Honble YADAV, J.–This is tenants motion for action in contempt against his landlord-respondent for non-compliance of the compromise decree dated 1.12.87 passed in Second Appeal and order passed in revision petition on 29.2.96. (2). The present contempt petition has a chequered history. The facts and circumstances leading to filing of it are stated hereinbelow. (3). It is revealed from the material available on record that an ejectment suit was filed by the landlord-respondent on the ground of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity as envisaged under Clause (h) of Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short `Act No. 17 of 1950) against the tenant-petitioner and other tenants which was dismissed by the learned trial court on 31.5.1975. (4). The landlord-respondent feeling aggrieved against the dismissal of his suit preferred an appeal, which was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge ordering ejectment of the petitioner and other tenants holding that the landlord-respondent desires to demolish the present structure and wants to raise a new building at the site for the purpose of a hotel. The learned first appellate court recorded a positive finding to the effect that the landlord-respondent succeeded to establish his reasonable and bona fide personal necessity within the meaning of Clause (h) of Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 17 of 1950, therefore, the appeal was allowed and the suit for ejectment was decreed. (5). The present petitioner, along with other dis-satisfied tenants, aggrieved with the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate court filed a second appeal. In second appeal, the parties entered into a compromise and a decree in terms of compromise was passed. In accordance with the terms of compromise, the land-lord respondent after constructing the hotel in accordance with the sanctioned plan would construct one shop each for the petitioner and other tenant and give it to them. It was also agreed that before starting the construction, the landlord-respondent would take requisite permission from the Local Authority and as and when the permission is granted, the petitioner and other tenant would be informed. In the sanctioned plan, the shops to be given to the petitioner and other tenants would be indicated. It was also agreed that before starting the construction, the landlord-respondent would take requisite permission from the Local Authority and as and when the permission is granted, the petitioner and other tenant would be informed. In the sanctioned plan, the shops to be given to the petitioner and other tenants would be indicated. It was also stipulated in the compromise decree that in case, the petitioner and other tenant after having been informed do not vacate the shops in their occupation within two months, the landlord-respondent shall get the same vacated in execution proceedings from the court and in that situation, the petitioner and other tenants would not raise any objection and would also forfeit their rights to get back possession of the shops as agreed between them. Another stipulation in the said compromise decree was that landlord-respondent would construct the shops for the petitioner and other tenants within eight months in accordance with the sanctioned plan. Other terms and conditions arrived at between the parties in their compromise decree is not necessary for the purposes of deciding the present contempt petition, therefore, they are being omitted. (6). It is revealed from perusal of the record that instead of handing over possession to the landlord-respondent within the stipulated time in the compromise decree, the petitioner and other tenants went to executing court with a plea that plan has not been sanctioned by the competent authority. It is borne out from the record that landlord-respondent has got sanctioned plan from Municipal Council and intimated to the petitioner and other tenants but neither they vacated the shops nor handed-over possession to him. They went to executing court with a plea that plan has not been sanctioned by competent authority. It is alleged by them before the learned executing court that in the present case, the Urban Improvement Trust was competent authority to sanction the plan and not the Municipal Council, therefore, the petitioner and other tenant did not vacate the shops as they apprehend that in case, the shops are vacated by them, the Urban Improvement Trust may stop raising the construction. It was alleged by the petitioner and other tenants before the learned executing court that the landlord-respondent is in connivance with the Local Authorities and he intends to deprive the petitioner and other tenants of getting back their shops after construction as agreed between them in the compromise decree dated 1.12.1987. (7). It is also revealed from perusal of record that the aforesaid objection raised by the present petitioner along with other tenants was thoroughly investigated and enquired into by the learned executing court and the same was rejected. Learned executing court issued warrant of possession against the petitioner and other tenants in respect of disputed shops which were in their possession at that time. (8). It is further borne out from perusal of the record that the order passed by the learned executing court was challenged by the present petitioner and one Ugam Raj by filing two revision petitions i.e. S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 153/94 Ugam Raj vs. Dhan Raj, and S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 150/94 Poonam Chand vs. Dhan Raj.. The aforesaid two revision petitions were consolidated and decided by composite order on 29.2.96 by the then Honble P.K. Palli, J. (9). It is revealed from perusal of decision dated 29.2.96 rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court that the landlord-respondent had also filed cross objection against the finding recorded by the learned executing court on issue No.5. Learned Single Judge of this Court, after hearing both the parties at length, modified the relief portion of the order passed by the learned executing court, which is reproduced below for ready reference:- ``It is towards the relief portion that the learned court appears to have gone wrong in dismissing the objections filed by the petitioner-tenants. Learned court has held in clear and un-equivocal terms that the petitioners are not being evicted from the premises and that they have not waived their right to re-enter into the shop to be constructed by the landlord-respondent. Having made these observations, the learned court should have made an order in clear terms so that it would not have caused any confusion between the parties which has resulted into the filing of the revision petitions as well as cross-objections. The filing of the cross-objections by the respondent-landlord appears to be that he perhaps does not want to fulfil his obligation sincerely. The filing of the cross-objections by the respondent-landlord appears to be that he perhaps does not want to fulfil his obligation sincerely. He cannot be permitted to escape his liability and obligations arising out of the terms of the compromise decree. The revision petitions deserve to be partly allowed and it is held that the petitioner-tenants have not violated any terms of the compromise and they are ready and willing to surrender possession of the shops and they are directed to hand-over the vacant possession of these shops to the respondent-landlord within four weeks from today and thereafter the respondent-landlord would be under obligation to restore back possession to the petitioners of the shops to be constructed for them in terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties. (10). I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. (11). It is strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in pursuant of the order dated 29.2.96 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, the petitioner had handed over possession within four weeks as directed by the learned Single Judge but more than three years have expired, the landlord-respondent is not making sincere efforts to restore back possession to the petitioner and other tenants of the shops to be constructed for them in accordance with the terms of the compromise. (12). The aforesaid argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is refuted with equal vehemance by the learned counsel for the respondent. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of landlord-respondent has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present contempt proceedings initiated under Sec. 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the landlord-respondent that the present contempt proceedings are not maintainable which have been initiated to enforce the compromise decree and the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge on 29.2.96. In alternative, it is also argued by the learned counsel for the landlord respondent that the permission obtained under Sec. 170 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (for short `the Act of 1959) has been made ineffective due to objection raised by the petitioner and other tenants before the executing court. Now fresh permission is required to be obtained by the landlord-respondent under Sub-Sec. (9) of Sec. 170 of the Act of 1959. Now fresh permission is required to be obtained by the landlord-respondent under Sub-Sec. (9) of Sec. 170 of the Act of 1959. Unless fresh permission under the aforesaid provision is obtained, it is not possible for the landlord-respondent to construct the shops in terms of the compromise arrived at between the parties. It is urged by the learned counsel for the respondent that due to prolong litigation by the petitioner and other tenants on non-existent ground to the effect that permission for construction had not been obtained by the landlord-respondent from the competent authority was finally decided in his favour on 29.2.96 and by that time permission for construction had already expired. Thus, valid permission obtained by landlord-respondent became ineffective and now fresh permission is required to be obtained by him. (13). After hearing the learned counsel for the parties in extenso, I am of the view that the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent has substance and I find no merit in extra-ordinary proceedings for action in the contempt. I am of the view that the contempt court will not permit execution of a compromise decree directly or indirectly through the medium of a contempt proceeding. There is a distinction between a compromise arrived at between the parties or a consent order passed by the court at the instance of the parties and categorical undertaking given by any of the parties. In fact, if there is a violation of compromise or consent order, the question of contempt of court does not arise but the party has a right to enforce the compromise or the order in execution side. (14). In the instant case, I do not find any written undertaking given to the petitioner or any other tenant by the landlord-respondent to construct the shops. Since the landlord-respondent has not given any written undertaking it is difficult to hold that landlord-respondent has wilfully dis-obeyed or committed breach of any written undertaking. The compromise decree arrived at between the parties, does not include a written undertaking by the landlord-respondent. It is not possible for me in the present case to hold that non-compliance of a compromise decree or consent order amount to contempt of court. The compromise decree arrived at between the parties, does not include a written undertaking by the landlord-respondent. It is not possible for me in the present case to hold that non-compliance of a compromise decree or consent order amount to contempt of court. As a matter of fact, where a contemner by making a false representation to the court, obtains a benefit for himself and he fails to honour the undertaking, he plays a serious fraud on the court itself and thereby obstructs the course of justice and brings into disrepute the judicial institution. However the same principle is not extendable to a consent order or a compromise decree where the fraud if any is practised by the person concerned not on the court but on one of the party. Thus the offence committed by the person concerned is qua the party not qua the court and, therefore, the very foundation for proceeding for contempt of court is completely absent in such cases where dis-obedience of compromise decree is alleged unless there is an express undertaking given in writing before the court by the contemner or incorporated by the Court in its order, there can be no question of wilful dis-obedience of such an undertaking. (15). From perusal of the revisional order dated 29.2.96 it is not deducible that the landlord-respondent has given any written undertaking, hence, the question of committing breach of such undertaking does not arise in the present case. The improper or reprehensible conduct of a party in not complying with the terms of the consent decree does not amount to an offence within the meaning of Sec. 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. My aforesaid view is buttressed from the decision rendered by the Apex court in case of Babu Ram Gupta vs. Sudhir Bhasin and another (1). The aforesaid question again came up for consideration before Honble Supreme Court in case of Ahmed R.V. Peermohamed vs. Jogi S. Bhar and others (2), their Lordships reiterated with approval of the decision rendered in case of Babu Ram Gupta (supra) and ruled that court will not permit execution directly or indirectly of a consent decree through the medium of the contempt proceeding. (16). As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the motion fails and the same is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.