S. Muthiah v. Parvathy & Others — 1999 DIGILAW 1038 (MAD)

Judgment : The above civil revision petition is directed against the judgment and decree dated 16. 1996 made in R.C.A.No.76 of 1993 by the Rent Control Appellate Authority and VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras, thereby confirming the order dated 10. 1991 made in R.C.O.P.No. 189 of 1987 by the Rent Controller and XVI Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras. 2. Thepetition filed before the Rent Controller is one made under Sec.10(2)(i) and (v) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) thereby alleging that the respondent is a tenant under the first petitioner, viz., Mariammal to whom the property belongs and the rent being collected by the second of them, who is also made a party therein, of a room for residential purpose located at 24, Elaya Mudali Street, Madras-21, on a monthly rent of Rs.40 payable on the first of every succeeding English calendar month. 3. The other contentions of the petitioners before the Rent Controller are that the respondent having paid the rent for the months of March, 1986 and May, 1986, failed and neglected to pay for the subsequent months from April to November, 1986, thus for a total period of 8 months accumulating to Rs.440 and inspite of repeated demands including the notice dated 210. 1986, which was acknowledged, but without any reply or response, rendered himself liable to be evicted for wilful default in payment of rent. 4. The further contentions of the petitioners/ landlords are that whenever the rents were demanded, he created scene and caused troubles not only to the petitioners, but also to the co-tenants, thus causing nuisance to the intolerable extent especially after the receipt of the notice issued by them and hence, at this score also, the respondent became liable to be evicted. 5. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent/tenant, it would be urged that it is the first petitioners husband Thangaiya Nadar with whom this respondents father-in-law entered into an agreement of becoming the tenant, thus occupying the vacant site belonging to a Trust and it was his father-in-law who constructed the superstructure along with Thangaiya Nadar and started occupying the premises and effecting the payment of rents to the Trust. After him, it is this respondent, who is in possession of the premises for the last ten years stepping into the shoes of his father-in-law. After him, it is this respondent, who is in possession of the premises for the last ten years stepping into the shoes of his father-in-law. Hence, there is no landlord-tenant relationship between the first petitioner and the respondent under the Act. 6. It would further be contended by the respondent that the petitioners were never in the habit of issuing receipt for the amounts paid and there is no arrears of land rent at all. The land rent is only Rs.5 per month and not Rs.40 as falsely alleged in the petition. Hence, no landlord-tenant relationship exists between the first petitioner and the respondent. Therefore, no default much less any wilful default would be attributed to the respondent; that the second petitioner is in no where connected with the premises and he is a third party. He has no locus standi to be a party to the petition much less joining hands with the first petitioner. 7. Ultimately, the respondent/tenant would also allege that this court in the above facts and circumstances brought forth, has no jurisdiction to try the above petition, since there is no landlord-tenant relationship ever existed in between the first petitioner and the respondent. With these averments, the respondent would pray for dismissing the petition with costs. 8. The Rent Controller, during enquiry, would frame three issues for determination, viz., (i) whether the petition is maintainable. (ii) whether the respondent committed wilful default in the payment of rents; and (iii) whether the respondent had caused nuisance to the petitioners and would also conduct the enquiry with due opportunity for parties to be heard when the second petitioner, besides examining himself as the sole witness on his side as RW.1, would also mark 9 documents as Exs.P-1 to P-9. On the other side, the respondent would also examine himself as the sole witness D. W. 1, and the documents marked on his side is nil. 9. On the other side, the respondent would also examine himself as the sole witness D. W. 1, and the documents marked on his side is nil. 9. With the above evidence both oral and documentary placed on record, the Rent Controller appreciating the same and testifying the veracity of the case as put up in evidence and in compliance of the norms of law, has ultimately decided to dismiss the petition without costs on the point of maintainability of the petition by the present petitioner though upheld the petition on both the grounds alleged as a result of which, the petitioner has preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, wherein it is only the second petitioner, who is the sole appellant and the Appellate Court too having gone into the facts and circumstances of the case and appreciating the evidence and testifying the validity of the order made by the Rent Controller, would agree with the Rent Controllers finding and had ultimately dismissed the appeal with costs in consequence of which, the second petitioner to the original petition, viz., S.Muthiah in his capacity as the landlord, has come forward to file the above revision petition, on certain grounds such as, (i) that the Rent Controller having decided against the tenant upholding the grounds of eviction, dismissed the petition on ground of the legal representative of the deceased first petitioner, viz., Mariammal having not been brought on record and the Appellate Authority also erred in dismissing the appeal on the same ground; (ii) that since the second petitioner is already on record, he has to be recognised as the legal representative of the first petitioner in the light of Ex.P-3 settlement deed dated 3. 1981 thereby settling the property in dispute in favour of the second petitioner and his brother one S.Natarajan, who as co-owner being represented by the second petitioner to the knowledge of the tenant; (iii) that the courts below have erred in dismissing the petition in M.P.No.600 of 1989 seeking an amendment to recognise the second petitioner and his brother, viz., S.Natarajan to continue the proceedings and the order being interlocutory, the same cannot be questioned in appeal; (iv) that it has been erroneously held that the petitioner ought to have preferred an appeal against such an order of dismissal of M.P.No.600 of 1989 and that the petitioner is not entitled to collect the rent and that there is no relationship of landlord-tenant in existence; (v) that the order of dismissal made in the said petition is against law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case apart from being perverse, the correctness of which cannot be canvassed before the Appellate Authority and in the above circumstances, the Appellate Authority should have come to a different conclusion thus allowing the appeal and passing an order of eviction thereby upholding the conclusions of the Rent Controller answering the wilful default in payment of rent and committal of nuisance as proved; and (vi) that the decision of the Appellate Authority is based on surmises and conjectures but not on facts and law, the same being cryptic, never meeting the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner. With these and such other-minor grounds alleged, the petitioner would pray for setting aside both the orders passed by the authorities below and for ordering eviction of the present respondents, who are the legal representatives of the deceased respondent, viz., S.Vinayagamoorthy. 10. During arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that the R.C.O.P. was filed on two grounds, viz., wilful default and nuisance that is under Secs. 10(2)(i) and (v) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act; that the crucial factor being that both the authorities have held in favour of the landlord, but dismissing the R.C.O.P. ultimately on ground that on the death of the first petitioner/landlord, the legal representatives have not been properly brought on record and hence the petition is not maintainable; that himself and his brother issued notice in Ex.P-1; that Ex.P-2 acknowledgment has been signed by the respondent, but with no reply. He would further contend that the first petitioner was the original owner of the land and the superstructure and since she being very old, the second petitioner had been collecting the rents even during the life time of the first petitioner; that apart from this tenant, there are other 18 tenants and that he had been collecting the rents from all as the representative of the first petitioner; that she died on 29. 1989 during the pendency of the petition. 11. The learned counsel would further contend that the deceased first petitioner has also executed Ex.P-3, a registered settlement deed dated 3. 1981 in favour of the second petitioner and his brother; that the property was let out for a monthly rent of Rs.40; that for the portion occupied by the respondent, he had paid up to March, 1986 and thereafter till November, 1986, no rent was paid and that is the default period. The other ground under which the petition has been filed is nuisance; that he indulged in quarrels with the co-tenants and caused obstruction to the rent payable by the other tenants; that he also joined third parties against whom proceeding are pending in the civil court; that the petitioner had also filed a suit against the respondent; that Ex.P-1 notice dated 210. 1982 had been issued both by himself and the deceased first petitioner; that in para 3 of the petition the status of the deceased first petitioner as the owner of the premises and that of the second petitioner, who is the representative to collect the rent on her behalf have been made clear. 12. The learned counsel would then draw the attention of this Court to Sec.2(6) that is the definition section and would point out the meaning of ‘landlord’ and would contend that within the meaning of this section, he is the landlord. He would further contend that he had already been on record; that on the basis of Ex.P-3, settlement deed, an application was made in M.P.No.600 of 1989 on the file of the Rent Controller and the same got dismissed. He would further contend that he had already been on record; that on the basis of Ex.P-3, settlement deed, an application was made in M.P.No.600 of 1989 on the file of the Rent Controller and the same got dismissed. Citing from the commentaries for Sec.2(6) of V.N.Krishnamurthis, “The Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 revised by Sri P.B.Ramanujam”, the learned counsel would argue that as far as the rent control applications are concerned, it is not the ownership of property that entitles a person to file an eviction petition, but when a person comes under the definition of ‘landlord’ mentioned in Sec.2(6) of the Act he is entitled to maintain a petition for eviction; that Sec.2(6) which defines ‘landlord’ and Sec.2(8) which defines ‘tenant’ are symmetrical and complimentary definitions Raval and Company v. Ramachandran , (1966)1 MLJ. 68) that the definition of the term “landlord” is of a wide amplitude: that the definition is an inclusive one and does not actually define the term “landlord”. Therefore, the inclusive definition adds to the normal concept of landlord certain other categories of persons also. The heir of the landlord, who was collecting the rent, during the life time of the landlord, is a “landlord” within the meaning of Sec.2(6) and hence, can maintain an application for eviction, after the demise of the landlord. 13. The learned counsel would then cite a judgment delivered in Jayaraman v. Jelhama , (1995)2 MLJ. 240 wherein in the learned single Judge of this Court, citing a decision of the Apex Court delivered in Majati Subbarao v. P. V.K.Krishna Rao, (deceased) by L.Rs. Majati Subbarao v. P. V.K.Krishna Rao, (deceased) by L.Rs. Majati Subbarao v. P. V.K.Krishna Rao, (deceased) by L.Rs., A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 2187 and would recite from the said judgment wherein it is held that, “if a tenant denies the landlords title that itself is sufficient to pass an order of eviction. It need not be in a separate proceeding”. Citing the above portion of the judgment of the Apex Court, the learned single Judge of this Court has held that “in view of the finding that the denial is lacking in good faith, following the decision of the Apex Court, I hold that the tenant is liable to be evicted.” 14. It need not be in a separate proceeding”. Citing the above portion of the judgment of the Apex Court, the learned single Judge of this Court has held that “in view of the finding that the denial is lacking in good faith, following the decision of the Apex Court, I hold that the tenant is liable to be evicted.” 14. The learned counsel would then cite from the counter statement filed in the R.C.O.P. to the effect of the respondent pleading that the petitioner never gave receipts for the amount paid and there is no arrears of land rent as stated in the petition; that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between the first petitioner and the respondent and hence, there was no default, etc. The learned counsel would then cite from the order of the Rent Controller to the effect of having constructed the superstructure, the respondent has not examined anybody, nor submitted any municipal tax receipts, but would only exhibit ignorance of the tax being paid by Muthiah, the petitioner, nor did he submit any approved plan or permit in proof of having constructed the superstructure, thus the lower court not admitting his contention that he has constructed the superstructure. 15. The learned counsel would then cite from para 4 of the memorandum of grounds of appeal preferred before the Appellate Authority for having filed the amendment petition in M.P.No.600 of 1989 and the order dated 2. 1990, dismissing the same and would recite a passage from the grounds of appeal stating that the lower court while dismissing, has remarked that ‘without any proof the appellant cannot claim to be the co-owner of the petition property, under which circumstances he cannot pray for necessary changes in the petition and now he cannot hold out that the petition cannot be sustained for the reasons stated by him as opposed to his own order, against which no appeal can be preferred then”. The learned counsel would also cite the remarks offered by the Appellate Authority to the effect that the Rent Controller had admitted the petition on both the grounds, but dismissed the same on the ground of maintainability. 16. The learned counsel would also cite the remarks offered by the Appellate Authority to the effect that the Rent Controller had admitted the petition on both the grounds, but dismissed the same on the ground of maintainability. 16. The learned counsel would then contend that the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority not considering that the revision petitioner and his brother have become the owners of the property thus the landlords especially both the authorities below accepting the knowledge of the respondent about Ex.P-3 even during the life time of the donor. In this context, the learned counsel for the petitioner would conclude his arguments citing a judgment delivered in Majati Subbarao v. P. V.K.Krishna Rao Majati Subbarao v. P. V.K.Krishna Rao Majati Subbarao v. P. V.K.Krishna Rao , A.I.R. 1989S.C. 2187 wherein it is held as follows: “In this connection we may point out that it is well settled that the Court hearing a suit or appeal can take into account events which are subsequent to the filing of the suit in order to give appropriate relief or mould the relief appropriately”. The learned counsel for the petitioner would end up his arguments contending that he has also filed another R.C.O.R for eviction which is pending still and that was for non-payment of the rent for the subsequent period. 17. In reply, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents would contend that it is not the deceased first petitioner, but her husband Thangaiya Nadar, who allowed the respondents’ father-in-law to occupy the premises belonging to one Trust and that he was paying the rent only to the Trust; that his father-in-law put up the present superstructure along with Thangaiya Nadar thus being in possession for 10 years and that there is no landlord-tenant relationship is in existence so far as the petition properties are concerned; that the land belonging to the Trust is three grounds but the settlement pertains to the superstructure measuring 900 sq.mtr. Mangalore tiled roof on the ground floor, as in Ex.P-3; that Thangaiya Nadar was the rent collecting agent of Radhakrishna Trust; that even according to Ex.P-3, the land belongs to the Trust; that in the above circumstances, the proper remedy open to the petitioner is only to approach the Civil Court claiming the superstructure also; that an amendment petition filed by the petitioner to bring the legal representatives on record in the place of the deceased first petitioner got dismissed, which has become final and no appeal was preferred on the same; that they were only collecting the rent and not in any manner have become the owners of the property so as to be called the ‘landlords’. 18. In clarification, the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the relationship of the landlord-tenant is accepted by the Appellate Authority and again referring to the judgment reported in Jayaraman v. Jelhama , (1995)2 MLJ. 240 the learned counsel would cite paragraphs 13 and 14 which are extracted hereunder: “Merely because a tenant denies the title, the jurisdiction of the Rent Control Court is not taken away, and the Rent Control Court has to decide whether such denial is bona fide.” “In S.Rathinammal v. Ayyavu S.Rathinammal v. Ayyavu S.Rathinammal v. Ayyavu , 93 L. W. 236 a learned Judge of this Court, has held thus: “In the light of what has been held by the Supreme Court about the approach to be made regarding direction for deposit of rents a simple denial of title of the landlord cannot take away the jurisdiction of the statutory authorities to invoke Sec.11 of the Act. Even in a case where the landlord files a petition for eviction on the ground that the tenant had denied his title, the statutory authorities have the jurisdiction to find out whether there is a bona fide denial of title or not and if no case is made out on that aspect, under the Act, eviction can be ordered. Only in cases whether the statutory authorities hold that there is a bona fide denial of title, the parties are directed to seek their relief in the civil court. Hence, there is necessary power, conferred on those statutory authorities under Act 18 of 1960 to find out whether the denial of title is bona fide or not. Only in cases whether the statutory authorities hold that there is a bona fide denial of title, the parties are directed to seek their relief in the civil court. Hence, there is necessary power, conferred on those statutory authorities under Act 18 of 1960 to find out whether the denial of title is bona fide or not. Hence for the purpose of Sec. 11 of the Act, the concerned statutory authority can look into the prima facie material available on record and if it be shown that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists, in spite of the stand taken by the other side that the landlord is not having any title to the property, an order for payment or deposit of arrears of rent and for continued payment or deposit of the rent can be made.” .19. Citing the above judgments, the learned counsel would seriously contend that it is the glaring instance to show how far the Rent Controller could go into the question of title to decide one as the landlord for the purpose of deciding the Rent Control Petition. The learned counsel would cite yet another Judgment delivered in Ansari v. Sarangan in Ansari v. Sarangan in Ansari v. Sarangan , (1996)1 MLJ. 388 wherein it is held: .“A reading of the definition shows that any person who is entitled to receive rent is a landlord. It has nothing to do with ownership. Tenant is defined only as a person who is liable to pay rent. It also does not say that the person in occupation must be a person who came into possession from an absolute owner.” 20. Applying the above norms, the learned counsel would say that so far as the first petitioner was concerned, they have admitted her to be the owner; that the respondent can go into Annexure I-A of the suit properties in Ex.P-3; that in the very same Annexure, all the properties are mentioned, but in the counter, they have admitted the entire property and that he is only paying the land rent to the Government, and would ultimately pray for allowing the above revision. .21. .21. It is a revision petition against the concur- rent finding arrived at both by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority alike holding that on both the grounds of wilful default and nuisance alleged under Sec. 10(2)(i) and (v) of the Act come to be proved against the respondent/tenant thereby making out a clear cut case against him for eviction, but still regarding locus standi of the petitioner raising doubts and holding that the petitioner cannot maintain the petition without being impleaded as the legal representatives of the deceased first respondent, both the courts have dismissed the petition on that score. 22. It is the fair case of the petitioner that the first petitioner was his cousin and that he was only collecting the rent on her behalf as an authorised person to do so even during her life time and continuing to do so after her demise; that apart from this status of authorisation to collect the rent, under Ex.P-3, registered settlement deed, the deceased first petitioner in her capacity as the original owner of the property in question, had bequeathed the entire properties in his favour and in favour of his brother and hence, they have also become the full-fledged owners of the premises and hence they are entitled not only to receive the rents, but also to maintain such petitions as one in hand. 23. On the contrary, the contention of the other side is that even the deceased first petitioner was not the owner of the property and that the tenancy as entered not for the superstructure, but for the vacant site, that too with their deceased father, Thangaiya Nadar and thus it is a property of which Thangaiya Nadar was the trustee and only in such capacity he was collecting the land rent and the superstructure, himself and Thangaiya Nadar contributing, they both constructed and hence it is not a mere rent control dispute coming within the ambit of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, but something more which could be decided only by a court of Civil Jurisdiction. The respondent would also not admit Ex.P-3 to be either genuine or validly executed by the deceased first petitioner; that the only petition that the petitioner filed is M.P.No.600 of 1989 before the Rent Controller and the same got dismissed, on which no appeal had been preferred as a result of which that order has become final and binding. Hence, it would be argued that at any rate, the petitioner cannot claim to be the owner so as to become entitled either to claim rent or to file a petition for eviction in his capacity as the landlord. The right course that is open for him is to establish his ownership over the property so as to become the landlord and getting himself impleaded as the legal representative of the deceased first petitioner according to the procedures established by law. Only then he will become entitled to maintain a petition of that sort and hence the said petition had been rightly held not maintainable in a concurrent manner by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority as well and would pray for dismissing the above revision also as not maintainable. 24. It is the case of the petitioner that he was collecting the rents on behalf of the deceased first petitioner having been authorised by her to do so and by virtue of Ex.P-3 which she is said to have executed as early as on 1981 thereby bequeathing the property concerned in favour of the petitioner and his brother, viz., S.Natarajan, thus himself becoming the landlord. Further, since the respondent committed wilful default in the payment of monthly rents and causing nuisance, on both these grounds, he becomes liable to be evicted. 25. On the other hand, the contention of the respondent is that the revision petitioner is neither the owner of the property being entitled for the same, nor is he the landlord within the meaning of relevant provisions of the Rent Control Act and that he has no locus standi to file or to maintain a petition under Sec.10(2)(i) and (v) of the Act as the landlord; that he must himself declare to be the owner of the property and then on a petition he must get himself impleaded as the legal representative of the deceased first petitioner in the proper manner. Since none of these requirements have been complied with, he does not become entitled to any relief and the very petition filed by him in M.P.No.600 of 1989 before the rent controller for impleading him as the legal representing of the deceased first petitioner having been dismissed, this revision itself is not maintainable. 26. The Rent Controller having examined the facts and circumstances of the case in the light of the pleading and testifying the same with the evidence placed on record both oral and documentary by parties and applying the norms and procedures established by law, has arrived at the conclusion which came to be proved on facts that the respondent has committed wilful default and nuisance, but however, since the petitioner has not proved his locus standi to maintain the petition himself independently, nor did he take any step either to recognise himself as the sole legal representative of the deceased first petitioner or to get himself and his brother declared as the legal representatives of the deceased first petitioner and to implead. them as proper parties to the proceedings. Hence, they become incapacitated to maintain a petition after the death of the first petitioner and on such score of maintainability, would reject the claim of the petitioner thus dismissing the petition ultimately. 27. The above contentions of the Rent Controller had been completely accepted by the Appellate Authority thus a concurrent finding came to be given by both the authorities alike as a result of which the petitioner has now come forward to file the above revision before this Court. 28. It is settled law that in the concurrent findings arrived at by the statutory authorities, the Revisional Court cannot normally interfere with unless patent errors of law or perversity in approach or denial of opportunity in violation of the principles of natural justice resulting in consequent failure of justice are shown. Regarding the concurrent finding arrived at by the authorities below fairly appreciating the evidence and applying the norms of law which is agreeable in every sense, the Revisional Court is not at all expected to interfered with. Based on this settled principle, it is relevant to consider the position of the case to an extent. 29. Regarding the concurrent finding arrived at by the authorities below fairly appreciating the evidence and applying the norms of law which is agreeable in every sense, the Revisional Court is not at all expected to interfered with. Based on this settled principle, it is relevant to consider the position of the case to an extent. 29. The case of the petitioner is that he was the second petitioner to the original petition and that he filed the above petition along with the deceased first petitioner in his capacity only as the authorised agent of the first petitioner to collect the monthly rents. It is ofcourse the further case of the petitioner that even during the life time of the deceased first petitioner he was in the habit of collecting the rent for the premises occupied by the respondents. It is his further contention that the first petitioner died on 29. 1989 and even thereafter for some time, he continued to collect the rent. But from a particular point of time, the respondent stopped deliberately from making payment of rents as a result of which on that score and on the other ground of causing nuisance to the landlord and to the co-tenants, the petitioners had come forward to maintain the above petition himself independently. 30. It further comes to be known that Ex.P-3 had been executed by the deceased first petitioner in favour of the present petitioner and his brother, in some capacity or other. An application to implead them as parties had also been filed before the Rent Controller and unfortunately, it got dismissed for reasons assigned therein. But the petitioner has not taken the least step to prefer an appeal against the said dismissal as a result of which that order has become final. Nor, did the petitioner take any step to declare himself to be the full-fledged owner either based on Ex.P-3 or on some other proof or locus standi which has to be done only before a court of civil jurisdiction. Once it is declared that the petitioner himself or both himself and his brother as it is claimed under Ex.P-3 to be the owners, they would become entitled to maintain a petition of this sort, taking such steps for impleading them as parties to the proceeding. Once it is declared that the petitioner himself or both himself and his brother as it is claimed under Ex.P-3 to be the owners, they would become entitled to maintain a petition of this sort, taking such steps for impleading them as parties to the proceeding. But doing neither of the above, only based on the ground that he was permitted by the first petitioner to collect the rents during her life time, the peti- tioner claims that he is entitled to be recognised as the landlord at that score and under Ex.P-3, and would pray for orders passed in the petition, taking himself as the landlord. 31. It should be remembered that the petitioner has come out with the plea that during the life time of the first petitioner, he was authorised to collect the rents. But the big question is whether he was authorised to collect the rents even after her demise for which absolutely there is no evidence placed on record. Secondly, Ex.P-3 under which the petitioner would claim the title along with his brother is seriously attacked by the other side. 32. In the above circumstances, it is not the business of the Rent Court to appreciate Ex.P-3 in evidence so as to declare the petitioner much less his brother, who is not at all a party here, to be the landlords of the premises in their capacity as the co-owners of the same, which could be done only by a Civil Court. Hence, under these circumstances, it should be held that the lower courts have rightly arrived at the conclusion to hold that the petitioner cannot maintain a rent control petition in his capacity as the landlord and on such legality, the petition had been rightly dismissed, since the petitioner cannot settle scores as to the ownership and such other matters in a rent control petition which has to be done in the appropriate forum of law. Since he has also failed to implead him as the legal representative of the deceased first petitioner, he has further failed to qualify himself to be the petitioner any more even after the death of the first petitioner. Since, during the life time of the first petitioner, he was authorised by her to collect rent, he continued to be the petitioner which lapsed on the death of the first petitioner. Since, during the life time of the first petitioner, he was authorised by her to collect rent, he continued to be the petitioner which lapsed on the death of the first petitioner. No more authorisation to collect the rent even after her death had either been given or placed before the court and hence rightly he was not impleaded as the legal representative of the deceased first petitioner too. 133. There is no patent errors of law, nor perversity in approach in so far as the concurrent finding rendered by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority as well, so as to call for interference by this Court. Also, the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the present case in hand. Hence, the interference sought to be made by this Court is absolutely not warranted, since the order made by the courts below are well considered and well merited. In result, the above civil revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 16. 1996 made in R.C.A.No.76 of 1993 by the Rent Control Appellate Authority and VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras, thereby confirming the Order dated 10. 1991 made in R.C.O.P.No.189 of 1987 by the Rent Controller and XVI Judge, Small Causes Court, Madras; is hereby confirmed.