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1999 DIGILAW 1076 (PAT)

Harishankar Jha v. State of Bihar

1999-10-07

S.K.KATRIAR

body1999
JUDGMENT S.K. KATRIAR, J. This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India at the instance of the sole petitioner has been preferred with the prayer to quash the criminal proceeding started against the petitioner by instituting Madhepura PS Case No. 20.7/95 (originally typed at some places as 20.7/93), dated 31.7.95, under sections 3 and 4 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. The FIR has been instituted by one Ram Naresh Raman, the then Executive Engineer, National Rural Employment Programme (NREP), Madhepura. According to the allegations, the informant was occupying the said office, and the accused petitioner had been transferred to succeed the informant. The petitioner had reported in the informant's office on 31.7.95 to take over charge from the informant. The District Magistrate had given oral direction to the informant to hand over charge on 2.8.95, notwithstanding which the petitioner had assumed charge unilaterally on 31.7.95 himself and had accordingly informed the informant. According to further allegations, the petitioner had arrived with his own luggage along with a container containing about 10 litres of Ganga-Water. The FIR itself states that the petitioner had dumped his luggage at the residence of the informant himself. According to the further allegations, the petitioner had told the informant that he had brought the Ganga Water to purify the office chamber as well the incumbent's chair so that it is properly washed and purified, because the same was being used by a Harijan officer. According to further allegations, the petitioner had told the informant that he was a favourite officer of a particular former Chief Minister, "and any delay in getting him the charge of his office will prove costly to the DM. He allegedly informed the informant that, he was successful in putting the DM at Katihar in trouble. On these allegations, Madhepura PS Case No. 0.20.7/95, dated 31.7.95, under sections 3 and 4 of the Act was instituted, and a copy of which is Annexure 1. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is manifest from a plain reading of the FIR that it suffers from inherent contradictions and is palpably false. On these allegations, Madhepura PS Case No. 0.20.7/95, dated 31.7.95, under sections 3 and 4 of the Act was instituted, and a copy of which is Annexure 1. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is manifest from a plain reading of the FIR that it suffers from inherent contradictions and is palpably false. He submits that if he had told the informant that the Ganga Water had been brought to cleanse the office and the chair which the informant was using because he is a harijan officer then, in the submission of the counsel, the FIR contradicts the statement in the FIR itself that the petitioner had brought and lodged his entire luggage including the container carrying the Ganga Water in the informant's house itself. I have, therefore, not the slightest manner of doubt that this completely falsifies the core of the prosecution case, and is clearly covered by Proposition 5 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan lal, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 , which is to the following effect: "5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused." In such circumstances, I have no manner of doubt that the core of the prosecution case is inherently absurd and improbable and, in that view of the matter, further investigation is not called for. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the case in hand is also covered by Proposition No.7 of the aforesaid reported judgment which is to the following effect: "7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior• motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to personal and private grudge." He has rightly submitted that the background of the case is really the transfer matter. It is manifest on the very face of it that the informant was the predecessor who had to demit his office in favour of the petitioner, the successor. It is further manifest from the FIR itself that problems had arisen in the process of handing over and taking over charge. It is manifest on the very face of it that the informant was the predecessor who had to demit his office in favour of the petitioner, the successor. It is further manifest from the FIR itself that problems had arisen in the process of handing over and taking over charge. It appears that the District Magistrate seems to have issued verbal ukase directing the informant not to hand over charge before 2.8.95. This Court is surprised if there was any valid justification for such a verbal order; the District Magistrate ought to have issued a written order, if administratively and/or legally permissible. (4.1) Learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited my attention to the statements made in paragraphs 8 to 10 of the writ petition which are to the effect that the petitioner had preferred CWJC No. 590 of 1995 in this Court for an appropriate direction to the authorities so that the petitioner could take charge from the informant. This Court had passed orders on 18.9.95, calling upon the State Govt. to file their counter affidavit. It is relevant to state that the present FIR was lodged on 18.9.95 itself, and the occurrence is alleged to have taken place on 31.7.95. These dates speak volumes on the issue in hand. Firstly, this Court passed order on 18.9.95, and on the same date the FIR was lodged, and, secondly, FIR was relating to an offence which allegedly took place on 31.7.95. How is the delay explained? I would have normally not taken notice of the statements made in paragraphs 8 to 10 of the writ petition which normally constitute the defence of the petitioner, but I do so in the present case for the reason that the statements of facts made therein relate to a judicial proceeding. I have, therefore, no doubt in my mild that the present prosecution is equally covered by Proposition no.7 of Bhajan Lal's case (supra). 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited my attention to a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1995(1) PLJR 307 (Natho Yadav vs. State of Bihar) wherein the conduct of the same DM at Madhepura was under scrutiny, as in the present case. This Court recorded the following observations in paragraph 11 of the judgment:- "The District Magistrate is well advised to confine himself to the duties, which are entrusted to him under the law. This Court recorded the following observations in paragraph 11 of the judgment:- "The District Magistrate is well advised to confine himself to the duties, which are entrusted to him under the law. He should not consider that he is a king or a free-wheeler, who can move in any direction and pass any order in any matter irrespective of the fact that he is in jurisdiction to deal with those matter. Because of his unwarranted interference, the matter has come to this Court." Learned counsel has also invited my attention to paragraph 11 of the writ petition where the aforesaid observations are set out along with his assertion on oath that it was the same DM in both the cases. If that be so, then the same observations apply with equal force in the present case. I strongly deprecate this kind of habit on the part of the incumbents of the State Government to implicate other officers in criminal cases with respect to matters which are entirely administrative in nature. The present case further creates the impression that the informant was a personal favourite of the District Magistrate of Madhepura, and the two appear to be hand in glove with each other. 6. In the result, this writ petition is allowed, the FIR and the criminal proceeding against the petitioner of Madhepura PS Case No. 207/95, dated 31.7.95, is hereby quashed.