Honble YADAV, J.–The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for issuing a writ of mandamus, directing the respondents to appoint him on the post of Constable with all consequential benefits from the date persons lower in merit to him were appointed in services of State Police under the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rule 1989. (2). Heard learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. B.S.Charan as well as Mr. R.P.Vyas, appearing for the respondents. (3). Perused the averments made in the writ petition as well as the facts averred in the reply filed on behalf of answering respondents. (4). It is borne out from materials available on record that the respondents is- sued advertisement for recruitment of Constables in the Rajasthan Police and the petitioner being eligible in all respects submitted his application in prescribed proforma within stipulated time. After scrutiny of his application form petitioner appeared in written test and being qualified in written test he was subjected to endurance test. Measurement of his height and chest was found to be in accord- ance with the statutory Rules framed in this regard. (5). It is averred in paragraph 3 of the writ petition that petitioners name found place in the final select list which was notified on 29.12.97. (6). It is evident from Annex.1 dated 7.4.98 that during police verification the petitioner was found to be involved in a criminal case under Sec. 353 IPC, registered at Police Station Kerla Dist.Pali. After investigation, a challan was also filed against him in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) cum Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Pali. However, in the aforesaid criminal case, the petitioner was given benefit of doubt as all the witnesses were declared hostile. (7). It is relevant to mentioned here that the petitioner deliberately avoided to mention the aforesaid fact in his application form which was submitted by him for his appointment on the post of Constable and as such he was not given appointment on the ground of concealment of aforesaid facts in his application and also due to his involvement in the criminal case mentioned above though otherwise eligible in all respects. (8). It is not disputed before me that every candidate for his enlistment in Rajasthan Police Service is required to fill up a prescribed form where there is a specific column No. 17 which relates to pendency/involvement in criminal case. (8). It is not disputed before me that every candidate for his enlistment in Rajasthan Police Service is required to fill up a prescribed form where there is a specific column No. 17 which relates to pendency/involvement in criminal case. It is averred in Para 6 of the reply that the petitioner while submitting his application form which was required to be filed in by him had written `No against column No. 17. It is also averred in para 6 of the reply that there was a specific note in the application form itself that if any information given by a candidate is found to be false his application will be rejected and even after selection to the State service proceedings will be taken for his removal. It is how admitted by petitioner himself that he was tried for offence u/Sec.353 IPC in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.) cum Judl. Magistrate, Ist Class, Pali in case No.62/96 and was given benefit of doubt. Besides deliberate concealment of the aforesaid facts in proforma application, the petitioner again in the verification roll in Column No.8 (whether the applicant was made accused in any criminal case) specifically mentioned `No. (9). On the aforesaid premises it is urged by learned counsel for the respondents Mr. Vyas that the petitioner having been found to have furnished false information and also found guilty of material concealment has rightly been denied appointment. In support of his contention he placed reliance on two decisions rendered by learned Single Judge of this Court (Honble Mr. B.S. Chauhan, J.) in S.B.Civil Writ Pet.No. 226/1997 decided on 20th of July 1998 (1) and another decision om S.B. Civil Writ Peti. No. 1493/98 decided on 27th of July 1998(2) reiterating his earlier view after surveying catena of decision of the Apex Court as well as series of decisions rendered by this Court on the subject together with relevant Rajasthan Police (Subordinate Service) Rules 1989 with reference to Rule 13 of the aforesaid Rules. (10). Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. B.S. Charan on the other hand urged before me that while deciding the aforesaid two cases a decision rendered by Division Bench of this Court in D.B.C. Special Appeal no. 726/97 (State of Rajasthan V. Khalid Ahmed) decided on 18th of May,1998 (3), had escaped the notice of learned Single Judge. (11). The aforesaid argument of Mr. B.S. Charan on the other hand urged before me that while deciding the aforesaid two cases a decision rendered by Division Bench of this Court in D.B.C. Special Appeal no. 726/97 (State of Rajasthan V. Khalid Ahmed) decided on 18th of May,1998 (3), had escaped the notice of learned Single Judge. (11). The aforesaid argument of Mr. Charan is not acceptable to me for the simple reason that the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench in case of Khalid Ahmed (supra) themselves had affirmed the decision taken by learned Single Judge in case of Shesh Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan & Others (S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.2490/97) (4) where in Shesh Kumar applied for the post of Constable in the district police Dholpur. He was declared successful and found physically fit and was provisionally selected. However, on police verification of the character and antecedents it was found that criminal case under Sec.394 IPC was pending against him. This fact was deliberately suppressed by him in the application form, as also in the verification roll. The learned Single Judge relying on Delhi Administration Vs. Sushil Kumar(5) dismissed the writ petition of Shesh Kumar. The learned Judges, constituting Division Bench has distinguished the decision render- ed by learned Single Judge in case of Shesh Kumar (supra) on the ground that an offence under Sec.394 IPC involved moral turpitude whereas the offence alleged against Khalid Ahmed which he did not disclose in his application form or in verification roll does not involve moral turpitude, therefore, there was no necessity for him to disclose this fact in the application form or in the verification roll. (12). It is pertinent to mention here that from the judgment of learned Judges, constituting Division Bench in case of Khalid Ahmed (supra) it is not decipherable as to whether applicant Khalid Ahmed was given honorable acquittal or was also extended benefit of doubt as in the present case. I am the view that since in the case of Khalid Ahmed it is not disclosed as to whether he was given benefit of doubt or was honorably acquitted, it is to be presumed that he was honorably acquitted whereas in the present Case, the petitioner was not honorably acquitted but his acquittal is based on benefit of doubt. To my mind, honorable acquitted cannot be placed at par with an acquittal based on benefit of doubt. To my mind, honorable acquitted cannot be placed at par with an acquittal based on benefit of doubt. If a person is honorably acquitted, the Courts of law are to presume that such person was innocent whereas if a person is acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt, the Courts of law cannot afford to presume his innocence. Ordinarily, where a person is acquitted after extending benefit of doubt it is to be presumed that he is acquitted due to lack of legal evidence and not because of his innocence. (13). The learned Judges constituting Division Bench have arrived at a conclu- sion that offence alleged against Khalid Ahmed does not involve moral turpitude and as such after his acquittal it was not required for him to make a mention either in the application form or in the verification roll whereas in the present case the petitioner was charged under Sec.353 IPC which involves moral turpitude and violence. Section 353 IPC envisages that whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person intending thereby to dishonor that person otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with five or with both. Assuming for arguments sake that the offence under Section 353 I.P.C. does not involve moral turpitude yet it does involves violence and as such the petitioner is not entitled to be appointed as Police Constable merely because his name was in the select list. (14). I am of the view that as in the present case on hand, the petitioner was involved in case which involves moral turpitude and violence thus it was incumbent upon him to disclose this fact in column No.17 of the application and this fact also required to be disclosed in the verification roll that he was involved in a criminal case although acquitted by extending benefit of doubt. (15). In my considered opinion verification of character and antecedent is one of the most important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable for appointment on a post of police constable though he was found physically fit, passed the written test and interview and was provisionally selected. The character verification and inquiry relating to his antecedent assumes importance as appointment on the post of Constable relates to a disciplined force. The character verification and inquiry relating to his antecedent assumes importance as appointment on the post of Constable relates to a disciplined force. In such cases if the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint such person on the post of Constable which is disciplined force then such order cannot be made ineffective by issuing a prerogative writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. (16). Thus, the facts and circumstances of decision rendered by Division Bench of this Court in case of Khalid Ahmed (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. (17). As a result of aforementioned discussion, the instant writ petition lacks merits and the same is hereby dismissed in limine.