JUDGMENT 1. :- By way of this writ petition, orders dated 23.3.85 (Ann.1) and 24.5.99 (Ann.3) have been challenged. The facts giving rise to this writ petition, briefly stated are, that in Ward No.24 of Sawaimadhopur, in between petitioner's house and a Mazjid there was a Padat land measuring 59 ft. x62.5 ft., for which an application on behalf of Mazjid was filed by one Akthar Hussain for regularisation of possession of land measuring 43.6 x 62.5 ft.. Consequently the Commissioner, Municipal Board Sawaimadhopur vide order dated 23.3.85 (Ann.1) regularised the land at the rate of Rs. 7/- per sq. metre dividing the same into two parts i.e. 45.6x9=34.6 ft. x45, and permission for construction was accorded. Against which the petitioner preferred a revision petition before the District Collector, Sawai Madhopur who vide Judgment dated 6.2.96 (Ann.2) set aside the order dated 23.3.85 (Ann.1) with regard to land measuring 45.6x9 ft situated on southern side of the Mazjid. Against the said Judgment dated 6.2.96 (Ann.2) respondents No.4 and 5 filed revision petition before the Divisional Commissioner, Kota (respondent No.1) who vide Judgment dated 24.5.1999 (Ann.3) while allowing the revision set aside the order dated 6.2.96 (Ann.2) of the Collector and restored the Municipality's order dated 23.3.95 (Ann.1) holding that District Collector had no jurisdiction under section 80(2) of the Municipalities Act. Hence this writ petition. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned judgments referred to above. 3. Shri M.L. Goyal learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Divisional Commissioner had committed an error of law in passing the impugned order against the provisions of law and facts of the case. According to him respondents No.1, 2 & 3 had not exercised the powers vested upon them on the application of the petition moved on 30th October, 1984 for regularising his possession over the land measuring 21x81 ft and 35.6 ftx14.6 ft. to which none had objected whereas the Municipal Board rejected his application and contrarily accepted the application of respondent Nos. 4 & 5, without taking into consideration the fact that respondents No.4 & 5 were permitted of the regularisation of the land, in fact over which the petitioner had possession. Thus the Municipal Board completely oblivious of the actual possession of the petitioner. 4 & 5, without taking into consideration the fact that respondents No.4 & 5 were permitted of the regularisation of the land, in fact over which the petitioner had possession. Thus the Municipal Board completely oblivious of the actual possession of the petitioner. In the alternative Shri Goya] contended that even if the regularisation of the land sought for by the petitioner was granted in his favour, no prejudice would have been caused to the respondents no.4 & 5 because they had individual claim for regularisation of the disputed land. 4. Before dealing with the contention as advanced by the learned counsel, I deem it proper to refer to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 80 of the Act, which stipulates as under: "(2)(a) The State Government or any Officer authorised by it in this behalf may, for the purpose of satisfying as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any proposal to lease, sale or transfer or any Government land made by or on behalf of a board or by any member Chairman, Vice Chairman or Officer of a board call for the relevant record, and may while doing so direct that pending the examination of the matter, the proposal to lease, sell, or transfer of the Government land shall remain in abeyance and no action in furtherance thereof shall be taken till the decision of the State Government or of the aforesaid officer under Sub-Sec (2)(b). (b) If after examination of the record and after giving to the person interested in such proposal, a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the State Government or the officer authorised as aforesaid, is satisfied that the proposal to lease, sell or transfer the Government land is not in accordance with or in contravention of the provisions of this Act, it may by order published in the Official Gazette, modify, cancel or rescind wholly or in part the proposal made for lease, sale or transfer of the Government land or any action or proceeding taken in pursuance thereof or may give any other direction as may be deemed proper." 5. The Divisional Commissioner while passing the impugned judgment (Ann.3) has placed reliance upon the decisions in Mst. Gora Vs. Sohan Singh (1983 RKD 567) and Chauthmal Vs. State of Rajasthan and others (1971 WLN 213) . In Gora Vs. The Divisional Commissioner while passing the impugned judgment (Ann.3) has placed reliance upon the decisions in Mst. Gora Vs. Sohan Singh (1983 RKD 567) and Chauthmal Vs. State of Rajasthan and others (1971 WLN 213) . In Gora Vs. Sohan Singh (supra) the revision petition was preferred before the Board of Revenue against the order of the Municipal Council Ajmer. The question which arose for consideration was as to whether the Board of Revenue was competent to entertain the revision petition contrary to the provisions contained in sections 300, 170(12) and 266 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. While dealing with the contentions raised on behalf of the revisionist with reference to aforesaid provisions, the learned Member of the Board of Revenue was of the opinion that no doubt the order of the Municipal Council was passed under section 170(11), however, Section 170(14) of the Act lays down that the order of the Appellate Authority would be final and not open to challenge which only means that so far as action under section 170 is concerned no further proceedings should be taken, and this however,.does not mean that the order of the Appellate Authority cannot be examined under section 300 of the Act nor does it mean that Municipal Council is debarred from proceeding under section 266 of the Act. As regards compounding of the offence, it was observed by the Board of Revenue that to claim compounding of an offence by paying a penalty imposed on the applicant for violation of any of the provisions of the Act, is not a matter of right. However, the said compounding, as per requirement of Section 170 can be compromised only in certain circumstances as stipulated within the ambit of Sub-section (12) of Section 170 and not otherwise. Another question arisen before the Board of Revenue was whether direct revision against order of the Municipal Council compounding offence was maintainable or not. On this question, the Board of Revenue observed that an appeal has been provided under sub-section (12) of Section 170 of the Act against certain orders specified in that sub-section. No appeal has however, been provided against an order passed uls 266 of the Act. On this question, the Board of Revenue observed that an appeal has been provided under sub-section (12) of Section 170 of the Act against certain orders specified in that sub-section. No appeal has however, been provided against an order passed uls 266 of the Act. If an offence under section 170 of the Act is compromised or compounded it could not mean that it was an order falling within clauses specified in sub-section (12) of Section 170 of the Act and therefore it would not be an appealable order. In the circumstances, only a revision was held to be maintainable under section 300 of the Act against such an order made under section 266 of the Act. It was further observed on the merits of the case that any dispute between the parties relating to the ownership of the plot is to be settled by civil courts and the Municipal Council is not concerned so long as the land in dispute does not belong to it. In Gora Vs. Sohan Singh (supra), it was never the case of the Municipal Council that the land in dispute belonged to the Municipal Council and, therefore, the function of the Municipal Council was only to ensure compliance with the building rules and bye-laws and if there was any breach of any provision of law, the Municipal Council was competent to take such action as was authorised by law, and was equally competent to compromise an offence under Section 266 of the Act. Ultimately the revision petition under section 300 of the Act was dismissed and the order of the Municipal Council was maintained. 6. In Chauthmal Vs. State of Rajasthan (supra), while dealing with the questions (1) whether the Nazul lands can be said to belong to Municipal Board or the Government and (2) whether section 80(1) of the Act is applicable to the sale of Nazul lands, the Division Bench of this Court observed as under:- "On a proper interpretation, it appears reasonable to hold that Section 2(e) of the Act refers to property not only vesting in but also belonging to the Municipal Board and the property belonging to the Government and not to the Municipal Board cannot be covered by section 92(2)(e) of the Act. Nazul lands belonging to the Government and not to the Board, therefore, cannot vest in the Municipal Board. Nazul lands belonging to the Government and not to the Board, therefore, cannot vest in the Municipal Board. The Local Self Government Department Notification dated 8.10.1968, therefore, cannot have the effect of vesting Nazul lands in the Municipal Boards under clause 2(e) of Section 92 of the Act. The decision of the learned Single Judge holding the sale void on account of non-compliance of Section 80(1) proviso, therefore, cannot be sustained." 7. This Court observed that Section 80(1) of the Act requires approval of the Collector only when the land has become vested in the Municipal Board under clause (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 92 of the Act and not to lands otherwise vesting in the Municipal Boards, and section 80(1) proviso therefore could not be applicable in sale of Nazul lands. In these circumstances the Division Bench of this Court then observed that the decision of the learned single Judge holding the sale void on account of non-compliance of proviso to Section 80(1) of the Act, therefore, cannot be sustained. This Court also observed as under:- "The sale to the appellant being neither void with reference to Section 80(1) proviso nor having been set aside by the State Government under Section 83 of the Land Revenue Act and the decision of the Collector dated 29.6.61 recommending the setting aside of the sale under Section 283 of the Act and the order of the State Government under Section 235 of the Act setting aside the sale being without jurisdiction, the appellant is entitled to a writ quashing the orders of the State Government and the Collector." 8. In the instant case, the Commissioner, Municipal Council Sawaimadhopur in fact on 23.3.85 has accorded sanction to issue order permitting the mutawali of Mazjid (respondent no.4 & 5) for further construction of Mazjid and compounding the case and against which the petitioner filed revision under section 283 read with Section 0(2) of the Act before the Collector. It is not disputed that the land in dispute vests in the Municipal Board and has been placed at the disposal of the Municipal Board. In the light of decision of the Division Bench of this court in Chauthmal Vs. It is not disputed that the land in dispute vests in the Municipal Board and has been placed at the disposal of the Municipal Board. In the light of decision of the Division Bench of this court in Chauthmal Vs. State of Rajasthan (supra), in case of sale of Nazul lands placed at the disposal of the Board, no approval of Collector is necessary and, the Collector has no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Municipality under section 283 of the Act. Further, even against an order made under section 266 of the Act in case of compounding a case or compromising an offence, only a revision is maintainable under section 300 of the Act to the State Government and atleast not to the Collector. Therefore, in my considered view, I find no error of law or irregularity or illegality or any jurisdictional error in the order of the Divisional Commissioner, where he held the order dated 6.2.96 of the Collector having been passed without jurisdiction. Accordingly, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed being devoid of merit.As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in this case. The writ petition is dismissed summarily.Petition Dismissed. *******