D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, through this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has challenged the detention order dated 2. 9. 1998 passed by the District Magistrate, Vadodara, under Section 3 (2) of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, and has prayed for quashing of the said order and his immediate release from illegal detention. ( 2 ) FROM the grounds of detention it appears that the petitioner was running two fair price shops, one in the name of Government approved fair price shop No. 115, Shiyapura, Raopura, Vadodara city and other in the name of Tarsali Co. Operative Credit Society, shop No. 189, Indrapuri Complex, Vadodara. Grave irregularities were found in the aforesaid fair price shops. Inquiry was held on 29. 4. 1998. The petitioner was asked to open his shop upto 5. 00 p. m. There was allegation that he was not regularly opening his shop and was harassing the customers. The petitioner was asked to produce record for inspection. He did not appear. By letter dated 29. 4. 1998 he was again asked to produce record, but he did not do so in relation to shop No. 115. Inspection was conducted on 27. 5. 1998 and 17. 8. 1998 at the Government approved fair price shop No. 115 run by the petitioner. Cross checking was made with record, sale bills, stock, etc. It was found that during January, 1998 to August 1998 the petitioner unlawfully disposed of 677 ltrs. of kerosene and huge quantity of wheat, rice, sugar, etc. mentioned in Para : 8 of the grounds of detention. It was also found that stock meant for public distribution system was disposed of in black market by the petitioner which was prima facie made out from sale bills, statements of card holders, original ration cards and details of cancelled ration cards. Other similar activities of the petitioner have been high-lighted in the grounds of detention to show in what manner he entered in repeated black marketing activities and earned huge profit by selling essential commodities meant for public distribution system in the market secretly. Alternative remedies were considered by the Detaining Authority who found that in past also such irregularities were found in the fair price shop of the petitioner and his licence was cancelled. Alternative remedies were considered by the Detaining Authority who found that in past also such irregularities were found in the fair price shop of the petitioner and his licence was cancelled. This was in respect of shop situated at Raopura. The Bail bonds were demanded and in persuance of bond the licence was continued. Finding that alternative remedies were ineffective the impugned order of detention was passed. ( 3 ) THIS detention order has been challenged in the course of arguments on six grounds, but in the midst of arguments two grounds were not pressed. ( 4 ) ONE of the grounds of attack is that on two occasions the petitioner was enlarged on parole on the strength of one medical certificate and without making inquiry about truthfulness in allegation of illness and without satisfying that the medical certificate was genuine the state Government released the petitioner on parole which signifies that continued detention became illegal inasmuch as power under Section 15 of the Act was recklessly exercised by the State Government. This ground is contained in Ground No. (p) of the writ petition. The ground itself is vague. It is said in this ground that the petitioner was released temporarily for a period of ten days from 22. 9. 1998 on the ground of sickness of mother of the petitioner. In Para : 11 of the counter Affidavit of Shri P. R. Shukla, Deputy Secretary to the State Government it is admitted that the detenu was released on parole for a period of ten days, but not on the ground of illness of the petitioners mother but on the ground of sickness of the wife of the detenu. No rejoinder has been filed to this additional counter Affidavit. It has, therefore, to be believed that the petitioner was released on parole for ten days. In the same para it is mentioned that again during Diwali holidays on the zerox copy of earlier medical certificate the State Government released the petitioner on parole, but it is not disclosed for how many days parole was granted to the petitioner second time. Para : 11 of the counter affidavit of Shri P. R. Shukla is equally vague. He also did not care to specify that for how many days the second parole was granted. Para : 11 of the counter affidavit of Shri P. R. Shukla is equally vague. He also did not care to specify that for how many days the second parole was granted. In ground No. (p) it is further alleged that the State Government has not looked into the medical certificate and granted parole to the petitioner. It is difficult to accept this allegation. Without looking to the medical certificate the parole could not be granted. In Para : 11 of the counter Affidavit of Shri Shukla it is admitted that on the same ground on the basis of earlier doctors certificate parole was granted which implies that medical certificate was perused and considered by the State Government. It was therefore contended that release of the petitioner twice on parole just for asking indicates that continued detention of the petitioner was not required and this has rendered the detention order invalid. The Division Bench pronouncement of this court in Rasiklal Nathulal Shah v/s. District Magistrate, Himatnagar, reported in 1992 (1) G. L. R. 465 was referred. This case is absolutely distinguishable on facts. The facts in this case were that immediately after detenu was taken in custody under Prevention of Black Marketing Act within five days he was enlarged on parole and successive paroles were also granted to him. This court observed that where immediately after a man is taken in detention and he is released on parole on insufficient ground there is scope for contending that the order of detention was passed without application of mind. This court, however, did not rule in this case that in no case power under Section 15 of the Act can be exercised for granting parole. The facts were discussed in detail and the conduct of the detenu was also high-lighted by this Court in what manner he was enlarged on parole, firstly on ground of illness of his wife and then he attempted to obtain parole on his medical ground and did not surrender. One of the salient feature was that one of the medical certificates did not even bear the thumb impression or signature of the detenu. Another salient feature was that the detention order was passed by the detaining Authority on 19. 11. 1990. Before the order of the detaining authority could be approved by the State Government, the State Government on 23. 11. Another salient feature was that the detention order was passed by the detaining Authority on 19. 11. 1990. Before the order of the detaining authority could be approved by the State Government, the State Government on 23. 11. 1990 granted parole to the detenu from 24. 11. 1990 to 1. 12. 1990. These were the salient features on which the Division Bench of this Court observed that if a person is enlarged on parole within five days of passing of detention order and that too by the State Government before considering the report of the detaining Authority and approving the same it can be said that the State Government did not consider it expedition to detain the detenu and the subjective satisfaction of the State Government stood vitiated. It was in this background that the other activities of the petitioner in getting him hospitalised and obtaining medical certificate was high-lighted and criticised. The Division Bench never meant to say that in every case a detailed inquiry should be held to find out whether the medical certificate is genuine or not and whether the person is really ill or not. Each case has to be decided on its own facts. If on these facts the detention order was quashed by the Division Bench in Rasiklals case (Supra) the said verdict cannot be applied to the facts of the case before me. Here the detention order was passed on 2. 9. 1998 and first parole was granted on 22. 9. 1998. It was therefore not a case where parole was granted immediately after the detention of the petitioner. The second date on which parole was granted is neither disclosed in the grounds of attack in Para (p) of the writ petition nor it has been disclosed in the counter affidavit of Shri P. R. Shukla. It is true that second time parole was granted on the strength of the same medical certificate, but since earlier medical certificate was believed to be true by the State Government and same ground was pressed for second parole, viz. illness of the wife of the petitioner it cannot be said that the State Government exercised the powers under Section 15 of the Black Marketing Act carelessly, recklessly or callously. ( 5 ) THE other case cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was in which bunch of writ petition Nos. illness of the wife of the petitioner it cannot be said that the State Government exercised the powers under Section 15 of the Black Marketing Act carelessly, recklessly or callously. ( 5 ) THE other case cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was in which bunch of writ petition Nos. 1409/92, 1621/92, 1577/92, 1524/92, 1623/92, 1541/92 and 1643/92 were decided by this Court on 25. 11. 1992. This case is also distinguishable on facts. In this case bunch of writ petitions were disposed of. A chart was annexed in this judgment which shows that the seven petitioners were granted parole ranging from seven days to 21 days. Col. No. 10 of this chart shows that in two cases no medical certificate was filed still parole was granted. Likewise in three cases medical certificate from private clinic was filed, but its authencity was not verified. The two certificates were from primary health centre and community health centre. These doctors were Government doctors, however, since most of the certificates were issued by private clinics it was observed that it should have been verified by the State Government whether the person concerned was ill and whether the certificate was genuinely issued by the doctors or not. The verdict of this case also cannot be safely applied to the facts of this case. ( 6 ) IT would also be contradiction in term to permit the petitioner to request on the one hand that he may be enlarged on parole, but once enlarged on parole he may be permitted to say that parole was granted recklessly. This would be permitting the petitioner to blow hot and cold together. There is no material to infer that the medical certifricate filed by the petitioner in this case was fictitious or his wife or mother was not ill. If this was so then no indepth inquiry was required to be made by the State Government. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons stated above granting parole twice to the petitioner has not rendered continued detention of the petitioner illegal. ( 8 ) THE second ground of challenge to the detention order has been that the licence of the petitioners fair price shop was suspended on 2. 9. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons stated above granting parole twice to the petitioner has not rendered continued detention of the petitioner illegal. ( 8 ) THE second ground of challenge to the detention order has been that the licence of the petitioners fair price shop was suspended on 2. 9. 1998 for 90 days which was not considered in the grounds of detention and this has rendered the subjective satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority bad in law and it also reflects non-application of mind by the detaining Authority to the entire material on record. This contention has absolutely no force. It is admitted in Para : 8 of the counter Affidavit of the detaining Authority that the licence of the fair price shop of the petitioner was suspended on 2. 9. 1998 for 90 days. The detention order was also passed on 2. 9. 1998. It is not said that proceeding for suspension of licence were pending before the Detaining Authority. There is also nothing on record to show that the order dated 2. 9. 1998 suspending the licence of the petitioners fair price shop for 90 days was in the knowledge of the Sponsoring Authority nor it could be in the knowledge of the Sponsoring Authority because order was not in existence when the report was submitted by the Sponsoring Authority. Likewise if this material was not before the detaining Authority on the date when the detentionorder was passed it cannot be said and held that the detaining Authority without applying its mind to the material on record passed the impugned order. Thus this ground of attack has absolutely no force. ( 9 ) THE third contention has been that the representation dated 28. 10. 1998 sent to the central Government was received on 30. 10. 1998, but it was not expeditiously disposed of inasmuch as it was rejected on 18. 11. 1998. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner this delay has not been explained. This contention has also no substance. In the counter Affidavit of Shri A. L. Makhijani, Under Secretary in the department of Consumer Affairs, Ministry of Food and Consumer Affairs, New Delhi, it is deposed in Para : 4 that one representation dated 28. 10. 1998 made by the son of the detenu was received in the concerned Section on 6. 11. 1998. In the counter Affidavit of Shri A. L. Makhijani, Under Secretary in the department of Consumer Affairs, Ministry of Food and Consumer Affairs, New Delhi, it is deposed in Para : 4 that one representation dated 28. 10. 1998 made by the son of the detenu was received in the concerned Section on 6. 11. 1998. The counsel for the petitioner had drawn my attention to paper No. 26 of the compillation and pointed out that this representation was delivered on 30. 10. 1998 and as such it is not correct that the representation aforesaid was received on 6. 11. 1998. In the grounds of detention it has been clearly specified that inter-alia if the petitioner wanted to make any representation to the Central Government it should be addressed to the Secretary, Ministry of Civil Supply and Public Distribution, Shashtri Bhavan, New Delhi. This disclosure was made with a view to facilitate the petitioner in sending the representation to the delegated authority who was competent to deal with such representation. Once the Authority was delegated to the Secretary, Ministry of Civil Supply and Public Distribution it did not lie to the choice of the petitioner to send the representation to the Minister, Civil Supply, Government of India. Paper No. 26 shows that the representation was sent to the Minister, Civil Supply, Government of India. If the representation was received in the Secretariate of the concerned Minister on 30. 10. 1998 naturally it was likely to take time to travel from one table to another so as to reach the Secretary concerned. In this view of the matter the petitioner cannot be heard saying that there was delay between 28. 10. 1998 to 6. 11. 1998. Since it might have been received by the Secretariate of the Minister concerned on 30. 10. 1998, five days time was but natural to reach from one section to another. Thus, the Central Government has to explain the delay between 6. 11. 1998 to 18. 11. 1998. In the aforesaid affidavit of Shri A. L. Makhijani it is deposed in Para : 4 that the Central Government thought it proper to obtain parawise comments of the State Government on the representation. It was called for telegraphically on 6. 11. 1998 itself. Parawise comments were received on 17. 11. 1998. 11. 1998 to 18. 11. 1998. In the aforesaid affidavit of Shri A. L. Makhijani it is deposed in Para : 4 that the Central Government thought it proper to obtain parawise comments of the State Government on the representation. It was called for telegraphically on 6. 11. 1998 itself. Parawise comments were received on 17. 11. 1998. 10 days time in preparing the parawise comments and time taken in postal transit cannot be said to be extra-ordinary or unreasonable. Since it was received only on 17. 11. 1998 it was expeditiously disposed of on 18. 11. 1998 and as such there was no delay on the part of the Central Government in dealing with the representation. ( 10 ) ANOTHER contention has been that another representation dated 26. 10. 1998 was likewise not expeditiously disposed of. This contention has absolutely no force in view of what is deposed in para : 4 of the counter Affidavit of Shri A. L. Makhijani. He has deposed that another representation dated 26. 10. 1998 was received in the concerned office on 18. 11. 1998 through the office of the District Magistrate. It was considered and relevant record was also considered and thereafter it was rejected on 23. 11. 1998. Since it was second representation it was not necessary for the Central Government to deal with successive representation with same expedition which is required from it while dealing with the first representation. Thus, on this ground also the detention order cannot be said to be invalid. ( 11 ) THERE is also no merit in the contention that each days delay in dealing with the representation was not explained by the State Government. Para : 7 of the counter Affidavit of Shri P. R. Shukla, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Gujarat is complete answer to this contention showing that the representation was decided expeditiously. It is not expected that each and every days delay should be explained or the delay of one day falling in between should also be explained. It is only unreasonable delay which is required to be explained. Reasonable delay is not required to be explained because such representation have to be dealt with after applying mind to the material on record and not in a mechanical manner. ( 12 ) THE next contention has been that the representation dated 26. 10. It is only unreasonable delay which is required to be explained. Reasonable delay is not required to be explained because such representation have to be dealt with after applying mind to the material on record and not in a mechanical manner. ( 12 ) THE next contention has been that the representation dated 26. 10. 1998 demanding copies of certain documents was not expeditiously disposed of and only some of the documents were supplied quite late on 11. 1. 1999. Reliance was placed upon the Apex Courts verdict in Ramchandra A. Kamat v/s. Union of India and others, reported in A. I. R. 1980 SC 765. It was laid down by the Apex Court in this case that right to make representation is a fundamental right. The representation thus made should be considered expeditiously by the Government. In order to make an effective representation, the detenu is entitled to obtain information relating to the grounds of detention. When the grounds of detention are served on the detenu, he is entitled to ask for copies of the statements and documents referred to in the grounds of detntion to enable him to make an effective representation. When the detenu makes a request for such documents, they should be supplied to him expeditiously. The Apex Court further observed that what is reasonable expedition will depend on the facts of each case. It is therefore clear that what is reasonable expedition according to the Apex Court will depend on the facts of each case. The Apex Court further observed in this case that if there is undue delay in furnishing statements and the documents referred to in the grounds of detention the right to make effective representation is denied. The detention cannot be said to be according to the procedure prescribed by law. ( 13 ) THUS, the Court is entitled to consider on the facts of this case whether the delay in supplying the documents has been explained and whether this procedural delay has caused any material prejudice to the petitioner in making effective representation and whether safe-guards contemplated under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India have been violated. Para : 4 of the Counter Affidavit of the detaining Authority sworn on 17. 2. 1999 completely explained the reasons for delay. The detaining Authority has explained in detail in Para : 4 of this counter Affidavit. Para : 4 of the Counter Affidavit of the detaining Authority sworn on 17. 2. 1999 completely explained the reasons for delay. The detaining Authority has explained in detail in Para : 4 of this counter Affidavit. The representation was received in the office of the detaining Authority on 27. 10. 1998. The detention order by then was already approved by the State Government. Consequently the detaining Authority was justified in forwarding copies of representation to the authorities on 29. 10. 1998. After approval of the detention order by the State Government the detaining Authority could not take any decision on this representation. Further in view of confidential instructions quoted in Para : 4 of the Counter Affidavit the detaining Authority was justified in forwarding the representation to the State Government. Parawise remarks were sent in response to the telephonic talk with the concerned department of the Government on 5. 11. 1998 by Fax. Thereafter letter dated 11. 11. 1998 was received from the Food and Civil Supplies Department. The detaining Authority was required to take decision in the matter. The Government by letter dated 11. 10. 1998 informed the District Magistrate to arrive at proper decision after taking into consideration the merits of the case so far as supply of documents, etc. was concerned. After receiving this reply the documents were made available to the petitioner. As such there is explanation of delay and it cannot be said that right to make effective representation was in any way jeopardised. The documents which were actually relied upon by the detaining Authority were supplied to the petitioner along with the grounds of detention. If additional informwation was sought and further documents were required by the petitioner the delay occurred for the reasons stated in para : 4 of the Counter Affidavit of the detaining Authority. As such on the facts of the case keeping in view the verdict of the Apex Court (supra) it can be said that the right of the petitioner to make effective representation was not at all jeopardised. ( 14 ) ANOTHER contention has been that the documents referred to and relied upon in the grounds of detention were not supplied to the detenu and as such the right to make effective representation was jeopardised. ( 14 ) ANOTHER contention has been that the documents referred to and relied upon in the grounds of detention were not supplied to the detenu and as such the right to make effective representation was jeopardised. It was also contended that the copies of sale bills were illegible as a result of which the detenu was again jeopardised in making effective representation. So far as copies of bills are concerned the original bills were prepared by the detenu or by his staff and in whatever manner those bills were prepared, its copies were furnished to the petitioner. The zerox copies could not be improvement over illegible original copies of the sale bills. Consequently on this ground it cannot be said that the right to make effective representation was in any way affected nor it can be said that the detaining Authority has not applied its mind to illegible sale bills and as such his subjective satisfaction is not vitiated. ( 15 ) IT should not be forgotten that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court can not sit in Appeal over subjective satisfaction of the detaining Authority nor it can observe that particular evidence was not considered or certain documents were misread. Over all impression from the material on record in the mind of the detaining Authority that the petitioner was a black marketeer and was habitually indulging in such activities cannot be said to have been vitiated on any grounds whatsoever. ( 16 ) IN Para : 12 of the grounds of detention it is mentioned that earlier also vide order dated 18. 11. 1994 licence of the petitioners fair price shop situated at Raopura was cancelled. The petitioner preferred Appeal before the collector. The petitioner was ordered to file Bond for Rs. 50,000. 00 for good behaviour for two years and then his licence was continued on 10. 2. 1995. Still instead of keeping good behaviour he committed serious acts of black marketing which are high-lighted in detail in the grounds of detention. ( 17 ) IT was also contended that the detaining Authority has placed reliance upon sale bills Nos. 1687 to 1670. This itself is a contradictory because there can be no reason that serial No. 1687 to 1670 should have been mentioned in the grounds (N ). ( 17 ) IT was also contended that the detaining Authority has placed reliance upon sale bills Nos. 1687 to 1670. This itself is a contradictory because there can be no reason that serial No. 1687 to 1670 should have been mentioned in the grounds (N ). It is thus not clear what were the requirements of the petitioner. The representation of the petitioner, paper No. 22, however, shows that copies of these sale bills were not demanded by him or by his son. As such it cannot be said that the right to make effective representation was in any way jeopardised. Non-supply of copy of ration card of Dineshbhai for the year 1998 has also not prejudiced the right of the petitioner to make effective representation. The detaining Authority in Affidavit dated 17. 2. 1999 has deposed in Para : 5 that since there were no details in the said ration card of 1998 its copy was not supplied. It was not necessary for the detaining Authority to supply copy of ration card which was all together blank. The case of Budhabhai Somabhai Parmar v/s. District Magistrate, reported in 1989 (1) G. L. R. 325 is distinguishable on facts and can not help the petitioner. In this case this Court following the Apex Courts verdict in Hansmukhs case reported in A. I. R. 1981 sc 28 observed that the basic documents will be primary material and parimary material would be books of accounts and other records maintained by the detenu while running the frair price shop. It was therefore held that copies of stock register, bill books, etc. though blank or written should have been supplied to the detenu. Ration card is neither a document maintained by the detenu nor it falls in the category of sale bill or stock register maintained by the detenu. Hence non supply of copy of blank ration card of Dinesh of the year 1998 cannot be said to have prejudiced the right of the petitioner to make effective representation. Thus, this ground of attack has also no substance. ( 18 ) THE other two grounds, viz. Hence non supply of copy of blank ration card of Dinesh of the year 1998 cannot be said to have prejudiced the right of the petitioner to make effective representation. Thus, this ground of attack has also no substance. ( 18 ) THE other two grounds, viz. non-consideration of alternative remedy and cancellation of licence by State Government and its effect were not pressed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the midst of the arguments because he was unable to supply english translation of the orders passed by the State Government in a proceeding in the nature of suo-motu revision and like failure to supply English translation of application praying for resignation from business. Thus, these grounds require no consideration. ( 19 ) NO other point was pressed. ( 20 ) AFTER considering all the grounds of attack I find that they are ineffective and they cannot invalidate the detention order. The detention order being perfectly in accordance with law it requires no interference. There is thus no merit in this petition which is hereby dismissed. .