ORDER J.G. Chitre, J. 1. Shri D.D. Vyas, Additional Advocate-General, has submitted that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to hear and decide this matter because this petition does not fall under purview of Article 226 of the Constitution. According to Shri Vyas it falls under the purview of Article 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, this Court would not be having jurisdiction to hear and decide this petition. Shri G.M. Chaphekar, Senior Counsel, strongly contended that this Court is having jurisdiction to hear and decide this petition because in the petition a prayer has been made for the purpose of issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari for the purpose of setting aside the order which has been passed by the Additional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore, on November 15, 1988 (annexure D) by which the petitioner has been saddled with the responsibility of paying the additional tax with penalty by holding that the petitioner concealed the transactions which were transacted by him in the territory of this State which was taxable. 2. Few facts need to be stated for the purpose of unfolding the matter. The petitioners trade in betelnuts and black pepper having their headquarter in Kerala State and having a branch office at Indore. They trade in those two commodities within the territory of M.P. and in that context they hold a registration in view of the provisions of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act", for convenience). The petitioner is having a registered partnership firm carrying on business of betelnut and black pepper under the style Keveyam & Co. having its branch at 36, Gajendra House, 10, Jawahar Marg, Siyaganj, Indore. The said firm is having partners, namely-- K.V. Mohammad, K.V. Baba K.V. Zakir Mainer K.V. Zinuddin. They are having a manager named as K.V. Abdul who is managing the business of the petitioners at Indore while functioning as such at Indore. One P.T. Daud was the sales manager of the petitioner at Indore branch of the petitioners at the relevant time. The said firm is having its godown at Bank of Baroda Bhawan, Khosla Chambers, Navlakha, Indore. They had taken a premises on lease at 306, Khatiwala Tank, Indore, accommodating their employees for residence posted at various stations at Indore. One S.M. Ahmed was the owner of said building at the relevant time. The said firm is having its godown at Bank of Baroda Bhawan, Khosla Chambers, Navlakha, Indore. They had taken a premises on lease at 306, Khatiwala Tank, Indore, accommodating their employees for residence posted at various stations at Indore. One S.M. Ahmed was the owner of said building at the relevant time. One P.J. Joy was also an employee engaged by the petitioners' firm. 3. Petitioners' branch at Indore had filed its return for period April 1, 1983 to March 31, 1984, showing a turnover of Rs. 92,88,728.49 on account of receiving the said two commodities from Kerala and selling it within the jurisdiction of M.P. State. The petitioners also acted as commission agent and for that Indore branch was maintaining regular books of account in respect of their transactions, business and doing overall purchases and sales of the abovesaid commodities. The petitioners have enclosed challans showing payment of tax of Rs. 5,28,381. Their branch at Indore has been registered as dealer in view of provisions of Section 2(a) of the Act having a registration certificate in that respect. 4. A flying squad of the respondents raided the said premises situated at Khatiwala Tank on December 31, 1984 in the course of and in connection with the assessment proceedings of the petitioners' branch at Indore for the period April 1, 1983 to March 31,1984. The premises at Khatiwala Tank branch was also raided on that date. The respondents after said raid kept quiet till September 22, 1986 when they started assessment proceedings against petitioners' Indore branch for enhancement of turnover on the ground of alleged escapement of turnover. They imposed additional tax and penalty on them ; the said assessment and enhancement of the turnover and imposition of penalty was based on the report of the flying squad raid on December 31, 1984. Said report as per averments of the petitioners contained 150 pages. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioners in consequence with the said raid on December 12, 1986. 5. It was alleged by the respondents that one T. Mohiuddin has opened an account bearing No. 6864 in the Bank of Baroda, Industrial Estate Branch, Indore on August 30, 1982. And similarly K. Ahmed and C. Holaram had opened accounts with Vijaya Bank. 5. It was alleged by the respondents that one T. Mohiuddin has opened an account bearing No. 6864 in the Bank of Baroda, Industrial Estate Branch, Indore on August 30, 1982. And similarly K. Ahmed and C. Holaram had opened accounts with Vijaya Bank. It is the allegation of the respondents that these accounts were operated by the employees of the petitioners' branch at Indore and larger sum of money was remitted by telegraphic transfer and drafts to the petitioners' employees residing at Kerala and thus turnover was minimised and tax was evaded. It has been also alleged that the said transfers of money were made to Abdul Kadir and C.C. Quadar and those transfers represented purchases made by the petitioners. It was further alleged that there were transfers by Kishore & Company, Siyaganj, Indore and K.V. Supari Traders, Daulatganj, Indore and the said transfers were to the petitioners. It is also alleged by the respondents that Shri K. Ahmed who had opened a bank account with Vijaya Bank was introduced to the said bank by one Arvind Kumar who happens to be a partner of Arvind Trading Company and Prabhakar Rao, Branch Manager of Vijaya Bank stated that he knew K. Ahmed. 6. The petitioners replied to the show cause notice which was issued by the respondents on December 12, 1986 by their reply dated December 26, 1986 and the petitioners had pointed out that the report submitted to the assessing authority by the Sales Tax Officer, flying squad had not been given to the petitioner and no opportunity had been given to the petitioners to go through the same so as to make an effective representation. It was further pointed out that the respondents had wrongly attempted to correlate the transactions based on entries in the account No. 6864 of T. Mohiuddin with the business of the petitioners. 7. Petitioners had asked respondent No. 1 to produce said T. Mohiuddin for cross-examination but that was not done. Petitioners averred that it was very much necessary for the purpose of proving their bona fides and innocence to cross-examine S.M. Ahmed, the landlord, also but he was not made available. 7. Petitioners had asked respondent No. 1 to produce said T. Mohiuddin for cross-examination but that was not done. Petitioners averred that it was very much necessary for the purpose of proving their bona fides and innocence to cross-examine S.M. Ahmed, the landlord, also but he was not made available. It was pointed out by the petitioners that the sales manager, P.T. Daud had actually operated the account in the name of T. Mohiuddin and P.T. Daud though happens to be employees of the petitioners, was having and running his own independent business in the name of "Harshad Corporation" and was also registered under the M.P. General Sales Tax Act and, therefore, assuming without admitting the fact that said P.T. Daud was alleged to have operated the bank account in the name of T. Mohiuddin. The said act of P.T. Daud was not connected in whatsoever way with the petitioners and the respondents had not proved that those transactions were the outcome of the sale and purchase activities of the petitioners and on account of that liable to be assessed and taxed. Petitioners averred that the allegations in respect of telegraphic transfers were made by Ashraf (who was once upon a time in the employment of the petitioners as cashier) of T. Mohiuddin, when Ashraf was requested to produce for cross-examination, the respondents did not do that. It is the averment of the petitioners that respondents placed reliance on the statement of branch manager, Prabhakar Rao and other bank employees but without giving proper opportunity to the petitioners to cross-examine the important witnesses, denied the justice to the petitioners. 8. It is the case of the petitioners that when the Us went to the Supreme Court, Supreme Court had remanded the said matter to the assessing authority to start the taxation assessment proceedings again ; however, at that time also no copy of said big report containing 150 pages was given to the petitioners so as to enable them well in advance in reasonable time to prepare for their defence. It is also case of the petitioners that said witnesses who happen to be their important witnesses for purpose of proving the truth before the authority were not produced and thus, the petitioners could not cross-examine and bring the truth on record showing that the petitioners did not conceal the turnover, did not minimise it and did not evade the tax which was liable to be paid in that context. 9. The respondents contended that the said bank accounts were operated by the employees of the petitioners and those transactions, transfer of money, demand drafts showed the turnover of the business of the petitioners. The respondents also contended that the petitioner had evaded tax by using clandestine method and by holding those two bank accounts in the bogus names through their employees. It is the case of the respondents that the sum which was indicated by the said transactions of those accounts in the said bank was nothing but the turnover of the petitioners which was concealed by the petitioners only for the purpose of evading the tax. 10. Shri G.M. Chaphekar, Senior Counsel for the petitioners, reiterated these averments and put his submission for the purpose of canvassing the case of the petitioners. Shri D.D. Vyas, Additional Advocate-General also reiterated the stand taken by the respondents and justified the cause pleaded by the respondents. 11. Shri D.D. Vyas placed reliance on the following judgments for the purpose of substantiating his submission : (1) (1996) 10 SCC 351 (Union of India v. Mohan Singh). (2) (1996) 6 SCC 584 (Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Roochira Ceramics). (3) (1997) 1 SCC 156 (State of M.P. v. M.V. Vyavsaya & Co.). (4) (1997) 8 SCC 730 (Union of India v. Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd.). (5) [2000] 117 STC 312 (SC); (1998) 9 SCC 631 (State of Kerala v. Namputhiris Pickle Industries). (6) AIR 1994 SC 921 (Union of India v. Bata India Ltd.). (7) AIR 1984 SC 38 (Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim). (8) AIR 1973 SC 194 (V.V. Iyer of Bombay v. Jasjit Singh, Collector of Customs). (9) [1963] 14 STC 410 (SC); AIR 1967 SC 549 (Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. D.P. Dube, Sales Tax Officer). (10) AIR 1969 SC 983 (Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain). (7) AIR 1984 SC 38 (Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim). (8) AIR 1973 SC 194 (V.V. Iyer of Bombay v. Jasjit Singh, Collector of Customs). (9) [1963] 14 STC 410 (SC); AIR 1967 SC 549 (Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. D.P. Dube, Sales Tax Officer). (10) AIR 1969 SC 983 (Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain). The ratio of these judgments is that when the High Court is blessed with writ petitions concerning the taxation matters, the High Court should not reappreciate the evidence if that happens to be the basis of the conclusion drawn by the taxing officers. It also conveys a submission that in such matters the High Court would be entertaining the writs in view of provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution and thereby would be focusing its attention towards credibility, quality and maintainability of the orders passed by the authority which are being assailed, with a view of supervision. By relying on those judgments and the ratio conveyed by the judgments mentioned above, Shri D.D. Vyas, vehemently argued that this Court needs to be pleased to dismiss this writ petition because in the present matter the taxing authorities have based their conclusion on some evidence which has been recorded by it which was adduced through the mouth of some witnesses who have been examined. For the purpose of avoiding verbosity a detailed reference is not made to each and every judgment but a general regime has been made and considered so far as the main ratio the judgments intend to convey. 12. Shri Chaphekar, Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that in the present case the question is not of appreciating the evidence but considering the illegality of the said order which is being depicted prima facie and from its appearance. It is his submission that the said illegality and perverseness of the order being assailed are so significant that this Court has to exercise its jurisdiction in view of Article 226 of the Constitution by issuing writ of certiorari. For substantiating his submission Shri Chaphekar placed reliance on judgments which can be enumerated as mentioned hereunder : (1) [1957] 8 STC 770 (SC) (Raghubar Mandal Harihar Mandal v. State of Bihar). (2) [1985] 59 STC 362 (MP) (Gadkari, V.B. v. Sales Tax Officer). (3) [1981] 127 ITR 27 (MP) (Ganga Prasad Sharma v. Commissioner of Income-tax, M.P.). For substantiating his submission Shri Chaphekar placed reliance on judgments which can be enumerated as mentioned hereunder : (1) [1957] 8 STC 770 (SC) (Raghubar Mandal Harihar Mandal v. State of Bihar). (2) [1985] 59 STC 362 (MP) (Gadkari, V.B. v. Sales Tax Officer). (3) [1981] 127 ITR 27 (MP) (Ganga Prasad Sharma v. Commissioner of Income-tax, M.P.). He pointed out that these judgments are dealing with the facts and circumstances of the cases which are very much similar to the present one. He pointed out further that in the present case the orders which are being assailed by this writ petition by making a prayer of issuing of writ of certiorari are based on no material at all. According to him in the present matter there has been no evidence at all to show that the petitioners have transacted in territorial area of M.P. State and, therefore, it was not taxable at all as the taxing authority have done, he submitted further that the witnesses who have been examined dp not render any basis by their testimonies that any article was either purchased or sold within the territorial limits of M.P. State where the M.P. General Sales Tax Act provisions would be applicable and the petitioners would be so taxable. 13. In the matter of T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa reported in AIR 1954 SC 440 , the Supreme Court has clarified as to what should be the attitude of the Indian courts dealing with the writ jurisdictions. In the said matter Supreme Court held that: "As is well-known, the issue of the prerogative writs, within which certiorari is included, had their origin in England in the King's prerogative power of superintendence over the due observance of law by his officials and Tribunals. The writ of certiorari is so named because in its original form it required that the King should be 'certified' of the proceedings to be investigated and the object was to secure by the authority of a superior court, that the jurisdiction of the inferior Tribunal should be properly exercised. These principles were transplanted to other parts of the King's dominions. In India, during the British days the three chartered High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were alone competent to issue writs and that too within specified limits and the power was not exercisable by the other High Courts at all. These principles were transplanted to other parts of the King's dominions. In India, during the British days the three chartered High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were alone competent to issue writs and that too within specified limits and the power was not exercisable by the other High Courts at all. The language used in Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is very wide and the powers of the Supreme Court as well as of all the High Courts in India extend to issuing of orders, writs or directions including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and certiorari as may be considered necessary for enforcement of the fundamental rights and in the case of the High Courts, for other purposes as well. In view of the express provisions in our Constitution, the court need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English judges. It can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of certiorari in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, so long as it keeps to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English Law." 14. Further Supreme Court observed that: "One of the fundamental principles in regard to the issuing of a writ of certiorari, is, that the writ can be availed of only to remove or adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts. The expression "judicial acts" includes the exercise of quasi-judicial functions by administrative bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to exercise such functions and is used in contrast with what are purely ministerial acts. The second essential feature of a writ of certiorari is that the control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-judicial Tribunals or bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory capacity. In granting a writ of certiorari the superior court does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior Tribunal. In granting a writ of certiorari the superior court does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior Tribunal. The supervision of the superior court exercised through writs of certiorari goes on two points. One is the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise ; the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. These two heads normally cover all the grounds on which a writ of certiorari could be demanded. Certiorari may and is generally granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding or from the absence of some preliminary proceeding or the court itself may not be legally constituted or suffer from certain disability by reason of extraneous circumstances. When the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the existence of some collateral fact, it is well-settled that the court cannot by a wrong decision of the fact give it jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess. A Tribunal may be competent to enter upon an enquiry but in making the enquiry it may act in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or where no particular procedure is prescribed, it may violate the principles of natural justice. A writ of certiorari may be available in such cases. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision." 15. Shri Chaphekar has pointed out the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax reported in [1954] 26 ITR 775 (SC); AIR 1955 SC 65 where the Supreme Court was dealing with taxation matter. Shri Chaphekar has pointed out the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax reported in [1954] 26 ITR 775 (SC); AIR 1955 SC 65 where the Supreme Court was dealing with taxation matter. Supreme Court held in that matter : "Though the Income-tax Officer is not fettered by technical rules of evidence and pleadings and is entitled to act on material which may not be accepted as evidence in a court of law, it is equally clear that in making the assessment under Sub-Section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, the Income-tax Officer is not entitled to make a pure guess and make an assessment without reference to any evidence or any material at all. There must be something more than bare suspicion to support the assessment under Section 23(3)." In the said matter it was found that: "In arriving at an estimate of gross profit rate, the Income-tax Officer and the Tribunal had violated certain fundamental rules of justice firstly, by not disclosing to the assessee what information had been supplied to it by the departmental representative ; secondly by not giving any opportunity to the company to rebut the material furnished to it by him, and lastly, by declining to take all the material that the assessee wanted to produce in support of its case, with the result that the assessee had not had a fair hearing." After assessing facts and circumstances of the said case the Supreme Court held, that-- "Both the Income-tax Officer and Tribunal in estimating the gross profit rate on sales did not act on any material but acted on pure guess and suspicion and it was thus a fit case for the exercise of the powers under Article 136." 16. In the matter of Ganga Prasad Sharma v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1981] 127 ITR 27 (MP) the division Bench of this Court observed that: "While making a best judgment assessment, though there must necessarily be guess-work in the matter, it must not be arbitrary." In that matter also the division Bench was dealing with a matter where : "The petitioner filed his return on estimate basis by computing profit at a fiat rate of 10 per cent on gross receipts as he did not maintain any account books. The ITO computed the net profit at 15 per cent on the contract payments received by the petitioner. The Commissioner dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioner under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on the ground that, in view of the nature of the business, the estimate of net profit at 15 per cent was reasonable. On a writ petition filed by the petitioner under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the division Bench held that the basis on which the computation was made was not disclosed in the orders of the ITO and the CIT as neither the ITO nor the CIT had referred to any material for applying the flat rate of 15 per cent while estimating the net profits." The division Bench of this Court quashed the order, passed by ITO and CIT. 17. Again in another case the division Bench of this High Court made some observations in respect of subject-matter which is being depicted in the present matter. In the matter of V.B. Gadkari v. Sales Tax Officer, Circle VI, Indore, a judgment reported in [1985] 59 STC 362 (MP), the division Bench of this Court held: "Where all that the assessing authority stated in the order of assessment after rejecting the books of account and the taxable turnover disclosed by the assessee in the return was that the taxable turnover was determined at Rs. 1,05,000, and the assessee's revision petition against such assessment was also dismissed." While adjudicating over the matter, the division Bench held-- "that the order of assessment did not refer to any material whatsoever on which the estimate was based. Thus, it was clear that the assessing authority made an assessment based on pure guess without reference to any evidence or material at all. Therefore the order of assessment and the order dismissing the revision petition of the assessee were vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record and deserved to be quashed." 18. Thus, it was clear that the assessing authority made an assessment based on pure guess without reference to any evidence or material at all. Therefore the order of assessment and the order dismissing the revision petition of the assessee were vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record and deserved to be quashed." 18. Section 2(t) of the Act gives the definition of "turnover" by defining it as : " 'Turnover' used in relation to any period means the aggregate of the amount of sale prices received and receivable by a dealer in respect of any sale or supply or distribution of goods made during that period, whether or not the whole or any portion of such turnover is liable to tax but after deducting the amount, if any, refunded by the dealer to a purchaser, in respect of any goods purchased and returned by the purchaser within the prescribed period : Provided that-- (a) in the case of sale by bona fide agriculturist as defined in Clause (e) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (No. 20 of 1959) of ghee produced by himself, or (b) in case of sale by a person of agricultural or horticultural produce grown by himself or grown on any land in which he has an interest whether as owner, usufructuary mortgagee, tenant or otherwise, when such produce is sold in the form in which it was produced, without being subjected to any physical, chemical or other process for being made fit for consumption save mere dehusking, cleaning, grading or sorting, the amount of consideration relating to such sales shall be excluded from his turnover." Section 4(1) provides : "Every dealer whose turnover during a period of twelve months immediately preceding the commencement of this Act exceeds the limit specified in Sub-Section (5), shall from such commencement be liable to pay tax under this Act on his taxable turnover in respect of sales or supplies of goods effected in Madhya Pradesh." 19. Thus, making a reference to provisions of Section 4(1), Shri Chaphekar had argued that it was incumbent on the part of the taxing authority to prove it legally up to permissible extent that there was purchase and sale by the petitioners within the limits of M.P. State. 20. Thus, making a reference to provisions of Section 4(1), Shri Chaphekar had argued that it was incumbent on the part of the taxing authority to prove it legally up to permissible extent that there was purchase and sale by the petitioners within the limits of M.P. State. 20. In the present matter there were raids--one at the office place and other at the residential place situated at Khatiwala Tank, Indore where some employees of the petitioners were resided. Some documents were found. Those documents and the material which were found in those raids indicated that an account was opened in Vijaya Bank, Indore in the name of (1) K. Ahemad bearing No. 2922, (2) an account was opened in Bank of Baroda, Navlakha Branch bearing No. 32431 in the name of K. Ahemad, (3) an account in Bank of Baroda, Industrial Estate Branch in the name of T. Mohiuddin, bearing No. 6864. It has been pointed out in the order passed by the Additional Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, dated November 15, 1988--annexure "D", that according to the assessment done by the taxing authority the information was available which has been tabulised as mentioned hereunder : (1) The account books disclose that there were turnover to the tune of Rs. 92,69,860. Thereafter the taxation started subjected on alleged evasion of the tax which was categorised. (2) Vijaya Bank, Indore, account in the name of K. Ahemad showing the collection of the amount of Rs. 8,00,430.50. (3) A T.T. was sent by K. Ahemad to the tune of Rs. 1,70,000. (4) The bank account in the name of K. Ahemad in Bank of Baroda and T.T. was sent through it which was to the tune of Rs. 10,87,438. (5) An account in Bank of Baroda, Navlakha through a T.T. to the tune of Rs. 27,25,000 was sent. (6) A T.T. and D.D. which were sent through Bank of Baroda branch Industrial Area, account in the name of T. Mohiuddin to the tune of Rs. 84,75,300. (7) T.T. /D.D. was sent through Bank of Baroda account in the name of T. Mohiuddin to the tune of Rs. 17,90,000. Thus, taking over the initial turnover of Rs. 92,69,860 by process of addition of these things the figure of Rs. 1,50,47,853.90 were calculated and the petitioners were taxed on that amount. 84,75,300. (7) T.T. /D.D. was sent through Bank of Baroda account in the name of T. Mohiuddin to the tune of Rs. 17,90,000. Thus, taking over the initial turnover of Rs. 92,69,860 by process of addition of these things the figure of Rs. 1,50,47,853.90 were calculated and the petitioners were taxed on that amount. This was the addition to the original turnover which was assessed to the tune of Rs. 92,69,860. The total taxable turnover thus, heaped to the figure of Rs. 2,43,17,715. Another table has been adopted for the same which showed that said turnover was classified in two categories--one betelnut and another black pepper. The tax and surcharge thus amounted on these two counts to Rs. 14,60,803 which was pertaining to the period commencing from April 1, 1983 to March 31, 1984. 21. Shri Chaphekar has submitted that raids which were effected resulted in report which was containing 150 pages even though the matter was remitted by the Supreme Court and direction was given to the concerned authority to decide it within a particular span of period, the copy of that report was not furnished to the petitioners. He pointed out the show cause notice which was sent to the petitioners on December 12, 1986 (annexure A). It is pertinent to note that in that show cause notice, it has been mentioned that a demand was made by the petitioners that a copy of said report be furnished to them for the purpose of enabling them to meet the situation and explain the situation to the taxing authorities. It means that when that show cause notice was issued, the copy of that report was not supplied to the petitioners. Further, it shows that Sales Tax Officers P.T. Daud, Dinesh Soni and J.K. Soni were present and they were appraised of the substance of the said report. The information which was conveyed to them, disclosed to them as shown by the said show cause notice, is cryptic one. 22. It further shows that the information was given about those bank accounts in the names of K. Ahemad, 306, Khatiwala Tank, Indore, who was introduced by Arvind Kumar, the partner of Arvind Kumar Trading Company, Siyaganj, Indore. The information which was conveyed to them, disclosed to them as shown by the said show cause notice, is cryptic one. 22. It further shows that the information was given about those bank accounts in the names of K. Ahemad, 306, Khatiwala Tank, Indore, who was introduced by Arvind Kumar, the partner of Arvind Kumar Trading Company, Siyaganj, Indore. The name of Prabhakar Rao, Manager of Vijaya Bank, who was known to both K. Ahemad and P.T. Daud quite well and the descriptions of account which these persons were having as well as the account which was in the name of petitioners Keveyam & Co. It has been mentioned in Clause (4) of said show cause notice that assessing and taxing authorities got the information of this turnover by recording the statements of K. Ahemad and P.T. Daud. It was pointed out that P.T. Daud refused to identify K. Ahemad. The statement of Prabhakar Rao, P.T. Daud, K. Ahemad and the information indicated by some of these of the accounts books were sent only for assessing authority to come to the conclusion that the petitioners-company had prosecuted for purchasing and selling in betelnut and black pepper which was a legitimate "turnover" which was assessable and taxable. 23. It is pertinent again to note that as indicated by annexure "B", the reply given to said show cause notice by the petitioners-company in which a grievance was made that the copy of said report was not furnished to the petitioners so as to enable them to meet out the allegations made against them. Vide that show cause notice, as it has been submitted by Shri Chaphekar, that by the said orders which has been assailed by this writ petition, the assessing and taxing authorities have acted on mere suspicion and conjuncture without there being any material to support the same, such stand was taken by the petitioners in the reply to said show cause notice. In fact a demand was made for producing same person for cross-examining on whose statements assessing and taxing authorities based their conclusion. T. Mohiuddin was requested to be produced for cross-examination for proving that T. Mohiuddin had no relations whatsoever with the business of the petitioners. In fact a demand was made for producing same person for cross-examining on whose statements assessing and taxing authorities based their conclusion. T. Mohiuddin was requested to be produced for cross-examination for proving that T. Mohiuddin had no relations whatsoever with the business of the petitioners. K. Ahemad was also requested to be produced for cross-examination who happened to be introduced by T. Mohiuddin to the bank for opening his account, so also P.T. Daud was requested for cross-examination. A categorical statement was made in the said reply by the petitioners that T. Mohiuddin was never in the employment of the petitioners-company. It was averred that the petitioners nor the person employed by them in their business were knowing said T. Mohiuddin. It was also averred that the petitioners wanted to impeach the statement of K. Ahemad by cross-examining, because their statements were recorded by the assessing and taxing authorities behind back of the petitioners. So also petitioners wanted to cross-examine one Ashraf for the purpose of knowing whether he had signed for Mohiuddin. The petitioners also wanted to cross-examine these witnesses for the purpose of bringing it on record that there was no jural relationship of purchaser and seller between any person and so far as commodities mentioned above were concerned. The petitioners further wanted to demonstrate that P.T. Daud could have been within territory of M.P. State and in context of the said business or those transactions he might have been dealt with those bank accounts, transfer entries or demand drafts. Some summons were sent to those persons but they were returned with endorsement that those are not traceable. Shri Chaphekar submitted that unless an exercise has been established between the petitioners' business in M.P. State and those persons in context with those accounts or transfer entries for demand drafts, petitioners cannot be held liable for assessment and taxation in respect of that. According to him what was important for the respondents to establish is that the petitioner had a trade in respect of those entries, despatch of demand drafts and payment of money as indicated by the said show cause notice and those bank accounts. According to him what was important for the respondents to establish is that the petitioner had a trade in respect of those entries, despatch of demand drafts and payment of money as indicated by the said show cause notice and those bank accounts. He further submitted that merely despatch of money from a bank account by itself is not sufficient enough to establish that there were trading transactions within the territory of M.P. and the said amount credited in bank reflected the turnover which is subject to assessment and levy of tax. It is the submission of Shri Chaphekar that unless there is some evidence to come to conclusion that those figures reflect the turnover as contemplated by provisions of the Act, the respondents were not lawfully permitted to assess the petitioners and tax them as they wanted to do by issuing show cause notice and passing the order which has been assailed by this petition. 24. Shri Chaphekar pointed out that even according to the stand taken by the respondents as depicted by the show cause notice Prabhakar Rao has stated in his statement that he was showing K. Ahmad and P.T. Daud but in the order the respondents have concluded that those names were fictitious names. This is also not digestible. Petitioners have rightly used the term that the respondents wanted to blow hot and cold by the same breath. 25. Shri D.D. Vyas, Additional Advocate-General, vehemently submitted that it is not necessary for taxing authority to come to the point of proving a case as it is required by civil cases or criminal prosecution. It is true to some extent but the taxing authorities are not permitted to assess and tax the citizens on suspicious and conjectures. There has to be reasonable basis for that and that should be in the nature of assessment and adjudication of turnover, which is capable of being determined to a point of certainty. 26. It is possible as submitted by Shri Chaphekar that some employees of the petitioners might have started trading independently without the knowledge of the petitioners and they may have opened the accounts in the bank also. Their transactions would be totally independent. All these transactions are not flowing from the business of petitioners and, therefore, petitioners would not be liable to be assessed and taxed for that. I agree with it. It is so. Their transactions would be totally independent. All these transactions are not flowing from the business of petitioners and, therefore, petitioners would not be liable to be assessed and taxed for that. I agree with it. It is so. A nexus has to be established between the said bank accounts and the trade conducted by the petitioners in territory of M.P. State, and if that is not established, the petitioners cannot be taxed on increased turnover. 27. It is simply unimaginable that the counsel of the petitioners would be humanly capable of cross-examining those witnesses after perusing the report containing 150 pages during short span of time. Unfortunately, the tendency is growing when the persons who are put in a trade, commercially is required to peruse voluminous record and to be prepared for cross-examining the witnesses that cannot be, in any way, said to be consistent with rule of natural justice. A person against whom an adverse order is to be passed has to be given full opportunity of defending himself or for the purpose of showing the cause or explaining the situation as to why such adverse orders should not be passed against him. In the present matter unfortunately the taxing authorities have not done so. Inspite of repeated bouts, the said report of 150 pages was not made available to the petitioners for purpose of thinking over it, for using it for their defence in said proceedings. How that can be called to be a fair and just proceeding in which petitioners were asked to participate totally unprepared. 28. It is true that the taxing authorities can have the reasonable guess work for purpose of assessing or determining the turnover for assessment and fixing liability of paying the tax but in that case a criteria should be certain and the amount which is to be determined should be specified. Shri Chaphekar has rightly pointed out that had there been a case that the trader who had submitted the return showing a particular figure of turnover and taxing authority formed the opinion that it was less than the actual turnover which was reflected by the transactions in the business, in such case, the taxing authorities would be permitted to have a reasonable guess work for the purpose of increasing the said figure of turnover. But when there is no material at all to come to a conclusion that there were any commercial transactions resulting in turnover, the taxing authorities could not have a jurisdiction or a right to come to a conclusion that the petitioners were assessable to the particular figure of turnover and as such were taxable. 29. In the present show cause notice the amount has been added as turnover and the petitioners have been held responsible for payment of additional tax and penalty. For that purpose, those bank accounts have been used and transfer entries and despatch of demand drafts have been used. Names of those persons whom taxing authorities claim to have examined, have been also used. The petitioners were entitled to impeach their credibility and credit worthiness of the information, which they might have supplied to the taxing authorities. The landlord of a building is not supposed to know normally the depth of commercial activities of a tenant, a person introducing another person to the bank may not be also aware of the depth or extent of commercial activities of such a person who has been introduced. Therefore, keeping in view all these things, the approach which has been adopted by the taxing authorities, the respondents, is totally improper, totally inconsistent with rule of natural justice. 30. Shri Vyas, has canvassed by placing on the judgments which he cited for the purpose of strengthening respondent's case and submitted that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to decide or interfere in the orders which are being assailed by this writ petition. He submitted that the power of High Court while dealing with present writ petition would be of superintendence only. I am very much afraid, I will not be able to agree with him because as it has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in the judgment of T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa AIR 1954 SC 440 , the Indian High Courts are not restricted to the prerogatives which were being used and which are being exercised by the courts in England. Those courts are totally dependent on common law but here the provisions of Article 226 is quite clear and that is conferring the High Courts in India with more power than that which is expected to be exercised by the courts in England. Those courts are totally dependent on common law but here the provisions of Article 226 is quite clear and that is conferring the High Courts in India with more power than that which is expected to be exercised by the courts in England. Those courts are totally dependent on common law, in majority portion, mainly uncodified law. Indian High Courts are guided by the Indian Constitution which is full of details about the powers which are to be exercised by the High Courts while issuing the writs. 31. Therefore, the Indian High Courts need not be shy of exercising the writ jurisdiction and exercising its power and jurisdiction while issuing the writs. In the present case this Court is fully empowered to issue writ of certiorari for the purpose of correcting the orders which are being passed by the taxing authorities against the petitioners and which are being assailed by the present writ petition. 32. In the present matter this Court is fully empowered to issue writ of certiorari for the purpose of correcting orders passed by taxing authorities. In fact the prayer has been made by the petitioners in the writ petition for issuing the writ of certiorari in prayer clause for the purpose of quashing orders annexures "D", "G" and "H". Thus, this petition is hereby allowed, and those orders "D", "G" and "H" are hereby quashed by issuing writ of certiorari. It is made clear here that the petitioners are liable to pay tax on the turnover which was disclosed by them as to the tune of Rs. 92,69,861 and they have paid the tax on such turnover to the tune of Rs. 5,28,881. This declaration, assessment and payment of tax is not hereby touched at all. 33. The petitioners to bear cost of this litigation as well as the respondents, because the entire matter seems to be misdirected on account of misinterpretation of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.