ORDER: The accused 2 to 7 in S.T.C.No.58 of 1996 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Virudhunagar, have filed this petition under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. to quash the said case pending against them. 2. The respondent has filed a charge sheet against the petitioners, who are accused 2 to 7 and also on Balakrishnan-1st accused, for offences under Secs.78(1)(a), (b) and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 read with Sec.34, I.P.C., alleging that in February, 1985, the accused in furtherance of their common intention to falsify the registered trademark “Rose” by making “White Rose”, which is deceptively similar to that of the registered trademark “Rose”, falsely applied to matches, manufactured by them, and sold them through the 1st accused. 3. The chargesheet was dated 24.7.1986 and the charges were framed in 1998. Thereafter, the petitioners have come forward with this petition. 4. According to the petitioners, the trademark “White Rose” is entirely different from the trademark “Rose”, that they are not at all similar to each other and that by no stretch of imagination it can be called that they are similar. 5. The charges against the accused are for under Secs.78(1)(a), (b) and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. Sec.77(1)(a), (b) is as follows: “Falsifying and falsely applying trade marks: (1) A person shall be deemed to falsify a trade mark who, either, (a) without the assent of the proprietor of the trade mark makes that trade mark or a deceptively similar mark; or (b) falsifies any genuine trade mark, whether by alteration, addition, effacement of otherwise.” Likewise, the relevant Section is Sec.78(a) and (b), which says- “Penalty for applying false trade marks, trade descriptions, etc.: Any person who, (a) falsifies any trade mark; or (b) falsely applies to goods any trade mark. (c)xxxx (d)xxxx (e)xxxx (f)xxxx (g)xxxx shall, unless he proves that he acted without intent to defraud, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” Sec. 79 speaks about the penalty for selling goods to which a false trade mark or false trade description is applied. 6. The main contention of the prosecution is that the trademark “Rose” is the original trade mark of the complainant rope. 6. The main contention of the prosecution is that the trademark “Rose” is the original trade mark of the complainant rope. The King Match Factory, Kalugumalai, Tirunelveli district, and the petitioners herein have falsified the said trademark in the name “White Rose” which is deceptively similar to the trade mark “Rose” of the complainant. Sec.2(1)(d) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act defines: “Deceptively similar”- “A mark shall be deemed to be deceptively similar to another mark if it so nearly resembles that other mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion.” Deception or confusion may arise in the following ways- (1) Deception or confusion as to goods. A person may buy the goods seeing one mark thinking that it is the brand which is in his mind which on fact is not the case. (2) Deception or confusion as to trade origin. A person looking at a mark may buy the good thinking that it is coming from the same source as some other goods bearing a similar mark which he is familiar with. (3) Deception or confusion as to trade connection. A person looking at the mark may not think that it is the same as the one with a different brand in his mind but the similarity may make him believe that the two are in some way or other connected with each other.” Lord Denning in Parker-Knoll v. Knoll International, 1962 R.P.C. 265 (H.L.) observed: “Looking to the natural meaning of the words, I would make two observations: first, the offending mark must ‘so nearly resemble’ the registered mark as to be ‘likely’ to deceive or cause confusion.....‘Secondly, to deceive’ is one thing. To ‘cause confusion’ is another. The difference is this: when you deceive a man, you tell him a lie. You make a false representation to him and thereby cause him to believe a thing to be true which is false. You may not do it knowingly, or intentionally, but still you do it, and so you deceive him. But you may cause confusion without telling him a lie at all, and without making any false representation to him. You make a false representation to him and thereby cause him to believe a thing to be true which is false. You may not do it knowingly, or intentionally, but still you do it, and so you deceive him. But you may cause confusion without telling him a lie at all, and without making any false representation to him. You may indeed tell him the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, but still you may cause confusion in his mind, not by any fault of yours, but because he has not the knowledge or ability to distinguish it from the other pieces of truth known to him or because he may not even take the trouble to do so.” The respondent/police have filed the charge sheet on the allegation that the petitioners have their trade mark “White Rose” which is deceptively similar to that of “Rose” of Pope the King Match Factory, Kalugumalai. 7. Whether the alleged false trademark of the accused had caused confusion in the mind of the purchaser is a fact which has to be decided after letting in evidence and marking the documents. However, there must be some substance to show that there are similarities between the two trademarks to cause confusion in the mind of the ordinary and innocent purchaser. When we see these two trade marks, no ordinary man will feel, rather confuse himself, that they are one and the same trade mark. These two trademarks are entirely different and they are not likely to deceive any purchaser of the match box. Unless there are some basis to the meaning of “deceptively similarly”, there is no reason in continuing the prosecution. (1) Between these two trademarks, there is no similarity in the nature of marks, and (2) There is no resemblance between two marks in phonetic, visual as well as similarity in idea. 8. When we see the nature of marks, they are entirely different. One is a “Red Rose” another is a “White Rose”, and the name of the original trade mark is ‘Gulab’ in Hindi and the other is “White Rose” in English. The design and nature of Rose are different. In the original trade mark, the colour is rather ‘Red’, whereas it is ‘White’ in the other. The petals are entirely different. The leaves are also entirely different and the colour of leaves is also entirely different. The design and nature of Rose are different. In the original trade mark, the colour is rather ‘Red’, whereas it is ‘White’ in the other. The petals are entirely different. The leaves are also entirely different and the colour of leaves is also entirely different. In the original trade mark after the registered trade mark “GULAB” in Hindi, there is no words. In WHITE ROSE a bud comes above the Rose and thereafter “50’s 20 Ps” and below the words “White Rose” Safety Matches - Damp Proof, which is not found in the original trade mark. The printed materials below, is also entirely different. 9. Two similarities which are contended by the respondent/police, are that both of them are selling “matches” and both the trade marks contained “Rose”. However, if one man is having a particular trade or business, the other man cannot be restricted. If so it amounts to unfair trade practice. Though both of them are ‘Rose’, as already stated they are entirely different and they are not at all similar and no purchaser can purchase the product of the petitioners for the product of the complainant who has registered the original trade mark ‘GULAB’ in Hindi. As there is no similarity between these two trade marks, it cannot be contended that any purchaser would purchaser the matches of the petitioners herein for the matches of the complainant. Therefore, these two trademarks would not fall under (he meaning “deceptively similar”. As such there is no justification in allowing the prosecution to continue against the petitioners herein. 10. Sec.482, Crl.P.C. is to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and the High Court in its inherent powers can quash such proceedings. 11. When we see the trademarks which are entirely different, it cannot be said that they are deceptively similar, the petitioners herein are liable for the charges under Secs.78(1)(a), (b) and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, read with Sec.34, I.P.C. Therefore, the said case pending against the petitioners herein, who are accused 2 to 7, has to be quashed. 12. In the result, S.T.C.No.58 of 1996 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Virudhunagar, is quashed in respect of accused 2 to 7. Consequently, there are no order necessary in Crl.M.P.Nos.8474 and 8475 of 1998.