JUDGMENT R.L. Khurana, J.—The petitioner, Bipan Lal, was tried for the offence under Section 16(1)(a) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short the Act) by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla. He was convicted for such offence vide judgment dated 23.3.1993 and sentenced to simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. In default of payment of fine, he was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of three months. 2. The conviction and sentence imposed upon the petitioner by the learned Magistrate stand confirmed in appeal by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Shimla, vide judgment dated 22.8.1996. 3. As per the prosecution case, the sample of cows milk purchased by the Food Inspector Shri Yudhister Lal, on 6.12.1990 was found to be adulterated since it had fat contents to the extent of 2.7% and milk solids not fat to the extent of 7.9% which contents were far below the minimum prescribed standard. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner while assailing the conviction and sentence imposed upon the petitioner by the two courts below, at the very outset, has contended that PW-1 Yudhishter Lal, on the relevant date was not a Food Inspector and as such the entire trial stood vitiated. 5. Under Section 9 of the act, the Central Government or the State Government may, by Notification in the official Gazette, appoint such person as it thinks fit, having the prescribed qualifications to be Food Inspector for such local areas as may be assigned to them by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. 6. In exercise of the powers under Section 9, the State Government vide notification dated 24.7.1976 (Ex. P-13) had appointed Food Inspectors throughout the State of Himachal Pradesh. PW1 Yudhishter Lal was appointed a Food Inspector for the local limits of Municipal Corporation, Shimla. This Notification was never superceded, annulled, altered or revoked at any time by the State Government. 7. Much reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to the admission made by PW- 1 to the effect that he was not exercising the powers of the Food Inspector from June 1985 to October 1990 and the administrative letter/orders copies of which are Ex. D-1 to D-4 and DW1/A. 8. Vide Ex. 7. Much reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to the admission made by PW- 1 to the effect that he was not exercising the powers of the Food Inspector from June 1985 to October 1990 and the administrative letter/orders copies of which are Ex. D-1 to D-4 and DW1/A. 8. Vide Ex. DW1/A, PW-1 was reverted to the post of Chief Sanitary Inspector on 16.3.1985 by the Commissioner Municipal Corporation, Shimla. Admittedly, the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation has no power under Section 9 to appoint or remove a Food Inspector. The petitioner who was appointed as a Food Inspector vide Ex. P-13 by the State Government continued to be a Food Inspector inspite of the order Ex. DW1/A. 9. This aspect finds support from Ex. D-2 whereby it was clarified by the State Government to the Director (Health) that the appointment of PW-1 as Food Inspector made under Ex. P-13 on 24.7.1976 have never been revoked/cancelled by the State Government and that he could function as a Food Inspector. In view of Ex. P-13 and D-2, the administrative letters Ex. D-1 and D-3 have no meaning and the same do not have any effect on the appointment of PW1 as Food Inspector vide Ex. P-13. 10. Even if PW-1, for some administrative reasons, had not acted as Food Inspector during the period June 1985 to October 1990, the same would not go to show that he had ceased to be a Food Inspector or that his appointment stood cancelled and revoked. It was next contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that assuming PW1 was appointed as a Food Inspector, such appointment is not valid inasmuch as, he was not possessing the requisite qualifications prescribed under Rule 8 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. 11. Rule 8 as it exists presently on the statute came to be incorporated by way of amendment of the original rule on 18.3.1980 and 16.3.1983. The qualifications for appointment as Food Inspector are detailed in clauses (1) to (e) of Rule 8. Admittedly, PW-1 does not possess the qualifications as laid down in any of the three clauses (a) to (c). He was a Sanitary Inspector and has been appointed as Food Inspector vide Ex. P-13 in addition to his own duties. Third proviso to Rule 8 is very material for the purpose of present case. Admittedly, PW-1 does not possess the qualifications as laid down in any of the three clauses (a) to (c). He was a Sanitary Inspector and has been appointed as Food Inspector vide Ex. P-13 in addition to his own duties. Third proviso to Rule 8 is very material for the purpose of present case. It reads: "Provided also that nothing in this rule shall be construed to disqualifying any person who is a Food Inspector on the commencement of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Rules, 1980 from continuing as such after such commencement." The Amendment Rules of 1980 came into effect from 18.3.1980. PW1, as stated above, was appointed as Food Inspector vide Ex. P-13 on 24.7.1976. He was, therefore, a Food Inspector on the commencement of Amendment Rules of 1980. Therefore, under the third proviso (quoted above), he could continue as Food Inspector even after the commencement of the Amendment Rules of 1980. His appointment would not stand invalidated because he was not possessing the qualification prescribed by the Amendment Rules of 1980. 12. The two courts below, therefore, have rightly held that PW-1 at the relevant time was a Food Inspector having been validly appointed under Section 9 of the Act vide Ex. P-13. 13. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is to the effect that the petitioner at the relevant time was a Government servant. The shop is owned by his son. At the relevant time, the petitioner was only guarding the shop since his son had gone for some work. The sale of sample by the petitioner to PW1 therefore would not be a sale by a person selling article of food within the meaning of Section 10(1)(a)(i) of the Act. 14. Section 10(1)(a)(i) of the Act provides that a Food Inspector shall have power to take sample of any article of food from any person selling such article. The sale of sample by the petitioner to PW1 therefore would not be a sale by a person selling article of food within the meaning of Section 10(1)(a)(i) of the Act. 14. Section 10(1)(a)(i) of the Act provides that a Food Inspector shall have power to take sample of any article of food from any person selling such article. The term "sale" has been defined under clause (xiii) of Section 2 of the Act in the following terms: " Sale with its grammatical variations and cognate expression means the sale of any article of food whether for cash or on credit or by way of exchange and whether by wholesale or retain for human consumption or use, or for analysis, and includes an agreement for sale, an offer for sale, the exposing for sale or having in possession for sale of any such article, and includes also an attempt to self any such article." (Emphasis supplied) A bare reading of the above definition shows that though a sale "for analysis" is not a sale for human consumption nonetheless it is a sale within the meaning of the definition. It is an unqualified sale for the purpose of the Act. 15. In The Food Inspector, Calicut Corporation v. Cherukattil Gopalan and another, (AIR 1971 SC 1725), it has been held that a reference to the definition of "sale" will show that a sale of any food article for analysis comes within the definition and that it is not necessary to establish further that the person is a dealer in that article as such. 16. The Kerala High Court in Soman v. State of Kerala, 1987 E.F.R. 25, has held that the ownership of the shop is irrelevant matter to be gone into. The question is whether the accused had in fact sold the article of food to the Food Inspector. If there is a sale of article of food by the accused to the Food Inspector, then the accused is liable if such article of food is found to be adulterated on analysis. The statement of law will go to show that even if the accused had nothing to do with the ownership of the shop and if he in fact sold the article of food to the Food Inspector, that is sufficient to invoke the provisions of the Act. The statement of law will go to show that even if the accused had nothing to do with the ownership of the shop and if he in fact sold the article of food to the Food Inspector, that is sufficient to invoke the provisions of the Act. The prohibition to the sale of adulterated article of food applies to all persons who sell such adulterated article of food and for contravention of such prohibition, all such persons are penalised. 17. In the present case also, though the petitioner has denied his ownership qua the shop in question and has pleaded that he is a Government servant, it has come on the record that it was the petitioner who had sold the milk to the Food Inspector for the purpose of analysis which was found to be adulterated. The two courts below as such have rightly held that there has been a "sale" of milk by the petitioner within the meaning of the Act. 18. The third contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the sanction Ex. P-10 accorded by the competent authority is not valid inasmuch as, there is nothing on record to show application of mind by the competent authority. Sanction Ex. 10 has been proved by PW 1 Food Inspector. It is in the statement of Food Inspector that for the purpose of obtaining the sanction, he had submitted the entire record of the case. 19. The application of mind by the competent authority in the present case while according sanction Ex. P-10 is apparent from the bare perusal of sanction Ex. P-10. The competent authority appears to have added a full paragraph in hand before appending its signature thereto. This Court in Janak Raj v. State of H.P., (1998 (2) Shim. L.C. 274) where Competent Authority had carried out the corrections in the draft sanction submitted by the Food Inspector has held that there has been application of mind while according sanction. The two courts below as such have rightly held sanction Ex. P-10 to be valid. The petitioner, therefore, stands rightly convicted. 20. Insofar as the sentence imposed is concerned, the minimum sentence prescribed under the law has been imposed upon the petitioner and as such, no interference therein is called for. 21. The two courts below as such have rightly held sanction Ex. P-10 to be valid. The petitioner, therefore, stands rightly convicted. 20. Insofar as the sentence imposed is concerned, the minimum sentence prescribed under the law has been imposed upon the petitioner and as such, no interference therein is called for. 21. Resultantly, the petition is dismissed The petitioner who is on bail pursuant to the order of this Court is directed to surrender himself to his bail bonds before the learned trial Court within four weeks from today and to receive and serve out the sentence imposed upon him, failing which the learned trial Court shall commit the petitioner to jail by issuing distress warrants against him. Petition dismissed.