JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court by way of this misc. petition under section 482, Cr.P.C. by challenging the impugned-order dated 13.9.1996 passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate, Barmer on the grounds inter alia that the said order is not sustainable and deserves to be set-aside since; (a) that on the basis of the FIR lodged by the complainant Ishra against the petitioner with Police Station, Dorimana District Barmer on 15.9.1995 the case for commission of offences punishable under sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323 & 324 IPC was registered. The police started investigation and recorded the statements of some material witnesses and also inspected the site and thereafter the Investigating Officer arrived at the conclusion that the respondent No. 2 viz., the complainant party in furtherance of common object to cause serious injuries to the petitioners and which they did just outside their 'Dhani' (residence). It was further pleaded that in exercise of the right of self defence injuries were inflicted on the person of the respondent No. 2 and hence they were justified in their action to defend themselves. Correspondingly a cross case was also registered against the petitioners for having caused physical assault and injuries on Ishra-respondent No. 2, Sukhram and Hukma Ram i.e. the injured members of the other group. Thereafter, cross cases were registered by the police and police after investigating the matter came to the conclusion that the petitioners were not responsible for their acts of omission or commission and in exercise of right of self defence the injuries were caused to the complainant party i.e. the respondent No. 2 and hence the petitioners were justified in exercise of their right of self defence. 2. After the submission of the Final Report by the police before the learned trial Magistrate, a Protest Petition was filed by the respondent No. 2 and thereupon statements of some witnesses including that of respondent No. 2, Amra and Haru were recorded by the trial Court and on the basis of the said material a prima facie view was taken and cognizance against the petitioners was taken by the trial Court for offence under sections 147, 148, 323 & 341 IPC while against the petitioners Bhagchand, Gorkha, Amra, Teja and Poonma cognizance under section 324/149 IPC was taken. 3. 3. Be that as it may, it is the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that in a case of group fight when both parties i.e. the complainant as well as the person who in exercise of right of self defence of person or property has inflicted injuries to the members of the complainant party, as a result of the which at initial stage it becomes impossible to determine that who is the actual aggressor, the law is well settled that the trial Court as a matter of judicial prudence that in record the evidence of both the parties on the basis of the cross case which has been registered and thereafter the process of law has to follow after recording the statements of witnesses at the pre-charge stage in accordance with Sections 200 & 202, Cr.P.C. the Court may at its discretion if prima facie case for taking cognizance is made out, the Court may issue the process in accordance with Section 204, Cr.P.C., if there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is however settled principle of law that where an offence has been investigated by the police in pursuance of the order of the Magistrate, the Magistrate is not bound by the report of Police Officer and while at the same time he is not precluded from inquiring into the matter himself if dissatisfied with the police report. This view has also been expressed by the Apex Court in its various pronouncements such as Mohammad Atullah v. Ram Saran Mahto, AIR 1981 SC 1155 . 1n the matter of A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas, 1988 (2) SCC 602 . 4. As a result of above discussion, I am of the view that the learned trial Court was not bound by the final report which was filed by the Investigating Officer of Police Station Dorimana District Barmer. As a matter of fact the learned trial Magistrate was quite justified and competent enough in exercise of its judicial discretion on the basis of the evidence adduced before him to take cognizance against the accused in respect of the offences against the petitioners punishable under sections 147, 148, 323 & 341 IPC. 324/149 against accused -Teja, under section 326 IPC against accused Hariganga, and against accused Hariganga, Bhagchand, Amra, Punma & Gorkha for offences under sections 147, 148, 323, 341, 326/149 and 324/149 IPC. 324/149 against accused -Teja, under section 326 IPC against accused Hariganga, and against accused Hariganga, Bhagchand, Amra, Punma & Gorkha for offences under sections 147, 148, 323, 341, 326/149 and 324/149 IPC. Hence, it cannot be said that the impugned order dated 13.9.1996 in criminal case No. 538/96 passed by the learned trial Court was passed either without application of mind or without considering material on record. It may however be observed that the petitioners shall be entitled to claim all such defences which may be available to them in exercise of their right,of private defence of person or property in accidence with law. 5. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of Jagdish Ram v. State of Raj., RLR 1988 (2) 486. I have examined the ratio of the said decision and I find that it is not applicable to the instant case in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of A.R. Antulay (supra) as referred to above. 6. During the course of hearing, it has been stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that if bailable warrants are issued by the trial Court instead of non-bailable warrants as directed vide impugned-order dated 13.9.1996 they shall surrender themselves befort the trial Court and make themselves available as and when they are called upon to do so in future. The impugned-order dated 13.9.1996 is accordingly modified to this extent only as indicated above. The petitioners are accordingly directed to appear before the trial Court in compliance of this order on 6.10.1998 and shall be entitled to release on bail when they present bail bonds of adequate amount as directed. 7. With the above ,observations, the petition stands disposed of.Petition disposed of. *******