ORDER 1. On 11-5-1998 at 11.00 a.m. C.W. 1-Ramakrishna Gowda appeared before the K.R. Pet Police and informed the police that at 7.30 a.m. the accused persons attacked his father and murdered him in the farm house by forming themselves into an unlawful assembly and therefore, the police registered a case in Cr. No. 63 of 1998 for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 143, 144, 147, 148, 448, 302 read with Section 149, Indian Penal Code. After completing the investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against 9 accused persons and arrested some of the accused persons. However, the 5th accused M.S. Girigowda is treated as absconding. Honnaiah and Subbegowda who were in judicial custody filed Criminal Petition in No. 3014 of 1998 under Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code. M.S. Girigowda who is treated as absconding filed Criminal Petition No. 28 of 1999 seeking anticipatory bail under Section 438, Criminal Procedure Code. 2. Notice of these two petitions was given to the State Public Prosecutor who has filed his detailed objections. Since these two petitions arise from the same C.C. No. i.e., C.C. No. 973 of 1998, after hearing both the parties, these petitions are disposed off by this order. Retain a copy of this order in each file. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioners at the very outset submitted that these three petitioners were standing outside the farm house. That being the case, even if the case of the prosecution is taken to be true, they have not actively participated in committing the murder of the deceased. M.V. Nage Gowda who also was implicated as one of the accused in this case was granted anticipatory bail by this Court in Cr. P. No. 3167 of 1998 disposed off on 14-1-1999 was also similarly placed with these petitioners. Therefore, these petitioners are entitled to bail as sought for. 4. However, the learned Counsel for the State contended that these petitioners cannot claim parity with that of M.V. Nage Gowda referred to above and in support of his argument he has drawn my attention to the order passed by this Court granting anticipatory bail in his favour. Therefore, these petitioners are entitled to bail as sought for. 4. However, the learned Counsel for the State contended that these petitioners cannot claim parity with that of M.V. Nage Gowda referred to above and in support of his argument he has drawn my attention to the order passed by this Court granting anticipatory bail in his favour. From a perusal of the order, it is clear that the investigation itself disclosed to some extent that the petitioner's presence at the place of incident was doubtful as he being an employee of a local bank was working in the bank on that day and also the investigation has not definitely disclosed that he was personally involved in the incident. But in this case the statements of C.Ws. 2 and 3 who are son and servant of the deceased that they were also sleeping in the farm house on the previous night. At about 6.30 a.m. both of them went out to answer the call of nature, thereafter they were picking the fallen coconuts in the garden. At that stage they heard the cry of the deceased from the farm house. Therefore, they ran to the farm house from the back side and peeped through the window where they found A-1 to A-4, A-6 and A-8 inside the house and were assaulting the deceased with various types of weapons. Immediately both of them came to the front door and attempted to enter the house. At that time these three petitioners who were standing at the threshold stopped C.Ws. 2 and 3 from entering the room where the father of C.W. 2 was being battered. This clearly shows the overt act of these three petitioners who prevented C.Ws. 2 and 3 from entering into the house to save the deceased from being assaulted. Such being the case the contention of the learned State Public Prosecutor that they are also equally liable for the barbaric act of other accused persons who had actually assaulted the deceased and their act is entirely covered under Section 149, Indian Penal Code, has some force. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners have vehemently argued that the FIR being lodged by C.W. 1 who is admittedly not an eye witness to the occurrence but only on the facts which he heard from his brother C.W. 2, is either manipulated or hearsay. Therefore, it cannot be looked into. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners have vehemently argued that the FIR being lodged by C.W. 1 who is admittedly not an eye witness to the occurrence but only on the facts which he heard from his brother C.W. 2, is either manipulated or hearsay. Therefore, it cannot be looked into. This contention cannot be accepted at this stage. C.W. 2 is the brother of C.W. 1 and he is an agriculturist. C.W. 1 is a lecturer. It is for this reason that C.W. 2 approached C.W. 1 an educated man and narrated the incident which he informed to the police and both these persons would be witnesses in Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is hearsay and excluded under the Evidence Act. Further, these are the facts which will have to be established by the prosecution during trial. 6. Admittedly, there was a land dispute between the deceased and the 1st accused and the writ petition filed by Ramakrishna Gowda came to be dismissed with necessary direction by this Court in W.P. No. 22529 of 1997 connected with W.P. No. 25576 of 1997. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the deceased had gone to Bangalore on the previous day in connection with the writ petition cannot be accepted as the W.P. was disposed off on 13-3-1998 and nothing was pending in the High Court as on May 1998. Just because W.P. was disposed off, one cannot say that he did not have work in connection with the W.P. He might have come to Bangalore to discuss about his case with the Advocate. Even otherwise, that allegation could not in any way falsify the case of the prosecution. The fact remains that the deceased succumbed owing to 20 injuries sustained by him in his farm house and there are two eye witnesses who indicate the involvement of these accused persons. They also further stated the overt act of these accused persons as stated hereinabove. In addition to that, the learned State Public Prosecutor has submitted that C.W. 7-Ganesh has stated that all the accused persons were holding weapons and talking at 7.15 a.m. on that day. They also further stated the overt act of these accused persons as stated hereinabove. In addition to that, the learned State Public Prosecutor has submitted that C.W. 7-Ganesh has stated that all the accused persons were holding weapons and talking at 7.15 a.m. on that day. C.W. 6-Ramesh saw these accused persons talking to themselves at 7.30 a.m. The statement of C.W. 4-Venkategowda discloses that all these persons seemed to be as if they had completed their task and he later learnt as to what happened to the deceased in the farm house. From this, it is apparent that besides two eye-witnesses to the occurrence, three witnesses had seen these accused persons armed with weapons and were also found near the farm house during the relevant time. The complaint also came to be lodged at the earliest point of time. Therefore, at this stage it cannot be said that the case of the prosecution is totally baseless. While considering bail application, the Court has to keep in mind the feelings of the relatives and the impact on the general public. The status of an individual is hardly relevant in granting bail. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in Criminal Petition No. 28 of 1999 submitted that he is an Assistant Engineer, KEB, Mysore, and that he may be granted anticipatory bail as he has nothing to do with this case. He being a cousin was only helping the accused persons in the litigation. Therefore, he was also included as one of the accused. This argument cannot be accepted at this stage in view of the evidence of C.Ws. 2 and 3 who speak about the fact that, he along with two others prevented C.Ws. 2 and 3 from entering the house and saving the deceased. Further, C.Ws. 4, 6 and 7 have stated that, they had seen him along with other accused persons. Besides that, after the incident he has been absconding. Even though his bail application has been rejected, he has not surrendered before the Court. He has not attended his office and his whereabouts are not known. Hence his petition is liable to be rejected. It is held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pokar Ram v State of Rajasthan and Others, that status in life, affluence or otherwise, are hardly relevant considerations while examining the request for granting anticipatory bail. 8. He has not attended his office and his whereabouts are not known. Hence his petition is liable to be rejected. It is held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pokar Ram v State of Rajasthan and Others, that status in life, affluence or otherwise, are hardly relevant considerations while examining the request for granting anticipatory bail. 8. At this stage, it is necessary to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shahzad Hasan Khan v Ishtiaq Hasan Khan and Another, wherein their Lordships have held that the accused involved in a murder case committed in broad day light, number of witnesses to occurrence and allegation of tampering of evidence on behalf of co-accused cannot be ruled out, in such cases bail cannot be granted. Even in case of persons suffering from heart disease and being only earning member of the family also is held to be insufficient to entitled them to bail Venkataramanappa and others Vs. The State of Karnataka, (1992) CriLJ 2268. 9. The learned Counsel for the petitioners in Cr. P. No. 3014 of 1998 submitted that the 1st petitioner-Honnaiah is aged about 70 years and the 2nd petitioner-Subbegowda is aged about 85 years and to substantiate that fact, he has produced the voters list of 1995 which discloses that Honnaiah was aged 64 years and Subbegowda was aged 82 years. As far as age is concerned, it is not seriously disputed. Under such circumstances the learned Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Cr. P. No. 2446 of 1994, dated 13-2-1995. This Court granted bail to the petitioners therein who were 59 and 60 years respectively. That is solely depending on the facts of that case. The facts in those cases are inapplicable to the instant case. Besides that, the learned State Public Prosecutor submitted that there is nothing to indicate that these petitioners were suffering from any disease and were incapacitated from being present at the place of incident. On the other hand, they are hale and healthy. Old age by itself is not a ground to release accused persons who indulge in heinous crimes. 10. Their overt acts also have been spoken to by various witnesses. On the other hand, they are hale and healthy. Old age by itself is not a ground to release accused persons who indulge in heinous crimes. 10. Their overt acts also have been spoken to by various witnesses. He also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Criminal Petition No. 2557 of 1995 disposed off on 9-12-1995 granting bail in favour of some of the accused persons on the ground that there is nothing to indicate the overt acts of those petitioners to attract the provisions under Section 149, Indian Penal Code. In Lalji and Others v State of Uttar Pradesh, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that there are two essential ingredients of Section 149 viz., (1) commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful assembly and (2) such offence must have been committed in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or must be such as the members of that assembly know to be likely to be committed. Once the Court finds that these two ingredients are fulfilled, every person who at the time of committing of that offence was a member of the assembly is to be held guilty of that offence. After such a finding it would not be open to the Court to see as to who actually did the offensive act or require the prosecution to prove which of the members did which of the offensive acts. The prosecution would have no obligation to prove it. 11. Before parting with this order, it is clarified that any observation made and finding given is confined to this order only. Further, the Court below is directed to expedite the dispose of the case. Therefore, viewed from any angle, these petitioners are not entitled for bail. 12. For the foregoing reasons, these petitions are dismissed.