JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 2. The case of the petitioner in short is that he is a former Jagirdar of village Odhanda, Tehsil Hindoli, District Bundi and the said Jagir was granted to his ancestors by a former ruler of the erstwhile State of Bundi, Maharao Rajasthan Shri Bishan Singh Ji comprising 8349 Bigha and 3 biswa of land in the year 1861 as per patta issued in this regard (Ann.1) 3. The Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (for short the Jagir Act 1952), came into force with effect from 18th day of February, 1952. 4. It has been contended by the learned counsel that before the introduction of the aforesaid Act in State of Rajasthan, the petitioner was holding 1007 bigha 4 biswa of land in village Odhanda as Khudkast land and as such the petitioner acquired khatedari rights over the same under section 10 of the Jagir Resumption Act. Thereafter he continued in possession over the aforesaid land as Karta Khandan and Manager of the Joint Hindu Family. 5. Thereafter, in exercise of powers conferred u/s.257 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 (Act No. III of 1955), the State Government made the Rajasthan Tenancy (Fixation of Ceiling of Land) (Government) Rules, 1963 by publishing the same in the Rajasthan Gazette on 26.11.1963 vide Notification No. 6(126) Rev.B/60/(ii). 6. Under rule 9 of the Ceiling Rules of 1963 every tenant who was on 25th February, 1958 or 9th December, 1959 or 15th December, 1965 or who was on the 1st of April, 1966 in possession of the land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him, was required within six months from 1st of April, 1966 to furnish to the Sub Divisional Officer of the Sub Division in which his holdings or any part thereof was situated by filing a declaration of his holdings and particulars of his family in the form Ceiling-N, pursuant to which the petitioner furnished the said details as under: 1. Land which stood in the khatedari of the petitioner as karta Khandan and manager of the joint Hindu Family in village Odhanda, Tehsil Hondoli. =851 bigha 7 biswa 2. Lands which stood in the khatedari of petitioner's sons Gajendra Singh and Rajendra Singh in village Odhanda Tehsil Hindoli =101 bigha 4 biswa 3. Land which stood in the khatedari of the petitioner as karta Khandan and manager of the joint Hindu Family in village Odhanda, Tehsil Hondoli. =851 bigha 7 biswa 2. Lands which stood in the khatedari of petitioner's sons Gajendra Singh and Rajendra Singh in village Odhanda Tehsil Hindoli =101 bigha 4 biswa 3. Lands which stood in the khatedari of petitioner's son Brij Raj Singh son of Shri Hari Singh in village Odhanda Tehsil, ⅓rd share of 165 bigha 14 biswa =55 bigha 4 biswa i.e. total 1007 bigha 4 biswa of land 7. The petitioner submitted his declaration under Rule 9 of the Old Ceiling Rules on 22.7.1970 in the office of the SDO, Nainwa, wherein he has stated the names of atleast 10 persons in whose favour the petitioner had transferred 246 bigha 15 biswa of land out of 851 bigha 7 biswa situated in village Odhanda during the year 1956 and who were landless agriculturists by vocation. He (the petitioner) also stated in the above declaration the names of his co-sharers. The total number of his family was given as 7 including himself. After receiving the report of the Tehsildar, the SDO Nainwa issued notice under Rule 14 of the Old Ceiling Rules to the petitioner and vide his order dated 12.1.1971 dropped the ceiling proceedings under the Old Ceiling law against the petitioner. While dropping the proceedings the SDO, Nainwa recognised the transfers made by the petitioner in favour of 10 persons as aforesaid. 8. Thereafter in accordance with the family arrangement made by the petitioner for apportionment of land in favour of his family members in the year 1969, 851 bigha 7 biswa of land which stood in the khatedari of the petitioner was divided amongst the various co-sharers. The SDO, Nainwa vide his decree dated 14.4.1971 accepted the arrangement as under: Bigha/biswa 1. Land of petitioner Hari Singh's share : 293/1 2. Land of Petitioner's son Brij Raj Singh's share : 75/4 3. Land of Gajendra Singh and Rajendra Singh's share : 67/15 4. Land of petitioner's brother Pratap Singh's share : 35/14 5. Land of petitioner's counsin Fateh Singh's share : 33/8 6. Land in joint khatedari of Fateh Singh and Pratap Singh : 96/12 Total : 601/14 9. Land of Petitioner's son Brij Raj Singh's share : 75/4 3. Land of Gajendra Singh and Rajendra Singh's share : 67/15 4. Land of petitioner's brother Pratap Singh's share : 35/14 5. Land of petitioner's counsin Fateh Singh's share : 33/8 6. Land in joint khatedari of Fateh Singh and Pratap Singh : 96/12 Total : 601/14 9. The remaining 246 bigha 15 biswa of land out of aforesaid 851 bigha 7 biswa of land had already been transferred by the petitioner in favour of landless agriculturists during the year 1956. 10. During the year 1972, the Collector, Bundi made a reference under section 232 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 to the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer for quashing the order of the SDO Nainwa dated 12.1.71 passed in the proceedings under the Old Ceiling Law to which the Board of Revenue issued notices to the petitioner. 11. After hearing both the parties, the learned Board of Revenue vide its judgment dated 25th July, 1975 (Ann.6) accepted the same and the Order of the SDO, Nainwa dated 12.1.71 was set aside and the matter was remanded to the SDO Nanwa to decide the case of the petitioner under Old Ceiling law afresh after giving notice to both the parties. 12. On receiving the record of the case from the Board of Revenue, the SDO Nainwa transferred the matter to the Court of Assistant Collector, Bundi, who vide his Order dated 24.7.1993 (Ann.7) decided the case of the petitioner and allowed the petitioner to retain only 40 Standard Acres of land and declared 851 Bigha 6 biswa of land as surplus. 13. The petitioner preferred appeal against the order of the Assistant Collector Bundi dated 24.7.1993 (Ann.7) before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota, who vide its judgment dated 23.9.1993 (Ann.8) held that the disputed lands were ancestral property in which petitioner's sons were entitled to get equal share with the petitioner and allowed the petitioner and his four sons to retain 30 standards acres of land for each of them i.e. in all 150 acres of land and declared 34 standard acres of land as surplus. 14. Again feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the RAA dated 23.9.93 (Ann.8), the petitioner preferred a revision petition before the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan Ajmer and also submitted an application u/s.5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. 14. Again feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the RAA dated 23.9.93 (Ann.8), the petitioner preferred a revision petition before the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan Ajmer and also submitted an application u/s.5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The learned Board of Revenue vide its Judgment dated 7.3.96 (Ann.9) after disagreeing with the order of the RAA regarding the disputed land being ancestral property, refused to give petitioner's four sons separate share in the land and quashed the order of the RAA. Hence this writ petition. 15. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and examined their rival submissions with reference to the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short the Act of 1955) as well as the provisions of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (for short the Act of 1973) as also perused the relevant material on record. Prima facie, I am of the considered opinion that admittedly as per the record when the reference was made and when the notice was issued to the petitioner, the proceedings for reopening the case under the new Ceiling Act were barred by limitation in view of the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act of 1973, which provides the limitation of seven years from the date of final order sought to be re-opened after the expiry of 30th day of June, 1979, whichever is later. Even as regards the reference was made up to 30th June, 1979, which obviously means and implies that it could be decided under the provisions of Section 232 of the Act of 1955, its provisions are not attracted to this case. 16. In view of the third proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act of 1973 which mandates that no final order shall be passed by the Board in the matter referred to in sub-section (1) or in sub-section (2) of Section 15 by way of either directing any reference to be reopened on account of the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which has since come to the notice or even due to some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. 17. 17. The very object of the Legislature in inserting the aforesaid provisions in the Act of 1973 was to put a finality as regards the decision taken when the Act of 1973 came into force. In this case admittedly, the reference was made on 25th June, 1972 when the Old Ceiling Act was in force but when the reference was directed by the Board i.e. on 25th July, 1975, a new law had already come into force with effect from 1.1.73. Hence the reference made under the Old law since it stood undecided when the new Act came into operation was obviously not competent as it stood barred by limitation. 18. My aforesaid observations are also fortified from the Judgment of this court in the matter of Hariprasad Vs. Returning Officer Nawalgarh (1962 RLW 57) as well as the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of A St. Arunachalam Pillai Vs. M/s. Southern Roadways Ltd. ( AIR 1960 SC 1191 ) as well as AIR 1969 SC 1267 Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lai Vs. National Building Material Supply Gurgaon. In the matter of St. Arunachalam Pillai (supra) it was observed by the Apex Court thus: "rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by an order of costs. However, negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however, late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side". 19. It was observed by this Court in the case of Hariprasad (supra) thus: "It was not until the decision of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1955 that it became the considered view of that Court that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to make any such variation. 19. It was observed by this Court in the case of Hariprasad (supra) thus: "It was not until the decision of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1955 that it became the considered view of that Court that the Regional Transport Officer had no jurisdiction to make any such variation. When the law was so declared by the High Court, it could not reasonable be said that the High Court erred in allowing the respondent to take this point although in its petition under Article 226 the point had not been taken. This was obviously because the decision of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 107 of 1955 had not been given at the time of the filing of the petition. Since the question went to the rest of the matter and it involved the question whether the Regional Transport Officer had justification to vary the conditions of a permit the High Court faced with a Division Bench decision of its own on the matter, could not very well refuse permission to the respondent to rely on that decision in support of its petition questioning the validity of the order of the Government of Madras made under Section 11-A of the Act." 20. I am further of the view that the provisions of the aforesaid enactments are meant to be included in order to improve the pictorial relief to a party who had made the reference as per the statutory provisions within the time permissible under the statute. 21. Be that as it may, since the reference itself was barred in view of the New Ceiling Act which came into force with effect from 1.1.73, the limitation which under the law was seven years, which admittedly stood expired on 30th June, 1979, hence the same obviously could not be extended by any authority exercising its powers contrary to law nor any such reference could be reopened or decided thereafter. Hence, it had to be decided under the new ceiling law and not under the old law. Admittedly, the reference order made by the Joint Collector to the Collector stood decided prior to the commencement of the New Ceiling Law. Hence the courts below have committed obvious fallacy by not following this aspect of the matter as it could not be exercised under section 232 of the Act of 1955. Admittedly, the reference order made by the Joint Collector to the Collector stood decided prior to the commencement of the New Ceiling Law. Hence the courts below have committed obvious fallacy by not following this aspect of the matter as it could not be exercised under section 232 of the Act of 1955. Hence, the question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner by way of the above mentioned application amendment sought from this court by the petitioner goes to the root of the matter and deserves to be allowed. Obviously the question of law which has to be decided affirmatively in favour of the petitioner in accordance with law as per the provisions of statute. 22. While deciding the question of law as aforesaid with reference to the provisions of the statutes, in the matter of Om Prakash & 4 others Vs. State of Rajasthan & two others (SB Civil W.P. No. 860/1988) [reported in 1999(1) RLR 333 ] , this court has taken similar view on 10.3.99 and it was observed that the order passed under the Ceiling Act attains finality and can only be varied or modified if the steps are taken within the period prescribed under second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act of 1973. What cannot be done directly cannot be achieved indirectly. The proposition of law as propounded by this court in the above matter is exactly the same and attracted to the instant case. 23. I find no reason or justification to take contrary view of the matter. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the Order of the Assistant Collector Bundi dated 24.7.1993 (Ann.7) and the Judgment of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated 23.9.93 (Ann.8) as also the Judgment of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer dated 7.3.96 (Ann.9) are quashed and set aside. No order as to costs.Petition Allowed. *******