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1998 DIGILAW 974 (RAJ)

Ram Narain v. State of Rajasthan

1998-09-04

P.P.NAOLEKAR

body1998
Honble NAOLEKAR, J.–The petitioner was a Sub-Inspector of Police. Land comprising in Khasra no.301 measuring fifteen bighas situated in village Board Tehsil Digod District Kota, was declared surplus under the ceiling proceedings under Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955, and the same was available for allotment. The petitioner applied under R.44 of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) (Government) Rules 1963, for allotment of the aforesaid land. The Tehsil Land Allotment Committee, presided over by the Additional Collector (Colonisation) Kota, allotted land to the petitioner by order dated 14.6.1976. After allotment of the land comprising in Khasra No. 301 measuring fifteen bighas, the petitioner was placed in possession. (2). The State Government, aggrieved by the order dated 14.6.1976, preferred an appeal in the court of Collector Kota, under s.23 of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (for short hereinafter to be referred to as `the Act of 1973). In that appeal an objection was raised by the petitioner that no appeal is maintainable against the order of Government dated 14.6.1976. The Coll- ector treated the order of allotment to be passed under the new Ceiling Act and exercised the powers under R.17(4) of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Rules, 1973(for short hereinafter to be referred to as `the Rules of 1973), and cancelled the allotment made in favour of the petitioner. (3). During the pendency of appeal before the Collector, the Land Allotment Committee of Tehsil Digod had cancelled the allotment made in favour of petitioner, on 2.6.1981. The said order was treated by the Collector to be null and void while deciding the appeal by its order dated 16.8.1983. Being aggrieved against the said order of cancellation, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 23(2) of the Ceiling Act before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue by its judgment dated 10.7.1987 dismissed the appeal as not maintainable. (4). The only submission urged before this court by the learned counsel for petitioner is that the order of Board of Revenue dismissing the appeal of petitioner as not maintainable, does not borne out from the true construction of S.23 of the Act of 1973 and R.17 read with R.22 of the Rules of 1973. (5). To appreciate the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner it would be fruitful to refer to the relevant sections and rules. (5). To appreciate the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner it would be fruitful to refer to the relevant sections and rules. The Rules of 1973 are made in exercise of the powers conferred by S.38 of the Act of 1973. R.17(1) provides for allotment of the land declared surplus under the Ceiling Act, which reads-``Subject to the provisions contained in Sub-rules (2) (3) (4) and Rules 18, 19, 120, 20A and 21, the surplus land vested in the State Government under any law relating to imposition of the Ceiling on agricultural holdings shall be allotted in accordance with the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Allotment of Land for Agricultural Purposes) Rules, 1973 in Non-Project Areas and in accordance with the rules or statement of conditions issued under the Rajasthan Colonisation Act 1954, in Project Areas. Thus, under R.17(1) the surplus land if it is in Non-Project Area shall be allotted in accordance with the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Allotment of Land for Agricultural Purposes) Rules, 1973 and if the land is situated in Project Areas then in accordance with the provisions contained in the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954. Sub-rule(4) of R.17 authorises the Collector to cancel any allotment made under the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) (Government) Rules, 1963 or under the Rules of 1973 or under any other rules so far as the allotment relates to land acquired under laws relating to agricultural ceilings, either suo motu or on the application of any person. The allotment can be cancelled in case the allotment has been secured through fraud or misrepresentation, or has been made against rules, or in case the allottee has committed breach of any of the conditions of allotment. A cancellation order could be passed by the Collector only after giving notice to the person affected for an opportunity of being heard. Rule 17(4) clothes the Collector with the powers of cancellation. Rule 22 is a provision for appeal which says that appeals from orders passed under these Rules shall be governed by the provisions of Sec. 23 of the Act of 1973. If the allotment is cancelled by the Collector in exercise of the powers conferred on the Collector under Rule 17(4) of the Rules of 1973, appeal is provided under Rule 22 and is governed by s.23 of the Act of 1973. (6). If the allotment is cancelled by the Collector in exercise of the powers conferred on the Collector under Rule 17(4) of the Rules of 1973, appeal is provided under Rule 22 and is governed by s.23 of the Act of 1973. (6). Chapter VI of the Act of 1973 relates to appeals wherein under S.23 appeal has been provided. Sub-section (1) and (2) of S.23 which is relevant for our purpose and reads as under :- ``(1) The State Government or any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Authorised Officer under Sub-section (3) of Section 12 or Sub-section (3) of Section 11-B or under sub-section (3) of Section 19 or under Section 21 may, within thirty days of the date of decision or order, appeal to the Collector of the concerned district against such decision or order. (2) The State Government or any person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector in appeal under Sub-section (1) may, within sixty days from the date of appellate order, appeal to the Board against such decision. A bare reading of Sub-sec. (1) makes it clear that no appeal is provided against the cancellation order passed by the Collector in exercise of the powers conferred u/R. 17(4) of the Rules of 1973 and rightly so because the order passed by the Collector u/R.17(4) could not have been hear by the Collector himself who is an Authority to hear appeals u/S.23(1) of the Act of 1973, appeal referable under Sub-section (1) is, where the order is passed by the Authorised Officer under Sub-section (3) of S.12 or Sub-sec. (3) of S.11-B or u/Sub-sec. (3) of S.19 or under S.21. Under R. 17(4) no order is passed by the Authorised Officer and it is passed only by the Collector. Sub- section (2) of S.23 provides for, that the State Government or any person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector in appeal under Sub-section (1) may, within sixty days from the date of appellate order, appeal to the Board against such decision. Sub- section (2) is a provision for filing an appeal against the order passed by Collector in appeal referred before him under Sub-sec.(1) of S.23. Under Sub-section (2) appeal lies from the order of the Collector to the Board of Revenue. Sub- section (2) is a provision for filing an appeal against the order passed by Collector in appeal referred before him under Sub-sec.(1) of S.23. Under Sub-section (2) appeal lies from the order of the Collector to the Board of Revenue. If Sub-section (1) and (2) of S.23 are strictly construed then there is no scope u/S.23(2) for filing an appeal before the Board of Revenue against the order passed by the Collector under R.17(4) of the Rules of 1973. But R.22 provides that appeal shall lie from the order passed under the Rules of 1973 and it shall be governed by the provisions of S.23 of the Act of 1973. Thus, R.22 imports the provisions of S.23 for the purposes of filing appeal against the order passed by the Collector. When the provision of appeal is made under R.22 having a reference to S.23, the endeavour should be to give a reasonable meaning so as to give meaning to the legislative in- tent. A court is required to adopt a construction which advances the policy of Legislation to extend the benefit rather than one which curtails the benefit. (7). R.22 of the Rules of 1973 clearly provides for appeal against the order passed by Collector and a reference is made to S.23 wherein the forum and period of limitation is provided for filing the appeal. Legislative intent is clearly to provide an appeal but it appears to be a case of unskilfulness of the draftsman in not introducing certain words in the Statute i.e. R.22, resulting in apparent ineffectiveness of the language. Since the courts strictly lean against reducing a Statute to futility, it is permissible in these cases to reject the surplus words in S.23(2) of the Act of 1973 which intend to provide appeal to Board of Revenue against the order of Collector under R.17(4) of the Rules of 1973 to make the whole Statute effective and workable. To give meaning to R.22, words ``in appeal under Sub-sec. (1) and ``appellate shall be treated as surplusage and deleted from Sub-sec. (2) of S.23 of the Act of 1973. The broad intention of the Rule Making Authority was not in doubt to provide for an appeal against the order passed by the Collector u/R. 17(4). The words from S.23(2) could be rejected as immaterial to make the provisions of R.22 effective. (2) of S.23 of the Act of 1973. The broad intention of the Rule Making Authority was not in doubt to provide for an appeal against the order passed by the Collector u/R. 17(4). The words from S.23(2) could be rejected as immaterial to make the provisions of R.22 effective. The literal reading of the words of the words in S.23(2) of the Act would have frustrated substantially the purpose of enactment providing appeal against the order u/R.17(4) of the Rules of 1973. Sub-sec. (2) thus, shall be read as ``the State Government or any person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector may, within sixty days from the date of order, appeal to the Board against such decision. (8). Having construed S.23(2) and R.22 in the aforesaid manner for the purposes of appeal against the order passed by Collector under R.17(4) of the Rules of 1973, this court is of the opinion that the appeal filed by petitioner before the Board of Revenue, was in accordance with law and could not have been dismissed by the Board of Revenue as not maintainable. As a result thereof, the order of Board of Revenue dated 10.7.1987 is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Board of Revenue for rehearing the appeal of petitioner and passing a fresh order on merits in accordance with law. The petition stands disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order for costs.