JUDGMENT S.B. Sakrikar, J. 1. The appellants have directed this appeal against the order dated 3rd December, 1998 rendered by III M.A.C.T. Dewas in Misc. Civil Case No. 12/98 thereby rejecting the application filed by the appellants under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. for setting aside an ex parte award dated 27.9.1997 passed by the Tribunal in Claim Case No. 252/96. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondents have filed a claim petition for award of compensation for the injuries sustained in a motor accident as a result of rash and negligent driving of the scooter bearing Registration No. MP 13A-3304. The said scooter, at the relevant time, was driven by appellant No. 1 and the appellant No. 2 was registered owner of the said vehicle. 3. On service of notice of the aforesaid claim petition on the appellants, they resisted the claim by filing the reply. The appellants have also engaged the Counsel in the aforesaid claim case to defend them. It is stated that on 8.8.1997 when the case was fixed for hearing the Counsel appearing for the appellants appeared before the Tribunal and pleaded 'no instructions' on behalf of the appellants. The claim case proceeded ex parte and ultimately on 27.9.1997, ex parte award was passed against the appellants and in favour of respondents/claimants. On getting the knowledge of ex parte award on 25.4.1998 the appellants have filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. alongwith the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking setting aside of the ex parte order and ex parte award passed against the appellants. The Tribunal, on considering the application filed on behalf of the appellants, rejected-the application for setting aside the ex-parte award on the ground that sufficient cause for delay in filing the application is not made out as also on the ground that from the facts sufficient ground for not appearing before the Court on the date of hearing is not made out. Aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal against the impugned order of the Tribunal. 4. The Counsel for the appellants contended that prima facie no case of negligence or laches on the part of the appellants is made out. Aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal against the impugned order of the Tribunal. 4. The Counsel for the appellants contended that prima facie no case of negligence or laches on the part of the appellants is made out. The Counsel contended that the appellants have engaged a Counsel for defending them in the claim case and the Counsel engaged by the appellants was present before the Tribunal oh 8.8.1997 when the case was fixed for hearing but without any knowledge or intimation to the appellants the Counsel pleaded 'no instructions' with the result the case proceeded ex parte against them and ex parte award was passed against the appellants on 27.9.1997. The Counsel submitted that the Counsel engaged by them did not inform them about pleading of 'no instructions' on 8.8.1997 neither he gave any information to the appellants with regard to passing of ex parte award dated 27.9.1997. The appellants came to know about the ex parte award on 25.4.1998 on making enquiry to their Counsel and immediately thereafter, the appellants have filed petition for setting aside ex parte award alongwith the prayer for condonation of delay. 5. In view of the aforesaid facts the Counsel submitted that the Trial Court should have allowed the application filed by the appellants and set aside the award passed ex parte against them. The Counsel relied on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Malkiat Singh and Anr. v. Joginder Singh and Ors. AIR 1998 SC 258 . 6. Considering the submissions of the Counsel fir the appellants and on perusal of the law laid down by the Apex Court in case of Malkiat Singh (supra) the first contention of the Counsel for the appellants deserves to be accepted. It is not disputed that the appellants have engaged a Counsel to defend them in claim case filed against them by the respondents and the Counsel engaged by the appellants was appearing before the Tribunal on the dates of hearing. It is also not in dispute that on 8.8.1997 Mr. Verma Counsel for the appellants did appear before the Tribunal but pleaded 'no instructions' on behalf of appellants. In the result, the case proceeded ex parte and ex parte award dated 27.9.1997 was passed against the appellants. It is no body's case that after pleading 'no instructions' on 8.8.1997 the Counsel for the appellants Mr. Verma Counsel for the appellants did appear before the Tribunal but pleaded 'no instructions' on behalf of appellants. In the result, the case proceeded ex parte and ex parte award dated 27.9.1997 was passed against the appellants. It is no body's case that after pleading 'no instructions' on 8.8.1997 the Counsel for the appellants Mr. Verma informed the appellants with regard to pleading of 'no instructions' on their behalf on 8.8.1997. No information was given with regard to passing of ex parte award against the appellants on 27.9.1997. In such state of affairs, the appellants were entitled to file an application for setting aside ex parte award soon after receiving the information about passing of alleged ex parte award and the Court ought to have set aside ex-parte award holding that sufficient cause for non-appearing before the Court on the date of hearing is made out no error. But on perusal of the record of the case on hand, it emerged that as per case of the appellants, in their application, they have received the knowledge that alleged ex parte award through their Counsel on 25.4.1998 and the application for setting aside the alleged award was filed as long as on 20.5.1998..In the application filed on behalf of the appellants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before the Tribunal, practically no explanation was given for the delay caused in filing the application under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. with effect from 25.4.1998 to 20.5.1998. Under Article 123 of the Limitation Act 30 days limitation is prescribed for filing an application for setting aside the. decree passed ex parte, and the limitation shall start from the date of decree. In this case, at the most, appellants were entitled for condonation of delay in the prescribed period of limitation till 25.4.1998 when they have received knowledge of passing of ex parte award against them through their Counsel but thereafter the time consumed by the appellants in filing the application till 20th of May, 98 has not at all been explained in an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 7. In the result, in my considered opinion, the Trial Court has committed no error in dismissing the application filed by the appellants for setting aside ex-parte award also on the ground of limitation. 7. In the result, in my considered opinion, the Trial Court has committed no error in dismissing the application filed by the appellants for setting aside ex-parte award also on the ground of limitation. The impugned order of the Trial Court dismissing the application of the appellants filed under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. on the ground of limitation is well founded and deserves to be upheld. 8. Consequently, this appeal being devoid of any merit and substance fails and the same is accordingly, dismissed with no orders as to cost.