( 1 ) THE matter was heard on 6. 8. 1998 and orders had been reserved, which is being pronounced today. There had been a direction on 6. 8. 1998 that till orders were recorded, further proceedings in case Crime No. 1218 of 1996, pending before the c. J. M. , Mirzapur, would remain stayed. ( 2 ) BY an order of the C. J. M. , Mirzapur, dated 7. 1. 1998 the present applicants were summoned for an Offence under Section 380, I. P. C. in purported exercise of the powers of the Magistrate under Section 319, Cr. P. C. The aggrieved applicants moved a criminal Revision No. 16 of 1998 before the Sessions Judge, mirzapur, and the revision application was dismissed on 13. 7. 1998. A complalnt was filed by one Rajendra Kumar before the c. J. M. , Mirzapur, for an offence under Section 379, I. P. C. on 8. 4. 1996 for an incident that allegedly took place on 21. 3. 1996. The complalnant and his witnesses were examined under Sections 200 and 202, Cr. P. C. and upon those statements the Magistrate recorded an order dated 26. 9. 1996 under Section 203, Cr. P. C. dismissing the complalnt against the present applicants, but one Om Prakash son of applicant no. 1 was summoned for an offence under Section 380, i. P. C. This order was not challenged at any point of time before any forum and, accordingly, the order attained finality. The trial against om Prakash proceeded before the court below and during the course of trial statements of the witnesses were recorded under section 244, cr. P. C. At that stage, an application was filed under Section 319, cr. P. C. for summoning the accused applicants on the basis of the statements made in court and the Magistrate did record the order dated 7. 1. 1998 in exercise of his powers under Section 319, Cr. P. C. and he summoned the present two applicants. Only thereafter the revision application, as stated above, was preferred and was dismissed on 13. 7. 1998. ( 3 ) THE order of the Magistrate, as confirmed by the Sessions judge, was challenged mainly on two grounds. It was stated that the magistrate, after discharging the present applicants at an earlier stage, would not have taken recourse to Section 319, Cr. 7. 1998. ( 3 ) THE order of the Magistrate, as confirmed by the Sessions judge, was challenged mainly on two grounds. It was stated that the magistrate, after discharging the present applicants at an earlier stage, would not have taken recourse to Section 319, Cr. P. C. as that power could be exercised against a person who was not an accused, while the present applicants were very much accused persons before the court below, albeit discharged. It was also contended that the statements made by the witnesses under Section 244, Cr. P. C. were verbatim the same as were made under Sections 200 and 202, cr. P. C. and when these very statements were once disbelieved or thought not sufficient for issuance of summons, the same would not have been acted upon at a subsequent stage. So far the first point is concerned, the learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court as reported in A. I. R. 1990 S. C. 2158 (Sohan Lal and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan ). Two honble Judges of the Supreme Court had before them a case in course of a criminal appeal against a judgment of the Rajasthan High court. In that matter one Shanti Lal had lodged a report before police against four persons for having pelted stones at his house causing damage and causing injuries to certain persons. Police submitted charge-sheet for offences under Sections 147/323/325/336/427, i. P. C. and the Magistrate, after taking cognizance and after hearing the arguments, discharged two persons of all the charges levelled against them and directed framing of charge under Section 427 I. P. C. only against some others. Subsequently, the Assistant Public prosecutor submitted an application for amendment of charge under section 216, Cr. P. C. in view of the evidence that was led in the case. The Magistrate took fresh cognizance for offences under Sections 147/427/336/323/325, I. P. C. not only against three persons standing trial, but also against the other two, who were discharged after hearing. ( 4 ) THE Honble Judges engaged themselves to the proper interpretation of Sections 216, 319 and 398, Cr. P. C. and were of the view that the discharge, as aforesaid, was not one under Section 203, cr. ( 4 ) THE Honble Judges engaged themselves to the proper interpretation of Sections 216, 319 and 398, Cr. P. C. and were of the view that the discharge, as aforesaid, was not one under Section 203, cr. P. C. The order of discharge could have been challenged in a revision and, if so challenged, it could not have been disposed of without hearing the person so discharged. It was observed that section 319, Cr. P. C. could not have been taken recourse to circumvent the bar under Section 398, Cr. P. C. The learned State Counsel relied on an earlier decision of the supreme Court as reported in 1983 S. C. C. (Crl.) 115 (Municipal corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and others ). It also dealt with the power of the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P. C. read with Section 319, Cr. P. C. and it was held that this Section 319 was really an extra-ordinary power that was conferred on the Court and was to be used sparingly and if compelling reasons existed for taking cognizance against other persons against whom action had not been taken. The Supreme Court observed that if the prosecution at any stage produced evidence which satisfied the court that the other accused or those who have not been arrayed as accused, against who proceedings had been quashed, had also committed the offence, the court could take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused. The Supreme Court observed that the mere fact that the proceedings had been quashed under Section 482, Cr. P. C. against some of the accused persons would not prevent the court from exercising its discretion if it was fully satisfied that a case for taking cognizance against them had been made out on the additional evidence led before it. ( 5 ) THE decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal corporation of Delhi (supra) was referred to in the latter judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sohan Lal (Supra) and was not overruled. It was submitted, however, on behalf of the applicants that if at all there be any conflict between the two decisions of the supreme Court given by Benches of equal strength, the decision of the latter Bench would be binding. It was submitted, however, on behalf of the applicants that if at all there be any conflict between the two decisions of the supreme Court given by Benches of equal strength, the decision of the latter Bench would be binding. Reliance on this point was placed on a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of gopal Krishna Indlev V. V Addl. District Judge, Kanpur and others as reported in A. I. R. 1981 Allahabad 300. On the question of binding nature of precedence, it is felt that the subsequent judgment of the supreme Court, if at all it was in conflict with the earlier judgment, would be taken to be the law of the land. Thus, the judgment in sohan Lals case (supra) would have a binding effect as precedent on the ratio enunciated therein. The facts of the case, however, must tilt the view of this Court in favour of the present applicants. To recapitulate in brief, it may be indicated that after the complalnt was filed by respondent no. 2, the witnesses were examined and upon those statements only the Court declined to proceed against Anand Kumari and Baby. The copies of the statements made before the court during trial and those made before the court under Section 200 and 202, Cr. P. C. have been submitted before this Court to say that they were verbatim the same. If at one point of time a particular evidence is not acted upon when the court was to look only for a prima facie material, it may not be proper for the court at a subsequent stage to record an order contrary to the earlier order on the basis of verbatim the same evidence. Even the case law relied upon by the State Counsel requires that the power under Section 319, Cr. P. C. should be sparingly used and that too for compelling reasons. Viewing from this angle and being aware of the fact that the records are not before this court and the complalnant should also be heard in the matter, it is felt that the order of the magistrate and the consequential order of the Revisional Court should be quashed and the matter should be sent down to the court below to see and compare if the two sets of statements made under section 200 and 202, Cr. P. C. and dureing trial were same, so far the present two applicants are concerned. If so, then certainly it would not be a case of compelling reason for an action under Section 319, cr. P. C. ( 6 ) IN view of above, the application stands allowed. The orders of the Magistrate and that of the Sessions Judge, dated 7. 1. 1998 and 13. 7. 1998 respectively, are quashed. The matter is sent back to the trial Judge, who will proceed according to the directions given above and if the statements made in the course of trial made the same allegations against the present two applicants as were made during the stage of Sections 200 and 202, Cr. P. C. , the Magistrate will not exercise his powers under Section 319, Cr. P. C. for summoning the present two applicants. Application Allowed. .