Judgment : This civil miscellaneous appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 12. 1998 in A.S.No.27 of 1997 on the file of the Additional District Judge, Pondicherry, remanding O.S.No.67 of 1990 for a second time to the trial court for fresh trial. The circumstance which gave rise to the filing of this civil miscellaneous appeal may be stated thus:The appellant/plaintiff instituted the suit O.S.No.67 of 1990 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Karaikkal for a declaration of his title to the suit property, for direction the defendant to deliver vacant possession of the suit property and to pay future damages at the rate of Rs.10 per month and for costs. The appellant/plaintiff claimed title to the suit property as a purchaser under the document Ex.A-1 dated 2. 1988 from one Earnest Mariyanayagam alias Aruldass Carasse. The said Mariyanayagam got the property by virtue of the settlement deed Ex.A-2 dated 15. 1981 executed by his mother Claris alias Margueritte, wife of Aruldass Carassee and from that time, he became the owner, While so, the defendant claimed title to the suit property and trespassed into the same, which compelled the plaintiff to file the suit. 2. The defendant resisted the suit on several grounds inter alia contending that the mother of the vendor herself has no title to the suit property and no valid title has been conveyed to the plaintiffs vendor. Till 1975 the suit property was occupied by the defendants mother-in-law and after her death, the defendant continued to live in the suit property. During 1986, one Mary Therasa issued a reply notice to the notice of the defendant stating that Claris, the daughter of Mary Therasa had leased the suit property to the defendant and the notice sent by the plaintiff on 6. 1988 contained different facts. 3. On the abvoe pleadings, of the parties, the Principal District Munsif, Karaikkal framed the necessary issues. On a consideration of the evidence placed before him, the learned District Munsif, by judgment dated 30.1.1991. decreed the suit. 1988 contained different facts. 3. On the abvoe pleadings, of the parties, the Principal District Munsif, Karaikkal framed the necessary issues. On a consideration of the evidence placed before him, the learned District Munsif, by judgment dated 30.1.1991. decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the defendant preferred A.S.No.38 of 1991 on the file of the Additional District Judge, Pondicherry at Karaikkal, The learned Additional District Judge, on a re-appraisal of the evidence and on a consideration of the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the parties and for the reasons stated by him in the judgment dated 22. 1993, concluded that the plaintiff had not proved that the mother of his vendor Claris had valid title to the suit property and no clear finding had been given by the learned Principal District Munsif that the suit property is in the occupation of the defendant. According to the learned Additional District Judge, there is legitimate doubt whether the property mentioned in Ex.A-2 is in the possession of the defendant and the matter needs further investigation regarding the title of the plaintiff. Therefore, he remanded the suit to the trial court for the limited purpose of investigating the title of the plaintiff and permitted both the parties to adduce further evidence on the question of title. 4. Thefollowing issues and additional issues are formulated for trial by the learned Principal District Munsif, Karaikkal: .• 1. Whether the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit property. .• 2. Whether the suit is under valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction. .• 3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. .• 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim damages, if so what is the quantum. .• 5. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled to. Additional Issues: 1. Whether this Court is having jurisdiction to try this case. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree. 5. The learnedPrincipal District Munsif, by his judgment dated 2. 1995 concluded that the plaintiff had title to the suit property. However, he held that he is not entitled to vacant possession of the suit property and that he shall file an eviction petition before the Rent Controller under the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The legal representatives of the defendant Evaline file A.S.No.27 of 1997 as Evaline died. However, he held that he is not entitled to vacant possession of the suit property and that he shall file an eviction petition before the Rent Controller under the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The legal representatives of the defendant Evaline file A.S.No.27 of 1997 as Evaline died. The learned Additional District Judge, Pondicherry on a consideration of the submissions made by the learned counsel for both and on an analysis of the evidence on record was of the view that the Principal District Munsif, Karaikkal had not considered the evidence recorded before remand, and he had concentrated only on the evidence that was recorded subsequent to the remand, which is against the order of remand. Therefore, he allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and remitted the suit for a second time to the trial court for fresh disposal. While remitting the suit, the Additional District Judge, Pondicherry directed the appeal trial court to frame the following issues: 1. Whether the description of property mentioned. In the plaint sale deed dated 2. 1998 in favour of the plaintiff executed by one Mariyanayagam and settlement deed dated 15. 1981 in favour of the vendor of the plaintiff Mariyanaygam executed by mother of the vendor Claris are one and the same. 2. Whether the defendant was in possession of the suit but on the date of execution of the settlement deed dated 15. 1981 executed by Claris in favour of Mariyanayagam. 3. The exclusion of a hut in the settlement deed dated 15. 1981 in favour of the vendor of the plaintiff is referable to the suit superstructure in possession of the defendant. 4. Whether the suit hut was in existence at the time of execution of sale deed dated 2. 1988 in favour of the plaintiff. 5. Whether the hut referred in the sale deed dated 2. 1988 in favour of the plaintiff is referable to the suit premises in possession of the defendant or otherwise. 6. If the suit premises was in existence on the date of sale deed dated 2. 1988 in favour of the plaintiff then why the existence of suit premises was not referred in the sale deed and will it not amount to suppression of fact. 6. If the suit premises was in existence on the date of sale deed dated 2. 1988 in favour of the plaintiff then why the existence of suit premises was not referred in the sale deed and will it not amount to suppression of fact. The learned Additional District Judge also directed the trial judge to record his findings on those issues together with the issues already framed by the learned District Munsif, which judgment is being challenged in this appeal. 6. Thepoint for consideration is whether the Appellate Judge is incorrect in remanding the suit for a second time for fresh disposal. The learned counsel for the appellant represented before me that the action of the learned Appellate Judge in remanding the matter for the second time for fresh disposal is unwarranted and not justified. The reason on which the matter has been remanded for the second time is the learned trial Judge has not considered the evidence that was recorded prior to the remand which may not be a justificable reason. Further, the appellate Judge had directed the trial court to frame six more issues apart from the issues already on record and directed findings to be recorded on them. It was pointed out the suit was remanded for the first time for the specific purpose of recording a finding as to whether the mother of the vendor of the plaintiff had title to the suit property. It was argued that the evidence recorded before the remand and after the remand are available on record and nothing prevented the appellate judge himself to analyse the evidence and record a finding regarding the title of the mother of the vendor of the plaintiff, by name, Claris Mariyanayagam. Without adopting that procedure the appellate Judge gave an easy disposal by remanding the matter for a second time, which is absolutely unnecessary and delay would occur in the disposal of the case. 7. The attention of this Court is invited to the following three decisions: (a) Rajalakshmi and others v. Minor Venkatesan and others Rajalakshmi and others v. Minor Venkatesan and others Rajalakshmi and others v. Minor Venkatesan and others (1988)1 MLJ. 196 ; (b) Srinivasagam Pillai v. Kuttiah (1988)1 L.W. 100 and (c) Visalakshi Ammal v. Dhanalakshmi Ammal (1989)2 L.W. 414 (D.B.). The attention of this Court is invited to the following three decisions: (a) Rajalakshmi and others v. Minor Venkatesan and others Rajalakshmi and others v. Minor Venkatesan and others Rajalakshmi and others v. Minor Venkatesan and others (1988)1 MLJ. 196 ; (b) Srinivasagam Pillai v. Kuttiah (1988)1 L.W. 100 and (c) Visalakshi Ammal v. Dhanalakshmi Ammal (1989)2 L.W. 414 (D.B.). In the first decision, while dealing with the power of the appellate court to remand the suit under O.41, Rules 23 and 23-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, after an elaborate reference to the earlier decisions on this aspect, this Court had observed at page 200 as follows: “…. The main questions are whether the plaintiffs have got title to the suit properties, whether the alleged settlement deeds and the sale deed in favour of the defendants are sham and nominal, whether the will set up by the plaintiffs is true and valid, whether it was the last will executed by the deceased Ramaswamy Thevar and whether the said will has not been superseded by the latest will set up by the defendants under Ex.B-113. In the instant case, the trial Judge came to a conclusion against the plaintiffs on all these issues. The lower appellate Judge without going to the said findings erred in assuming many things and passed the order of remand directing the plaintiffs to take steps for impleading parties and adding properties, even though the counsel for the plaintiffs wanted those things to be relegated to a separate suit. I find much force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the lower appellate court has not understood the scope of O.41, Rule 23, or 23-A, C.P.C., but exercised its jurisdiction improperly contrary to ration laid down in various decisions of this Court. For all these reasons, the order of remand is certainly nor substantiable and it is liable to be set aside.” In the second rulings, in para 5 it has been held thus: “… At the outset it is to be mentioned that the learned Subordinate Judge has not properly understood the scope of O.43, Rule 23, Civil Procedure Code, and also the pronouncements of this Court on that point. First of all before ever Ordering remand of the case, the appellate court ought to have discussed the finding of the trial court and arrived at a conclusion that the said finding is liable to be set aside and that only the appellate court could think of remitting the case back. Secondly an order of remand cannot be made just to fill up a lacuna by allowing the party to adduce evidence but the order of remand is possible only if the court feels that further evidence is necessary for the arrival of a just decision. If the appellate court feels that additional evidence is necessary or additional evidence can be allowed to be adduced by one party, under O.43, Rule 27, C.P.C., it could be adopted and the appellate court itself can dispose of the appeal on merits. But that cannot be a ground for remanding the suit to the trial court for fresh disposal.” In the third decision, a Division Bench of this Court at para 4 has observed: “…As we could see from the extract of the passages from the judgment of the learned single Judge, on the opinion that the first court has not considered the aspect of equity satisfactorily and the question of res judicata has been dealt with by the first court without reference to the latest decisions and additional evidence may have to be let in by the parties, the learned single Judge deemed fit to set aside the judgment and decree of the first court and to remit the suit for fresh disposal. The unsatisfactory consideration of an issue by the first court, and the non-advertance to the Judicial Precedents by the first court while deciding an issue and the need to take additional evidence, should not always be counted in favour of making an order of remand. These lacunae, if in fact they are present, can be rectified by the appellate court itself, unless there are very compelling circumstances to make an order of remand. An order of remand should not be taken to be matter of course on the grounds. The power of remand should be always endeavour to dispose of the case by the appellate court itself. when the commissions and omissions made by the first court could be corrected by the appellate court. An order of remand should not be taken to be matter of course on the grounds. The power of remand should be always endeavour to dispose of the case by the appellate court itself. when the commissions and omissions made by the first court could be corrected by the appellate court. It is not claimed by either side that there is a total dearth of evidence to decide the concerned questions.“ And ultimately the order of remand had been held to be unwarranted. 8. On a perusal of the judgment of the appellate court, I am satisfied that the learned appellate Judge has not understood the scope of O.41, Rules 23 and 23-A of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding remand of a suit. The learned counsel for the respondent is unable to convince this Court that the Order of remand is warranted on the facts of this case and the course adopted by the appellate Judge is justified. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant the entire evidence is before the appellate Judge and therefore, he himself could have considered the evidence comprehensively and recorded the finding as to whether the mother of the vendor of the plaintiff had title to convey and for that purpose only the remand had been made for the first time. There is also absolutely no justification for the appellate judge to frame six more issues and to have directed to record findings on those issues apart from the issues already formulated. The mere fact that the learned trial judge has not considered the evidence that was recorded before the remand and rendered its judgment only on the basis of the evidence recorded after the remand, will not be sufficient to set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and remand the same for fresh disposal without discussing the merits and demerits of the case and reaching a definite conclusion that the judgment and decree of the trial court is erroneous on facts and law and the remand of the case is warranted. In the case on hand it is apparent that the lower appellate court has not at all discussed the merits and demerits of the case before ever thinking of ordering remand and the reasons given for ordering remand are unsustainable and, therefore, the order of remand is liable to be set aside. 9. In the case on hand it is apparent that the lower appellate court has not at all discussed the merits and demerits of the case before ever thinking of ordering remand and the reasons given for ordering remand are unsustainable and, therefore, the order of remand is liable to be set aside. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of remand passed by the lower appellate court is set aside and the lower appellate court is directed to restore the appeal to its file and give opportunity to both parties to advance arguments and dispose of the appeal on the merits of the case with reference to the evidence already on record according to law within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the records without fail. Both the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.P. is closed.