K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala (supra) should not be applied to cases, which were decided by the learned Single Judge before the decision in the above cases. (135). There is no merit in the view that the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh vs. State (supra) and K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala (supra) should not be applied to cases, which were decided by the learned Single Judge before the decision in the above cases. (135). To sum up, in our view, the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court in Raghubir Singhs case (supra) and in K.S. Paripoornans case (supra) as to the interpretation of Section 30 of the Amending Act of 1984 (Act No. 68 of 1984), read with Section 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by Amending Act of 1984 is the law in force. We are further of the opinion that the doc- trine of prospective over ruling has no application to the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court in the above mentioned cases. Even, if the acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the claimants would not have been entitled to the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended by Amending Act of 1984) in view of the law declared by the Honble Supreme Court in K.S. Paripoornans case (supra), because the award was made by the Land Acquisition Officer before 30th April, 1982, the date on which amendment Bill was introduced in the Lok Subha. However, the benefit under Section 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Amending Act 1984 would have been available in above mentioned cases in view of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Raghubir Singhs case (supra), because the award by the Civil Judge was given after 30th April, 1982, the date of introducing the Amendment Bill in the Lok Sabha. In the instant case, the acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 and the possession of the land had been taken by the State Government on May 27, 1977 and as soon as possession of the land was taken by the Government, the land vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances, and therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Pratap & Anr. vs. State of Raj. vs. State of Raj. (supra), the fact that Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was extended to Rajasthan w.e.f. 24th September, 84 and that Sec. 56 was added by the Land Acquisition (Rajasthan Amendment) Act 1967, are not relevant for determining the amount of compensation payable to the claimants, and therefore, the claimants were not entitled to any benefit under Section 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Act 68 of 1984. (136). For reasons mentioned above, these appeals deserve to be partly allo- wed and are hereby allowed. The orders passed by the learned Civil Judge granting benefit of Sec.23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984 to the claimants and the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge upholding the award of the learned Single Judge which benefit of Sections 23(1-A), (2) and Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was given to claimants, are hereby quashed and set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.