Dhondiba Vithalrao Jagtap and others v. Parubai Malhari More
1999-02-15
T.K.CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS
body1999
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - T.K. CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J.:---This writ petition arises out of the suit filed being Civil Suit No. 245 of 1981, on the file of the 2nd Additional Small Causes Court, Pune where the plaintiffs who are the landlords of C.T.S. No. 52/1, Mangalwar Peth, Pune, sought eviction of the tenant Smt. Parubai Malhari More on four grounds: namely, defaulting payment of rent, bona fide need for their own occupation, alternative accommodation and non user. The trial Court decreed the suit on all these four grounds. The appellate Court, the findings entered by the trial Court on these issues were reversed and set aside the decree of eviction. It is in this circumstances, that the petitioners approach this Court by way of this writ petition. During the pendency of the writ petition, the original defendant Smt. Parubai More died and present respondents were impleaded and were served by this Court on 21-7-1997. 2. I have examined the judgments of the courts below and heard the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners and respondents. I find reasoning stated by the lower appellate Court for setting aside the trial Court judgment and decree for eviction is perverse and illegal. The trial Court found on the issue of alternative accommodation that Smt. Parubai More instead of staying in the suit premises, permanently was staying in Door No. 215. Mangalwar Peth. It is pertinent to note that even the suit summons were sent to her at the address 215, Mangalwar Peth. Even suit notice was sent on that address. Her explanation at the time of examination was that she was staying at Door No. 215, temporarily for treatment. The trial Court had perused the evidence of D.W. 2. examined on behalf of the tenant. Mr. Manjulal Dhumal D.W. 2 had produced ration card purported to be of Zopadi No. 215, Plot No. 4, Mangalwar Peth. But the trial Court has found that the ration card actually produced by him was in respect of No. 55/56, Somwar Peth, Pune. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Manjulal Dhumal D.W. 2 was sought to be examined on behalf of the tenant to show that defendant's stay in 215, Zopadi was only temporary for treatment and 215 is belonging to Manjunath Dhumal.
It is pertinent to note that Mr. Manjulal Dhumal D.W. 2 was sought to be examined on behalf of the tenant to show that defendant's stay in 215, Zopadi was only temporary for treatment and 215 is belonging to Manjunath Dhumal. However, the documentary evidence, as indicated above, proves otherwise and the trial Court has rightly held that the tenants contention that she was staying temporarily in Zopadi No. 215 cannot be believed. Against this fact finding, the appellate Court has found fault with the landlord for non production of any documentary evidence from corporation to show that Zopadi bearing No. 215 belongs to D.W. No. 2. I fail to appreciate that reasoning of the lower appellate Court. Even the evidence produced by the tenant itself belied her statement that she was temporarily staying in Zopadi No. 215. I do not think the lower appellate Court was justified in insisting on further evidence to be adduced by the landlord, that too, documentary evidence to prove that she was staying in Zopadi No. 215. In view of this, I do not think the Lower Appellate Court was justified in upsetting the findings on the alternative accommodation. While examining the issue of alternative accommodation, the trial Court has taken into consideration the evidence of landlord which has not been controverted that the suit premises has been always found locked. Therefore, the issues of alternative accommodation and non user as has been held by the trial Court has to be upheld. 3. The next important issue is regarding the arrears of rent. The trial Court found that there was default in the payment of rent. Mainly, the trial Court, to arrive at this conclusion has relied upon the facts that the tenant has not produced any receipts for having paid the rent. Whereas it has come out in the evidence that in the earlier occasion, the receipts have been issued by the landlord. It is primary duty of the tenant who asserts that he has paid rent, to produce rent receipts and in the absence of sufficient explanation for non production of such rent receipts his statement cannot be believed. In the trial Court the witness was examined on behalf of the landlord.
It is primary duty of the tenant who asserts that he has paid rent, to produce rent receipts and in the absence of sufficient explanation for non production of such rent receipts his statement cannot be believed. In the trial Court the witness was examined on behalf of the landlord. The lower appellate Court relied on the admission made by the witness on behalf of the landlord that he is in possession of the receipt book showing arrears of rent from 1.12. 1974 and his inability to say as to whether any rent has been paid to his father, and his refusal to accept some amounts, will discharge the tenant from his burden who asserts that he has paid rent to the landlord. Therefore, in this case also the findings of the lower appellate Court is perverse and is liable to be set aside. Lower appellate Court erroneously rejected the findings of the trial Court about his default of payment of rent. 4. The next ground that has been set up for eviction is bona fide requirement of the landlord. It has come out in the evidence that the landlord is in possession of one room and that room was not sufficient for his entire family. Against this, tenant asserts that the landlord is occupying three rooms. It also come out in evidence that the family of the landlord consist of 3 to 4 persons. The Lower appellate Court set aside the ground of bona fide need of the landlord on the ground that the landlord did not prove that he is not occupying three rooms. A very strange attitude seems to have been taken by the lower appellate Court. It is elementary principle underlying the rule of evidence that a person is required to prove what he asserts. In this case, it is the tenant's case that the landlord was occupying three rooms. The primary duty of the tenant is to prove that the landlord was occupying three rooms. The landlord asserts that he is only occupying one room and he has led evidence to that effect. It is illegal on the part of the lower appellate Court to expect the landlord to had negative evidence that he was not occupying 3 rooms. For this ground also the approach of the appellate Court is found faulty.
The landlord asserts that he is only occupying one room and he has led evidence to that effect. It is illegal on the part of the lower appellate Court to expect the landlord to had negative evidence that he was not occupying 3 rooms. For this ground also the approach of the appellate Court is found faulty. So also there are no sufficient evidence on record to upset the findings of the trial Court on the grounds of alternate accommodation and non user. On this ground I do not find any justification in sustaining the lower appellate Order. I, therefore, have set aside the lower Appellate Court order and confirm the trial Court decree for eviction. 5. At this juncture, the learned Counsel for the respondent Shri Apte, argued that the respondents claims status of the tenants by virtue of section 5(11)(c)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act. For appreciating the argument of the learned Counsel for respondent Shri Apte, it is necessary to refer to that section 5(11)(c)(i) of the Bombay Rent Act. 'in relation to any premises let for residence, when the tenant dies, whether the death has occurred before or after the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Act, 1978, any member of the tenant's family residing with the tenant at the time of his death, or in the absence of such member, any heir of the deceased tenant, as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court.' 6. The learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the respondents after the death of original tenant, Smt. Parubai More, respondent was in occupation of the suit premises and they are entitled to all the benefits of the tenants under Act and this change of circumstances has to be considered before the decree of eviction is passed or confirmed by this Court. Dwelling on this point, he submits that the comparative hardships of the landlord and tenant as envisaged under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Rent Act has to be considered afresh in view of change of circumstances. He submits that for that purpose either it may be remanded to the trial Court or the appellate Court or may be considered by this Court.
He submits that for that purpose either it may be remanded to the trial Court or the appellate Court or may be considered by this Court. It is true that the courts before passing the decree of eviction, has to consider the subsequent events which tilted the balance of the position of the parties. As I indicated earlier, the respondents were not staying in the premises at least at the time when the tenant was examined before the Court. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Naik brought to my notice statement made by original tenant that she was alone staying in the premises and that she has no issues. This will go to show that if at all the present respondents are staying in the premises, they must have started to stay in the premises subsequently. But till today, there is no materials before this Court how they came to occupy the premises and when? What is their relationship with original tenant? Why they have not brought these facts to the notice of the Court as and when they came to know of the pendency of proceedings. It must have within their knowledge that original tenant was occupying the premises as tenant and not as absolute owner. Respondents cannot pretend ignorance on all these basic facts. If this Court or any other Court for taking into account subsequent development, it is for the parties concerned to come and inform the Court the subsequent developments and consequences that may ensue from such subsequent developments. 7. As I indicated earlier, as early as on 21-7-1997 the respondents were impleaded in this case. So far the respondents have not placed any new materials before this Court, at least by way of an affidavit as to what according to them is change of circumstances and how the balance tilted in favour of the respondents after the death of the original tenant or what is the legal compulsion in considering the comparative hardship as envisaged under sub section (2) of section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act. It was the duty of the respondents to bring on record on these facts, in the absence of such pleadings before this Court, the contention of Mr. Apte cannot be countenanced to when the matter has come before this Court for final hearing after 13 years of the filing of the writ petition.
It was the duty of the respondents to bring on record on these facts, in the absence of such pleadings before this Court, the contention of Mr. Apte cannot be countenanced to when the matter has come before this Court for final hearing after 13 years of the filing of the writ petition. If the contention of the learned Counsel Shri Apte is accepted at this belated stage, this Court is throwing the parties to midst of another battle which may continue for another 12 to 14 years. This Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised to push the litigants to such state of uncertainty. As I indicated earlier, any party to take into consideration subsequent events he must come before the Court at the earliest opportunity with clear pleadings and satisfy the Court how the balance tilt in his favour or against; without which no party can seek relief from this Court under extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The concept of consideration of subsequent events in the Rent Courts proceedings has to confine only to mould the final relief. Otherwise, each subsequent event may entail a fresh trial, which is not the idea behind the concept of consideration of the subsequent events. Let us take this case as an example. If this case is remanded as requested by the learned Counsel Mr. Apte for consideration of subsequent events after a long years and the present respondents were to displace by some other persons, and the trial has to be started de novo and comparative hardship has to be assessed before a decree of eviction is passed. In this case, respondents have slept over the matter for nearly two years without taking any action after they received notice of the pendency of the case before this Court. In view of this, I decline to consider the request of the learned Counsel for the respondent Shri Apte and allow the writ petition. 8. In the result, writ petition is allowed. Judgement of the lower appellate Court is set aside. The decree for eviction granted by the trial Court in favour of the petitioner is confirmed. In the circumstances, no orders as to costs. Certified copy expedited. Petition allowed.