V. K. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 31st July 1992 passed in Title Suits No. 29 and 30 of 1991 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Sealdah (South 24-Parganas) whereby the suits filed by the Appellant-Plaintiff were dismissed on contest. The brief facts leading to the filing of the Appeal are that the Plaintiff-Appellant on 26th December, 1986 entered into two registered Agreements for sale with two sets of defendants in respect of Southern and Northern portions of premises No. 72, Tiljala Road, Calcutta for a consideration of Rs. 8,77,000/- and Rs. 6,30,000/- out of which Rs. 87,000/- and Rs. 63,000/- were paid to the defendants towards the earnest money. The defendants in both the suits got their respective shares in the suit property by virtue of a Decree in a Partition Suit being T. S. No. 87/63 in the court of Sub-Judge at Bhagalpur, Bihar. It was agreed upon between the parties that the transactions will be completed within a months from the date of the execution of the agreements or within the said extended period as may be mutually agreed upon between the parties. The defendants undertook to get their names mutated in respect of the suit property with C. M. C. before completion of transaction and the plaintiff would be at liberty to deal with the tenant (Proforma defendants) within the suit property at its own cost with prior consent of the defendants. The defendants were to obtain Income Tax clearance certificate and Urban Land ceiling clearance with necessary assistance of the plaintiff. It was also agreed upon that on payment of the balance of the consideration money the defendants shall execute the Deed of Conveyance. ( 2 ) FURTHER case of the plaintiff is that the proforma defendant filed two suits before the High Court in the year 1987 against the parties of these suits against the aforesaid purported agreement in which this Court had passed an Order over the execution of any conveyance in favour of the plaintiff. Those suits were ultimately withdrawn by the proforma defendant on 6th March, 1991. On 11th March, 1991 the plaintiff came to know through one Arnak Dugar, an Estate Broker that the defendants were negotiating through him for sale of the suit property to a third party at a lucrative price. Those suits were ultimately withdrawn by the proforma defendant on 6th March, 1991. On 11th March, 1991 the plaintiff came to know through one Arnak Dugar, an Estate Broker that the defendants were negotiating through him for sale of the suit property to a third party at a lucrative price. The plaintiff was always ready and willing to discharge the obligations under the agreements and repeatedly requested the defdts to perform their obligations which they did not ultimately comply. The plaintiff is entitled to the claim of specific performance of the said agreements or the claim of damages of rupees seven crores in case the specific performance is not allowed. The defendants in both the suits contested by filing written statements challenging their maintainability denying all the material averments made in the plaint and contending inter alia that the defendants were always ready to discharge their duties and obligations for fulfilling the agreement and that the mutation was not at all a factor against the purchase of the property and that Arundharee Lall had no authority to give approval in the draft deed on behalf of all the defendants, that the affidavit sworn by Arnak Dugar is a procured one, that the defdts. had already entered into an agreement on 8th March, 1991 for the sale of the suit property, that none of the defendants had any discussion with any person Arnak Dugar by name, that the defdts. duly terminated the said agreement by the letters dated 29th January, 1991 and 6th February, 1991 as the plaintiffs were never willing to perform any term of agreement at any point of time at all. ( 3 ) UPON pleadings of both parties the following issues were framed for consideration :-issues1. ARE the suits maintainable in its present form 2. Has the plaintiff any cause of action to file the suits 3. Are the suits had for non-joinder of parties are the suits barred by limitations is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for specific performance of contract as prayed for to what other reliefs is the plaintiff entitled ( 4 ) ISSUE No. 3, relating to limitation was not pressed by the defendants in the Suit. With regard to other issues the learned court below returned findings against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit; hence the present Appeal. With regard to other issues the learned court below returned findings against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit; hence the present Appeal. ( 5 ) WE have heard the arguments of the learned advocates for the parties. We have gone through the record of the case as well. ( 6 ) THE plaintiff appellant's case is that it was on 11th March 1991 that it came to learn through P. W. 2 Arnak Dugar, who claimed himself to be an Estate Broker, that the defendants were negotiating through him for sale of the suit property to a third party at a lucrative price. The plaintiff being always ready and willing to purchase the property and to discharge obligations under the Agreement repeatedly requested the defendants to perform their obligations which they did not comply. Ultimately the plaintiff had to file the suit based upon the aforesaid information. As against the aforesaid claim of the plaintiff, the defendants have clearly alleged that they wrote two letters dated 29th January, 1991 and 6th February 1991 informating the plaintiff about the cancellation of the two Agreements dated 26th December 1986. These letters were received by the plaintiff yet the plaintiff did not refer to these letters in the plaint or at any other stage of the Suit. By concealing this fact regarding the receipt of these two letters, the plaintiff based his Suit on the disclosure made to it by P. W. 2 Arnab Dugar on 11-3-1991. ( 7 ) WE agree with the finding of the learned court below that the cause of action as pleaded by the plaintiff based on 11th March 1991 was incorrect and the Suit was not properly founded on such cause of action. We also agree with the finding of the learned court below that 29th January 91 and 6th February 91 were the two dates when the cause of action could actually be deemed to have accrued to the plaintiff to file the Suit, if at all, but for unexplained reasons the plaintiff concealed the receipt of the said two letters, thus creating avoidable complication in law for itself. In so far as the main question regarding specific performance of the agreement is concerned we also agrees with the findings of the learned court below that the plaintiff did not perform its part of the agreement and that it delayed the matter beyond the stipulated period of 9 months and kept on unnecessarily wasting time, thus creating a situation where the defendants had to write letters to him to cancel the agreement. The learned court below has found, based on the materials on record and the evidence that it was the fault of the plaintiff that the agreements between the parties could not be enforced and yet he unnecessarily dragged defendants in litigation. The suit was ultimately dismissed based on these findings. The court records concurrence with the findings of the learned court below and hold that the plaintiff could not establish any right of specific performance in the facts and circumstances of this case, and that the suit was not properly founded on any tangible ground. For the reasons above stated, the Appeal is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Interim order, if any subsisting, shall stand vacated immediately and forthwith. D. P. Kundu, J.-I agree. Later after the judgment was pronounced in the court, learned Advocate for the appellant made an oral prayer for staying the operation of the judgment. The oral prayer, on consideration, is rejected.