Judgment : .1. W.P.No.7429 of 1989 and W.p. 7436 of 1989 are filed by the respective petitioners for the issue of writ certiorarified mandamus to call for the records of the third respondent in Roc. C1/123820 of 1987 and Roc.C1/123819 of 1986, dated 17. 1987, of the second respondent in D.Dis(1) (CA) 188 of 1987 and D.Dis (1) (CA) 189 of 1987, dated 28. 1987 and of the first respondent in G.O.Rt No. 1643, Home Cinemas. 11, Department, dated 25. 1989 and G.O.Rr.No.1064, Home Cine.I, Department, dated 25. 1989 respectively and quash the same and consequently, forbear the respondent from enforcing the punishment of suspension against the petitioners in respect of the alleged violation on 11. 1986. 2. It is averred in the affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions that the petitioners are licensees of the permanent cinema called Valluvar Thiraipada Arangam and Cine Valluvar Theatre respectively in Palani Town and the theatres have been functioning meticulously observing the provisions of law and the terms and conditions of the licences. It is further averred that the third respondent in his notices dated 2. 1987, issued on the basis of a report from the 4th respondent, called upon the petitioners to show cause as to why action should not be taken against them for the alleged admission of 94 persons and 83 persons respectively over and above the permitted capacity. It is stated that the petitioners have submitted a detailed explanation, explaining the situation that there were really no over accommodations in the theatres, but the third respondent o btained, behind the back of the petitioners, remark from the Commercial Tax Department and on the basis thereof ordered suspension of C’ Form licence of both the theatres for one day, that is on 28. 1987, The appeals filed by the petitioners have been rejected by the 2nd respondent. Thereupon the petitioners filed a further revision under Sec 9.B of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas Regulations Act, 1955 hereinafter referred to as the Act before the Government. The 1st respondent, after issuing notices on 27.1 2.1988 enhanced the period of punishment from one day to fifteen days in respect of both the theatres. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petitions have been filed. .3. The 1st respondent, after issuing notices on 27.1 2.1988 enhanced the period of punishment from one day to fifteen days in respect of both the theatres. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petitions have been filed. .3. It is contended by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the Appellate Authority as well as the Revisional Authority have passed the orders mechanically and without looking into the provisions of the Act. He further brought to my notice that no appeal lies against the order passed by the licensing authority under Section 9(1) (b) of the Act as per the judgment rendered by his Court in The Licensee, Sangeeth Theatre, Vaniambadi, North Arcot, Ambedkar District and others v. The Appellate Authority, etc. and two others, 1992 W.L.R. 634. He further contended that as the appeal itself is not maintainable, the orders passed by the Appellate Authority as well as the Revisional Authority are non est orders. It has also been further contended by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the Revisional Authority by modifying the order of the appellate authority and enhancing the punishment to 15 days from one day, has committed illegality and such enhancement is without any basis and power. 4. On the other hand, it is contended by learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents in these matters that the orders were passed by the Revisional Authority only after giving opportunity to the petitioners, that the Managers of the Cinema theatres in question have admitted the offence and that, therefore, the orders of the Revisional Authority are right and there is no violation of the powers conferred on the Government to exercise under Section 9-B of the Act. 5. In view of the above submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, the point for consideration is whether the revisional authority has got any power to modify the orders of the appellate authority by enhancing the punishment. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has brought to my notice the meaning of the word "modify" as found in the Law Lexicon. According to which, modify means to change, or vary, to qualify or reduce. He has also brought to my notice the judgment of the Patna High Court in Rameshar Das v. Tildhari Das, A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has brought to my notice the meaning of the word "modify" as found in the Law Lexicon. According to which, modify means to change, or vary, to qualify or reduce. He has also brought to my notice the judgment of the Patna High Court in Rameshar Das v. Tildhari Das, A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 313, wherein it was held that the term"modify" does not include the power of enhancement of sentence. It has been held in the above judgment that the Full Bench had no power to enhance the sentence imposed by the Gram Cutcherry, in an appeal. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thippeswamy v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 747 to show that the enhancement of sentence by appellate or revisional court by acting on the plea of guilty is violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. In the said decision, it has been observed by the Honourable Supreme court as follows: "It is obvious that by reason of plea bargaining, the appellant pleaded guilty and did not avail of the opportunity to defend himself against the charge, which is a course he would certainly not have followed if he had known that he would not be let off with a mere sentence of fine but would be sentenced to imprisonment. It would be clearly violative of Art.21 of the Constitution to induce or lead an accused to plead guilty under a promise or assurance that he would be let off lightly and then in appeal or revision, to enhance the sentence. Ofcourse when we say this, we do not for a moment wish to suggest that the Court of Appeal or revision should not interfere where a disproportionately low sentence is imposed on the accused as a result of plea bargaining. But in such a case, it would not be reasonable, fair, just to act on the plea of guilty for the purpose of enhancing the sentence. But in such a case, it would not be reasonable, fair, just to act on the plea of guilty for the purpose of enhancing the sentence. The Court of Appeal or Revision should, in such a case, set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused and remand the case to the trial court so that the accused can, if he so wishes, defend himself against the charge and if he is found guilty, proper sentence can be passed against him." Basing on the above judgment, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has argued that even though the Managers have admitted the guilt, the revisional authority should not have acted on the plea of guilty, as it would not be reasonable or fair to enhance the punishment of suspension of C Form licence from one day to fifteen days. Basing on the above submissions, he further contended that the orders passed by the Appellate Authority as well as the Revisional Authority are liable to be set aside. 7. It has been held by this Court in The Licensee, Sangeeth Theatre, Vaniambadi North Arcot v. The Appellate Authority, 1992 W.L.R.. 634, that no appeal lies against the orders passed by the Licensing Authority, suspending the C’ Form licence under Sec. 9 (1) of the Act. In the present case, the orders of the Licensing Authority were passed on 17. 1987, whereby the C’ Form Licences have been suspended for a period of one day under Section 9(2) of the Act. But the judgment of this court referred to supra was passed on 3. 1992 and as such it cannot be said that the same will have retrospective effect to set aside the orders of the 3rd respondent passed on 17. 1987. 8. However, it has to be seen whether the 1st respondent has got any power to enhance the punishment imposed by the 3rd respondent from one day to fifteen days in the revisions filed by the petitioners herein. As per the Law Lexicon, the word "Modify" means "To change, or vary, to qualify or reduce." Further, as can be seen from the judgment of the Patna High Court in Rameshar Das v. TildhariDas, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 313, the term "modify" does not include the power of enhancing the sentence. As per the Law Lexicon, the word "Modify" means "To change, or vary, to qualify or reduce." Further, as can be seen from the judgment of the Patna High Court in Rameshar Das v. TildhariDas, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 313, the term "modify" does not include the power of enhancing the sentence. As noticed already, the Supreme Court has also held in Thippeswamy v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 747, that it will not be fair and just to act on the plea of guilty for the purpose of enhancing the sentences. In the present case, the revisional authority has enhanced the sentence only on the ground that the petitioners have admitted the offence on the spot. When once the revisional authority comes to the conclusion that these are cases where the sentences have to be enhanced, the only course open to the revisional authority is to remit the cases to the licensing authority, so that the petitioners, if they so desire, could defend themselves against the proposed enhancement. Instead of that, the Revisional Authority has taken the responsibility of enhancing the sentence. 9. Basing on the decisions referred to supra, I hold that it would not be reasonable, fair and just on the part of the revisional authority to act on the plea of guilty for the purpose of enhancing the punishment. Further, "enhancement" cannot ofcourse be included in the terms "uphold" or "set aside " and it cannot be included in the terms "modify" either. Various meaning have been given to the word "modify" in the Oxford English Dictionary and one of the meanings which I think should be adopted for the purposes of the present cases is "to make less severe", or "to tone down", which is reverse of enhancement. In view of the above, I hold that the power of modification includes the power of annulling or reversing, but not the power of enhancement of sentence. I also hold that the word "modify" does not include and could not have been intended to include the power of enhancing the sentence. 10. In view of the above, I set aside the orders passed by the Revisional Authority, whereby the punishment of suspension of C’ Form licence for one day has been enhanced to fifteen days. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. No costs. Consequently the connected W.M.Ps. are dismissed.