M. S. A. Siddiqui ( 1 ) BY this petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. , petitioners seek quashing of the proceedings emanating from the complaint filed by the respondent under Section 276-B of the Income-tax Act (for short the Act) on account of their failure to deduct TDS on payments made to the contractors. ( 2 ) THE petitioner No. 1 is the private limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. Petitioners No. 2 to 5 were the Directors and were also incharge of and responsible to the petitioner No. 1 for the conduct of its day-to-day business. In the year 1982, the petitioner No. 1 paid different amounts to the contractors for carrying out the contract of stitching, embroidery and finishing etc. According to the provisions of Section 194-C of the Act, tax @ 2% was deductible at source from the payments made by the petitioner No. 1 to the contractors engaged for carrying out the aforesaid work. The petitioners contravened the provisions of Section 194-C of the Act inasmuch as they failed to deduct the tax at source while making payments to the contractors. On these allegations a complaint under Section 276-B of the Act was filed against the petitioners. ( 3 ) THE petitioners have sought quashment of the proceedings mainly on the following grounds: (i) That the averments made in the complaint do not attract the provisions of Section 194-C of the Act; (ii) That the petitioners have already undergone the proceedings for seven years with no progress in the trial and they are likely to suffer ordeal of. a trial for a further period of ten to fifteen years for a technical offence. ( 4 ) IT is well settled that the power of quashing criminal proceedings has to be sparingly exercised by the Court with due regard to the guide-lines laid down in this behalf by various judicial pronouncements. In State of Haryana and Others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others, AIR 1992 SC 604 , certain categories of cases have been laid down by way of illustrations wherein extraordinary power can be exercised by the Court either to prevent abuse of process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In the instant case, the petitioners have themselves admitted in their petition that the offence complained of is purely a technical offence. In the instant case, the petitioners have themselves admitted in their petition that the offence complained of is purely a technical offence. It is, therefore, obvious that the present case does not fall in any of the categories enumerated in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra ). ( 5 ) AS regards violation of the petitioners right to speedy trial, it is worth mentioning that the delay in non-completion of the trial is not attributable to the prosecution. Report of the ACMM, Delhi shows that no progress could be achieved as the file of the Trial Court was not traceable since 17. 2. 1994. However, by the order dated 16. 5. 1997 passed by this Court, the Administrative Sub-Judge and the District Judge were directed to have the file traced/reconstructed within minimum delay. In this view of the matter, the proceedings of. the Trial Court cannot be quashed on the ground of delay. ( 6 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed. However, keeping in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Deo Sharma v. The State of Bihar, J. T. 1999 (7) S. C. 317=vii (1999) SLT 512=iv (1999) CCR 1 (SC), the Trial Court is directed to dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible preferably within six months from today. ( 7 ) PARTIES are directed to appear before the Trial Court on 17. 1. 2000.