( 1 ) ON the ground of certain lapses committed by the petitioner in the season 1995-96 when he was appointed as seasonal clerk, he was subjected to a disciplinary proceeding initiated on 9. 7. 1997. The disciplinary proceeding was concluded on 9. 10. 1998. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. N. L. Pandey relying on Regulation 27 of the U. P Cane Co-operative Service Regulation 1975, contends that disciplinary proceeding in respect of a lapse committed during a particular season, is to be initiated and concluded before the end of the crushing season or within the time stipulated therein, whichever is latter, and in default such disciplinary proceeding shall be deemed to have been automatically dropped. Therefore, according to him, the lapse committed by the petitioner in crushing season 1995-96, cannot be gone into after the end of the said crushing season namely on 9. 7. 1997. He alternately argues that even if it can be so initiated, it has to be concluded within the time frame stipulated in Regulation 27 and in default the same shall be deemed to have been automatically dropped, after expiry of the crushing season. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, there cannot be any jurisdiction to pass an order against the petitioner on 9. 10. 98 namely in the next season. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned order being wholly without jurisdiction and a nullity, the petitioner should not be thrown to the process of appeal as provided in regulation 31. On these grounds he prays for quashing of the impugned order. ( 2 ) MR. P. M. N. Singh, Learned Addl. Advocate General, On the other hand contends that regulation 31 provides for an appeal which is adequate alternative remedy, and in view of existence of such adequate remedy, this court sitting in writ jurisdiction should not enter into the questions which also requires investigation on merits. According to him, such a question have arisen in the case of devendra Singh and others Vs. Chairman, District Cane Service authority, Bijnor and others (Writ Petition No. 42588 of 1998, disposed of on 11. 1. 1999) Zerox copy of the certified copy of the said judgment has been produced by him in court. Relying on this decision, Mr. P. M. N. Singh contends that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. 1. 1999) Zerox copy of the certified copy of the said judgment has been produced by him in court. Relying on this decision, Mr. P. M. N. Singh contends that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. He next contends that since the question is a question of fact, sitting in writ jurisdiction, this Court cannot enter into the question, therefore, the petitioner cannot obtain any relief by invoking writ jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 3 ) MR. N. L. Pandey, however, has not addressed the Court on the merits of the case. He has confined his submission to the said question and contends that in view of patent absence of jurisdiction, it is not necessary that the petitioner should be thrown to the process of appeal when on the face of it, it is apparent that the order has been passed without any jurisdiction in consequence of the provisions of regulation 27. ( 4 ) I have heard both Mr. Pandey and Mr. P. M. N. Singh at length. There is no dispute that the petitioners service is governed by u. P. Co-operative Service Regulation 1975 and the petitioner is subject to the provisions thereof. Admittedly, the petitioner is a seasonal clerk. He was subjected to a disciplinary proceeding initiated on 9. 7. 1997 in respect of the lapse committed by him in the season 1995-96 and the said proceeding was concluded on 9. 10. 1998 when the impugned order was passed in respect of the said proceeding. In his usual fairness, Mr. P. M. N. Singh has not disputed these facts. It appears from annexure-12 and 13 to the writ petition, that the proceedings against the petitioners were initiated in July 1997 and the impugned order was passed in October, 1998, in respect of the lapse committed in the season 1995-96. Admittedly, the crushing season begins on 1st October and continues till the end of July following. Thus, the season which might have begun in october, 1997, had come to an end in July 1998 and a different season has started in October, 1998 and thus order passed on 9. 10. 1998 falls in subsequent season. In this background, let us test the provisions of regulation 27 which provides as follows: "27. Thus, the season which might have begun in october, 1997, had come to an end in July 1998 and a different season has started in October, 1998 and thus order passed on 9. 10. 1998 falls in subsequent season. In this background, let us test the provisions of regulation 27 which provides as follows: "27. Disciplinary proceedings: in the event of a complaint against any member of the seasonal staff, the Secretary of the Union shall made a preliminary enquiry and if he is satisfied that a prima facie case is established against the person concerned, he shall intimate the same to him in the form of charges and call for his explanation to be submitted within a specified time. The secretary of the alongwith definite recommendations to the district or Zonal Authority, as the case may be, for passing final order in the case. In case the explanation is not received within the specified time the Secretary shall submit his final report to the District or Zonal Authority as the case may be, on the basis of material already on the file. These proceedings shall be of a summary nature and the Secretary should not take more than a month to complete the same. The District or zonal Authority as the case may be, should also arrange to dispose of the same within one month of the receipt of the final report form the Secretary. In case of default on the part of Secretary of cane union or the District or Zonal Authority as the case may be, in not completing the disciplinary proceedings against a seasonal staff by the end of crushing season, the same shall be deemed to have been automatically dropped. " ( 5 ) REGULATION 27 specifies that in respect of any lapse an explanation is to be called in the form of charges and the Secretary is required to examine records and submit his final report with definite recommendations to the District or Zonal authority for passing final order. In case no explanation is received, then final report may be submitted by the Secretary to the District or zonal authority on the basis of records already on the file. In case no explanation is received, then final report may be submitted by the Secretary to the District or zonal authority on the basis of records already on the file. The proceedings is a summary proceedings which is to be completed within one month by the secretary, and the district and zonal authority is also required to dispose of the matter within one month form the date of receipt of final report from the Secretary. It is further provided that in case of default either on the part of the Secretary of the Cane Union or on the part of the District or Zonal Authority in not completing the disciplinary proceedings against a seasonal staff by the end of the crushing season, the same shall be deemed to have been automatically dropped. ( 6 ) THE expression used in Regulation 27 is clear and unambiguous and has specified specific time and has also provided for the consequence in respect of non compliance of the time frame stipulated therein. If there is a provision for automatic dropping of the proceedings at the end of the crushing season, in cases where the proceeding could not be completed, there cannot be any different consequence conceived out of such provision. Therefore, after the end of the season, if the proceeding is not concluded, the same is deemed to have been automatically dropped. Thus, once time frame expires, non-completion of the proceedings within the stipulated period, results into dropping of the proceedings which cannot be revived since the same is automatic. Once it is dropped, in the absence of specific provision, it cannot be revived. The provision of regulation 27 does not provide any exception that in certain contingencies such proceedings could be revived. If the disciplinary proceedings could not be concluded within the stipulated time frame, any order passed thereafter would be void any a nullity and wholly without any jurisdiction. The jurisdiction to continue the proceedings would cease at the end of the crushing season if time frame is not adhered to. In such circumstances, the impugned order which was passed in October, 1998 in the proceedings initiated on 9. 7. 97 , thereafter the succeeding crushing season having ended in July 1998, the provisions of regulation 27 with regard to default clause is attracted. In such circumstances, the impugned order which was passed in October, 1998 in the proceedings initiated on 9. 7. 97 , thereafter the succeeding crushing season having ended in July 1998, the provisions of regulation 27 with regard to default clause is attracted. As soon it is attracted, the disciplinary proceedings having lapsed the orders passed are wholly without jurisdiction and non est and has no existence in the eye of law. ( 7 ) THOUGH rightly contended by Mr. P. M. N. Singh, this Court should not enter into such question when there is alternative remedy in existence, but in cases where the order on the face of it is without jurisdiction and void and when the Court is not required to go into disputed questions of fact and on the basis of the records it can be ascertained that there are absence of jurisdiction and the orders passed are nullity and has not existence in the eye of law, in such circumstances, existence of alternative remedy cannot stant in the way of invoking writ jurisdiction which is discretionary one. Alternative remedy is not an ab-solute bar. It is at the discretion of the Court either to exercise the writ jurisdiction or not to do it. The question is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case and it is for the Court to decide that where such discretion should be exercised judicially. In this case it is apparent on the face of the record that the impugned order is without jurisdiction and void ab initio, therefore, it is a case fit for exercising such discretion. If the order itself is without jurisdiction and void ab initio, in that event, there cannot be any question of prefering appeal when on the face of it, the order has no existence. ( 8 ) THE decision in the case of Devendra Singh (supra) has not dealt with this particular point or question since not raised therrin. Therefore, the said deecision is distinguishable on the question raised by Mr. Pandey in the present case. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is allowed. The orders impugned contained in annexure-13 to 20 are hereby quashed. Let a writ of certiorari do accordingly issue. Petition Allowed. .