Board of Trustees of the Port of Mumbai v. Transport and Dock Workers Union and another
1999-01-13
N.J.PANDYA
body1999
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - N.J. PANDYA, J.:---The petitioner is a Board of Trustees of the Port of Mumbai and has challenged the Award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2, Mumbai, in Reference No. CGIT-2/13 of 1992. 2. A dispute related to the correct birth date of the worker Shaikh Zakeria Ahmed, Winchman, working in Dredging Section. 3. According to the original service record, when he entered the service in the year 1953, his birth date was shown to be as 15th July, 1936. Six months before his retirement i.e. 30th July, 1989, he pursued the School Leaving Certificate issued on 1st March, 1988 showing that his correct birth date is 1st July, 1931 or 1937. In such case ordinarily, the management always takes an objection that it is a belated offer on the part of the workman to get his birth date corrected solely with a view to get his services extended by dubious and devious ways. In the instant case, this plea could not be taken because as per the agreement between the petitioner and the union-respondent, the workmen were permitted to get their birth date corrected six months prior to the date of their eminent retirement. The workman in the instant case availed of this provision. 4. The question therefore is whether the Tribunal was right in accepting the case of the workman based on the School Leaving Certificate. Ordinarily, one would have looked at the certificate with a suspicion because, it has been issued as recently as in the month of March, 1988. However, the matter does not rest there. The petitioner had entered into correspondence with regard to the genuineness of the correctness of the certificate with the Head Master of the School. The Head Master by his letter Exhibit 5/7 confirmed that the School Leaving Certificate produced before the Tribunal at Exhibit 5/2 is correct. This has been referred to by the Tribunal in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Award at Pages 36 and 37. 5. It may be mentioned here that before the Tribunal, both the sides had declared that they do not want to lead any oral evidence and had filed purshis at Exhibits 6 and 7 to that effect. The matter, therefore, was considered on the basis of the documentary evidence and other materials that were produced on record by way of pleading and written submissions. 6.
The matter, therefore, was considered on the basis of the documentary evidence and other materials that were produced on record by way of pleading and written submissions. 6. In face of the aforesaid documentary evidence produced supporting the case of the workmen, all that the petitioner pointed out to the Tribunal was that going by the said School Leaving Certificate Exhibit 5/2 on the date of his appointment, the workman would be below the age of 18 years. However, it has come on record that at the time when the workman was employed, a person below the age of 18 years, used to be employed by the petitioner. 7. Moreover, peculiar situation was there at the time when workman was appointed on or about 19th December, 1953. Many persons were employed by the Port Trust-the petitioner during that period and it is a clear case of the respondent/Union that the date of birth of this workman in absence of any record was taken as 15th July, 1936. 8. This may or may not be the case. So far as the workman in the instant case is concerned, going by the said School Leaving Certificate Exhibit 5/2, vouched by the Head Master, the Tribunal was left only with the objection that the workman was likely to be a minor. Going by the age, as disclosed by the said certificate, if it has come to the conclusion that the claim of the workman of correcting his birth date is justified, I do not see any reason to interfere with the same. 9. The petitioner is relying on the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court pertaining to the correction of birth date. It is reported in 1995 Lab. I.C. page 2405 in the case of (M. Appa Rao, etc. v. Visakhapatnam Dock Labour Board)1, where the learned Judge of that Court was dealing with the fundamental rules and more particularly Rule 56. The Ld. Judge of that Court held that the efforts made by the petitioners in that case were only for the purpose of getting benefits to stick on to their posts for an indefinite period though they were not entitled to, according to law. On the contrary, there have been decisions passed by the Supreme Court deprecating this practice. One of them is cited (Union of India v. Hanuman Singh)2, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. page 1367, in that very judgment. 10.
On the contrary, there have been decisions passed by the Supreme Court deprecating this practice. One of them is cited (Union of India v. Hanuman Singh)2, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. page 1367, in that very judgment. 10. In my opinion, therefore, the case decided on the basis of fundamental rules and propositions flowing from it, it can be of no assistance in the matter of the present nature. I am dealing with the award passed by the competent Tribunal on reference and if material placed on record justifies the conclusion, merely because another view is possible ordinarily this Court would not interfere. In my opinion, there is hardly any view possible when the matter was left to the discretion of the Tribunal by the parties without leading any oral evidence and, therefore, on the preponderance of probabilities when the Tribunal comes to the aforesaid conclusion, being supported by material on record, this Court would not interfere with the same. Petition is rejected. Rule is discharged accordingly. Rule discharged accordingly.