S. Amanullah v. Jaya — 1999 DIGILAW 1052 (MAD)

Judgment :- This appeal is directed against the award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Subordinate Judge), Pattukottai in MACTOP No. 78 of 1992 dated 30.11.1992. The owner of the bus and the insurance company are the appellants in the above appeal. 2. According to the claimants, the first, second third claimants are the wives of the deceased and the other claimants being the minor children of the deceased Balan. According to them, the deceased Balan was a wood putter and bamboo basket maker by profession and he used to get a monthly income of Rs. 1,000/-. The whole family of the deceased was mainly depending on the income of the deceased. As a result of his death, the family finds it difficult for further livelihood without the income of the deceased. On 2.12.91 at about 14.30 hours, the deceased Balan was returning home through Vaduvoor Road. The Vaduvoor Road is in North South direction. The deceased was proceeding from South to North on the left side of the mud portion of the road. At that time the bus bearing registration No. TMK 9475 came in a rash and negligent manner from northern side and dashed against Balan, who was run over by the said bus. He died on the spot. The accident was purely due to rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the bus and if the driver of the bus had been very careful enough in driving the bus, the accident could have been averted. Therefore the accident was purely due to rash and negligent driving of the bus. A total claim amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- was prayed for as compensation. 3. In the counter by the respondents, the manner of the accident as stated in the claim petition was denied. It is also contended that there was no rashness or negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle. He had driven the vehicle very slowly and cautiously and the driver sounded the horn to warn the pedestrians in front of him. However, the deceased ignored the caution and suddenly crossed the road and with the result he got himself dashed against the rear side of the body of the bus and sustained fatal injuries. The income of the deceased as claimed in the claim petition was also denied. 4. However, the deceased ignored the caution and suddenly crossed the road and with the result he got himself dashed against the rear side of the body of the bus and sustained fatal injuries. The income of the deceased as claimed in the claim petition was also denied. 4. On consideration of the said pleadings and evidence, the Tribunal held that the accident occurred only as a result of the negligence on the part of the driver of the bus. A sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- was awarded as compensation to be apportioned by the various claimants. Hence the present appeal. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the Tribunal had not adopted a proper calculation of the actual amount to which the claimants would be entitled. After considering the age and the probable income of the deceased, without any further calculation, the Tribunal had merely allocated various amounts to the respective claimants. Therefore, the calculation was wrongly made by the Tribunal. It is further stated that the claimants 1 to 3 are claimed to be the wives of the deceased and that as per the evidence of PW1 being the first claimant, she is the first wife and that claimants 2 and 3 are the subsequent wives of the deceased. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, claimants 2 and 3 have no legal status and the amount awarded in their favour by the Tribunal cannot be sustained. 6. I agree that the Tribunal has not adopted a proper calculation for arriving at the actual compensation payable to the claimants. However, having regard to the evidence, the ultimate quantum of compensation as fixed by the Tribunal cannot be said to be excessive. On the basis of the evidence, the Tribunal had held that the deceased was earning Rs. 750/- as monthly income. Therefore, by adopting Rs. 500/- as contribution to the family and adopting a multiplier of 15, loss of income itself would come to Rs. 90,000/- and adding further amounts towards loss of consortium and loss of love and affection, the grant of Rs. 1,00,000/- as compensation cannot be stated to be excessive. 7. 750/- as monthly income. Therefore, by adopting Rs. 500/- as contribution to the family and adopting a multiplier of 15, loss of income itself would come to Rs. 90,000/- and adding further amounts towards loss of consortium and loss of love and affection, the grant of Rs. 1,00,000/- as compensation cannot be stated to be excessive. 7. However, as regards entitlement of the amount of compensation to the claimants 2 and 3, who are stated to be second and third wives respectively of the deceased, I am inclined to hold that the Tribunal had fallen into error in allocating amounts to the claimants 2 and 3. The evidence of PW1 is very clear in the context of ascertaining as to who is the legitimate wife of the deceased. She claims to be the first wife and claimants 2 and 3 are said to be the second and third wives. There can be no doubt that claimants 2 and 3 cannot claim to be legally wedded. Neither claimant No. 2 nor claimant No. 3 had chosen to depose as witnesses to establish how they are in any manner the legally married wives of the deceased. Therefore, it has to be held that the second and third claimants are not the legally married wives of the deceased. 8. In this context, Mr. Sukanthraj, the learned counsel for the respondent very strenuously contends that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act require to be liberally construed. According to him. Section 110-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as interpreted by this court and Supreme Court, will show that the claimants 2 and 3 would also be entitled to compensation in the present case. Reliance is also placed on the Judgment of Jagadeesan, J reported in 1997 (III) CTC 346 {United India Insurance Company Limited, Cuddalore v. Kasiammal and four others ). Reference is made to the various observations contained in the Judgment emphasising a liberal approach to be adopted in the matter of ascertaining the right of claimants in respect of the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act. 9. Reference is made to the various observations contained in the Judgment emphasising a liberal approach to be adopted in the matter of ascertaining the right of claimants in respect of the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act. 9. The issue as regards the scope of the term legal representative as occurring in Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was considered by the Supreme Court in G.S.R.T. Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai ( AIR 1987 S.C. 1690 ), which has been cited in the Judgment rendered by Jagadeesan J. The Supreme Court had compared the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was ultimately held that a legal representative in a given case under Motor Vehicle Act need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent or child as provided under Fatal Accidents Act. The Supreme Court compared Section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and ultimately held that the right given to the legal representatives under the Motor Vehicles Act for claiming compensation was a new and enlarged one. The definition was not to be restricted by the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act 1855. 10. There can be no dispute over the scope of the definition ‘legal representatives’ as emphasised by the Supreme Court in the said Judgment. But by no stretch of imagination can it be stated that the term ‘legal representative’ would include persons who have no legal status. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that the compensation would form part of the estate of the deceased which can be claimed by any person, who is entitled to be included within the definition of legal representative namely a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. But the expression ‘legal representative’ cannot include claimants 2 and 3, who are not the legally married wives of the deceased. As stated earlier, neither claimant No. 2 nor claimant No. 3 had chosen to get into the box to state as to how they can claim as being legally married to the deceased as against the positive statement of R-1 that she is the first wife of the deceased. As stated earlier, neither claimant No. 2 nor claimant No. 3 had chosen to get into the box to state as to how they can claim as being legally married to the deceased as against the positive statement of R-1 that she is the first wife of the deceased. The judgment reported in 1997 (3) CTC 345, cited supra, dealt with married sons and married daughters who are undoubtedly persons who are entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased. Therefore the term ‘legal representative’ as occurring in Section 110-A of 1939 Act (Section 166 of 1988 Act) is referable only to persons who are legally entitled to succeed to the property or the estate of the deceased. Therefore none of the Judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the claimants, can have any relevance to the present appeal. 11. Surprisingly, Mr. Sugantharaj also submitted that claimant No. 2 was the proper person to be recognised as the legally wedded wife. Not only the said submission is not supported by any pleading but also would be opposed to the positive evidence of claimant No. 1 to the effect that she is the first wife. I also fail to understand the tenability or the basis of me said claim, legally or factually. 12. Therefore I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the claimants 2 and 3 would be entitled to share the compensation. 13. In the result, the above appeal requires to be allowed consequently disallowing the amounts apportioned in favour of claimants 2 and 3 by the Tribunal. Out of the total amount of Rs. 1,00,000/-. Rs. 10,000/- will be awarded to the first claimant towards loss of consortium. 14. In the result subject to the above terms, the appeal is partly allowed. No costs. C.M.P. No. 6086 of 1993 is closed.