JUDGMENT O.P. No. 3500 of 1999 : P. SHANMUGAM, J. – Section 23(3A) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, is under challenge. As per this provision, the accrual of interest for tax shall not stop running by virtue of stay orders. 2. The facts necessary but not fully stated in the original petition, but gathered from records which are relevant are as follows : The petitioner is a dealer in cashewnuts. The assessment for the year 1986-87 was made on January 31, 1989 and rectified by a revised order dated March 7, 1989. The main claim of the assessee for exemption for purchase turnover under section 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 of raw cashewnut was negatived by the assessing officer following the judgment in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew-nut Factory [1953] 4 STC 205 (SC) holding raw cashewnut and cashew kernel exported are different commodities. This was upheld in appeal by the Deputy Commissioner in his order dated July 17, 1989 following the decision in State of Kerala v. Sankaran Nair [1986] 63 STC 225 (Ker) and further finding that there is no evidence of anterior contract. On second appeal before the Tribunal in T.A. No. 780 of 1989 dated October 16, 1989, there was no representation for the appellant. The Tribunal found that the matter was covered by Sankaran Nair's decision [1986] 63 STC 225 (Ker), referred to above, and dismissed the appeal. T.R.C. No. 45 of 1990 raising the question of exemption under section 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act was dismissed on August 10, 1992 as one covered by Full Bench decision in N. Sundareswaran v. State of Kerala [1993] 91 STC 476 (Ker); 1992 KLJ (TC) 401. Instead of moving SLP, petitioner preferred another O.P. No. 10220 of 1993 stating that they are taking steps and understands that the Supreme Court had been granting stay on condition of depositing 50 per cent and obtained admission of O.P. and interim order on condition of deposit of a portion of the demand on July 30, 1993. The original petition was withdrawn on June 12, 1997. Thereafter, petitioner appears to have moved the Government and obtained a stay order on January 28, 1999 on condition of 20 per cent remittance. The original petition was withdrawn on June 12, 1997. Thereafter, petitioner appears to have moved the Government and obtained a stay order on January 28, 1999 on condition of 20 per cent remittance. The present O.P. is filed on the alleged threat of the Tahsildar demanding interest from November 1, 1989 to February 28, 1990, March 1990 to August 1993 and September 1993 to January, 1999 totalling to Rs. 18,47,732. The Supreme Court held in Vijayalakshmi Cashew Company v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer [1996] 100 STC 571, that the point raised in Shanmugha Vilas case [1953] 4 STC 205 (SC) and the issue raised are same and upheld the view. Thus the main issue raised has been concluded right through the proceedings. However, the matter is kept alive somehow even now. Therefore the pertinent question that will arise is whether is this not an attempt to avoid the payment of tax ? And should not the revenue get interest for the delayed payment of tax ? O.P. No. 1591 of 1996 : 2A. In this case, an assessment order for the year 1986-87 was completed on February 27, 1990 which was subsequently modified by the Deputy Commissioner in an appeal dated February 7, 1991. This was confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal. During the pendency of the appeal, the Tribunal stayed the collection for the period from March 23, 1991 onwards. The interest had been re-computed for the period of stay up to November 1, 1995. O.P. No. 17859 of 1995 : 3. As against the assessment order for the year 1988-89, petitioner preferred an appeal which modified the assessment order. Petitioner preferred a further appeal before the Tribunal and the Tribunal partly allowed the appeal on the question of rate of exemption. In the light of the modified orders, the Assistant Commissioner determined the balance of tax payable along with the interest from November 1, 1995. 4. The Supreme Court in Haji Lal Mohd. Biri Works v. State of U.P. [1973] 32 STC 496 while dealing with the interest on sales tax held that the liability to pay interest is automatic and arises by operation of law. There is nothing in the language of section 8(1-A) (of the U.P. Sales Tax Act) which prevents the running of interest because of the operation of any stay order. There is nothing in the language of section 8(1-A) (of the U.P. Sales Tax Act) which prevents the running of interest because of the operation of any stay order. The liability to pay interest is created by statute and the Sales Tax Officer has no discretion to grant any exemption from payment of interest. The same view was followed by the Supreme Court in Sales Tax Officer v. Dwarika Prasad Sheo Karan Dass [1977] 39 STC 36. 5. Under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, the impugned provision, viz., section 23(3A) specifically states that period of stay shall not be excluded in calculating interest. This provision is made applicable to pending demands. Section 23(3) as such enables demand of interest on the assessed tax if not paid. Hence the law laid down by the Supreme Court applies to this case in all fours. Their Lordships observed as follows : "The above provision was apparently added with a view to tighten up the machinery for collection of sales tax and as a deterrent measure so that the dealers may not evade or delay the payment of tax." Their Lordships rejected the argument for a separate notice. The liability to pay interest arises by operation of law. The amount of interest on the date of payment is not constant but increases from day to day. Hence it will not be possible to specify the amount in a certificate. It is a matter of arithmetical calculation. No elaborate procedure is required for that. 6. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Jain Brothers v. Union of India [1970] 77 ITR 107 has held that it is well-settled that in fiscal enactments the Legislature has a larger discretion in the matter of classification. 7. In Maya Rani Punj v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1987] 65 STC 416, the Supreme Court while upholding the rate of penalty under section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act held that penalty was to be visited commencing from the date of default and continued month after month until compliance was made and the default came to an end. The non-performance of duty is a continuing wrong. 8. The non-performance of duty is a continuing wrong. 8. The judgments and the ratio laid down by this Court in Aman Traders v. State of Kerala [1987] 66 STC 54, K. Nachimuthu v. Sales Tax Officer [1994] 95 STC 539 and State of Haryana v. Rohtas Industries [1990] 79 STC 238 (P&H) will not apply in the light of specific provision impugned hereunder. There can be no second opinion on the proposition that liability to pay the interest is statutorily automatic. For want of specific provision for interest, in spite of stay orders and in the facts of those cases, it was held that no interest can be claimed. 9. Another aspect is that the demand of interest though stayed for an interim period, is never held illegal by any of these judgments. Normally, once the matter is finally adjudicated, unless otherwise directed by the authority or court, interim orders merge with the final order. Hence if a writ petition is dismissed, obviously the interim application gets dismissed. The consequence will be the impugned orders were deemed to be in operation during the whole period. 10. Yet another aspect is that in many cases, writ petitions are filed to get the appeals pending before the statutory authorities disposed of and interim orders obtained in the meanwhile. As a matter of fact, after T.R.C. in this case, the petitioner in O.P. No. 3500 of 1999 obtained stay stating that he needs time to move S.L.P. but subsequently got the O.P. withdrawn and dismissed. The intervening period is July 30, 1993 to June 12, 1997. The Supreme Court deprecated the practice of moving and exercise of jurisdiction of article 226 of the Constitution of India only for getting interim orders in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. AIR 1985 SC 330 ; [1985] 58 Comp Cas 145 (SC) and Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1983] 53 STC 315 (SC); AIR 1983 SC 603 . 11. If this period is stopped from running, it will be against public policy, public interest and unjust enrichment and will encourage to delay the payment on some pretext. 12. Statutory prescription to pay interest is allowed under many enactments. Thus, section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, provides for interest in addition to compensation from the date of claim. If this period is stopped from running, it will be against public policy, public interest and unjust enrichment and will encourage to delay the payment on some pretext. 12. Statutory prescription to pay interest is allowed under many enactments. Thus, section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, provides for interest in addition to compensation from the date of claim. Section 34 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, provides for payment of interest from the time of taking possession until paid or deposited. Proviso to section 34 enhances the rate of interest if compensation is not paid within one year. The award of interest pendente lite is governed by section 79 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1925. Similarly, sections 351 to 353 of the Succession Act provide for payment of interest on general legacies remaining unpaid. In J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Commercial Taxes Officer [1994] 94 STC 422 (SC), a Constitution Bench held that interest charged on the strength of statutory provision with an object to compensate the revenue for delay in payment of tax. Their Lordships held while interpreting section 11B of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act that "tax payable" can only mean the full amount of tax which becomes due when assessed. It was further held that it would be different matter if the return is not approved by the authority and the assessee acted without reasonable cause in committing the default. Even for awarding interest, these two ingredients are not available in these cases. 13. The averment that sub-section (3A) is violative of articles 14 and 19(1)(g) is without basis and substance. In Calcutta Jute Manufacturing Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer [1997] 106 STC 433; AIR 1997 SC 2920 , the Supreme Court held that there is liability to pay interest during which recovery amount was stayed by orders of High Court. Their Lordships' observation would apply to the circumstances of this case which is as follows : "16. The tax amount which they should have paid as per section 6B remained with the appellant during the entire period and they would have earned good profit with that amount. The State, to which the tax amount should necessarily have gone, was not able to utilize it for public purposes. The tax amount which they should have paid as per section 6B remained with the appellant during the entire period and they would have earned good profit with that amount. The State, to which the tax amount should necessarily have gone, was not able to utilize it for public purposes. When appellants had the advantage of keeping the amount of tax without paying it to the State exchequer only because the High Court granted orders restraining the State from recovering that amount from the assessee, no act of the court shall cause prejudice to any party. The prestine doctrine couched in the maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' has ever remained a salutary and guiding principle. 17. The contention that as the courts granted injunction restraining the State from recovering the tax amount as per section 6B would raise a presumption that the court was then satisfied of the bona fides of the contention is too fragile for depriving the State of the statutory right of interest incorporated in section 10-A of the Act. Interim orders are passed by the High Court on a variety of considerations, one among being the strained financial position of the person approaching the court. Merely because the court granted interim orders it cannot be inferred that court was then satisfied of a strong prima facie case for the appellants. On the contrary, it is well-nigh settled that there is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality of a legislative act. The presumption cannot be the other way around." 14. On the objection to the retrospectivity of the provision, I do not see any merit. Claiming interest on pending payment due is not retrospective. The liability is already fixed as per sub-section (3) of section 23. Even so, it has been held that a taxing statute can be passed retrospectively and it is reasonable and in the public interest by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam AIR 1964 SC 925 . 15. Here, section 23(3) is not under challenge. We are concerned only with the period during which interest can be claimed. Sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) have to be read together to avoid any possibility of difficulties to the assessee. If so read together, I find no unreasonableness in sub-section (3A). The impugned provision is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. 15. Here, section 23(3) is not under challenge. We are concerned only with the period during which interest can be claimed. Sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) have to be read together to avoid any possibility of difficulties to the assessee. If so read together, I find no unreasonableness in sub-section (3A). The impugned provision is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. For all these reasons, there are no sustainable grounds to quash the impugned provision. Hence the original petitions fail and they are accordingly dismissed. Order on C.M.P. No. 5956 of 1999 in O.P. No. 3500 of 1999 N dismissed. Petitions dismissed.