JUDGMENT C.K. Prasad, J. 1. This is plaintiff's second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Jijiyabai, filed the suit for declaration of title & perpetual injunction in relation to the suit land situated in village Saunthar of Sohagpur Tahsil in the district of Hoshangabad. Alternatively, decree for recovery of possession was sought. Civil Judge Class-II, Sohagpur, by judgment and decree dated 13.08.1994 passed in Civil Suit No. 7-A/1982 found the plaintiff's title over half portion of the suit land and accordingly decreed the plaintiff's suit in part. Plaintiff as also defendants aggrieved by the same, preferred appeals. Appeal filed by the plaintiff led to registration of Civil Appeal No. 30-A/1986 and the appeal filed by the defendant was registered as Civil Appeal No. 38-A/1986 Both the appeals were heard by the Addl. District Judge, Hoshangabad, camp at Suhagpur and by common judgment dated 22.08.1991, he dismissed the appeal preferred by the plaintiff, but allowed the appeal preferred by the defendants. As a result thereof entire suit of the plaintiff has been dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, plaintiff has preferred these appeals. Second Appeal No. 493/91 and S.A. No. 494/91 have been preferred against the judgment and decree passed in Civil Appeal No. 38-A/86 and Civil Appeal No. 30-A/86 respectively. By order dt. 04.03.1992 both the appeals have been admitted on the following substantial question of law :- Whether the original plaintiff Jijiyabai could claim inheritence of the property in the hands of Draupadi, widow of Laxminarayan as the heir of her husband in view of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act and for that reason, her suit deserved to be decreed ? 2. According to the plaintiff Jijiyabai; disputed land having an area of 25.49 acres situated in village Saunthar of Sohangpur tahsil (Distt. Hoshangabad belonged to Dipiya Bai @ Draupadibai, widow of Laxminarayan. According to the plaintiff Dipiyabai died in the year 1960 and plaintiff being her successor came in possession of the same, after her death. It is assertion of the plaintiff that she became widow during her childhood and few years thereafter, she came to her father's place and started living with her brother's wife Dipiyabai. According to the plaintiff Dipiyabai died in the year 1960 and plaintiff being her successor came in possession of the same, after her death. It is assertion of the plaintiff that she became widow during her childhood and few years thereafter, she came to her father's place and started living with her brother's wife Dipiyabai. It is the assertion of the plaintiff that at the time of death of Dipiya, there was no close relation to deal with the property and as such plaintiff took the help of the defendant for management of the land and for agricultural operations. Case of the plaintiff further is that defendant used to give account of the agricultural produce and from that she was maintaining herself. 3. It is the assertion of the plaintiff that defendant used to go to the Tahsil office and other offices in connection with the land. Taking advantage of the same, according to the plaintiff, defendant got his name mutated in the revenue records and on being questioned defendant stated that the same has been done to avoid any problem and he had no dishonest intention. She has further stated that he acknowledged the plaintiff to be the owner of the suit land. According to the plaintiff, although the names of the defendant as also the plaintiff were recorded in the revenue records in relation to the land belonging to Dipiyabai, but in fact, plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the same. 4. Case of the plaintiff, further is that in the year 1980 defendant made attempt to receive the amount of compensation of the land acquired, but she objected to the same. This conduct of the defendant, according to the plaintiff, made her suspicious and when an enquiry was made, it was found that defendant has got his name recorded exclusively in the revenue records. In the aforesaid premises, plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of title and perpetual injunction, in the alternative for recovery of possession as also for restraining the defendant from receiving the compensation amount from the State Government. 5. Defendant Chhotelal @ Mohanlal has filed his written statement and contested the suit. According to him, disputed land originally belonged to his ancester Khubchand. After his death, Jagannath, Amirchand, Tikaram became its owners. Defendant is the son of Tikaram. 5. Defendant Chhotelal @ Mohanlal has filed his written statement and contested the suit. According to him, disputed land originally belonged to his ancester Khubchand. After his death, Jagannath, Amirchand, Tikaram became its owners. Defendant is the son of Tikaram. Case of the defendant further is that after the death of Jagannath and his three sons namely Laxminarayan, Ayodhya Prasad and Chhotelal; name of the widow of Jagannath namely Gangabai was mutated. Said Gangabai died in the year 1925 and after her death, dispute arose between the widow of Laxminarayan namely Draupadibai @ Dipiyabai and Tikaram, his father, before the Revenue Authorities. During the pendency of the said proceeding, according to the defendant, a compromise was arrived at and Dipiyabai was given 11.75 acres of land for her maintenance. According to the defendant, it was agreed that after the death of Dipiyabai, defendant shall become the owner of the properly. It is the stand of defendant that after the death of Dipiyabai he has exclusive title over the same. His further case is that after death of Dipiyabai, he is in possession of the disputed land and as such perfected his title by adverse possession. 6. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, trial court framed various issues and on consideration of the materials found that after death of Dipiyabai, plaintiff did not become the owner of the entire suit land, but found that she is entitled to possession of half share. However, in appeals, the lower appellate Court found that plaintiff has no right over the property and consequently dismissed the plaintiff's entire suit. Lower appellate Court has found that the dispute in regard to mutation over the disputed land was finally resolved in the year 1925 and before it, Jagannath and his sons have already died. In the opinion of the lower appellate Court at that particular point of time, Hindu widow had no right over the property by way of succession and it was for the first time, that limited rights was conferred to a Hindu Woman under the provision of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act 1937. In the opinion of the lower appellate Court, as Jagannath and all male members died prior to 1925,, Dipiyabai nor the plaintiff Jijiyabai had title over the property. 7. In the opinion of the lower appellate Court, as Jagannath and all male members died prior to 1925,, Dipiyabai nor the plaintiff Jijiyabai had title over the property. 7. Lower appellate Court, while passing the impugned judgment and decree has further found that defendant is the son of Tikaram who was cousin of Jagannath and hence according to the ancient Hindu Law, after the death of Jagannath, he being the only surviving male member, became the owner of his property. Lower appellate Court further found that after the death of Jagannath, according the prevalent law, his property devolved on Tikaram and thereafter his son defendant. Accordingly, the lower appellate Court found that after the death of Dipiyabai, Jijiyabai shall have no title over the property. 8. Shri Grisham Jain appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that the view taken by the lower appellate Court that Dipiyabai had no right in the year 1925, according to the prevalent law and as such after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, her right will not become an absolute right is erroneous. He submits that right of maintenance to a Hindu Woman is not the creation of statute like Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 and Hindu Women's Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946. He submits that the right of maintenance flows from temporal and spiritual relationship of husband and wife and is not created by any statute. He submits that the right of maintenance has been recognised under the aforesaid statutes, but the right of maintenance if pre-existing right under the Shastrik law. He submits that once it is held so, the property so given to Dipiyabai in 1925 after death of her husband and Dipiyabai having died in the year 1960 i.e. after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 her limited right has become an absolute right. He further submits that the plaintiff Jijiyabai being the sister of her husband she will inherit the property after he death under section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. 9. Shri A.K. Choube, however, appearing on behalf of the defendants-respondents submits that Tikaram being the only male member surviving at the time of death of Jagannath, who was his cousin according to the prevalent Hindu Law, he shall succeed to his property and thereafter his son, defendant Chhotelal shall step into his shoes. 9. Shri A.K. Choube, however, appearing on behalf of the defendants-respondents submits that Tikaram being the only male member surviving at the time of death of Jagannath, who was his cousin according to the prevalent Hindu Law, he shall succeed to his property and thereafter his son, defendant Chhotelal shall step into his shoes. He further submits that recording of name of Dipiyabai in the revenue record, shall not create any title in her favour as according to him entries in the revenue records neither create nor extinguish title and such entries are for limited purpose of recovery of revenue. He further submits that the name of Dipiyabai was recorded in the Revenue records with the consent of Chhotelal and as such same shall not confer any title on her. According to him, if Dipiyabai had no title, plaintiff who is her husband's sister cannot claim title over the disputed land by way of inheritance under section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. 10. Having heard Shri Jain for the appellants and Shri Choube for the respondents, I am of the opinion that the whole assumption on which the lower appellate Court has proceeded that in the year 1925, Dipiyabai had no right over the property and for the first time, right of Hindu Woman was recognised after coming into the force of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, is erroneous. This question pointedly came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in case of Raghvir Singh and ors. vs. Gulab Singh & others JT 1998 (4) SC 579 and on consideration of the earlier authorities and the text, the Apex Court had laid down the law in the following words :- The obligations, under the Shastric Hindu Law, to maintain a Hindu widow out of the properties of her deceased husband received a statutory recognition with the coming into force of the Hindu, Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. The law on the subject was codified by the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946 which came into force on April 23, 1946. The right to maintenance of Hindu widow, as a pre-existing right was thus recognised by the two statutes referred to above but it was not created for the first time by any of those statutes. The right to maintenance of Hindu widow, as a pre-existing right was thus recognised by the two statutes referred to above but it was not created for the first time by any of those statutes. Her right to maintenance existed under the Shastrik Hindu Law long before statutory enactments came into force. After the attainment of independence, the need for emancipation of woman from feudal bondage became even more imperative. There was growing agitation by Hindu Women for enlargement of their rights as provided by Shastric Hindu Law in various spheres. It was at this juncture that the Parliament stepped in and enacted various statutes like Hindu Marriage Act, 1956. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 providing for intestate succession. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in case of Raghvir Singh (supra) I do not have the slightest hestiation in holding that in the year 1925 Dipiyabai had right of maintenance and the contrary view taken by the lower appellate Court is erroneous. 11. Shri Grisham Jain then submits that once it is held that Dipiyabai had right of maintenance in the year 1925, she having died in the year 1960 i.e. after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act 1956, under sec. 14(1) of the Act, her limited right will become an absolute right. Shri Choube, however, appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that as Dipiyabai was given property by way of compromise before the Revenue Authorities, her limited right shall not become an absolute right in view of section 14 (1) of the Act and according to his submission as the case is covered under section 14 (2) of the Act Dipiyabai shall not become the full owner. In view of the rival submission what falls for determination is that in the facts of the present case whether the provisions of Sec. 14 (1) shall be applicable or Sec. 14 (2) of the Act ? In view of the rival submission, it is apt to reproduce Sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. This reads as under :- 14 (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. In view of the rival submission, it is apt to reproduce Sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. This reads as under :- 14 (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation :- In this sub-section, "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise or at a partition, or in liue of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person whether a relative or not, before at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as Stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. 14 (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order or a civil Court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. 12. According to Shri Choube as Dipiyabai was given property on account of a compromise arrived at before the Revenue Authorities and the aforesaid compromise having provided that after her death, defendant shall become the owner of the property, provision of Sec. 14 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act is clearly attracted and Dipiyabai shall not become the full owner of the property in view of Sec. 14(1) of the Act. In support of his submission, Shri Choube has placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Veddeboyina Tulasamma and others vs. Veddeboyina Sesha Reddi, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1944. Having gone through the judgment closely, I am of the the opinion that the same instead of supporting, his case goes against him. In the present case, the stand of the defendant is that by way of compromise, Dipiyabai was given the right of maintenance and thereafter, the property was to revert to defendant Chhotelal. As Dipiyabai had pre-existing right of maintenance notwithstanding the compromise providing limited interest for her in the properties, in view of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act she will become a full owner. As Dipiyabai had pre-existing right of maintenance notwithstanding the compromise providing limited interest for her in the properties, in view of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act she will become a full owner. I am fortified in any view from the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of V. Tulasamma (supra) in which it has been held as follows :- In the circumstances we reach the conclusion that since in the present case the properties in question were acquired by the appellant under the compromise in lieu or satisfaction of her right of maintenance, it is sub-section (1) and not sub-section (2) of Section 14 which would be applicable and hence the appellant must be deemed to have become full owner of the properties notwithstanding that the compromise prescribed a limited interest for her in the properties. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore that of the District Judge, Nellore. The result is that the suit will stand dismissed, but with no order as to costs. 13. Yet another decision on which Shri Choube placed reliance is the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Kothi Satyanarayana vs. Galla Sithayya and others, AIR 1987, Supreme Court, 353 and my attention has been drawn to the following paragraph from the said judgment:- The Settlement Deed is an instrument contemplated under sub-sec. (2) and admittedly it created a restricted estate in favour of the widow. Therefore, sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 14 would not attracted. The submission of the appellant's learned counsel that the Settlement Deed brought the properties covered by it in exchange or in lieu of properties unauthorisedly alienated by Ramamurthy and as the widow had full title in the alienated property, title must be held to have accrued in favour of the widow in the properties covered by the settlement cannot be accepted. In the aforesaid case, life estate was created in favour of the widow under the settlement deed. However, in the present case, as found Dipiyabai had pre-existing right of maintenance and recording of her name in the revenue records was by way of a compromise. Hence, it cannot be said that life estate was created in her favour by virtue of the compromise. She had a pre-existing right of maintenance under the Shastrik Law. However, in the present case, as found Dipiyabai had pre-existing right of maintenance and recording of her name in the revenue records was by way of a compromise. Hence, it cannot be said that life estate was created in her favour by virtue of the compromise. She had a pre-existing right of maintenance under the Shastrik Law. In case relied on by Shri Choube, life estate was created by way of a Settlement Deed and hence the provision of Section 14 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act has been found to be attracted. This is not the position here and hence the authority relied on, is clearly distinguishable. 14. Shri Choube lastly submits that even if it is assumed that Dipiyabai's limited estate has become absolute after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, still after her death in the year 1960, plaintiff Jijiyabai who is the sister of her husband shall not succeed to her property under sec. 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. In support of this submission, he has placed reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Hazarilal Mukundilal & ors vs. Mahesh and anr., 1961 MPLJ 590 . In the aforesaid case, this Court was considering the provisions of Section 11 of the C.P. Tenancy Act in relation to an occupancy holding, held as joint family property by 5 brothers and claim by widow of one of the brothers died in the year 1931 whereas the widow died in the year 1944. In the back ground of the aforesaid fact while considering Sec. 11 of C.P. Tenancy Act, this Court found that the holding shall go to the surviving members of the family and not to the daughter of the deceased brother. Here in the present case, one is required to consider the provisions of sec. 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. As Dipiyabai had died after coming into the force of the Hindu Succession Act in the year 1960, her limited right became absolute. Hence the authority relied on is clearly distinguishable. 15. Having held that Dipiyabai had become absolute owner, one is required to consider the effect of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. As Dipiyabai had died after coming into the force of the Hindu Succession Act in the year 1960, her limited right became absolute. Hence the authority relied on is clearly distinguishable. 15. Having held that Dipiyabai had become absolute owner, one is required to consider the effect of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. Section 15 of the Act reads as follows :- 15 (1) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall develop according to the rule set out in section 16 - (a) firstly, upon the sons and the daughters (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter and also the husband;) (b) secondly upon the heirs of the husband; (c) thirdly, upon the mother & father; (d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and (e) lastly upon the heris of the mother. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)- (a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father; and (b) any property inherited by female Hindu from her husband or from her father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband. Under Section 16 of the Act among the heirs specified in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 15, those in one entry shall be preferred to those in any succeeding entry. Here in the present case, Dipiyabai has inherited the property from her husband and hence Section 15 (2) (b) of the Act shall be attracted. Plaintiff Jijiyabai is the sister of Dipiyabai's husband namely Laxminarayan. Sec. 15 (2) (b) of the Act in no uncertain terms provides that in case a female Hindu has inherited the property from her husband, property shall devolve upon the heirs of the husband. In the absence of any other heir Laxminarayn's sister i.e., the plaintiff is one of the heirs. Sec. 15 (2) (b) of the Act in no uncertain terms provides that in case a female Hindu has inherited the property from her husband, property shall devolve upon the heirs of the husband. In the absence of any other heir Laxminarayn's sister i.e., the plaintiff is one of the heirs. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff Jijiyabai after the death of Draupadi @ Dipiyabai shall inherit the property left by her under section 15 of the Act. Substantial question of law framed is thus answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 16. In the result the appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside. It is held that the plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the disputed land referred to in paragraph-1 of the plaint and she is entitled for possession from the defendants the properties described in paragraph 12 (e) of the plaint. It is further held that the plaintiff is entitled to receive the amount of compensation from the State Government. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed