Jamuna Mehta v. State Of Bihar — 1999 DIGILAW 1012 (PAT)

Judgment G.S.Chaube, J. 1. This appeal has been directed against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the third Additional Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh on 27-9-1989 in S.T. No. 27 of 1984 whereby and whereunder the appellants Jamuna Mehta, Lal Mohan Mehta and Raju Mehta @ Rajkumar Mehta have been convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 201 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and rigorous imprisonment for five years respectively. However, their sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 2. According to the prosecution appellant No. 3 Raju Mehta @ Raj Kumar Mehta had been married to one Chhotni Devi of village Masnodih within Koderma Police Station in the district of Hazaribagh (now Koderma) sometime in the year 1982 and she was residing at her matrimonial home at Mahatbania Mahua Tola of village Domchanch within the same police station. On 3-3-1983 at about 4 in the morning, appellant No. 2 Lalmohan Mehta went to Masnodih for inquirying from the members of the paternal home of the said Chhotni Devi whether she had reached there because she had disappeared from the matrimonial home since the preceding evening. As Chhotni Devi had not reached her paternal home, her brother Shiv Nandan Mehta (PW-3) and Arjun Mehta left their village in her search. When they reached Mahatbania Mahua Tola, they learnt from the villagers there that a dead body of a woman was floating in a well. Consequently, they went to the said well and found that the dead body was of none else than of their own sister Chhotni Devi. The dead body was taken out from the well. It was found having some external injuries, including swelling on the neck. Blood was oozing out from her nose and ears. At that time, appellant No. 1 Jamuna Mehta was also present there. The villagers, namely, Krishna Lal Mehta PW-1 Daulat Mehta PW-2 Lal Bihari Mehta PW-5 and others enquired from the said appellant. He disclosed to them that the father of his deceased daughter-in-law had promised to give 2 tola gold at the time of the marriage, but had failed to fulfil the promise. Consequently, he conjointly with two sons Lal Mohan Mehta and Raju Mehta strangulated her and threw the dead body into the well. He disclosed to them that the father of his deceased daughter-in-law had promised to give 2 tola gold at the time of the marriage, but had failed to fulfil the promise. Consequently, he conjointly with two sons Lal Mohan Mehta and Raju Mehta strangulated her and threw the dead body into the well. The brother went to the police station situated at a distance of about 10 kilometres and lodged FIR (Ext. 2) at about 12.00 noon. In the FIR, he had also stated that even though the deceased was married to appellant No. 3 about eight months back, in the meantime, she had gone to her paternal home for about 15 times and used to narrate the story of cruelty meted out to her by her father-in-law, namely, appellant No. 1. Even two days prior to the incident, she had gone to the paternal home on being threatened by appellants of being killed in consequence of some brawl over the question of non-payment of dowry (gold). 3. Inquest on the dead body was held and the same subjected to post-mortem at Koderma Sub-Divisional Hospital on 4-3-1983. On post-mortem, some ante-mortem injuries indicating throttling were found on the dead body, besides water in the stomach suggesting that the death of the deceased had occurred due to strangulation as well as drowning. 4. In course of investigation, it came to light that on the preceding evening, the deceased along with these appellants was harvesting potato in their field situated close to the well in which her dead body was found floating. It had also come to notice that the wife of appellant No. 1 had approached PW-2 Daulat Mehta to enquire about the deceased on the pretext that she was not available at the matrimonial home. Consequently, the police submitted charge-sheet against the appellants for commission of offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 201 of Indian Penal Code. The appellants were put on trial on the said charges. However, they denied the charges and pleaded false implication by the first informant and other witnesses. 5. In course of the trial, the prosecution examined seven witnesses including a formal one who proved the FIR (Ext. 2) and the doctor who performed the autopsy and submitted the post-mortem report (Ext. 4). However, they denied the charges and pleaded false implication by the first informant and other witnesses. 5. In course of the trial, the prosecution examined seven witnesses including a formal one who proved the FIR (Ext. 2) and the doctor who performed the autopsy and submitted the post-mortem report (Ext. 4). The defence had also examined three witnesses primarily to prove the relationship of the prosecution witnesses inter se and some sort of enmity. They also produced two receipts in favour of appellant No. 1 purporting to have been issued in token of payment of membership fee of an institution called Chasa Vaishya Sewa Samiti (Exts. A and A/1). It may be mentioned at this stage that in course of the trial, the doctor who had held the post-mortem examination, had deposed on the basis of a note made by him regarding the result of the post-mortem in absence of the original post-mortem report, or even a copy thereof. However, at the time of preparing judgment, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh could notice that the original post-mortem report was available on the record of the case. He also noticed that the note on the basis of which the doctor had deposed, was also not marked Exhibit. Consequently, without taking the defence in confidence in this regard, he admitted those two documents as Exts. 3 and 4 respectively and mentioned this fact in the order-sheet of the case. Consequently, a criticism was made before us by the learned Counsel for the appellants in respect of the admissibility of those two documents. Therefore, by order dated 6-5-1999, we directed the trial Court to get those two documents formally proved, if possible, by calling the doctor concerned to the witness box. Pursuant to that order, the trial Court made an attempt to secure appearance before it of (PW-6) who had conducted the autopsy for proving those documents, but in view of his superannuation from service long back, his appearance could not be secured. Consequently, by examining yet another formual witness (PW-8) the trial Court admitted the note prepared by (PW-6) as well as the original post-mortem report as Exts. 3 and 4 respectively. After receipt of those documents having been admitted into evidence, an opportunity was given to the defence of being heard, but the Counsel for the appellants informed that he did not intend to make any further submissions. 6. 3 and 4 respectively. After receipt of those documents having been admitted into evidence, an opportunity was given to the defence of being heard, but the Counsel for the appellants informed that he did not intend to make any further submissions. 6. On consideration of the evidence adduced by the prosecution as well as the defence, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has held that in furtherance of their common intention, the appellants killed the deceased in consequence of non-fulfilment of the promise made by her father to give two tola gold, to the appellants at the time of her marriage with appellant No. 3, and threw her into a well even though by that time she was not completely dead. Therefore, he has convicted them under Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 201 of Indian Penal Code. In coming to such conclusion the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has relied on the extra-judicial confession made by appellant No. 1 to the prosecution witness at the site of the occurrence as well as some circumstantial evidence. The circumstances relied by the Addl. Sessions Judge are : promise by the father of the deceased at the time of her marriage to pay two tolas gold to the appellants; non-fulfilment of the promises; the deceased going to her parental home fifteen times within a short period of eight months after her marriage and complaining of torture on that account by appellant No.1; a witness on the preceding evening seeing the appellants and the deceased harvesting potato crops in their field close to the well in which the dead body was found; the wife of the appellant No. 1 going to the same witness on the same evening enquiring about the deceased; appellant No.2 going to the parental home of the deceased during the same evening and enquiring about the deceased; ante-mortem injuries on the person of the deceased to the effect that she was strangled before being thrown into the well; and no information having been given by the appellants to the police. Besides, of course, there was an extra-judicial confession made by appellant No. 1 implicating himself as well as the remaining two appellants. 7. Mr. Besides, of course, there was an extra-judicial confession made by appellant No. 1 implicating himself as well as the remaining two appellants. 7. Mr. T. R. Bajaj, learned Counsel for the appellants has assailed the findings of the trial Court on the ground that, according to him the learned Additional Sessions Judge has misdirected himself by relying on the extra-judicial confession of appellant No. 1 in utter disregard of the principles laid down by the apex Court. He further contended that there is nothing to show that the appellants, and the appellants alone, killed the deceased. According to him, all the accused {appellants) might or might not have taken part in the throttling of the deceased. For arriving at a conclusion of the guilt of the appellants, the conclusion must necessarily be that all the appellants had taken part in the throttling of the deceased. He has also adverted to some contradictions made in the statements of the witnesses examined by the prosecution to bring home his point that what the witnesses have stated, at least, on the point of extra-judicial confession cannot be relied upon. 8. Therefore, the point for consideration in the present appeal is whether the prosecution has been able to prove beyond any shadow of doubt that the deceased had been killed by the appellants or, for that matter, by any of them. In the present case, certain facts are not disputed at the bar. They are that the deceased was married to appellant No. 3 about eight months prior to her dead body having been retrieved from a well at a place distant from her matrimonial home. The well is said to be situated at a Badhar called Jeluadih situated, at least, 3/4 kilometres away form the tola of the appellants. The appellants have their baari, land there and potato grown thereon was found harvested. When the dead body was retrieved from the well, it was found having some external injuries and blood oozing out from the nose and the ears. When subjected to post-mortem, it was found that there were ante-mortem injuries on her person showing strangulation and blood mixed froth passing through one of the nostrils. The atomach contained some semi-digested food and water. It will be useful to reproduce the evidence of the doctor (PW-6) who had conducted the post-mortem examination. 9. When subjected to post-mortem, it was found that there were ante-mortem injuries on her person showing strangulation and blood mixed froth passing through one of the nostrils. The atomach contained some semi-digested food and water. It will be useful to reproduce the evidence of the doctor (PW-6) who had conducted the post-mortem examination. 9. (PW-6) has stated that on 4-3-1983 at 9.00 a.m. he had held post-mortem examination on the dead body of Chhotni Devi, wife of Raju Kumar Mehta of Domchanch, aged about 18 years and found rigor mortis present on her lower limbs mildly and on the upper extremities moderately. Mud and sand were present on her head and feet. Blood mixed froth was found coming out of nostril. Breast was non-porous. He found the following ante-mortem injuries on the dead body : (i) An abrasion with blood clots 1/2" X 1/2" on the lower margin of right ear lobule; (ii) An abrasion with blood clots," x 1/2" on the waist; (iii) A swelling with abrasion 5" x 2-1/2" on the front of both lateral part of neck with upper abrasion. On dissection, there was noticed echymosis and subcutaneous haemorrhage and congestion of mucusa on upper part of trachea and larynx with blood clots. Hyoid bone of the larynx was also found factured. The doctor had also found that both lungs of the deceased were oe-dematous, frothy and crepitus. The stomach was full of semi-digested food and water; uterus was empty. The post-mortem report (Ext. 4) supports her version in Court. 10. It appears that in course of his evidence (PW-6) who had deposed on the basis of the note made by him, has stated that the death of the deceased had occurred due to asphyxia as a result of throttling and drowning about 26 hours prior to the. autopsy. Incidentally, in the note prepared by him the time elapsed between death and the post-mortem is also mentioned as about 26 hours. Consequently, when cross-examined on behalf of the defence, he stated the death of the deceased might have occurred between 5 a.m. and 7 a.m. on 3-3-1983. the doctor also stated that his opinion regarding the time of death admitted 3 hours either way. Consequently, when cross-examined on behalf of the defence, he stated the death of the deceased might have occurred between 5 a.m. and 7 a.m. on 3-3-1983. the doctor also stated that his opinion regarding the time of death admitted 3 hours either way. However, in the original post-mortem report submitted by him time elapsed between the death and the post-mortem has been mentioned as 36 hours and not 26 hours as deposed by the witness in Court. The post-mortem was held at 9.00 a.m. on 4-3-1983. 36 hours preceding the time of post-mortem takes the time of death to about 9.00 p.m. on 2-3-1983. Three hours this way or that. In other words, according to the medical evidence, the death of the deceased might have occurred between 6.00 p.m. and 12.00 mid-night on 2-3-1983. 11. The defence has, however, disputed the correctness of the allegation that there was promise by the father of the deceased to give 2 tolas gold on the occasion of the marriage and in consequence of failure to keep the promise, the deceased was killed. In course of his evidence PW-4, the informant and full brother of the deceased, has stated that at the time of the marriage of the deceased with the appellant No. 3, his father had promised appellant No. 1 to give him 2 tolas gold, but the promise could not be fulfilled some how or the other. This statement of (PW-4) finds corroboration in the FIR lodged by him. There does not appear any serious challenge to this version of (PW-4). 12. Contrary to his version-made in the First Information Report that appellant No. 2 had gone to his house at about 4.00 in the morning on 3-3-1983, (PW-4) has stated in Court that on 2-3-1983 itself at about 7.00 in the evening appellant No. 2 had gone to Masnodih and enquired about the deceased who had allegedly fled from the matrimonial home. He has further stated that next morning he joined by his elder brother Arjun Mehta left home in search of the deceased. They came across one Chetlal at Mahatbania Mahua Tola. It was learnt from him that their sister was killed and thrown into a well. Thereafter, he went to the well and found appellant No. 1, besides PWs-1 and 5, present there. The dead body of his sister was found floating in the well. They came across one Chetlal at Mahatbania Mahua Tola. It was learnt from him that their sister was killed and thrown into a well. Thereafter, he went to the well and found appellant No. 1, besides PWs-1 and 5, present there. The dead body of his sister was found floating in the well. It was taken out and on inquiry, appellant No. 1 disclosed that he had killed the deceased and thrown the dead body into the well, because he was not given gold as promised. Thereafter, he went to the police station and lodged FIR. However, when put to cross-examination, he stated that when he reached Mahatbania Mahua at about 10.30 or 11.00 a.m. via Baheridih, Nawadih and Jaswadih, he learnt for the first time from (PW-5) that his sister had been killed and the dead body thrown into the well and on getting such information from (PW-5) he, joined by his brother Arjun Mehta, went to Domchanch situated 1/2 kms away form Mahat-Bania Mahua. By the time they reached near the well at about 11.00 a.m., thousands of people had gathered there. He further stated that nobody present there told anything to them. He stayed there for about five minutes and then went to the police station and lodged the FIR at 12 noon. On the basis of these statements made by (PV/-4) in course of his cross-examination, it was contended that the story of the extra-judicial confession having been made by appellant No. 1 in presence of this witness is not correct. However, one finds that it is not that the story of extra-judicial confession by appellant No. 1 was invented by the prosecution after lodging of the FIR. On the other hand, this story finds mention in the FIR itself lodged by (PW-4) at the police station at 12 noon on 3-3-1983, when he reached there after witnessing the dead body of the deceased. Therefore, the statement of the witness that when at the well nobody had told him anything may well be under stress of cross-examination. 13. Besides PW-4, there are four other witnesses who have also stated that appellant No. 1 had made such a confession in their presence. (PW-1) Krishna Lal Mehta is a resident of Domchanch. Therefore, the statement of the witness that when at the well nobody had told him anything may well be under stress of cross-examination. 13. Besides PW-4, there are four other witnesses who have also stated that appellant No. 1 had made such a confession in their presence. (PW-1) Krishna Lal Mehta is a resident of Domchanch. He has stated that in the morning on 3-3-1983 when he woke up, he heard some people talking in the lane that the dead body of a woman was floating in the well in question. Consequently, he went there. Some people had assembled there. The dead body was taken out from the well. It was having injuries on the neck and other parts; the neck was swollen. In the meantime, appellant No. 1 had also arrived there. On inquiry, the said appellant told that on the preceding evening the deceased was taken to the potato field near the well for harvesting potato. At about 6.00 in the evening, he quarrelled with the deceased in state of inebriation on the question that her father had not given gold as promised. As the deceased dared enter into discussion with him, he got enraged and with the help of his sons (appellants Nos. 2 and 3), he strangled her to death and then threw the dead body into the well with an intent to conceal the corpse. The witness further stated that as a matter of fact, appellant No.1 was made to write down whatever he had stated to him and other witnesses, and the same was given to the police when it arrived at the place of the occurrence. However, in course of cross-examination, the witness stated that nothing was reduced to writing, because appellant No. 1 is an illiterate and does not know how to write. The record of the trial Court shows that the said appellant had put his signature on his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procdure. Be that as it may, no writing containing the confession made by appellant No. 1 was brought on the record. The witness also expressed his inability to reproduce the statement made by appellant No. 1 to him. Be that as it may, no writing containing the confession made by appellant No. 1 was brought on the record. The witness also expressed his inability to reproduce the statement made by appellant No. 1 to him. In course of the cross-examination, PW-1 has stated that as a matter of fact, he took appellant No. 1 aside and taking him into confidence made enquiry and then appellant No. 1 had made the disclosures referred to above. Thereafter, they came where the people had assembled. It appears that according to this witness, the people assembled there and had given a good beating to the said appellant on learning that he had killed his daughter-in-law. 14. PW-2 Daulat Mehta of Mehat Bania Mahua Tola of Domchanch has stated that he went to the well situated in the baari of the appellants on 3-3-1983 on seeing the assemblage of some people there. Other witnesses like PWs 1, 3 and 5 were present there from before; appellant No. 1 was also there. The dead body of the deceased was taken out and it was found having injuries on the neck, etc. He has also stated that appellant No. 1 was drunken. On inquiry, he told that the father of the deceased had promised to give 2 tolas gold at the time of marriage with his son, but did not keep the promise. Hence, joined by appellants Nos. 2 and 3 he strangled the deceased to death and threw it into the well. The witness has stated that even on the preceding evening at about 6.00 p.m. when he was going to his own field where potato was being harvested, he had noticed the appellants and the deceased harvesting potato near the well. From his field, he went to the nearby market for taking a cup of tea and returned home. Later, the same evening, the wife of the appellant No. 1 had gone to his house and enquired if the deceased was there. He replied in the negative. However, in course of his cross-examination, he has stated that on inquiry appellant No. 1 had stated that he as well as appellants Nos. 2 and 3 had killed the deceased. He has also stated that appellant No. 1 was assaulted by the people present there. He replied in the negative. However, in course of his cross-examination, he has stated that on inquiry appellant No. 1 had stated that he as well as appellants Nos. 2 and 3 had killed the deceased. He has also stated that appellant No. 1 was assaulted by the people present there. He has further admitted that at the time of making confession by appellant No. 1 he had been assured that he would not be allowed to suffer in consequence of the confession made by him. An attempt was made by the defence to show that the witness was on inimical terms with the appellants because earlier appellant No. 2 had lodged a criminal case against the son of this witness alleged theft of a bicycle. The witness denied the suggestion. No attempt was made by the defence to bring on record any FIR or the complaint to show that earlier appellant No. 2 had lodged any criminal case against the son of PW-2. Only a witness DW-3 a co-villager of the appellants was examined to say that appellant No. 2 had instituted a criminal case against the son of PW-2 five years prior to his evidence in the Court in the month of August 1987. If actually appellant No. 2 had instituted any criminal case against the son of PW-2, this fact could have been proved by documentary evidence, and not by statement on oath of DW-3 in view of the categorical denial by PW-2 on oath; Except what was suggested to PW-2, there is no whisper of any animus on the part of PW-2 to depose falsely against the appellants. 15. PW-3 Bahadur Narayan Mehta is another resident of Domchanch. He has stated that on 3-3-1983 at about 7 in the morning when he was going to his field where potato was being harvested, he noticed assemblage of about 30-40 persons at the well of the appellants. He went there out of curiosity. A dead body was found floating in the well and it was taken out; it transpired to be that of the daughter-in-law of appellant No. 1 and wife of appellant No. 3. One Chetlal Mehta present there disclosed that the deceased had been killed by appellant No. 1 and other family members. He went there out of curiosity. A dead body was found floating in the well and it was taken out; it transpired to be that of the daughter-in-law of appellant No. 1 and wife of appellant No. 3. One Chetlal Mehta present there disclosed that the deceased had been killed by appellant No. 1 and other family members. Consequently, appellant No. 1 who was present was interrogated and then he disclosed that he and other members of his family had killed the deceased. Like PW-1, this witness has also stated that the statement of appellant No. 1 was reduced to writing by PW-1 himself prior to the arrival of the police. 16. PW-5 Lal Bihari Mehta, a resident of Padhmauni Mahua Tola of Domchanch also stated that the dead body of the deceased was found floating in a well situated at a distance of about 500 yards from his house. He went there on learning of this fact in the morning on 3-3-1983. Chetlal and PWs 1, 2 and 3 were also present there. Appellant No. 1 who was present there, disclosed that the deceased was strangulated to death because her father had not given gold, as promised, at the time of marriage. He also stated in course of his cross-examination that he had stayed there till 12 noon and disclosed to the persons who arrived there even sub-sequently what appellant No. 1 told about the murder of the deceased. However, abruptly, in para 7 of his cross-examination, he stated that no inquiry was made from appellant No.1 near the well prior to the arrival of the police and whatever disclosure the appellant No. 1 had made, was only after the arrival of the police at the well. This statement of PW-5 being not only contrary to his statement made in course of examination-in-chief, but also to the fact that even in the FIR lodged at the police station prior to the arrival of the police at the place of occurrence it was specifically mentioned that appellant No. 1 had confessed having killed the deceased, must necessarily be discarded. 17. Therefore, from the evidence of the witnesses of the prosecution referred to above, it is manifest that appellant No. 1 had confessed to them that he had killed the deceased in the evening on 2-3-1983. 17. Therefore, from the evidence of the witnesses of the prosecution referred to above, it is manifest that appellant No. 1 had confessed to them that he had killed the deceased in the evening on 2-3-1983. An attempt has been made by the defence to show that the witnesses are related, inter se and they conspired together to falsely implicate the appellants. I have already stated that the defence failed to prove that appellant No. 2 had instituted any criminal case against the son of PW-2 so as to provide a motive to the latter to falsely depose in the case. Indeed, PW-2 had admitted that he has relationship with one Bedu Mahto, a co-villager of PW-4, even though PW-4 has denied that he has any relationship with the said Bedu Mahto. It appears that the said Bedu Mahto is a related to him as uncle by village courtesy. The witnesses examined on behalf of the defence have also stated that PW-5 is related to the first informant as cousin-in-law (as per DW-1 and PW-3) is the cousin of the mother of PW-4 (as per DW-2) and that PWs 1 and 3 are related as uncle and nephew inter se. Even if what the defence has suggested regarding the inter se relationship between the prosecution witnesses, that does not provide a motive to them to falsely implicate the appellants. It appears that there is a committee of the caste to which the witnesses and the appellants belong, kown as Chasa Vaishya Sewa Samiti and Exts. A series disclose that fee or subscription was realized from appellant No. 1 sometime back. It is stated that all the office bearers of the Samiti conspired together to falsely implicate the appellants. I find no cogent reason to give ear to such suggestion by the defence. It may be that since the witnesses were connected with the said Samiti established for looking after the welfare of the members of the community to which they belonged, they made it a point to ensure that the person guilty of murdering a new wed bridge of their community did not go unpunished. Therefore, with this sense of duly they might be sticking to what they came to learn from appellant No.1 regarding the murder of the deceased. In my opinion, for this reason alone, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses cannot be disbelieved and thrown away. 18. Therefore, with this sense of duly they might be sticking to what they came to learn from appellant No.1 regarding the murder of the deceased. In my opinion, for this reason alone, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses cannot be disbelieved and thrown away. 18. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Chandrakant Chiman Lal Desai V/s. State of Gujarat, 1992 Cr LJ 2757, the learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the trial Court committed an error in approaching the case from a wrong angle to arrive at the conclusion it has drawn. According to him, it was not permissible for the trial Court to treat the confession of the appellant No. 1 as a substantive evidence to prove the guilt of the appellants. In the case before the Apex Court, complicity of two persons was sought to be establised, among other things, on the basis of a judicial confession of one of them, namely, the appellant Chandrakant Cheman Lal Desai who was accused No. 2 in that case. The trial Court found that the confession of the said appellant was not properly recorded and, therefore, it was not admissible and trustworthy. The trial Court also disbelieved the circumstantial evidence produced by the prosecution; consequently it acquitted both the accused-persons. On appeal having been taken by the State before the High Court of Gujarat, the order of acquittal was set aside and both the accused were convicted of having committed murder of the deceased. When the matter went to the Apex Court, it was observed in paragraph 5 of the judgment of the Apex Court, at page 2759 of the report, that the confession of the accused was retracted at the time when the accused was questioned under Section 313, Cr PC. In seeking reliability of this confessional statement, the High Court had not kept in view the observation of the Court in Kashmira Singh V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159 . 19. In the case of Kasmira Singh V/s. State of M.P., (supra), the complicity of the appellant before the Apex Court was sought to be established on the basis of the confession made by a co-accused. 19. In the case of Kasmira Singh V/s. State of M.P., (supra), the complicity of the appellant before the Apex Court was sought to be established on the basis of the confession made by a co-accused. It was in that context that the Apex Court had observed that the confession of an accused-person is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term as defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, it cannot be made the foundation of conviction and can only be used in support of other evidence. Here, in the present case, even though the confession made by appellant No. 1 to the witnesses may not be sufficient for arriving at the guilt of appellants Nos. 2 and 3, independent of any other evidence, direct or circumstantial, it can certainly, be used to found his conviction, if such confession is found to be reliable and acceptable by the Court. 20. Relying on yet another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Heramba Brahma & another V/s. State of Assam, AIR 1982 SC 1595 , it was canvassed by the learned Counsel for the appellants that since the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has failed to pass the test of reproduction of the exact words, the evidence of extra-judicial confession coming from the mouth of a witness cannot be the basis for conviction of the appellants. It was also submitted that since there was evidence that appellant No. 1 had been assaulted by the witnesses present at the well, any confession made by him cannot be relied upon. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Paramhans Yadav & Sadanand Tripathy V/s. State of Bihar & Other, AIR 1987 SC 955 ; 1987 East Cr C 230 (SC). In that case, suspecting the complicity of Paramhans Yadav in the murder of the District Magistrate of Gopalganj by exploding bomb, people present there caught hold of the said Paramhans Yadav immediately after the explosion and started beating him. In course of such beating he made confession implicating himself as well as the other accused Sadanand Tripathy. It was in that context that the Apex Court held that obviously, when Yadav was being beaten up, he must have been anxious to ensure that the assault stopped. In course of such beating he made confession implicating himself as well as the other accused Sadanand Tripathy. It was in that context that the Apex Court held that obviously, when Yadav was being beaten up, he must have been anxious to ensure that the assault stopped. Therefore, his plea in the situation could neither be voluntary, nor natural. Hence, the disclosure made by him was found not reliable and acceptable. However, in the present case, there is no evidence that appellant No. 1 had made the confessional statement while being beaten up by the mob assembled at the well where from the dead body of the deceased was retrieved. On the other hand, the evidence of PW-1 is that he had taken away the said appellant from the mob and inquired into the matter. Of course, he was taken into confidence by assuring that he will not be allowed to suffer; then, appellant No. 1 made the confession. It was only after the disclosure so made by him and when he again came near the mob that on learning of such disclosure the mob became infuriated and started assaulting appellant No. 1. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that appellant No. 1 made confession only with a view to ensure that he was not further assaulted or, for that matter, even lynched by the witnesses present there. 21. Indeed, according to Section 24 of the Evidence Act, any confession made by a person under threat, inducement promise is not admissible provided such threat, inducement or promise proceeds from a person in authority. None of the witnesses can be said to be person in authrotiy, so that the confession made to them on their promise that appellant No. 1 shall not be allowed to suffer in consequence of the confession is hit by Section 24 of the Evidence Act. 22. It is true that in the case of extra-judicial confession, the Court requires the witness to give the actual words used by the accused as nearly as possible, but it is not an invariable rule that Court should not accept the evidence, if not the actual words, but the substance of the disclosure made by the accused were given. 23. It is true that in the case of extra-judicial confession, the Court requires the witness to give the actual words used by the accused as nearly as possible, but it is not an invariable rule that Court should not accept the evidence, if not the actual words, but the substance of the disclosure made by the accused were given. 23. In the case of Baldeo Raj V/s. State of Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 37 : 1991 East Cr C 37 (SC), it has been held that an extra-judicial confession, if voluntary, can be relied upon by the court along with other evidence in convicting the accused. The value of the evidence as to confession depends on the veracity of the witness to whom it is made. It is true that the Court requires the witness to give the actual words used by the accused as nearly as possible, but it is not an invariable rule that the Court should not accept the evidence, if not the actual words, but the substance v/ere given. It is for the Court having regard to the credibility of the witness to accept the evidence or not. When the Court believes the witness before whom confession is made and it is satisfied that the confession was voluntary, conviction can be founded on such evidence. 23-A. Similarly, in the case of Ram Singh V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 152 , a three Judge bench of the Apex Court held that even though extra-judicial confessions are not usually considered with favour, but that does not mean that such confession coming from a person who has no reason to state falsely and to whom it is made in circumstances which tend to support his statement, should not be believed. 24. In the present case, as many as five witnesses have stated on oath that near the well where from the dead body of the deceased daughter-in-law of appellant No. 1 was retrieved, the said appellant had confessed having killed the deceased. As PW-1 has stated, the disclosure by appellant No. 1 was to the effect that in the state of inebriation he started blaming the father of the deceased for not giving the gold as promised at the time of her marriage with appellant No. 3. May be, he would have used some uncharitable words to the utter dislike of the deceased. Consequently, she protested. May be, he would have used some uncharitable words to the utter dislike of the deceased. Consequently, she protested. The protest by the deceased, a newly-wed, infuriated appellant No. 1. Therefore, according to the disclosure made by him, he strangled the deceased and threw the dead body into the well with the help of his two sons who were present there. The disclosure of appellant No. 1 coming from the mouth of PW-1 appears to be quite natural, convincing and probable. The other witnesses have also stated that appellant No. 1 made the confession that he killed the deceased, of course, with the help of his two sons, i.e., appellants Nos. 2 and 3. I have already indicated that none of the witnesses appear to have any animus against appellants except that the deceased was the sister of PW-4 married to appellant No. 3 within less than a year of her killing. Therefore, I find no reason whatsoever to disbelieve what the prosecution witnesses have stated regarding the confession made by appellant No. 1 that the deceased had been killed by him and his other two sons and, thereafter, the dead body was thrown into the well. It appears that on being strangled, the deceased might have swooned or become senseless and taking her to be dead she was thrown into the well and later, she died. This was the reason why water was found in the stomach, besides that the lungs were aedematous. 25. Besides the extra-judicial confession, some circumstances have also been brought on record to show that, in all probability, the murder would have been committed in the manner and for the reasons alleged. As stated earlier, PW-4 has stated that at the time of marriage of the deceased with appellant No. 3, there was promise by his father to pay to the appellants two tolas gold, which could not be given. Indeed, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has used the statement of PW-4 made in the FIR to the effect that about 15 times the deceased had gone to her parental home within eight months of her marriage and was complaining of torture by appellant No. 1 due to non-fulfilment of the promises to give gold, as a substantive evidence. Law is well settled that the statement made in the FIR is not a substantive place of evidence. Law is well settled that the statement made in the FIR is not a substantive place of evidence. Such evidence can be used only either for contradicting or corroborating the maker thereof in Court. In Court, PW-4 has not stated that at any point of time the deceased had complained that she was being tortured by the appellants or even by appellant No. 1 because gold, as promised was not given. He only stated this much that earlier when the deceased had come to the parental home, she stayed there for one day only. There is no whishper in the statement of any of the prosecution witnesses that the appellants used to torture the deceased for gold promised. Besides, PW-2 has stated that in the preceding evening he had seen the deceased and the appellants harvesting potato crop near the well. However, in course of his cross-examination he has stated that for going to his own field, he was not required to come across the baari of the appellants. The distance between his field and that of the appellants is said to be considerable. He has further stated that the same evening, the wife of appellant No. 1 had gone to his house in search of the deceased. There is nothing on the record to show why of all the persons, the wife of appellant No. 1 could have gone to the house of PW-2 in absence of any indication that he is a close door neighbour. Therefore, I have reasons to believe that the statement of PW-2 that during the preceding evening, the deceased was seen with the appellants harvesting potato near the well in question and later, the wife of appellant No. 1 had gone to his house making inquiry about the deceased is not without reproach. Law is well settled that If the case is based on circumtantial evidence, the circumstances relied upon must be of such nature as to conclusively point to the guilt of the accused. The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution in the present case sans the extra-judicial confession made by appellant No. 1 as not of that type. 26. Law is well settled that If the case is based on circumtantial evidence, the circumstances relied upon must be of such nature as to conclusively point to the guilt of the accused. The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution in the present case sans the extra-judicial confession made by appellant No. 1 as not of that type. 26. Therefore, on consideration of the evidence on record, including the extra-judicial confession of appellant No. 1 coming from the mouth of PWs 1 to 5, the irresistible conclusion is that appellant No. 1 strangled the deceased and thereafter threw her into the well resulting in her death supported by medical evidence. Therefore, he cannot escape the liability of committing the murder punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and causing disappearance of the evidence punishable under Section 201 of Indian Penal Code. Hence, the finding of his guilt and conviction and sentences recorded by the learned trial Court has to be confirmed. 26. (a). However as regards appellants Nos. 2 and 3, I find that circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution is not of the nature as to draw the only conclusion of guilt of the said appellants. As suggested by Mr. Bajaj, Counsel for the appellants, appellants Nos. 2 and 3 might, or might not, have participated in strangulating the deceased and throwing the dead body into the well. If the extra-judicial confession made by their father implicating them is excluded, there is no strong, much less conclusive circumstance to show their participation once the sole testimony of PW-2 regarding the presence at the site of the occurrence is disbelieved. According to Section 30 of the Evidence Act, confession of co-accused may be taken into consideration by the Court against other accused-persons, if they are tried jointly. Indeed, in the present case, all the appellants including the one who made the confession, were tried jointly. But as observed by the Apex Court, in the case of Kashmira Singh (supra) and Chandrakant Chimanlal Desai (supra), such evidence is not of sub-stantive nature and cannot be used as the sole ground for arriving at the conclusion of the guilt of the other accused-persons. Confession of an accused-person implicating himself as well as others can only be taken into consideration for filling gaps, if any, in the evidence against other accused-persons. Confession of an accused-person implicating himself as well as others can only be taken into consideration for filling gaps, if any, in the evidence against other accused-persons. Beyond that, there is no relevancy of confession of a co-accused. It can be taken into consideration or even used only when there is other evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to show that the accused-persons implicated by the person confessing were also involved in the crime. In the instant case, except of the confession made of appellant No. 1 implicating them as well, there is absolutely no other evidence to fasten the liability on appellants Nos.2 and 3 for either murdering the deceased or causing disappearance of the evidence of her murder. Therefore, the conviction of appellants Nos. 2 and 3 is fit to be set aside. 27. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The conviction and sentences of appellant No. 1 are hereby confirmed and the appeal as against him is dismissed. However, the conviction and sentences of the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are hereby set aside and they are acquitted of the charges under Section 302 read with Sections 34 and 201 of Indian Penal Code and they are discharged from the liability of the respective bail bonds. The bail of appellant No. 1 is hereby cancelled and he is directed to surrender before the trial Court to serve out remaining part of the sentence. A.K.Sinha, J. 28 I agree.