JUDGMENT : P.D. Dinakaran, J.—The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorarified mandamus, calling for the records relating to the order of the first respondent dated October 8, 1996, in M.A. No. 107 of 1996, in I.D. No. 68 of 1991, refusing to give the petitioner an opportunity to lead evidence on the petitioner's side and quash the same and consequently direct the first respondent to give the petitioner an opportunity to lead evidence in I.D. No. 68 of 1991. 2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows: Admittedly, documents M-1 to M-8 were marked by consent of both parties. When the matter was posted for arguments, the second respondent-management came with applications I.A. Nos. 289 and 290 of 1995 to seek permission of the first respondent Tribunal to receive the documents and to permit the second respondent-management to examine its officers as witnesses respectively and both the said applications were allowed. Accordingly, M.W-1 was examined and through him documents M-8 to M-18 were marked. The petitioner of course, also cross-examined M.W-1. 3. Thereafter, the petitioner took out an application M.A. No. 107 of 1996 to reopen the case and to examine himself as a witness, which was objected by the second respondent management on two grounds: (1) that the petitioner had already cross-examined MW-1; and (ii) that the petitioner failed to produce the original certificates when he was called to report before the Personnel Officer on or before October 21, 1991, and even when the petitioner reported before the Personnel Officer on October 24, 1991, and October 26, 1991, he did not produce the original certificates and therefore, the petitioner could not be permitted to examine himself as a witness to mark the documents which he failed to produce before the Personnel Officer. 4. The Tribunal in the light of the affidavit filed in support of M.A. No. 107 of 1996, filed by the petitioner and the counter-filed by the management, agreed with the contentions of the management, by its order dated October 8, 1996, in M.A. No. 107 of 1996, refused to permit the petitioner to examine himself as a witness and mark certain documents. Hence the above writ petition. 5. Mr. Hence the above writ petition. 5. Mr. K. Chandru, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the Tribunal failed to exercise the discretion conferred on it under Rule 15 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, by refusing to permit the petitioner to examine himself as a witness particularly when the second respondent-management has not explained in their counter-affidavit how they would be prejudiced by permitting the petitioner to examine himself as a witness and adduce certain documentary evidence. Mr. K. Chandru, learned senior counsel further contends that the permission given to the petitioner to cross-examine M.W.-1 would not take away the right of the petitioner to examine himself as a witness and to adduce certain documentary evidence. 6. Per contra, Mr. Venkataraman, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent-management contends that the Tribunal had exercised its discretion fairly by accepting the contention of the management as referred to above and therefore, the same cannot be interfered with by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. I bestowed my careful consideration to the submissions of both sides. Rule 15 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, reads as follows: "15. Evidence: A Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal or an Arbitrator may accept, admit or call for evidence at any stage of the proceedings before it/him and in such manner as it/he may think fit." 8. A reading of the above rule makes it clear that the Tribunal can exercise its power either to accept, admit or call for the evidence at any stage of the proceedings pending before it in such manner as it may deem fit. Therefore, discretion is conferred on the Tribunal in the matter of accepting, admitting and calling for the evidence at any stage of the proceeding pending before it and, of course, such discretion should be exercised fairly and reasonably. In the instant case, the Tribunal after the matter was posted for arguments, permitted the management to examine their witnesses and accordingly, M.W.-1 was examined and through him ten documents (M-9 to M-18) were marked even though the management took out applications I. A. Nos. 289 and 290 of 1995 to mark only three documents. It is thereafter the petitioner took out M.A. No. 107 of 1996 to lead evidence on his side. 289 and 290 of 1995 to mark only three documents. It is thereafter the petitioner took out M.A. No. 107 of 1996 to lead evidence on his side. The Tribunal, however, accepting the contention of the management, refused to permit the petitioner to lead evidence on his side. In my considered opinion, such refusal by the Tribunal in permitting the petitioner to lead evidence on his side merely on the grounds that the petitioner had cross-examined the management witness and that he failed to produce the documents before the Personnel Officer on or before October 21, 1991, and even at the time when he reported before the Personnel Officer on October 24, 1991, and October 26, 1991, is unjust and unfair particularly when the management had not explained how they would be prejudiced if the petitioner is permitted to lead evidence on his side. Therefore, I am of view that the Tribunal had failed to exercise the discretion conferred on it under Rule 15 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules in a proper and fair manner. Hence, I am obliged to interfere with the impugned order dated October 8, 1996, passed by the first respondent in M.A. No. 107 of 1996 in I.D. No. 68 of 1991, and set aside the same. Consequently, the matter is remitted to the first respondent with d direction to the first respondent to permit the petitioner to lead evidence on his side and dispose of I.D. No. 68 of 1991 expeditiously, in any event within six months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 9. The writ petition is allowed with the above direction. No costs.