JUDGMENT 1. First defendant in a suit for rendition of accounts of a dissolved firm and mandatory injunction to put the plaintiff in possession of A and B Schedule properties and also prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from entering in the premises, is the appellant. 2. Plaint A schedule property having an extent of 8 cents and the building thereon belongs to the plaintiff's mother-in-law. On 20th May 1976 the mother-in-law executed a lease in favour of the plaintiff, stipulating a rent of Rs. 125 per mensem. On 21st May 1976 the plaintiff and defendants entered into a partnership agreement as per Ext. A-1 to start a business in the schedule premises. Ext. A-1. partnership deed provides that the lease in favour of the plaintiff will continue as such, that the defendants shall pay the plaintiff Rs. 1,500 per mensem, that the term of the partnership is for three years, that the defendants have to contribute Rs. 25,000 in the business, that the business shall be in copra, that the profits of the business shall be shared between the plaintiff and defendants at the ratio 40:30:30, that in case of loss in the business, the plaintiff is to get Rs. 5,000 in a year, that the business shall be managed by the defendants, that the B schedule movables supplied by the plaintiff shall be returned on the dissolution of the partnership, and that after the dissolution, the lease in favour of the plaintiff shall continue. 3. On the allegation that amounts are due to the plaintiff under the terms of Ext. A-1 the partnership agreement, and that the defendants even after the dissolution and termination of the partnership have not vacated the premises, the suit was laid. It is also alleged that the defendants after discontinuing the copra business have started rubber business against the terms of the partnership agreement and so a suit O.S. No. 44/79 was instituted by the plaintiff for injunction, etc. 4. It is contended that the lease actually was not in favour of the plaintiff, but in favour of the firm, that the lease deed produced by the plaintiff is a concocted document, that in 1976 August the plaintiff retired from the partnership, that the defendants continued as partners and in 1982, the 2nd defendant retired and the partnership reconstituted by the first defendant with his wife as the other partner. 5. 5. Elaborate evidence was taken and considering the evidence, the trial court held that Ext. A-1 is a genuine and valid lease in favour of the firm and also that the plaintiff did not retire from the partnership as contended, out she continued as a partner till the expiry of the term provided in Ext. A-1. It was also held that no proper accounts were maintained by the defendants and the plaintiff is entitled to get the accounts rendered and accordingly a preliminary decree was passed. Mandatory as well as prohibitory injunctions were also granted. 6. The first defendant went in appeal and the first appellate court with some modifications confirmed the findings of the trial court and also confirmed the preliminary decree. The first appellate court took note of the retirement of the second defendant and induction of the first defendant's wife as a partner and hence the modifications in the decree. 7. The trial court decree was modified to the effect that the first respondent (plaintiff) and appellant (1st defendant) are entitled to the profits at the ratio 40:60 and first respondent is entitled to receive Rs. 1,500 per mensem from the date of execution of Ext. A-1 till the date of dissolution of the partnership firm subject to the provisions of Clause.6 and 19 of Ext. A-1, and that the first respondent is not entitled to any relief against the second respondent. The first appellate court appointed a receiver for the rendition of accounts and further steps in the matter. It is against the above Judgment decree that ' the second appeal is directed. 8. Even though many points are seen raised in the Appeal Memorandum, the only point argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the suit as laid for the relief of mandatory injunction, cannot be sustained for the reason that the appellant is in possession, at worst as a trespasser. Ever since the moment the partnership was dissolved, his possession became that of a trespasser and so the suit should have been one for recovery of possession instead of mandatory injunction. 9. Ever since the moment the partnership was dissolved, his possession became that of a trespasser and so the suit should have been one for recovery of possession instead of mandatory injunction. 9. There are concurrent findings on the fact that the plaintiff is the lessee of the property, that she continued to be a partner till the expiry of the term of 3 years and that the contention that the lease was in favour of the firm and in 1976 the plaintiff retired from the firm, cannot hold good. In the light of the said findings of facts, there is actually no scope for the other points raised in the Appeal Memorandum and so the learned counsel did not rightly urge those points. 10. According to the learned counsel when the partnership came to an end, the first defendant was actually in possession of plaint A and B schedule properties and his possession from the date of dissolution of the partnership is that of a trespasser and so only a suit for possession could be maintained. The point is covered by binding precedents and an identical case was decided by the Supreme Court in Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh 1985 (2) SCC 332 . In that case, the appellant therein took on lease a plot of land including a shed from the original owner. While so in possession of the entire demised premises, he inducted the respondent as a licensee for one year. After expiry of the licence period, the appellant revoked the licence and filed the suit for mandatory injunction, directing the respondent to vacate the premises. During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent acquired the ownership of the land and shed from the original lessor and resisted dispossession. The Supreme Court held: "The respondent licensee must be deemed to be always a licensee. It was not open to him, during the subsistence of the licence or in the suit for recovery of possession of the property instituted after the revocation of the licence to set up title to the property in himself or anyone else. It was his plain duty to surrender possession of the property as a licensee and seek his remedy separately. ......." 11. The position in the case at hand is similar. Originally the defendants were only licensees whereas the plaintiff, the lessee had the legal possession of the property. It was his plain duty to surrender possession of the property as a licensee and seek his remedy separately. ......." 11. The position in the case at hand is similar. Originally the defendants were only licensees whereas the plaintiff, the lessee had the legal possession of the property. When the partnership dissolved on the expiry of the three year term, in spite of the dissolution, the defendants continued to be licensees and their character did not change into that of trespassers. When the licence was revoked by the plaintiff, it was incumbent upon the licensees to surrender possession and in such circumstances a suit for mandatory injunction to put the plaintiff in possession is certainly maintainable and well within the powers of the plaintiff. 12. A Division Bench of this Court in George v. John 1984 KLT 179 has held: "S.63, Easements Act, provides that where a licence is revoked, the licensee is entitled to a reasonable time to leave the property and to remove any goods which he has been allowed to place on the property. This shows that the licensee does not become a trespasser the moment the licence expires or is revoked for he has a reasonable time to leave the land and where he has brought goods on the land to remove the goods. His continuance on the property during this period at least is by no means as a trespasser. A trespasser is a person in wrongful possession who has a hostile animus against the person entitled to the legal possession of the property. A licensee has no possession and having common the property under a permissive arrangement with no possession or interest it cannot be assumed that the moment the licence is withdrawn he acquires the necessary physical and mental elements to become a trespasser. He might usurp the possession and develop into a trespasser, but then it is not an automatic and necessary development, the moment the licence is over. If he is a trespasser he would perfect his possession and become an owner at the end of 12 years. Possession of a licensee could become hostile, after the revocation of the licence only if the possession was adverse to the licensor to his knowledge and with his acquiescence. That is a matter to be pleaded and proved by the licensee. Possession of a licensee could become hostile, after the revocation of the licence only if the possession was adverse to the licensor to his knowledge and with his acquiescence. That is a matter to be pleaded and proved by the licensee. Lawful possession however long will not be adverse and it is only adverse possession that leads to the acquisition of title. A licensee's occupation does not become hostile possession or the possession of a trespasser the moment the licence comes to an end." 13. So, the law is that the licensee does not become a trespasser the moment the licence expires or is revoked. His continuance on the property certainly is not as a trespasser. 14. With expedition the plaintiff proceeded to get back the plaint schedule properties and there was no inordinate delay. The term of the partnership agreement expired on 21st May 1979 when there was automatic dissolution of the partnership. On 11th June 1979, the plaintiff filed the present suit, as O.S. 276/79 before the Munsiff's Court, Kozhikode which was subsequently re-numbered as O.S. 277/80 before the Sub Court. Even a case where a similar suit was instituted after the lapse of 3 years was found to be within reasonable time by the Supreme Court in the decision cited supra (Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh 1985 (2) SCC 332 . In the above circumstances, there is no merit at all in the Second Appeal. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed. No costs.