JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, while working as District Excise Officer, was served with a charge sheet on 21.9.1995 alongwith a memorandum of charges. The petitioner also retired from service on reaching the age of superannuation w.e.f. 30.9.1995. The charge-sheet dated 21.9.1995 is under challenge in the present writ petition with a further prayer that the respondents be restrained from holding any enquiry against him since the petitioner had already been retired after Issuance of the charge sheet. The petitioner has also prayed for release of all this retirement benefits. 2. The writ petition was filed on 31.1.1996 Vide interim order dated 5.3.1996, this court, while issuing notice to the respondents, stayed further proceedings in the departmental enquiry. 3. The impugned charge sheet has been challenged mainly on the ground that the incident relates back to the year 1987-88 and 1988-89 and no charge sheet could have been served after more than 6 years that also just prior to date of retirement of the petitioner. It has further been alleged that the whole amount involved in the matter had already been deposited or recovered and since it is only a matter of irregularity which had duly been explained by the petitioner to the concerning authorities, there was no occasion for the respondents to issue charge sheet before retirement of the petitioner. 4. Mr. K.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner while relying on various judgments of the Apex Court and also this court has assailed the charge sheet mainly on the ground of delay. Mr. K.K. Sharma has heavily relied on the judgment of Apex Court in case of State of MP v. Bani Singh & another reported in 1990(2) SLR 798 , State of Punjab & others v. Chaman Lal Goyal, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 570 and also State of AP v. N. Radhakishan, reported in JT 1998 (3) SC 123 . 5. He has further contended that it will not be possible for the petitioner to defend his case after a lapse of more than 6 years resulting in violation of the principles of natural justice. 5. He has further contended that it will not be possible for the petitioner to defend his case after a lapse of more than 6 years resulting in violation of the principles of natural justice. He has also contended that since total amount involved has already been deposited or recovered, no purpose will be served in pursuing the matter for a minor irregularity which had duly been explained by the petitioner much prior to the date of his retirement and the whole exercise will result in nothing but mere harassment of the petition after his retirement. 6. Mr. Sharma, in the alternative, has also submitted that rule 170 of the RSR should also be so read for those persons also who were served with a charge sheet just prior to their retirement and since the incident is of the year 1987-88 and 1988-89, the exclusion part of four years be read in case of the petitioner also as provided under rule 170 of the RSR. 7. Mr. N.K. Maloo, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand, has contended that the writ petition is pre-mature since the petitioner has yet not filed reply to the charge sheet and it is not proper for this court to interfere in such matters at this stage. Mr. Maloo has placed reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in case of Union of India v. Ashok Kacker, reported in 1995 (7) SLR 430 and Union of India v. Upendra Singh, reported in JT 1994 (1) SC 658 , in which cases of Chamanlal Goyal and Bani Singh (supra) had been distinguished. 8. After having considered the submissions made at the Bar and carefully gone through the material on record and also the judgments cited at the Bar by the counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner are not sustainable. 9. Under the relevant provisions of the rules, the petitioner could have been served with a charge sheet even prior to the date of his retirement. Validity of rule 170 of the RSR is not under challenge in the present writ petition. It is for the concerning authorities to take a decision in regard to holding of departmental enquiry against the delinquent officer on the basis of material on record. Validity of rule 170 of the RSR is not under challenge in the present writ petition. It is for the concerning authorities to take a decision in regard to holding of departmental enquiry against the delinquent officer on the basis of material on record. This court under its writ jurisdiction cannot scrutinise the material so as to come to a different finding so far as sufficiency of material is concerned. 10. Further mere recovery of the amount is not relevant so far as allegations mentioned in the memorandum of charges are concerned. The petitioner has got an opportunity of filing reply to the memorandum of charges giving all the details as have been given in the present writ petition. It is the discretion of the disciplinary authority to even drop the proceedings after having been satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioner. In absence of any mala fides or bias against any of the officer, it cannot be presumed by this court that the disciplinary authority shall not act fairly and in accordance with law. 11. In any case, the writ petition is absolutely pre-mature and in such matters, moreso, in the facts and circumstances of this court under its writ jurisdiction. So far as judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner are concerned, each judgment has to be seen on its own facts. On peculiar facts of those cases where the charge-sheet or the order of suspension had been ordered to be quashed by the courts on the ground of delay. 12. In the present case, even otherwise, I find no such inordinate delay on the part of the respondents in issuing the charge sheet. It may be a matter of chance that the same could be served just prior to his reaching the age of superannuation. 13. The Apex Court in the case of N. Radhakishan (supra) has also observed as under- "It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all relevant factors land to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after' delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation of the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when there are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred, if the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charges officer unless It can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations." 14. Since the petitioner has already retired on 30.9.1995 and further disciplinary enquiry having been stayed by this court on 5.2.1996, in the interest of justice, I deem it proper to direct the respondents to complete the disciplinary enquiry within four months after receipt of certified copy of this order and also pass necessary orders within two months thereafter. It is expected from the petitioner also to fully cooperate in the departmental enquiry so that same may be concluded within the period specified above. 15. It is expected from the petitioner also to fully cooperate in the departmental enquiry so that same may be concluded within the period specified above. 15. In view of the discussion and observations made above, the writ petition is dismissed as having no merits. There will be no orders as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******