Honble CHAUHAN, J.–This is a unique case wherein the petitioner has approached this Court for issuing direction to the respondents that they must act in accordance with law, though he has not established as what is his legal right which is likely to be infringed or what is the cause of action which has given him a right to approach this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (2). Petitioner is holding a valid permanent stage-carriage permit on the route Jhunjhunu to Pabana via Pushkarni Chadi and Mukandgarh within the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur (hereinafter called ``the R.T.A.). In the said Region, two routes, namely, Mundawa to Mukandgarh via Chadi, and Jaipur to Pilani via Nawalgarh have been notified under the provisions of Section 100 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred as ``the Act) or under the provisions of Section 68-D (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called`` the old Act) and the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter called, ``the R.S.R.T.C.) has an exclusive right to ply its vehicles on the said routes. Petitioners grievance is that some persons are trying to get permits on the route Mandawa to Udaipurwati over-lapping the notified route from Mandawa to Mukandgarh via Chadi and also a portion of the route, on which he is plying his vehicle from Mukandgarh to Pabana, his rights will be adversely affected and there is imminent danger to his rights. It has been urged that the notified portion of the route from Chadi to Mukandgarh is 18 kms. and from Dudlod to Nawalgarh it is 12 Kms. and it is not permissible to grant any permit over-lapping the notified route over 10 Kms. under the law. It has further been urged that the R.T.A. is likely to consider the grant of permits by Circulation which is also prohibited by law and, thus, this Court must issue direction to the R.T.A. not to entertain any application for the grant of any permit on the route Mandawa to Udaipurwati. It may be pertinent to mention here that petitioner holds a permit on a non-notified route and he has no concern with any notified route. (3). It may be pertinent to mention here that petitioner holds a permit on a non-notified route and he has no concern with any notified route. (3). There is no quarrel with the proposition of law that once a route has been notified under the provisions of Section 68-D (3) of the Old Act or under Section 100 (3) of the Act, 1988, no person other than those who have specifically been permitted under the Scheme are permitted to ply their vehicles on the route for the reason that a Scheme under the said provisions of the Act is a law within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution of India, as held by the Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court in H.C. Narainappa vs. State of Mysore (1) and Chau- dhary Khazan Singh vs. State of U.P. and others (2); and by virtue of the provisions of Section 68-B of the Old Act and its corresponding provisions of Section 98 of the new Act, the Scheme of Nationalisation would over-ride the other provisions of the Statute, (Vide T.N.Raghunatha Reddy vs. State Transport Authority (3); and S.A. Abdul Khaddar Sahib vs. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal & Or.s (4). The Cons- titution Bench of the Supreme Court in M/s. Adarsh Travels Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (5), held that no person other than those authorised under the Scheme, can ply the vehicle on the notified Route. In Sumer Chand Sharma vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (6), the Apex court has observed that provisions of the Scheme require strict adherence and authorities are required to comply with the terms of the Scheme and consider the applications for the grant or renewal only in consonance with the Scheme. Same view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in Smt. T.P.K. Thilagavathy vs. R.T.A, Periyar District (7). In Gajraj Singh vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors. (8), the Apex Court has held that the approved Scheme is a ``self-contained and self-operative Scheme. It is law by itself. (4). Same view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in Smt. T.P.K. Thilagavathy vs. R.T.A, Periyar District (7). In Gajraj Singh vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors. (8), the Apex Court has held that the approved Scheme is a ``self-contained and self-operative Scheme. It is law by itself. (4). There can be no quarrel to the settled legal position that a person can approach the Court in writ jurisdiction when his right is threat or there is a imminent danger to a right or imminent violation of the right, but threate or imminent danger to the right or imminent violation of the right has to be determined on the basis of the alleged overt-act as ``the protection of a legal right is to be distinguished from its restoration or remedy after violation. Law surely cannot take action for internal thoughts but can act only after the overt-act is done. If the overt-act and violation have already been done and the same has come to the knowledge of the person threatened with that violation and he approaches the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, giving sufficient particulars of proximate actions as would immediately lead to violation of the rights, the Court can interfere for the reason that if ``a threatened invasion of a right is removed by restraining the potential violator from taking any steps towards violation, the rights remain protected and the compulsion against its violation is enforced. If the right has already been violated, what is left is the remedy against such violation and for restoration of the right. ( Vide S.M.D. Kiran Pasha vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (9); Vedprakash Devkinandan Chiripal vs. State of Gujrat and Another (10); A.K.Gopalan vs. State of Madras (11); and K.K.Kochunni vs. State of Madras (12). (5). It is also, well settled law that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for enforcing the statutory right or when there is a complaint by the petitioner that there is a breach of statutory duty on the part of the respondent. Therefore, there must be judicially enforceable right for the enforce- ment of which the writ jurisdiction can be resorted to. Therefore, there must be judicially enforceable right for the enforce- ment of which the writ jurisdiction can be resorted to. The Court can enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public bodies through its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such writ jurisdiction. (State of Kerla vs. K.G. Madhavn Pillai (13); State of Kerala vs. Smt. A. Laxmikutty (14); Mani Surat Jain and Others vs. State of Haryana (15); Calcutta Gas Company (Property) Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal and Others (16); and Smt. Rampati Jaiswal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (17). (6). In Rajendra Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (18), the Apex Court held that every violation of mandatory provisions of law does not furnish a ground for the High Court to interfere in its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Con- stitution of India. It is settled position of law that writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 ``is not intended to facilitate the avoidance of an obligation. (7). In fact, petitioner has espoused the cause of the respondent No.2 as if the respondent No.2 is unable to protect its interest. Whether persons, who had been permitted to ply their vehicles on a notified route with corridor restrictions, i.e. with a condition neither to pick-up nor drop any passenger on the over- lapping part of the notified route, can be permitted to approach the writ Court for violation of the Scheme has been considered by the Honble Supreme Court in Smt. Mithlesh Rani vs. R.T.A., Dehradun and Others (19) and the Court has observed as under :- ``It is only the respondents No.3 and 4 who are operating on a route which partially over-laps the route concerned herein hat have chosen to come forward. We are not inclined to entertain the said objection at their instance, more particularly, when a copy of the Scheme (s) even has not been filed. This aspect would become relevant if and when the State Transport Authority undertakes objection to the grant of permit to the appellant and the approved scheme or the draft scheme, as the case may be, is placed before the Court in support of the said objection. In the present state of facts we decline to go into the said question. (8). In the present state of facts we decline to go into the said question. (8). Similarly, in Charanjit vs. R.T.A., Bikaner and others (20), this Court has held that a private operator has no locus standi to object to the grant of permit on the portion of the notified route. The Court further observed as under :- ``The off--set of the discussion made hereinabove is that the petitioners have no locus standi to object to the grant of a permit on a portion of a notified route or draft scheme because it is the R.S.R.T.C. or the State road Transport Undertaking which alone is an aggrieved party and it can object to the grant of such permit on a portion of the notified route or a route covered by an approved or draft scheme. (9). In the instant case the petitioner has not filed the copy of any scheme whatsoever. Not a single application, which allegedly has been filed before the R.T.A., Jaipur for the grant of permit, has been filed and no particulars of any such application have been given. This is a case where the petitioner has approached this Court in a most cavellier manner without any sense of responsibility. (10). The Motor Vehicles Act is a self-contained Code. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in G. Veerapa Pillai vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. (21), has held that the Motor Vehicles Act provides for a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits. It provides for a regular hierarchy of administrative bodies established to deal with a regulation of transport by means of motor vehicles. It prescribes for appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedy for redressal of the grievances or correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had. Similar view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in M/s. Northern Plastics Ltd. vs. Hindustan Photo Film Manufacturing Co. Ltd. & Others (22). (11). Mr. Maheshwari has submitted that if permits are granted on the route Mundawa to Udaipurwati, it will also over-lap the non- notified route of the petitioner from Mukandgarh to Pabana and the rights of the petitioner would be adversely affected and, therefore, he has a right to maintain the writ petition. In support of his contention, reliance has been placed by Mr. In support of his contention, reliance has been placed by Mr. Maheshwari on the judgment of this Court in R.S.R.T.C. vs. R.T.A., Bikaner and Others (23), wherein the question of jurisdiction to grant a permit on inter-state route had been considered and it was held that permits, if granted in violation of the statutory provisions, are liable to be quashed. (12). Further, reliance has been placed on a judgment of this Court in Smt. Jamna Devi vs. R.T.A. and Others (24). Where in the permit granted over-lapping the notified route more than 10 Kms. was quashed by this Court and the Special Leave petition against the said Order was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court vide its Order dated 31.7.95. Further, reliance has been placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ashwini Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, (25), wherein it was held that the R.S.R.T.C. has a locus standi to file the writ petition if an illegal act is committed by any of the public Authority as the R.S.R.T.C. was found having vital interests, its right to challenge the impugned order was up-held. It was also observed therein that any citizen, having any interest, can also challenge the illegal order. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Smt. Jamma Devi (supra), against which the Special Leave Petition had been dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court in limini, cannot be a guiding factor in this case for the reason that the issue of maintainability of the writ petition by a private operator for espousing the cause of R.S.R.T.C. was not considered nor the locus standi of that petitioner was considered and a decision cannot be relied upon in support of a proposition that had not been decided in the said case. (Vide Mittal Engineer Works (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise (26); and National Insurance Corporation vs. Santro Devi and Others (27); M/s. Amar Nath Om Prakash and Others vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (28); Rajpur Rauda Meha vs. State of Gujrat (29); and Sarva Sharmik Sangh, Bombay vs. Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd. and Another (30). (13). In H.H. Maharaja Dhiraj Madhav Raj Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur & Ors. (28); Rajpur Rauda Meha vs. State of Gujrat (29); and Sarva Sharmik Sangh, Bombay vs. Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd. and Another (30). (13). In H.H. Maharaja Dhiraj Madhav Raj Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur & Ors. vs. Union of India (31), the Supreme Court observed as under:- ``It is difficult to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of this Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment. (14). Similarly, in C.I.T. vs. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (32), the Apex Court made the following observations:- ``It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a senten- ce from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the contest of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete ``law declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the question which were before this Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from the question involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the Courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this Court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under con- sideration by this Court, to support their reasonings. (15). Same remains the position regarding the other judgments referred to by Sri Maheshwari as the case requires consideration from the point of view that under the provisions of Section 47 (3) of the old Act, the existing operator had been given a right of raising objection and right of hearing at the time of grant of permit on the route on which he was plying his vehicle. There is no provision corresponding to Section 47 (3) in the New Act and the conscious deviation by the Legislature on this issue, depriving the existing operator of having a right of raising the objection or having been heard, would mean that the existing operator, who has no right to challenge the grant of permit on his route, would certainly have no legal right to challenge the grant of permit by filing a writ petition. (16). The issue was considered by the Apex Court in Methilesh Garg vs. Union of India and Others (33) and the Court held that the New Act provides for liberal grant of permit and excludes the participation of the existing operators in the proceedings pertaining to grant of permits. In view of the provisions of the Act, an existing operator can neither oppose the grant of permit on the ground that his right under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution will be affected, for these articles do not confer any right of monopoly on him, nor can he challenge the order of the Transport Authority granting permit on the ground that his income will be adversely affected by induction of more operators on his route. (17). In Secretary, R.T.A., Guntur and Others vs. E. Ramarao and Others (34) the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court considered the effect of having no provision in the New Act corresponding to the provisions of Section 47 (3) of the Old Act and observed as under :- ``We are of the view that Parliament intended to negative any right to the existing operators either to submit their representations or to a right of hearing under Section 71 (1) or Section 80 (2) of the New Act. It is, therefore, not open to the Court to imply principles of natural justice and add further restriction than what Parliament has considered sufficient, according to its new legislative policy. (18). Thus, if the existing operator has lost the right of making a representation before a permit is granted to a person on his route, it is beyond imagination that he will have a right to approach the writ Court seeking a direction to restrain the Authority to grant permit on the existing route. (19). A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Lal (35), considered the aspect of locus standi of a ``rival businessman in the same trade : whether he can claim to be an ``aggrieved person and maintain a writ petition ? The Court observed as under :- ``The expression ``aggrieved person denotes an elastic, and to an extent an illusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of the rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. The Court observed as under :- ``The expression ``aggrieved person denotes an elastic, and to an extent an illusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of the rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. It scope and ambit depends on other variable factors such as the contents and intent of the statute, of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioners interest and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. (20). While deciding the case, the Court had placed reliance on its earlier judgment in Nagar Flour and Rice Mills vs. N.T. Govwdi (36), wherein it was held that a rice mill owner had no locus standi to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution the setting-up of a new rice mill by another-even if such setting up was in contravention of the statutory provisions, for the reason that none of his vested right was infringed. The Apex Court considered such a rival businessman merely a stranger unless there were exceptional circumstances involving a grave mis-carriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interest and he should not be a busy-body. Grant of a licence to another intending trader may cause financial hardship to the existing businessman but it will not affect the right of the existing operator guaranteed under Article 19(i)(g) of the Constitution of India as it is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law and the Court held that in such a Case the rival businessman has no locus standi to challenge the order in favour of another trader under Article 226. (21). The issue was again considered by the Honble Supreme Court in M/s. Northern Plastic Ltd. (supra) and held that a ``person aggrieved and the concept of ``locus standi has to be considered in the context of the statute and the purpose of the enactment has to achieve. The Apex Court considered its earlier judgments in Bar Council of Maharastra vs. M.V. Dhabolkar and Another (37); and J.M. Desai (supra) and held that a person approaching the writ Court must satisfy that by pas- sing such an order in favour of another person, he has been denied or deprived of a legal right or sustained a legal injury or suffered his legally protected interest, has been subjected to a legal wrong or suffered a legal grievance. He must have a legal pag for a justiciable claim to hang on and only then he can have a locus standi to challenge the grant of licence etc: in favour of other persons. The Court, also, con- sidered the judgment in K. Ramadas Shenoy vs. Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi (38), in which a resident of a locality, where in a cinema building was being constructed contrary to the Building Town Planning Scheme, was held to be entitled to challenge the violation of the Scheme by construction of a cinema building. In that case a resident of that locality was held to have locus standi on the ground that the residential area was going to be spoiled by unauthorised construction and public interest was involved. It was a case where the loss was not to an individual person, natural or juristic. (22). In Adi Pherozshah Gandhi vs. H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharastra , Bombay (39), the Apex Court observed as under :- ``Innumerable statutes both in England and in India give the right of appeal to `a person aggrieved by an order made and the provisions of such statutes have to be construed in each case to find out whether the person preferring an appeal falls within that expression. (23). While deciding the case, the Court relied upon the judgment in Ex-parte Sidebotham in re Sidebotham (40) where in it was observed as under :- ``But the words `person aggrieved do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A `person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something. (24). Thus, in view of the above, the petitioner cannot claim to be an ``aggrieved person nor he can maintain the writ. (25). Till today, no application has been considered by the R.T.A. Petitioners apprehension is unfounded and even if there is an order which adversely affects the petitioner, he has a right to challenge it before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal by filing a revision under the provisions of Section 90 of the Act. (25). Till today, no application has been considered by the R.T.A. Petitioners apprehension is unfounded and even if there is an order which adversely affects the petitioner, he has a right to challenge it before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal by filing a revision under the provisions of Section 90 of the Act. The petitioners contention that R.T.A. is likely to consider the grant of permits by Circu- lation which would be violative of Rule 5.2 (3) of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1990, is not required to be considered at all at this stage, even if this provision is mandatory as, the petitioners apprehension is unfounded for the reason that Section 114 illustration (e) of the Indian Evidence Act provides for presumption that all Judicial and official acts would be regularly performed. This presumption thou- gh rebuttable but restrain to anticipate that the officers, who have been entrusted with the duty under the statutory provisions, would act in contravention of law and, thus, a writ be issued to the authority to act in accordance with law. If such writ petitions are entertained, it would reduce the Court to a mockery. The writ petition has been filed by the petitioner without adducing any evidence to substantiate its grievance. R.S.R.T.C. can also raise the grievance before the Statutory Authority on appropriate time. But today, there can be no cause concerning any one. In a given case, the private operator may maintain a revision under Section 90 of the Act, provided he satisfies the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the Transport Authorities exercised their power of granting permit erroneously or illegally and as the existing operator has an alternative remedy of revision before the Tribunal, the writ petition should not be entertained. (Vide Surendra Rao vs. Regional Transport Authority, Gorakhpur Region, Gorakhpur and Others (AIR 1992 All.211). (26). It is, also, well settled proposition of law that what cannot be done ``per directum is not permissible to be done per obliquum. Meaning thereby whatever is prohibited by law to be done directly cannot legally be effected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance and it can be explained by quoting the legal maxim ``quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne per quod devenitur ad illud. (Vide Rampati Jaiswal vs. State of U.P. and Another ( AIR 1997 All. 170 ). (27). Meaning thereby whatever is prohibited by law to be done directly cannot legally be effected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance and it can be explained by quoting the legal maxim ``quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne per quod devenitur ad illud. (Vide Rampati Jaiswal vs. State of U.P. and Another ( AIR 1997 All. 170 ). (27). In view of the above, I reach the following inescapable conclusions:- (i) the petitioner has no locus standi to file the petition in order to protect the interest of the R.S.R.T.C.; (ii) the grant of permit on the non-notified route does not affect any of the legal rights of the petitioner and he does not suffer any legal injury and, therefore, he cannot maintain the writ petition; (iii) as there is no provision in the New Act corresponding to Section 47 (3) of the Act and the petitioner has no right to be heard at the time of grant of permit on a non notified route even though he may be adversely affected in terms of money and business, he cannot be a ``person aggrieved nor has he any locus standi to approach the writ Court at this stage. (iv) there is no material on record to establish the apprehension of the petitioner that the statutory Authority will not act in consonance with the statutory provisions nor the writ Court can issue a direction, general in nature asking the statutory Authority that whenever they performs their official duties they should act in consonance with law; (v) none of the applications filed by any of the applicants has been put on record nor its particulars have been furnished nor the date on which the R.T.A., Jaipur would consider the case, has been mentioned. (vi) the petitioner cannot perempt and anticipate without any basis that whatever would happen, would be contrary to law. (vi) the petitioner cannot perempt and anticipate without any basis that whatever would happen, would be contrary to law. Thus, there can be no justifica- tion to entertain the per-emptive writ petition; (vii) if the petitioner has no right to be heard at the time of grant of permit to other person(s), it is beyond imagination as how he can maintain a writ petition on the same ground; and (viii) generally a rival businessman has no right to agitate an issue at the time of grant of a licence to any other person and the only exception can be made by a Statute as had been earlier by virtue of the provisions of Section 47 (3) of the Old Act. Thus, the writ petition is not maintainable. (28). The petition has been filed to achieve an ulterior goal under the garb of public interest. In fact, filing such a petition amounts to abuse of process of the Court. In Dr. Buddhi Kota Subba Rao vs. K. Parasram (43), the Honble Supreme Court observed as under :- ``No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Every access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived or frivolous petitions. (29). The petition is devoid of any merit and hence dismissed without notice to the other side.