Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant case is an eye opener as its special features present sorry state of affairs in the Law Department of the State. Moreso, it is astonishing to note that employees of the light house are being forced to work under complete darkness. The petition has been filed for issuing directions to respondents No.1 and 2 to finalise the seniority list after considering objections and to consider the candidature of eligible candidates, including petitioner, for promotion on higher pedestals, as well as for quashing the reversion order dated 13.10.98 (Annexure10) from the post of Office Assistant to the post of Upper Division Clerk. (2). The factual matrix of the case reveals that petitioner was appointed as Lower Division Clerk in the Law Department of the State on 11.6.1969 and was con- firmed on the said post vide order dated 28.8.81 (Annexure 1) with effect from 30.3.80. In between, two provisional seniority lists dated 22.1.79 and 30.7.79 were published showing petitioner over and above contesting respondents No.4 and 5. The name of respondent No. 3 did not appear in those lists. For the purpose of determining suitability of candidates for promotion on the post of Upper Division Clerk (for short, ``U.D.C.) a Departmental Promotion Committee (for short, ``D.P.C..) met on 16.10.85 and promoted respondent No.4 with two others, rejecting the claim of the petitioner. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, petitioner, on 17.2.86, preferred appeal No.121/1986 before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal challenging the order dated 16.10.1985. Petitioner was also subsequently promoted as U.D.C. vide order dated 20.6.86. The Tribunal allowed petitioners appeal vide judgment and order dated 28.2.90, holding that petitioner would also be entitled for promotion with effect from 16.10.85 with all consequential benefits and ``his seniority shall remain undisturbed for all purposes and intents. The Department issued a tentative seniority list of U.D.Cs. on 20.6.92 (Annexure 6) and invited objections. In the said seniority list, petitioner was shown below the contesting respondents. Petitioner filed objections on 16.7.92 against the said seniority list of U.D.Cs. but in vain. Petitioner, alongwith others, was considered for newly created posts of Office Assistant and was promoted alongwith others, including respondents No.3 and 4 on ad-hoc basis vide order dated 28.2.94 (Annexure 7). In the said seniority list, petitioner was shown below the contesting respondents. Petitioner filed objections on 16.7.92 against the said seniority list of U.D.Cs. but in vain. Petitioner, alongwith others, was considered for newly created posts of Office Assistant and was promoted alongwith others, including respondents No.3 and 4 on ad-hoc basis vide order dated 28.2.94 (Annexure 7). The Department issued a tentative seniority list of Office Assistants on 28.2.97, in which respondent No.3 was placed at Serial No.1, showing him to have been appointed/promoted as U.D.C. with effect from 7.6.82. This Court, while deciding Writ Petition No.4176/1997, vide judgment and order dated 6.7.98, directed the Department to determine year-wise vacancies on the post of Office Assistants and Office Superintendents and fill-up those vacancies strictly in accordance with law. In compliance of the said order, the Department passed the order dated 9.10.98 and promoted certain persons including petitioner in the said writ petition. Similarly, a D.P.C. met and considered the candidates for promotion from U.D.C. to Office Assistant and did not find petitioner suitable for promotion. Thus, vide order dated 13.10.98, petitioner has been reverted to the post of U.D.C. Though respondent No. 3 was promoted as Office Assistant vide order dated 28.2.94 (Annexure 7) and sub- sequently as Office Superintendent vide order dated 9.12.1998 (Annexure 9) with effect from 1.4.1993. Hence this writ petition. (3). Mr. L.S. Udawat, learned Senior Advocate appearing for petitioner, has submitted that respondent No.3 had never been promoted as U.D.C. and, therefore, question of promoting him as Office Assistant and thereafter as Office Superinten- dent did not arise at all and hence his promotion on the said posts are illegal, invalid and liable to be quashed. Moreso, if respondent No.3 had been promoted as Office Assistant vide order dated 28.2.94, how could he be appointed/ promoted as Office Superintendent w.e.f. 1.4.93. On the contrary, Mr. R.P. Vyas, learned Additional Advocate General, has pointed out from the record that respondent No.3. had been promoted on the post of U.D.C. vide order dated 7.6.82 (Annexure 12) passed by the learned Advocate General and, therefore, his further promotions cannot be challenged. Mr. On the contrary, Mr. R.P. Vyas, learned Additional Advocate General, has pointed out from the record that respondent No.3. had been promoted on the post of U.D.C. vide order dated 7.6.82 (Annexure 12) passed by the learned Advocate General and, therefore, his further promotions cannot be challenged. Mr. Srivastava, learned counsel for respondent No.3 has fairly conceded that his client, being initially appointed as L.D.C. on 4.8.1973, was junior to petitioner in the L.D.C. cadre but as petitioners record was not satisfactory, he cou- ld not get further promotion and respondent No.3 being most meritorious, stood promoted after being assessed in accordance with law. (4). The services of the contesting parties involved herein are governed by The Rajasthan Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957 (for short, `the Rules, 1957). The relevant provisions of the said Rules read as under:- ``26-B. Procedure and criteria for appointment by promotion: (1) Selection for promotion upto the posts of Upper Division Clerks and other equivalent posts shall be made solely on the basis of seniority-cum-merit, selection for promotion to posts higher than the posts of Upper Division Clerks shall be made strictly on the basis of merit and on the basis of seniority-cum-merit in proportion of of 1:2. ... ... ... ... Provided that if the Departmental Promotion Committee is satisfied that suitable persons are not available for selection by promotion strictly on the basis of merit in a particular year, selection by promotion on the basis of seniority-cum merit may be made in the same manner specified in these Rules. 27. Seniority: Seniority of persons appointed to the lowest post of the service or lowest categories of posts in each of Group / Section of the Service as the case may be, shall be determined from the date of confirmation of such persons to the said post but in respect of pers- ons appointed by promotion to other higher posts in the Service or other higher categories of posts in each of the Group/Section in the Service, as the case may be, shall be determined from the date of their regular selection to such posts. (5). (5). Thus, it is abundant clear from the aforesaid provisions that promotion from the post of Lower Division Clerk to Upper Division Clerk shall be made strictly on the basis of `merit and on the basis of ``seniority cum merit in proportion of 1:2 and seniority in the cadre of Upper Division Clerk has to be determined from the date of confirmation in the said cadre. (6). Rule 4 (a) defines the `appointing authority which means the Head of the Department. Similarly, rule 4 (J) defines `substantive appointment, which means an appointment made under the provisions of these Rules to a substantive vacancy after due selection by any of the methods of recruitment prescribed under these Rules and includes, an appointment on probation or as a probationer followed by confirmation on the completion of the probationary period. Rule 7 provides that there shall be 100% promotion from the post of Lower Division Clerk to Upper Division Clerk. Rules 8, 8-A and 8-B provide for reservation for scheduled caste and scheduled tribe, Other Backward Classes and Women candidates. Rule 9 provides for determination of year-wise vacancies on 1st April of every year. Rule 15 (4-A) provides that no person shall be appointed substantively as Assistant unless he has served atleast for ten years in connection with the affairs of the State including five years as U.D.C. Rule 15 (6) provides that a person can be appointed as Office Superintendent provided he has served the State for a period of ten years, including four years as Assistant. Rule 26 provides for appointment to senior post and the post of U.D.C. is to be filled-up by promotion by adopting procedure provided under rule 26-E which provides for filling -up vacancies upto the extent of 67% on the basis of seniority-cum-merit and 33% by `merit. (7). Rule 26 (3) provides for urgent temporary appointment only in case where a vacancy in the service, which cannot be filled-in immediately either by direct recruitment or by promotion under the rules, may be filled-in by the Competent Authority as the case may be, by appointing in an officiating capacity thereto an officer eligible for appointment to the post by promotion or by appointing temporarily thereto a person eligible for direct recruitment to the service. Rule 26-C pro- vides for procedure for selection on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. (8). Rule 26-C pro- vides for procedure for selection on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. (8). The order dated 7.6.82 passed by the learned Advocate General was only for providing promoting on temporary basis for a period of one year. Mr. Srivastava has admitted that there was no order extending the order dated 7.6.82 nor there was any order passed by the Competent Authority for promotion of respondent No.3 after due process of selection/promotion by the D.P.C. It is evident from the record produced by Mr. Vyas that respondent No.3 had never been substantively promoted to the post of U.D.C. nor his case had ever been considered by the D.P.C. or Competent Authority for promotion as U.D.C. This fact remains undisputed and undeniable. Therefore, his seniority has to be determined in the cadre of Lower Division Clerks and it is strange that in violation of Rules/Regulations, the Authorities promoted respondent No.3 to the post of Office Assistant and subsequently as Office Superintendent ignoring the claim of all other eligible persons and considering him as a substantive U.D.C. from 7.6.1982. (9). The Rules provide for a particular mode of appointment/promotion in di- fferent kind of contingencies. Respondent No.3 had been promoted on ad-hoc basis without being considered by D.P.C. and without being assessing the suitability and eligibility. Moreover, when promotion becomes due, all the eligible candidates falling within the Zone of Consideration, have to be assessed simultaneously. Admittedly, no such procedure has been followed while promoting respondent No.3 temporarily for a period of one year vide order dated 7.6.82. I have seen the original record and from the Office Order dated 28.7.79, it is apparent that respondent No.3 had also been earlier promoted as U.D.C. temporarily but was reverted as L.D.C. after expiry of the period. For promoting him on ad-hoc basis again vide orders dated 7.6.82, there are proceedings which reveal that a report was prepared by the Office stating that the work of respondent No.3 was satisfactory and his performance had been best amongst all the L.D.Cs. and, therefore, he should be given ad-hoc promotion and the order dated 7.6.82 has been passed. As the promotion had been granted to him dehors the rules which mandatorily provides for promotion on the basis of seniority and thus, respondent No.3 cannot take any advantage of such a promotion. and, therefore, he should be given ad-hoc promotion and the order dated 7.6.82 has been passed. As the promotion had been granted to him dehors the rules which mandatorily provides for promotion on the basis of seniority and thus, respondent No.3 cannot take any advantage of such a promotion. Undoubtedly, the other persons had been considered by the D.P.C. for promotion to the post of U.D.C. and they were promoted vide order dated 16.10.85. Petitioner was also held to be entitled for promotion from the said date vide judgment and order dated 28.2.90. The order dated 16.10.85 undoubtedly provided that it was a temporary promotion for a particular tenure. As the promotion had not been made under the provisions of Sub-rule (3) of rule 26 of the Rules, 1957, which provides for temporary appointment/promotion and it was accorded in consonance with the procedure laid down for permanent promotion under the Rules and they had properly been considered by the D.P.C., their promo- tions had to be treated as substantive. Had it not been so, the Department could have taken a plea before the Appellate Tribunal that petitioner was not entitled for the said relief as the same had been granted for a short period on temporary or ad-hoc basis and the tenure of the same had expired long back. The appeal was allowed vide order dated 28.2.90 and by that time, a period of more than four years had elapsed. This view is fortified by the judgments of Division Bench of this Court in Syed Mansoor Ali vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (1); Bhanwar Lal Malakar vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2); and by S.B. judgment in R.S. Rawat vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (3), wherein the cases have been decided after placing reliance upon a large number of judgments of the Supreme Court and held that if substantive promotion was due, candidature of eligible candidates was considered in accordance with law by the D.P.C., such an appointment would be treated as substantive and plea of acquiescence/estoppel against the promotee was not available. Undoubtedly, even for filling up a temporary vacancy or for ad hoc appointment, selection process in consonance with the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution has to be adopted. (Vide State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Piara Singh & Ors. (4): Parbhat Kumar Sharma vs. State of U.P. & Ors. Undoubtedly, even for filling up a temporary vacancy or for ad hoc appointment, selection process in consonance with the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution has to be adopted. (Vide State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Piara Singh & Ors. (4): Parbhat Kumar Sharma vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (5); and Thomas Chandi vs. Rajasthan Finan- cial Corporation (6). In the instant case, as the promotions dated 16.10.85 had not been made under Clause (3) of Rule 26 of the Rules, the same were the substantive promotions and the tenure stipulated therein remained inconsequential. (10). Respondent No.3, even after continuing for more than a decade on the post of U.D.C. cannot claim the status of U.D.C. or substantive appointment as U.D.C. for the reason, that it is not open to any employee to `claim automatic alteration of status unless that result is specifically envisaged by some provision in the statutory rules. (Vide State of M.P. & Anr. vs. Dharam Bir (7). On the contrary, if appointment had been made on substantive vacancy after following due selection process of the persons who fall within the Zone of Consideration and the vacancies had been filled -up strictly in accordance with the Rules, the appointment can be termed as substantive even though the order of appointment/promotion provides as temporary/ ad- hoc. (Vide C.K. Antony vs. B. Muraleedharan & Ors. etc. (8); and A.K. Sharma vs. Union of India & Ors. (9). (11). Controversy involved herein relates to the Department which has been established to look after litigations for, on behalf of and against the State of Rajasthan, whose each and every action should not only be fair but above suspicion. It appears that the Authorities never considered it appropriate to determine the seniority of its employees, after considering their representations rather they acted in an arbitrary, illegal and discriminatory manner, consciously with a view to provide benefits to their blue eyed employees. (12). In M/s. Erusian Equipment & Chemical Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal & Anr. (10), the Supreme Court observed that where Government activity involves public element, the ``citizen has a right to claim equal treatment, and when ``the State acts to the prejudice of a person, it has to be supported by legality. (12). In M/s. Erusian Equipment & Chemical Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal & Anr. (10), the Supreme Court observed that where Government activity involves public element, the ``citizen has a right to claim equal treatment, and when ``the State acts to the prejudice of a person, it has to be supported by legality. ``Functioning of democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination for the reason that ``Government cannot choose to exclude persons by discrimination. (13). Similarly, in Ramanna Daya Ram Shetty vs. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors. (11), the Apex Court observed as under:- ``Every action of the executive Government must be in form of reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of rules of law and its bare minimum requirement. (14). Thus, the decision taken in an arbitrary manner contradicts the principle of legitimate expectation and the plea of legitimate expectation relates to procedural fairness in decision making and forms a part of the rule of non- arbitrariness as denial of ``administrative fairness is Constitutional anethama. (Vide E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu (12); Smt. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India & Anr. (13); Ku. Shri Lekha Vidhyarthi vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (14), Ghaziabad Development Authority vs. Delhi Auto & General Finance Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (15); and Manmal Sharma etc. vs. Bikaner Sahkari Upbhokta Bhandar & etc. (16). (15). The rule of law inhibits arbitrary action and such action is liable to be invalidated. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should not only be fair, legitimate and above- board but should be without any affection or oversion. It should neither be suggestive of discrimination nor even apparently give an impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. (Vide Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther vs. Kerala Financial Corporation (17). (16). In the State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Nalla Raja Reddy & Ors. (18), the Cons- titution Bench of the Apex Court observed as under:- ``Official arbitrariness is more subversive of doctrine of equality than the statutory discrimination. In spite of statutory discrimination, one knows where he stands but the wand of official arbitrariness can be waved in all directions indiscriminately. (17). Similarly, in S.G. Jaisinghani vs. Union of India & Ors. (18), the Cons- titution Bench of the Apex Court observed as under:- ``Official arbitrariness is more subversive of doctrine of equality than the statutory discrimination. In spite of statutory discrimination, one knows where he stands but the wand of official arbitrariness can be waved in all directions indiscriminately. (17). Similarly, in S.G. Jaisinghani vs. Union of India & Ors. (19), the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court observed as under:- ``In the context it is important to emphasise that absence of arbitrary power is the first essence of the rule of law, upon which our whole Constitutional System is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon Executive Authorities, must be confined within the clearly defined limits. Rule of law, from this point of view, means that the decision should be made by the application of known principle and rules and in general such decision should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is, if a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law . (18). In the said judgment, the Apex Court has referred to the judgment in United States vs. Wounderlich (20), wherein it has been observed as under:- ``Law has reached its finest moments,when it has freed men the unlimited discretioin of some ruler... where discretion is absolute,man has always suffered. (19). Therefore, Rule of Law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. The Apex Court has, also referred to and quoted with approval Lord Mansfield in Rex vs. John Wilkes (21), wherein it has been observed as under:- ``Discretion means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful. (20). In a case where a result of a decision taken by the Government the other party is likely to be adversely affected, the Government has to exercise its powers bonafide and arbitrarily. The discretion of the Government cannot be absolute and injusticiable. (Vide Amarnath Ashram Trust Society vs. Governor of U.P. (22). (21). (20). In a case where a result of a decision taken by the Government the other party is likely to be adversely affected, the Government has to exercise its powers bonafide and arbitrarily. The discretion of the Government cannot be absolute and injusticiable. (Vide Amarnath Ashram Trust Society vs. Governor of U.P. (22). (21). There is no manner of doubt that the public authorities and the Government are bound to act reasonably and fairly and each action of such authorities must pass the test of reasonableness and whenever action taken is found to be lacking bonafide and made in colourable exercise of the power, the Court should not hesitate to strike down such unfair and unjust proceedings. (Vide Hansraj H. Jain vs. State of Maharastra & Ors. (23). (22). In fact the order of the State or State instrumentality would stand vitiated if it lacks bonafides as it would only be a case of colourable exercise of power. In State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh (24), the Honble Apex Court has deal with the issue of legal malice which is just different from the concept of personal vice. The Court observed as under:- ``When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested the Court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was not off the mark even in law when he stated : `I repeat........... that all power is a trust- that, from the people, allo springs, and all must exist. Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bonafide for the end designed. Fraud in this contest is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all cases in which the action impugned is to affect some object which is beyond the purpose and intent to the power, whether this be malice- laden or even benign. If the purpose is corrupt the resultant act is bad. If considerations, foreign to the scope of the power or extraneous to the statute, enter the verdict or impels the action malafides or fraud on power vitiates the .... official act. (23). In Delhi Transport Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress & Ors. (25), the Supreme Court observed that ``Discretion when conferred upon the executive authorities, must be confined within definite limits. official act. (23). In Delhi Transport Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress & Ors. (25), the Supreme Court observed that ``Discretion when conferred upon the executive authorities, must be confined within definite limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decision should be made by the application by known-principles and rules and in general, such decision should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. (24). It is settled law that when the action of State or its instrumentalities is not as per the rules or regulations or supported by a statute, the Court must exercise its jurisdiction to declare such an act to be illegal and invalid. (25). In Sirsi Municipality vs. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis (26), the Supreme Court observed that `` the ratio is that rules or the regulations are binding on the authorities. (26). Similarly, a Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court, in Sukhdeo Singh & Ors. vs. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Anr. (27), has observed as under:- ``The statutory authorities cannot deviate from the conditions of ser- vice. Any deviation will be enforced by legal sanction of declaration by Courts to invalidate actions in violation of rules and regulations. The existence of rules and regulations under statute is to ensure regular conduct with a distinctive attitude to that conduct as a standard. The statutory regulations in the cases under consideration give the employees a statutory status and impose restrictions on the employer and the employee with no option to vary the conditions..........In cases of statutory bodies there is no personal element whatsoever because of the impersonal character of statutory bodies....... the element of public employment or service and the support of statute require observances of rules and regulations. Failure to observe requirements by statutory bodies is enforced by courts by declaring (action) in violation of rules and regulations to be void. This Court has repeatedly observed that whenever a mans rights are affected by decision taken under statutory powers, the Court would presume the existence of a duty to observe the rules of natural justice and compliance with rules and regulations imposed by statute. (27). Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Ambica Quarry Works etc. vs. State of Guj. & Ors. (28) & Commissioner of Police vs. Gordhan (29). (27). Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Ambica Quarry Works etc. vs. State of Guj. & Ors. (28) & Commissioner of Police vs. Gordhan (29). In both the cases, the Apex Court relied upon the judgment of the House of Lord in Julius vs. Lord Bishop of Oxford (30), wherein it was observed as under :- ``There may be something in the nature of thing empowered to be done, some thing in the object for which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed, to exercise that power when called upon to do so. (28). In Commissioner of Police (supra), the Apex Court observed as under: ``Public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them, and persons to whose detriment orders are made are entitled to know with exactness and precision what they are expected to do or forbear from doing and exact what authority is making the order... An enabling power of this kind conferred for public reasons and for the public benefit is, in our opinion, coupled with a duty to exercise it when the circumstances so demand. It is a duty which cannot be shirked or shelved nor it be evaded, performance of it can be compelled. ``If the laws and principles are eroded by such institutions, it not only pollutes its functioning deteriorting its standard but also exhibits ....wrong channel adopted .......If there is any erosion or descending by those who control the activities all expectations and hopes are destroyed. If the institutions perform dedicated and sincere service with the highest morality it would not only up-lift many but bring back even a limping society to its normalcy. (29). The Supreme Court has taken the same view in Ram Chand & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (31), and held that ``the exercise of power should not be made against the spirit of the provisions of the statute, otherwise it would tend towards arbitrariness. (30). It is settled proposition of law that appointment/ promotion dehors the Rules/Regulations is illegal and invalid. vs. Union of India & Ors. (31), and held that ``the exercise of power should not be made against the spirit of the provisions of the statute, otherwise it would tend towards arbitrariness. (30). It is settled proposition of law that appointment/ promotion dehors the Rules/Regulations is illegal and invalid. The appointee cannot claim any benefit of such appointment as it is liable to be set-aside and if a person has been allowed to continue even for a long time, he cannot claim any benefit of the same. In Smt. Ravindra Sharma & ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (32), the Apex Court held that an ineligible candidate, if selected and appointed, cannot claim a right to continue on the post as the appointment is liable to be set- aside. In Harpal Kaur Chahal vs. Director, Punjab Industries (33), the Hon`ble Supreme Court up-held the termination order on the ground that being ineligible for post, her appointment had been dehors the Rules and the same did not deserve to be saved even after continuing in service for 23 years 7 1/2 months. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Shyama Pardhi (34), the Honble Supreme Court held that as his initial selection was per se illegal, principles of natural justice were not required to be observed before terminating the services. Similarly, in State of Rajasthan vs. Hitendra Kumar Bhatt (35), where the appointee had completed several years in service and had also been confirmed, the Court held that an ineligible person cannot be permitted to continue merely on compassionate ground and his appointment was quashed. Same view has been taken in Kishori Lal Charamkar & Anr. (36). In Patna University vs. Dr. (Mrs.) Amita Tiwari (37); the Court held that regularisation of an ineligible candidate merely on the ground of her continuation in service was impermissible. Same view has been reiterated in M.P. Electricity Board vs. S.S. Modh & Ors. (38); and Dr. Meera Massey (supra). (36). In Patna University vs. Dr. (Mrs.) Amita Tiwari (37); the Court held that regularisation of an ineligible candidate merely on the ground of her continuation in service was impermissible. Same view has been reiterated in M.P. Electricity Board vs. S.S. Modh & Ors. (38); and Dr. Meera Massey (supra). In Upen Chandra Gogoi vs. State of Assam and others (39), the Apex Court held that Court should not `validate an action which was not lawful at inception.Nor the Court can permit an appointment made by giving a go-bye to the essential mode of recruitment as provided by the Statutory Rules as the rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution have binding force and the same cannot be permitted to be over-looked/ violated. (Vide R.K. Trivedi & ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (40). (31). At the cost of repetition, it is pertinent to mention here that respondent No.3 had never been considered and appointed on the post of U.D.C. by any Competent Authority. The order dated 7.6.82 was passed by the learned Advocate General, who was not the competent authority and the promotion order, if any, could have been passed by the Law Secretary of the State on the recommendation of the D.P.C. Moreover, as there has been no extension of the said order and it was only for a period of one year, the promotion of respondent No.3 came to an end automatically after expiry of the tenure of one year and he continued to hold the post of U.D.C. illegally merely because the so-called administration wanted him to continue as such on its whims and further promotions have been given considering respondent No.3 as substantive U.D.C. with effect from 7.6.1982 consciously/purpo- sely and not by over-sight. Naked favouritism of an employee by the instrumentality of the State does not merely violate the mandate of equality clause enshrined in the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution but smacks of arbitrariness of highest magnitude. It also reflects that the State, which is a model employer, also treats its employees most discriminatorily and considers their cases for promotion etc. whi- msically, ignoring all Rules or law governing their terms and conditions of service. It is evident from this case that service of the employees in the department in question has always been run by the Rule of Thumb and not by Rule of Law. whi- msically, ignoring all Rules or law governing their terms and conditions of service. It is evident from this case that service of the employees in the department in question has always been run by the Rule of Thumb and not by Rule of Law. What can be more unfortunate than this as it has happened in the Department of Law of the State. The conduct of the authorities running administration in such a manner is not worth approving. The arbitrary manner in which the orders of promotion had been passed unerringly create an impression that the orders had been passed without any sense of responsibility and that too for extraneous consideration as for such a long time, nobody had ever considered it proper to examine the validity of continuation of respondent No.3 on the post of U.D.C. where the tenure had expired after one year from illegal order of ad-hoc promotion. Moreso, there is no explanation as once the petitioners seniority has been refixed by the Tribunal vide order dated 28.2.90, how it could be disturbed by the Authorities and that too without challenging the said order of the Tribunal. (32). The promotion of respondent No.3 temporarily even for one year was bad being not in consonance with Rules and his continuation for such a long period reflects that Rule of Law has no application in the Law Department of the State. The appointment and promotions made in flagrant violation of the mandatory provisions of the Statutory Rules not only opens the flood-gates of neoptism and favouritism but also breeds corruption and forces the eligible and competent can- didates to commit suicide out of frustration as the candidate, who can lick the boots of the bosses succeeds in the mission. The Court, being custodian of law, cannot close its eyes and become a silent spectator to such an illegality. (33). In Dwarka Nath vs. Income Tax Officer (41), the Hon`ble Supreme Court observed as under :- ``Article 226 is couched in comprehensive phrasology and it ex- facie confers a wide power on the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of power, the purpose for which and the person or Authority against whom it can be exercised. (34). This view has been reaffirmed in Mewa Singh vs. Siromani Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee (42). (35). The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of power, the purpose for which and the person or Authority against whom it can be exercised. (34). This view has been reaffirmed in Mewa Singh vs. Siromani Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee (42). (35). In view of the above, I have no hesitation in holding that promotion of respondent No.3 as U.D.C. without considering any other person even for ad-hoc/ temporary period of one year and his subsequent continuation for more than a decade and his further promotions to the posts of Office Assistant and Office Superintendent are not merely illegal/invalid and arbitrary but fraud upon the Statute played by the Authorities. (36). The original record produced by Mr. Vyas, learned Additional Advocate General, reveals that the candidature of respondent No.3 has been considered through-out treating him as appointed U.D.C. substantively with effect from 7.6.82, which is not justified and, therefore, all the proceedings for subsequent promotions on the post of Office Assistant and Office Superintendent also stand vitiated and the same cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. (37). In the facts and circumstances of the case, the following direction are issued:- (i) respondents No. 1 and 2 are directed to treat petitioner to have been promoted as U.D.C. with effect from 16.10.85 alongwith others; (ii) respondent No.3 shall be treated as L.D.C. on 16.10.85 and his candidature for promotion to the post of U.D.C. shall be considered whenever the vacancy becomes available in U.D.C. cadre subsequent to 16.10.85 and if he is found suitable, he shall be included in the U.D.C. cadre from that date; (iii) a final seniority list of U.D.Cs. shall be published considering representations/ objections of the employees; (iv) vacancies on the post of Office Assistant shall be determined on 1st April of every year and whenever the vacancy occurs and becomes available, the candidature of all the U.D.Cs., who fall within the Zone of Consideration for promotion on the post of Office Assistant, shall be considered and promotion from U.D.C. to Office Assistant shall be made; (v) the seniority list of the Office Assistants shall be published and vacancies on the post of Office Superintendent shall be determined on 1st April of every year and whenever the post becomes vacant and available, the candidature of all the Office Assistants, who are eligible and fall within the Zone of Consideration for promotion shall be considered and order shall be passed accordingly; and (vi) as the cases of all the employees have to be considered including the non-parties, therefore, if any order is likely to be passed adversely affecting an employee who is not before this Court, he shall be given an opportunity of hearing. (38). The entire exercise is to be done by respondents No.1 and 2 within a period of four months from today. Though the petition is disposed of finally but res- pondent No.2 is directed to submit the compliance report after expiry of four months to this Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be inequitable to make a recovery from the respondents No.3 at such a belated stage for working on the higher posts illegally. If persons are promoted from back date, they shall be entitled for all consequential benefits but not the arrears of pay. (39). The petition is allowed with the aforesaid observations. There shall be no order as to costs.