DEEPAK MISRA, J. ( 1 ) THE applicant was taken into custody in connection with Crime No. 329/99 instituted for an offence punishable under Section 20 (i) (b) of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'the NDPS Act') on the allegation that he was in possession of 15 gms. of 'ganja'. ( 2 ) THE applicant filed an application for obtaining concession of bail before the learned Sessions Judge, Bhopal on the ground that he was below 16 years of age, and hence, he was entitled to the benefit as envisaged under the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and under Section 437 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code' ). ( 3 ) IT was put forth before the learned Special Judge that the date of birth of the petitioner is 7-10-85 and in support of the same certificate of the school and marksheet were produced. The learned Special Judge appreciating the documents brought on record and observing the appearance of the petitioner came to hold that the petitioner appeared to be more than 16 years of age and, accordingly, rejected the prayer for bail. ( 4 ) MR. S. K. Gangrade, learned Counsel for the applicant has contended that when the applicant had filed adequate documents in support of his age he should have been given the benefit provided under the Juvenile Justice Act. It is his submission that the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act would override the provisions of NDPS Act. In support of his contention the learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of In Re, Sessions Judge, Kalapetta, 1994 (2) Kerala Law Journal 1221, Matadin v. State of M. P. (M. Cr. C. No. 998/94 decided on 23-5-94) : (reported in 1995 (1) EFR 187 ). MR. R. S. Jha, per contra, contended that the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act do not override the provisions of the NDPS Act inasmuch as Section 37 of the NDPS Act was brought into the statute book with effect from 29-5-89 by Act No. 2 of 1989. It is also his submission that the non obstante clause used in Section 37 has to be given due effect. It is also his submission that the non obstante clause used in Section 37 has to be given due effect. Learned counsel for the State has also proposed that while exercising jurisdiction under the Code for grant of concession of bail the Court has to keep in view the conditions precedent enshrined under Section 37 of the NDPS Act and an accused who is a juvenile has also to satisfy the conditions precedent as stipulated therein. Mr. Jha further submitted that the decision rendered in the case of Matadin (supra) is per incuriam as in the said case it has been held that the Juvenile Justice Act has an overriding effect over the provisions of the NDPS Act on the basis that Juvenile Justice Act was a latter statute than NDPS Act but as an actual fact Section 37 of the NDPS Act was incorporated in the statute book on 29-5-1989. It is also contended by Mr. Jha, learned Dy. A. G. , that in the present case as the accused is more than 16 years of age as per the finding recorded by the learned Special Judge the issue relating to the applicability of the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act is really academic. ( 5 ) TO appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar I have carefully perused the order passed by the learned Special Judge. It is to be noted here that the learned counsel for the petitioner while assailing the finding relating to age of the applicant/petitioner gave immense emphasis on the certificates produced before the learned Special Judge. It was also his submission that the learned Special Judge has been swayed away by his impression and not by the documents. Mr. Gangrade, learned counsel pressed hard that the petitioner is a juvenile, and therefore, he should be conferred the benefits as provided under the Juvenile Justice Act. As learned Counsel for the parties argued at length with regard to the issue of applicability of Juvenile Justice Act, it is thought appropriate to deal with the same. I may hasten to add here that Mr. Jha, learned Dy. A. G. , urged that even if the petitioner is treated as a juvenile he would not get thebenefit of a juvenile. In this context it is apposite to refer to Section 18 of the Juvenile Justice Act which deals with the bails and custody of juveniles. I may hasten to add here that Mr. Jha, learned Dy. A. G. , urged that even if the petitioner is treated as a juvenile he would not get thebenefit of a juvenile. In this context it is apposite to refer to Section 18 of the Juvenile Justice Act which deals with the bails and custody of juveniles. It reads as under :-"18. Bail and custody of juveniles.- When any person accused of a bailable or non-bailable offence and apparently a juvenile is arrested or detained or appears or is brought before a Juvenile Court, such person shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or in any other law for the time being in force, be released on bail with or without surety but shall be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the release is likely to bring him into association with any known criminal or expose him to moral danger or that his release would defeat the ends of justice. (2) When such person having been arrested is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the officer-in-charge of the police station, such officer shall cause him to be kept in an observation home or a place of safety in the prescribed manner (but not in a police station or jail) until he can be brought before a Juvenile Court. (3) When such a person is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the Juvenile Court it shall, instead of committing him to prison, make an order sending him to an observation home or a place of safety for such period during the pendency of the inquiry regarding him as may be specified in the order. "on a fair reading of the aforesaid provision it is apparent that a juvenile is to be enlarged on bail unless materials are brought on record to indicate his case is covered under the exception provided therein. Submission of Mr. Gangrade is that statute cost a mandate on the Court to admit the juvenile to bail notwithstanding anything containedin the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force. The Juvenile Justice Act came into force w. e. f. 2-10-87. Mr. Submission of Mr. Gangrade is that statute cost a mandate on the Court to admit the juvenile to bail notwithstanding anything containedin the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force. The Juvenile Justice Act came into force w. e. f. 2-10-87. Mr. Gangrade has placed heavy reliance on the decision rendered in the case of In Re Sessions, Judge, Kalpetta (supra) wherein a Division Bench of Kerala High Court while dealing with the provisions of Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 came to hold that the provisions of the said Act will not have any overriding effect over the provisions contained in Juvenile Justice Act. The Court observed that Juvenile Act is a special enactment which deals with the juvenile offenders and the provisions of the Act cannot be nullified by the 1989 Act which deals with an entirely different field. The learned Counsel submitted that in the case of Matadin (supra) this Court has already taken the view that the Juvenile Justice Act has an overriding effect over all the law existing at the time of enforcement of the said Act and hence, the petitioner has to be conferred the benefit. ON a careful reading of the decision rendered in the case of Kalpetta (supra), it appears their Lordships have taken into consideration the nature of the field that is sought to be covered by both the Acts discussed therein. That apart, the applicability of the Section 37 of the NDPS Act was not directly in issue. Hence, I am of the view that the said decision is not on the point in issue. ( 6 ) IN the case of Matadin (supra) the learned Single Judge has held as under :-"it will be useful to mention here that this Act i. e. the N. D. P. S. Act, is of the year 1985 whereas the Juvenile Justice Act is of the year 1986. It, therefore, goes without saying that the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act override the provisions of the N. D. P. S. Act. In other words, it can be said that if a person is a Juvenile he has to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Act. It, therefore, goes without saying that the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act override the provisions of the N. D. P. S. Act. In other words, it can be said that if a person is a Juvenile he has to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Act. No doubt, Section 36-A of the N. D. P. S. , Act do make a provision that notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr. P. C. all offences under the Act have to be tried only by the special Court. Thus, irrespective of this provision a Juvenile has to be dealt with under the Juvenile Justice Act, as said above, because the Juvenile Justice Act has an overriding effect over all the law existing at the time of the enforcement of the said Act which is later than the N. D. P. S. Act. In this view of the matter, if a person is brought before the special Court who claims himself to be juvenile within the Juvenile Justice Act, it is the duty of the special Judge to make an enquiry about the fact as to whether a person claims himself to be juvenile is a juvenile or not and in case the special Judge or the Magistrate before whom the accused is produced comes to the conclusion that the person is a juvenile he has to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Section 8 of the Juvenile Justice Act. On the other hand, if he comes to the conclusion that he is not a juvenile, the general law has to be followed. "from the aforesaid it becomes graphically clear that the learned single Judge has expressed the said view on the basis that the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 is a later law and therefore, the provisions contained therein would have full effect and must be given due weightage, and shall have the overriding effect over the NDPS Act which is an earlier Act. Before I deal in detail with regard to the precedential value of the said decision it is pertinent to refer to Section 37 of NDPS Act. The said provision reads as under :-"37. Before I deal in detail with regard to the precedential value of the said decision it is pertinent to refer to Section 37 of NDPS Act. The said provision reads as under :-"37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),- (A) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (B) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless. (I) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and (II) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. "the aforesaid provision was engrafted into the statute book with a purpose. The Apex Court while considering the import and effect of Section 37 of NDPS Act in the case of Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kishan Lal, AIR 1991 SC 558 : (1991 Cri LJ 654) has held as under at page 656 of Cri LJ :-"section 37 as amended starts with a non obstante clause stating that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no person accused of an offence prescribed therein shall be released on bail unless the conditions contend therein were satisfied. The NDPS Act is a special enactment and it was enacted with a view to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. That being underlying object and particularly when the provisions of S. 37 of the NDPS Act are in negative terms limiting the scope of the applicability of the provisions of Cr. P. C. regarding bail, it cannot be said that the High Court's powers to grant bail under Section 439, Cr. P. C. are not subject to the limitation mentioned under Section 37 of NDPSD Act. P. C. regarding bail, it cannot be said that the High Court's powers to grant bail under Section 439, Cr. P. C. are not subject to the limitation mentioned under Section 37 of NDPSD Act. The non obstante clause with which the section starts should be given its due meaning and clearly it is intended to restrict the powers to grant bail. In case of inconsistency between S. 439 Cr. P. C. and S. 37 of the NDPS Act, S. 37 prevails. The provisions of S. 4, Cr. P. C. also make it clear that when there is a special enactment in force relating to the manner of investigation, inquiry or otherwise dealing with such offences, the other power under Cr. P. C. should be subject to such special enactment. In interpreting the scope of such a statute the dominent purpose underlying the statute has to be borne in mind. Consequently, the power to grant bail under any of the provision of Cr. P. C. should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in S. 37 ofof the NDPS Act. " ( 7 ) IN this backdrop what falls for consideration is whether Section 18 of the Juvenile Justice Act would prevail and the accused would be entitled to be relased on bail even if the conditions precedent envisaged under Section 37 of the NDPS Act are not satisfied. IT is worth noting here that in the case of Matadin (supra) the learned Single Judge proceeded on the basis that NDPS Act is an earlier statute and the Juvenile Justice Act was a later one, and therefore, it has an overriding effect over all the law existing at the time of enforcement of the said Act. As I have indicated earlier that Section 37 of the NDPS Act came into effect from 29-5-89, and therefore, the premises on the basis of which Matadin (supra) was decided were factually not correct. It is plain as noon day that in the case of Matadin (supra) this Court proceeded on the assumption that Section 37 of the NDPS Act was in the statute book when the Juvenile Justice Act came into existence. Thus, syllogism on the basis of which this Court proceeded, in my humble view is in ignorance of the real terms of the statute. Thus, syllogism on the basis of which this Court proceeded, in my humble view is in ignorance of the real terms of the statute. Accordingly, I am of the considered view that the said decision is not a precedent on the field. ( 8 ) MR. Manish Datt, learned amicus curiae brought to the notice of this Court the decision rendered in the case of Antaryami Patra v. State of Orissa, AIR 1993 Cri LJ 1908. In the aforesaid case Hon'ble G. B. Patnaik, J. (as his Lordship then was) after discussing the principles of statutory interpretation and referring to the decisions rendered in the cases of Gaunlet (1872) LR PC 184, In Re Williams, (1887) 36 Ch D 573, Goodwin v. Phillips (1907) 7 CLR 1 and Harcourt v. Fox (1693) 1 Show 506 held as under :-"this being the position of law, no doubt, S. 18 of the Juvenile Justice Act made a general provision with regard to the right of a juvenile delinquent to be relased on bail irrespective of the offence committed by him, but the N. D. P. S. Act is a special provision and in that special statute a further special provision has been made with regard to the pre-conditions to be satisfied for an accused being released on bail. Therefore, the said special provision of the special statute, namely S. 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act, would override S. 18 of the Juvenile Justice Act, and therefore, even in case of a juvenile delinquent involved in commission of an offence under N. D. P. S. Act, no bail can be granted until and unless the provisions of S. 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act, are complied with. Then again, no doubt, the N. D. P. S. Act was enacted earlier in point of time than the Juvenile Justice Act, but the special provision in relation to the bail by way of insertion of S. 37 in the N. D. P. S. Act came into the statute book by Act 2 of 1989 and the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said amendment indicates that the Parliament thought it appropriate to make stringent provision in respect of an accused being released on bail to meet the challenge arising from drug trafficking. Therefore, the said latter provision contained in S. 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act would override the earlier general provision of S. 18 of the Juvenile Justice Act and consequently, a juvenile delinquent being accused of commission of an offence under the N. D. P. S. Actcannot be released unless the pre-conditions contained in S. 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act large complied with. "i am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view. Accordingly, it is held that a person arrayed as an accused under Section 20 (1) (b) of the N. D. P. S. Act, 1985 is not entitled to be relased on bail unless he satisfies the conditions precedent as enshrined under Section 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act. ( 9 ) AS I have already held that a juvenile has also to satisfy the conditions precedent as provided under Section 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act, I am refraining myself from addressing with regard to the finding whether the petitioner is a juvenile or not. ( 10 ) NOW to the factual matrix of the present case. In the case at hand there is allegation that 115 grams of 'ganja' was recovered from the custody of the petitioner. Keeping in view the material collected against him it cannot be held that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence. The contention relating to non-compliance of the mandatory provisions and other discrepancies are to be thrashed out during the trial. Hence, I am not inclined to entertain the prayer for bail. ( 11 ) THE application is accordingly rejected. Petition dismissed. .