( 1 ) THE short question that arises for consideration in this petitions whether where four teachers are charge sheeted for the same misconduct and punishment or removal from service is proposed by the committee of management which is modified with regard to three teachers by District Inspector of Schools to stopping of one increment for one year, whether the punishment of removed from service awarded to the petitioner, on parity, can be modified on the ground that the co-delinquents on identical charges have been awarded minor punishment. ( 2 ) THE short matrix of the case is that the petitioner was a confirmed assistant Teacher in L. T. Grade working since 1. 7. 70 in Rajarsh purshottam Das Tandon Uchchatar Madhymaic Vidyalay, Naini, mahewa, District Allahabad (in brief institution ). He and three teachers working in C. T. Grade namely, Laxmi Kant Bhatt, Ram krishna Singh and Shiv (in brief C. T. Grade teachers ) were issued charge sheet for misconduct on the same and identical charges. The charges were that in the annual internal examination of the institution of 1983 the teachers refused to sign and accept the notice dated 13. 4. 83 wherein detailed information and programme of examination was circulated ; though in the first meeting of the examination from 7. 15. a. m. to 9. 45 a. m. the teachers participated but in the second meeting of the examination from 10. 00 a. m. to 12. 00 noon they remained absent; in the examinations held on 2. 3. 4 and 5 May 1983 they did not record as to how many students were absent. The charges were replied by all the four teachers. The enquiry officer submitted his report and found the petitioner and other C. T. Grade teachers guilty of indiscipline, insubordination and dereliction of duty. The management of the institution resolved to remove the teachers from service. The management sent the proposal for removal from service with regard to C. T. Grade teachers to District inspector of Schools as prior approval for removal is required by law. Since the petitioner was Assistant Teacher L. T. Grade hence the management sent the proposal for obtaining prior approval of u. P. Secondary Educational Service Commission (in brief commission ). ( 3 ) THE District Inspector of Schools by his order dated 11. 2. Since the petitioner was Assistant Teacher L. T. Grade hence the management sent the proposal for obtaining prior approval of u. P. Secondary Educational Service Commission (in brief commission ). ( 3 ) THE District Inspector of Schools by his order dated 11. 2. 92 modified the proposal sent by the management for removal from service to stoppage of one increment for one year as the punishment was harsh and disproportionate to the charges. So far as the petitioner was concerned the commission granted its approval in its meeting dated 10. 1. 92. It was communicated by its letter dated 15. 1. 92 to District Inspector of Schools and the management of the institution. The management by its resolution dated 28. 1. 92 to removed the petitioner from the service and the order was communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 29. 1. 92. the petitioner has challenged the orders dated 28. 1. 92/29. 1. 92 Annexure 27 to the petitioner as well as the order of the commission dated 10. 1. 92 communicated by letter dated 15. 1. 92 Annexure-26 to the writ petition by means of the present writ petition. ( 4 ) I have heard Shri Ashok Khare learned counsel for the petitioner, A. K. Singh learned counsel for the respondent no. 1, Shri satya Foot Mehrotra learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 2, shri S. N. Srivastava learned standing counsel appearing for respondent no. 3, Shri Irshad Ali and Shri Rajiv Kumar Singh learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 4. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the enquiry officer has not recorded the reasons on the basis of which he has found the charges to be proved against the petitioner which was required to be done by enquiry officer as per chapter III of regulation 36 (1) of the regulations framed under U. P. Intermediate education Act ( in brief regulation ). He further argued that the charges against the petitioner related to the annual internal examination of the institution of 1983, and the charges were not such which warranted removal of the petitioner from service. He further urged that the charges mentioned in the charge sheet could not be held to be proved against the petitioner. He finally urged that the punishment of removal awarded to the petitioner was too harsh and disproportionate to the charges leveled against him. He further urged that the charges mentioned in the charge sheet could not be held to be proved against the petitioner. He finally urged that the punishment of removal awarded to the petitioner was too harsh and disproportionate to the charges leveled against him. And since on the same charges three other C. T. Grade teachers who were also found guilty of the identical charges but their punishment from removal from service was found to be not commensurate to the charges by the District Inspector of Schools and only minor punishment was awarded. The petitioner too was entitled for similar treatment on the principles of parity specially when there was nothing on record to show any other misconduct of the petitioner from 1984 till 1992. ( 6 ) ON the other hand, Shri S. P. Mehrotra learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 2 has supported the orders of respondent on the ground that the act of the petitioner amounted to misconduct as per chapter III of regulation 32 (1) of the regulations. The learned counsel urged that the enquiry officer, management and the commission found the petitioner guilty of the charges, after giving full opportunity of hearing at all the stages, therefore, the removal order is justified and in any case it does cast any stigma nor it bars the petitioner from seeking employment else where. He further argued that this court cannot go into question of adequary of punishment. The petitioner cannot get any benefit of the order dated 11. 2. 92 passed by District Inspector of Schools nor the petitioner can claim its benefit as in the petitioners case the approval for removal from service was granted prior to the order dated 11. 2. 92 passed by District Inspector of Schools. Moreover since the order dated 11. 2. 1992 passed by District Inspector of Schools has been challenged by the respondent no. 2 in appeal before the Joint director of Education the petitioner is not entitled for parity. ( 7 ) IN cases where domestic enquiry has been held and the punishing authority has agreed with the report of the enquiry officer the law is well settled by the apex court that the scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is very limited. The Court does not act as an appellate court. The apex court in State of U. P. and others versus. The Court does not act as an appellate court. The apex court in State of U. P. and others versus. Nand Kishore Shukla and another A. I. R. 1996 S. C. 1561 held as under: "it is settled law that the court is not a court is not a court of appeal to go into the question of imposition of the punishment. It is for the disciplinary authority to consider what would be the nature of the punishment to be imposed on a government servant based upon the proved misconduct against the government servant. Its proportionality also cannot be gone into by the court. The only question is whether the disciplinary authority would have passed such an order. It is settled law that even one of the charges, if held proved and sufficient for imposition of penalty by the disciplinary authority or by the appellate authority, the court would be loath to interfere with that part of the order. The order of removal does not cast stigma on the respondent to disable him from seeking any appointment elsewhere. Under these circumstance, we thing that the high Court was wholly wrong in setting aside the order. " In another judgement in Indian Oil Corporation and another vs. Ashok Kumar Arora 1997 (3) SCC 72 the law laid by the apex court is extracted below:"at the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate court/authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence, and/or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee. " ( 8 ) THE proposition is well settled that this court does not act as a court of appeal and would be reluctant to interfere in the matters where the report of the enquiry officer has been affirmed by the punishing authority. But the question still remains to be decided is as to whether the petitioner is entitled to parity with the other co-delinquents. The charges as mentioned earlier against all the teachers were identical. They arose out of the same incident and dereliction of duty was common. But the question still remains to be decided is as to whether the petitioner is entitled to parity with the other co-delinquents. The charges as mentioned earlier against all the teachers were identical. They arose out of the same incident and dereliction of duty was common. Under law the teachers could not be removed from service except with prior approval of the authorities mentioned in the act. The difference in the nature of punishment has arisen not because of any difference in nature of charge or the finding of guilt recorded by the enquiry officer but because the authorities empowered to grant approval were different. The approval of the petitioner was earlier in point of time, therefore, the question arises whether this court in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction can act in a manner to ensure justice to the petitioner. ( 9 ) THE apex court in B. C. Chaturvedi versus Union of India and others in AIR 1996 SC 484 in paragraph 18 laid down as under: "a review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High court/tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing and disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. " In paragraph 25 in B. C. Chaturvedi (supra) it further laid down:"no doubt, while exercising power under Article 226 of the constitution, the High Courts have to bear in mind the restraints inherent in exercising power of judicial review. It is because of this that substitution of High Courts view regarding appropriate punishment is not permissible. But for this constraint, I would have though that the law makers do desire application of judicial mind to the question of even proportionality of punishment/penalty. It is because of this that substitution of High Courts view regarding appropriate punishment is not permissible. But for this constraint, I would have though that the law makers do desire application of judicial mind to the question of even proportionality of punishment/penalty. I have said so because the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was amended to insert section 11a in it to confer this power even on a Labour corut/industrial Tribunal. It may be that this power was conferred on these adjudicating authorities because of the prevalence of unfair labour practice or victimisation by the management Even so, the power under Section 11a is available to be exercised, even it there be no victimisation or taking recourse to unfair labour practice. In this background, I do not think if we would be justified in giving much weight to the decision of the employer on the question of appropriate punishment in service matters relating to Government employees or employees of the public corporations. I have said so because if need for maintenance of office discipline be the reason of our adopting a strict attitude qua the public servants, discipline has to be maintained in the industrial sector also. The availability of appeal etc. to public servants does not make a real difference , as the appellate/ revisional authority is know to have taken a different view on the question of sentence only rarely. I would , therefore , think that but for the self-imposed limitation while exercising power under article 226 of the Constitution, there is no inherent reasons to disallow application of judicial mind to the question of proportionately of punishment/penalty. But then, while seized with this question as a writ court interference is permissible only when the punishment/penalty is shockingly disproportionate. " ( 10 ) THE apex in Director General of Police and othere versus G. Dasayan 1998 (2) SCC 407 while considering the case of a police constable, where the other constable was compulsorily retired on the identical charge, modified the order of dismissal to compulsory retirement. The relevant part of the case is extracted below: "the third ground that the co-delinquents except the Head Constable were let off though the charges were identical, it is stated by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Disciplinary Authority did not agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer so far as those two delinquents were concerned. The relevant part of the case is extracted below: "the third ground that the co-delinquents except the Head Constable were let off though the charges were identical, it is stated by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Disciplinary Authority did not agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer so far as those two delinquents were concerned. However, the Head Constable, who was also charged along with the respondent, was compulsorily retired by the disciplinaryauthority We find merit in the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants. At the same time, we are of the view that as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that a punishment of compulsory retirement in the case of the facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the Tribunal and in the place of order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the order of compulsory retirement is substituted. " ( 11 ) NORMALLY this court should not substitute its own conclusion on the penalty and impose some other penalty. However, this court is not precluded from interfering in exceptional circumstances. Our system of justice is founded on rule of law. Fair play is one of its important pillars. If the court finds any disturbance to it can always restore the balance. In this case due to tow different orders by tow different authorities on identical facts and similar situation has resulted in serious injustice. The C. T. Grade teachers are working since 1992 whereas the petitioner is out of service not because his conduct was in any manner worse than others but because his approving authority was different. But the effect is so severe that it shocks the conscience of the court as laid down in B. C. Chaturvedi (supra ). It would be fair and just that the petitioner be awarded some punishment as was awarded to C. T. Grade teachers. ( 12 ) SHRI Mehrotra has vehemently argued that appeal against the order of awarding punishment of stoppage of increment to C. T. Grade teachers is pending, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. Seven years have elapsed since the appeal was filed. Moreover, this court is only removing the disparity as it is existing today. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for respondent no. Seven years have elapsed since the appeal was filed. Moreover, this court is only removing the disparity as it is existing today. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for respondent no. 4 argued that his client having been selected by the commission and appointed in 1997, he shall seriously be prejudiced if this petition is allowed. The argument is devoid of any substance. This petition was filed in 1992. It was known to the management. If the appointment was made in vacancy of the petitioner it was obviously subject to decision of the writ petition. In any case, it is open to the commission to adjust the respondent no. 4 either in the same institution or some other institution without affecting the petitioner. ( 14 ) IN view of what I have stated above it is not necessary for me to consider various other submissions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. ( 15 ) IN the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 10. 1. 92 and its communication on 15. 1. 1992 of the commission granting approval to the removal of the petitioner from service Annexure-26 to the writ petition and the resolution of the respondent no. 2 dated 28. 1. 92 and order of removal dated 29. 1. 92 annexure-27 to the writ petition shall stand modified in the light of this judgement and shall stand substituted by stopping of petitioners one increment for one year as was awarded to three C. T. Grade teachers. The petitioner shall be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits of service. The aforesaid direction of this court shall be complied with by the respondents within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before them. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition Allowed. .