Arun Kumar,j. ( 1 ) ONE S. F. Lakhani claiming to be the owner of entire property No. E-14/2, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi, filed a suit for possession against the appellant with respect to one garage situated in the said property besides some other reliefs. Lakhani made his wife Lakshmi as a co-plaintiff in the said suit. The suit was filed some time in March 1992 when S. F. Lakhani claimed to be 88 years old. He died during the pendency of the suit. His son M. S. Lakhani was substituted in his place. The case of the plaintiffs was that the defendant was inducted as a tenant in two rooms along with a covered Varandah and W. C. on the first floor above the two garages in the annexe block of the property bearing No. E-14/2, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi at a monthly rent of Rs. 550. 00 which was later on enhanced to Rs. 650. 00 per month exclusive of water and electricity charges. The present proceedings are with respect to a garage on the ground floor of the said premises. According to the plaintiffs the defendant unauthorisedly took possession of the garage in question which is just below the tenanted premises of the defendant. In the written statement the defendant/appellant took a plea that the garage in question alongwith an attached bathroom was let out to him by the plaintiff in the year 1981 as per an oral agreement at a monthly rent of Rs. 150. 00. Thus the defendant/appellant set up the plea of tenancy with respect to the premises in question. The plaintiff denied having let out the said portion to the appellant. The plaintiff relied upon the written statement filed by the defendant in another proceedings between the parties with respect to eviction of the defendant from the premises which was admittedly under the tenancy of the defendant. With respect to the said premises, the landlord, i. e. plaintiff instituted an eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The landlord stated in the said eviction petition that the tenanted premises comprised of "two rooms measuring 13 8" X 9 3" each along with covered varandah in front and W. C. on the first floor". The landlord stated in the said eviction petition that the tenanted premises comprised of "two rooms measuring 13 8" X 9 3" each along with covered varandah in front and W. C. on the first floor". In reply to the said averment in the eviction petition, the tenant stated in his written statement as under:- "that para No. 8 is denied. The accommodation in occupation of the respondent comprises of suit premises and bathroom, courtyard with right to use roof and not as alleged. " ( 2 ) IT is significant to note that the written statement is dated 30th November 1988, i. e. much after the alleged tenancy with respect to the garage which is the subject matter of present litigation which according to the tenant was created in the year 1981. According to the plaintiffs/respondents if the appellant had become a tenant with respect to the garage in the year 1982 he would have surely stated so in the written statement which he filed in the year 1988 in the aforementioned eviction. ( 3 ) THE following issues were framed in the suit on 12th August 1997:- 1. Whether there was no privity of contract between defendant and plaintiff No. 2? OPD. 2. Whether the defendant is tenant and not a trespasser in the premises consequently the suit is barred under D. R. C. Act? OPD 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of the garage at E-14/2 Vasant Vihar, New Delhi? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction against the defendant for removal of obstructions and use of rear lawn? 5. Relief. ( 4 ) FOR the plaintiffs M. S. Lakhani, the son of the original owner appeared as PW-1. The defendant did not lead any evidence nor he filed any documents in support of his case. He was proceeded ex parte for failure to appear in Court in person or through counsel on 6th October 1998. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel has first made a grievance about the defendant/appellant having been proceeded ex parte and for that reason being denied opportunity to lead evidence. In this connection it is to be noted that on 7th September 1998 the case was adjourned for evidence of the plaintiff to 6th October 1998. None appeared for the defendant on 6th October 1998. In this connection it is to be noted that on 7th September 1998 the case was adjourned for evidence of the plaintiff to 6th October 1998. None appeared for the defendant on 6th October 1998. The court waited for the defendant or his counsel to turn up upto 12. 35 p. m. Thereafter the defendant was proceeded ex parte. The evidence of plaintiff was recorded on that date. The plaintiff closed his evidence. Arguments were heard and the case was adjourned for orders to 28th October 1998. On 28th October 1998 the defendant filed an application under order IX Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure. The case was adjourned to 9th November 1998. On that date reply to the application under Order IX Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code. was filed by the plaintiff. The case was fixed for orders for 16th November 1998. On 16th November 1998 the Court passed the following order:- ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the trial court should not have taken a technical view of the matter inasmuch as the application under Order IX, Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code. was not at all entertained. According to the learned counsel the said application should have been treated as an application under Order IX, Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code. and should have been heard and decided on merits. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent submits that since on 6th October 1998 when the defendant was proceeded ex parte, the evidence of the plaintiff was recorded and arguments were heard and the case was adjourned for judgment, neither Order IX, Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code. nor Order IX Rule 13 were applicable. Admittedly Order IX Rule 13 comes into play after ex parte decree is passed against the defendant. About non- applicability of Order IX Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code. our attention has been drawn to the said provision itself. Rule 7 of Order IX runs as under:- "procedure where defendant appears on day of adjourned hearing and assigns good cause for previous non-appearance. 7. About non- applicability of Order IX Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code. our attention has been drawn to the said provision itself. Rule 7 of Order IX runs as under:- "procedure where defendant appears on day of adjourned hearing and assigns good cause for previous non-appearance. 7. Where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit ex parte, and the defendant, at or before such hearing, appears and assigns good cause for his previous non-appearance, he may, upon such terms as the Court directs as to costs or otherwise, be heard in answer to the suit as if he had appeared on the day fixed for his appearance. " ( 7 ) IT is submitted on behalf of the respondents that Rule 7 envisages a situation when the Court after proceeding ex parte against the defendant adjourned the suit for further hearing. In the present case it is submitted that on 6th October 1998 the case was not adjourned for further hearing. Whatever hearing had to take place in the matter was concluded on that day itself and the case was simply adjourned for orders, i. e. for pronouncement of judgment. Nothing remained to be heard and, therefore, Order IX, Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code. had no application in the facts and circumstances of the case. We find force in this submission made on behalf of the respondents. When the "hearing" of a suit is completed and nothing remains to be heard further, Rule 7 will have no application. What remains to be done in the suit is only pronouncement of the judgment which is the function of the court. This is precisely what has happened in the present case. On 6th October 1998 the case was never adjourned for hearing. Rule 7 would have been attracted if the Court had adjourned the case for instance, for recording evidence or for hearing arguments to another date. This view finds supports from the judgments of this Court in Arti Sukhdev vs. Daya Kishore, 1992 RLR 442 and East India C. Manufacturing vs. S. P. Gupta, 1985 RLR 292 . ( 8 ) THE argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be an after-thought. The appellant made an application under Order IX, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code. Faced with the situation that the said application was not maintainable, he tried to invoke Order IX, Rule 7, CPC. ( 8 ) THE argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant appears to be an after-thought. The appellant made an application under Order IX, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code. Faced with the situation that the said application was not maintainable, he tried to invoke Order IX, Rule 7, CPC. Thus the appellant is trying to ride on two horses. In our view neither of the provisions was attracted or applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Interestingly the appellant withdrew the application under Order IX, Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code as well as the amendment application and for this reason also the appellant cannot make an issue of this aspect or raise any grievance about it. ( 9 ) WE would like to note here that nothing has been said to justify non-appearance of the defendant or his counsel on 6th October 1998 when the defendant was proceeded ex parte by the trial court. Keeping all aspects in view the plea of the appellant based on Order IX,rule 7 Civil Procedure Code is, therefore, rejected. ( 10 ) ON merits the learned counsel for the appellant has argued that there is a variance between pleadings sand evidence on the question as to how the defendant came in possession of the suit premises and, therefore, the suit ought to have been dismissed. Secondly, it was argued that the plaintiff never made any police complaint or serve any notice on the defendant with respect to the alleged trespass in his property by the defendant.