JUDGMENT R.B. Dixit, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved by a remand order dated April 16, 1996 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court (Hon'ble Justice T. S. DOABIA) in Writ Petition No. 1206/1993 filed by respondent, the appellants have come up in this Letters Patent Appeal, challenging the directions for reconsideration on punishment awarded to the respondent in a Departmental Enquiry against him. 2. The short facts leading to the filing of this appeal are that: The contesting respondent was posted at Gwarighat Branch, Jabalpur of UCO Bank as Branch Manager when two separate charge sheets were served for different lapses against him. The chargesheet dated January 16, 1988 (P/1) was served for his lapses/acts of omission and commission relating to sanction of a loan of Rs. 30,000/- in the name of a fictitious person, namely Suresh Kumar Yadav. The charge-sheet dated November 2, 1988 (P-II) was served to him for his serious acts of omission and commission pertaining to sanction of number of loans in utter violation of Bank's rules and procedures and allowing unauthorised and irregular overdrafts/cash credit limits to various constituents of the Branch, The Disciplinary Authority after holding the charges as proved passed two separate orders in respect of the concerned charges against the respondent. 3. In respect of charge-sheet dated January 16, 1998 the respondent's basic pay was reduced to eleventh stage in the time scale of Junior Management Grade-I cadre i. e. to Rs. 3,300/-. Further in respect of charge-sheet dated November 2, 1988 two separate punishments were imposed upon the respondent. For charges 1 and 2 his four increments of basic pay were withheld with cumulative effect and for charge No. 3, he was debarred from participating in the promotion process for promotion to next higher scale for a period of 3 years from the date of the order. 4. The respondent preferred appeal as against orders of punishment passed in departmental enquiry against him, but no favourable order was passed in appeal against him. Aggrieved by the departmental orders referred to hereinabove, the respondent in aforesaid writ petition before this Court raised various grounds. 4. The respondent preferred appeal as against orders of punishment passed in departmental enquiry against him, but no favourable order was passed in appeal against him. Aggrieved by the departmental orders referred to hereinabove, the respondent in aforesaid writ petition before this Court raised various grounds. However, the main grounds, as contended on behalf of respondent, are that copies of certain documents were not supplied to him at the time of initiation of the departmental proceedings and the enquiry report was also not made available which led to the breach of principles of natural justice. 5. The learned single Judge of this Court vide order impugned held that in so far as non-supply of documents is concerned, these documents which had been specified by the respondent, were not in possession of the Bank, for example, the copy of the FIR lodged with the CBI and the investigation report etc. The respondent-petitioner also failed to indicate in Annexure P/7 that he be furnished loan documents in respect of Suresh Kumar Yadav. The grounds, which were raised by the petitioner-respondent in the writ petition, were also not taken as grounds in departmental appeal. In the circumstances when the documents, which were sought by the petitioner-respondent, were not found available with the Bank and no prejudice was shown to have been caused on account of non-supply of such documents. The contention of the petitioner-respondent about violation of principles of natural justice was not found tenable by the learned single Judge. In fact, objection regarding non-supply of documents of which demand was made had no direct bearing on the charges framed against the petitioner-respondent because the allegations against the petitioner-respondent were that he had failed to conduct pre-sanction and post sanction inspection in a proper manner. He further failed to obtain certificate of the veterinary doctor and insurance policy in respect of loan transaction alleged to have been dealt with by the petitioner-respondent in his capacity as Branch Manager. 6. Although no procedural fault was found by the learned single Judge of this Court in the order impugned in respect of the departmental enquiry which terminated in the aforesaid punishment being awarded to the petitioner-respondent, yet a direction was issued vide the aforesaid impugned order on the point of punishment which was to the following effect: "10. 6. Although no procedural fault was found by the learned single Judge of this Court in the order impugned in respect of the departmental enquiry which terminated in the aforesaid punishment being awarded to the petitioner-respondent, yet a direction was issued vide the aforesaid impugned order on the point of punishment which was to the following effect: "10. However, there is something to be said in favour of the petitioner with regard to the punishment imposed. The perusal of entire file indicates that, there is basically one charge and that was with regard to improper sanction of loan and some dereliction of duty with regard to grant of loans in the matter of purchase of cattle. As such, in the matter of imposition of punishment, the whole lapse has to be taken into consideration as one unit and one simple punishment should be imposed. As such, the matter is remanded to the respondent-Bank to look into the matter afresh. The petitioner would be at liberty to raise any other point before the Disciplinary Authority." 7. It has been argued for appellants before us that the Hon'ble single Judge had not assigned any reason for setting aside the punishment awarded by the appellants and wrongly held mat there is basically only one unit of charge against the respondent-petitioner. It is further submitted that this observation of the learned single Judge is against the record. 8. The learned counsel of the respondent-petitioner wanted to support the impugned order challenging the finding on the point of non-supply of documents and consequent failure of natural justice in respect of departmental proceedings conducted against the respondent. However, in our considered opinion, since the respondent has not come up in letters patent appeal before us in respect of the learned single Judge pertaining to non-supply of documents and consequent failure of natural justice which has attained finality, as such, these findings cannot be challenged by the petitioner- respondent now in this appeal, which has been preferred on behalf of the appellant-Bank, on the point of direction issued in respect of reconsideration of punishment only. This has narrowed down the scope of the appeal confining it to the extent of directions given by the learned single Judge while remanding on the point of consideration whether the charges found proved against the petitioner constitute one unit and consequently reconsidering of the punishment awarded to him. 9. This has narrowed down the scope of the appeal confining it to the extent of directions given by the learned single Judge while remanding on the point of consideration whether the charges found proved against the petitioner constitute one unit and consequently reconsidering of the punishment awarded to him. 9. The learned counsel for the appellants has heavily relied upon a decision rendered by the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in case of A. S. Wadhwan v. UCO Bank (Civil Writ Petition No. 585 of 1992 Judgment dated October 20, 1995) (1996 (4) Serv LR 789) copy of which is also found included in the paper book of this appeal, in support of the contention that the impugned action does not suffer from the vice of double jeopardy as more than one penalty has been imposed on the petitioner and that in any event, the punishment was not disproportionate to the charges established against the petitioner. In that case also, the petitioner was admittedly governed by the provisions of the United Commercial Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations. 1976. These regulations were framed under Section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. In the instant case also, it is not disputed that the case of the respondent-petitioner also was governed by the same regulations. 10. Regulation 4 of 1976 enumerates following penalties, which may be imposed on an officer employee, for acts of misconduct or for any other good and sufficient reasons. "Minor penalties: (a) Censure; (b) withholding of increments of pay with or without cumulative effect; (c) withholding of promotion; (d) recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the bank of negligence or breach of orders. Major penalties: (e) reduction to a lower grade or post, or to a lower stage in a time scale; (f) compulsory retirement; (g) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment; and (h) dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment." 11. Major penalties: (e) reduction to a lower grade or post, or to a lower stage in a time scale; (f) compulsory retirement; (g) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment; and (h) dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment." 11. Although the copy of the charge-sheet or list of charges found proved against the petitioner-respondent was not included in the paper book of this appeal, however, from the memo of appeal and the allegations, as broadly put in the order impugned, it can be gathered that the charge-sheet dated January 16, 1988, marked as P/1, was about lapses in relation to sanction of loan of Rs. 30,000/- in the name of fictitious person, namely, Suresh Kumar Yadav and in respect of this charge, basic pay was reduced to eleventh stage in the time scale of Junior Management Grade-I cadre i.e. to Rs. 3,300/-. The 2nd set of charge dated November 2, 1988 marked as Annexure P/II, there were various acts of omissions and commissions pertaining to sanction of number of loans in utter violation of Bank's rules and procedures. This set of charge is divided between charges No. 1, 2 and 3 and in respect of charges 1 and 2, four increments in the time scale of pay were withheld with cumulative effect and for charge No. 3, he was debarred from promotional channel for a period of three years from the date of the order. It is, therefore, amply clear that the charges, which were found proved against the petitioner-respondent, were of different nature and pertaining to different allegations. Therefore, both minor and major penalties, as indicated in penalty Clause 4(b), (c) and (e), were imposed on him. By no stretch of imagination, the charges and penalties can be treated as one unit and, therefore, the learned single Judge under wrong assumption of facts had arrived at an erroneous conclusion that such charges formed part of single unit and required re-consideration in the matter of imposition of punishment. It was held in the similar case of A S. Wadhwan (supra) that there is nothing in the rule to indicate that the Disciplinary Authority is not competent to impose more than one penalty on an employee where the employee acts negligently or dishonestly and causes loss to the Bank. 12. It was held in the similar case of A S. Wadhwan (supra) that there is nothing in the rule to indicate that the Disciplinary Authority is not competent to impose more than one penalty on an employee where the employee acts negligently or dishonestly and causes loss to the Bank. 12. In a decision of the Apex Court rendered in case of State Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore Endow, reported in 1994 (2) SCC 537 : 1994-I-LLJ-872, where the objection in respect of non-supply of the enquiry report was also raised, it was held on the question of punishment that imposition of appropriate punishment is within the discretion and judgment of the disciplinary authority. It may be open to the appellate authority to interfere with it but not to the High Court or to the Administrative Tribunal for the reason that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is similar to the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power under Article 226 is one of judicial review. It is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. The High Court is not constituted under Article 226 of the Constitution as a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant; it is concerned to determine whether the inquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. 13. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. 14. 14. In a Constitution Bench decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra reported in AIR 1963 SC 779 : 1963-I-LLJ-239 it was held in respect of interference on the question, of penalty that if the order of punishing authority may be supported on any findings as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. In the aforesaid matter, it may be noticed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court after taking notice of its earlier decision in the case of State Bank of India (supra) further observed: "We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide, is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter." 15. The Apex Court in its decision rendered in case of Sanchalakshri v. Vijayakumar Raghuvir Prasad, reported in AIR 1999 SC 578 : 1998 (8) SCC 245 : 1999-I-LLJ- 343, where respondent was a school teacher and was asked to get his service book completed. He instead of approaching the concerned authorities, either himself or with the help of some other person forged entries in the service book. He instead of approaching the concerned authorities, either himself or with the help of some other person forged entries in the service book. He was dismissed from service. It was held that the punishment imposed by the School Management was not shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct. 16. In a decision rendered by the larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan, reported in 1998 (4) SCC 310 : 1998-I-LLJ- 1217, wherein the distinction sought to be drawn by the High Court that the first charge sheet served on the respondent related to the period when he was a clerk whereas the other three charge-sheets related to the period when he was promoted as a bank officer, observed that a bare look at these charges would unmistakably indicate that they relate to misconduct of a serious nature and even if the reasoning of the High Court that in the facts and circumstances of the case "it is difficult to apply the principle of severability as the charges are so inextricably mixed up." Since, all charges relate to serious misconduct which includes taking bribe, failure to protect the interests of Bank, failure to perform duties with utmost devotion, diligent, integrity and honestly, acting in a manner unbecoming of a Bank officer etc., this principle had no application. Such sort of misconduct being serious enough, the punishment of dismissal was not found disproportionate to the gravity of the charges framed against the respondent. In yet another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered by a larger Bench in case of Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Bombay v. Sharat Naryan Parab, reported in 1998 (1) SCC 484 : 1998-II-LLJ-653, where non-supply of enquiry report was not found to vitiate the enquiry, the punishment of dismissal was not found unreasonable or disproportionate to the charges. 17. In the present case also, one of the charges against the respondent-petitioner related to sanction of loan of Rs. 30,000/- in the name of a fictitious person and other set of charges were in respect of acts of omissions and commissions pertaining to sanction of a number of loans in utter violation of Bank rules and procedures. 18. 17. In the present case also, one of the charges against the respondent-petitioner related to sanction of loan of Rs. 30,000/- in the name of a fictitious person and other set of charges were in respect of acts of omissions and commissions pertaining to sanction of a number of loans in utter violation of Bank rules and procedures. 18. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and in the aforesaid legal position, we are of the considered opinion that the directions issued by the learned single Judge for consideration was based on the wrong fact that the charges against the respondent-petitioner constituted charges of one unit and is not tenable in law and cannot be sustained. 19. In view of our conclusion indicated hereinabove, this Letters Patent Appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed and the impugned direction of remand for reconsideration is set aside. As a consequence the writ petition shall stand dismissed. 20. No costs.