Judgment Arun Madan, J.-By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order of suspension dated 22-5-1999 (Annexure 3) and the order dated 28-6-1999 (Annexure 5) whereby, the State Govt. directed to hold judicial inquiry de, novo. 2. The facts giving rise to this writ petition in brief are that on the basis of complaint, an exploitation on the five charges was called for by the Dy. Secretary to the Local Self Government Department vide letter dated 29-9-1997 (Annexure l). Therefore, vide order dated 9-2-1999 (Annexure 2) it was conveyed by the aforesaid Dy. Secretary that upon preliminary inquiry prima facie the petitioner was found guilty therefore, under Section 63 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, a decision by the State Govt. was taken to hold judicial inquiry against the petitioner on the charges framed in the charge sheet annexed to the order dated 9-2-1999 (Annexure 2). Then, the impugned order of suspension dated 22-5-1999 (Annexure 3) was passed against the petitioner consequent upon having not been satisfied with his explanation called for under memo dated 29-9-1997 (Annexure 1), and the petitioner was suspended from the post of Chairman, Municipal Board Karauli, and the judicial inquiry was ordered to be initiated. During the pendency of the inquiry before the Joint L.R. (II) Govt. of Rajasthan, Jaipur, the petitioner on his application was informed by the inquiring authority vide letter dated 26-5-1999 that the departmental evidence has been closed and the petitioner was requested to adduce his evidence in defence on 1-5-1999, 12-5-1999 and 18-5-1990 and the Inquiry was at the fag end. However, vide Impugned order dated 28-6-1999 (Annexure 5) the State Govt. decided and directed to hold the judicial inquiry denovo under Sections 63(2) and 63(3) of the Act. Hence, this writ petition. 3. In the writ petition, the petitioner had also challenged the vires and validity of Section 63(4) of the Act but upon reply to the writ petition the respondent State raised preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition having regard to the earlier order dated 14-6-1999 passed by this Court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 287 1/ 99. Thereupon, the Division Bench of this Court in the writ petition at hand vide order dated 14-7-1999 observed that in view of the earlier order dated 14-6-1999 wherein Mrs. Thereupon, the Division Bench of this Court in the writ petition at hand vide order dated 14-7-1999 observed that in view of the earlier order dated 14-6-1999 wherein Mrs. Saraf did not challenge the vires of the Act, this writ petition be posted before the Single Bench making it clear that the validity of Section 63(4) cannot be questioned again in this writ petition. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Rafiq, learned Additional Advocate General for the State and Mr. Anurag Sharma for the respondent No. 3 Satish Jain, who was allowed by this Court vide order dated 21-7-1999 to be impleaded as party to this writ petition. 5. Before dealing with the contentions, I deem it proper to quote Section 63(4) of the as Act under :--“Sub-section (4) of Section 63 of the Act starts with a non-obstante clause i.e. “Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the State Govt. may place under suspension a member against whom proceedings have been commenced under this section until the conclusion of the enquiry and the passing of the final order and the member so suspended shall not be entitled to taken part in any proceedings of the board or otherwise perform the duties of a member thereof” 6. Main thrust of the learned counsel for the petitioner to challenge the impugned order of suspension as well as the initiation of the de novo inquiry is that once the petitioner stood exonerated in the judicial inquiry which was at the fag end and initiated in pursuance of earlier letter dated 9-2-1999 (Annexure 2) there was no occasion or justification for the State Govt. to hold second de novo inquiry in terms of the order dated 28-6-1999 and to continue suspension of the petitioner which shows mala fides of the respondents. Shri Yadav also contended that the impugned orders are not sustainable because there was non application of mind on the material on record of the inquiry which prima facie establish no evidence to prove any of the charges against the petitioner, which may justify continuance of suspension and therefore, the order of suspension as well as initiation of de novo inquiry is non est, void and without Jurisdiction under Section 63(4) of the Act. 7. On the contrary, the learned Addl. 7. On the contrary, the learned Addl. Advocate General in his reply to the writ petitioner as well as at the time of arguments vehemently contended that the contentions of the petitioner are wholly devoid of any merit and untenable on the ground that even during the pendency of the Inquiry with Joint Legal Remembrancer, the Vice Chairman of the Municipal Board submitted a complaint to the Director of the Local Bodies on 10-6-1999 that there was strong possibility and apprehension that the inquiry initiated against the petitioner may not be fair and tampered with since Shri R.N. Singh who was earlier posted as Munsif Magistrate, Gangapur City also, has been approached and telephonic conversation had taken place with the petitioner and the inquiry officer at his residence as would be clear from the STD/PCO shop’s slip issued on 6-6-1999 at 11.48 p.m. in pursuance of which, the said complaint 10-6-1999 was forwarded to the concerned authority vide Annexure R 8. ShriRafiq also contended that an inquiry report submitted by Jt. LR was supposed to be Secret, its confidentiality was completely lost and defeated inasmuch as, even before the confidential report in a sealed cover could be received by the Government, it was leaked to him and on the basis of this report, the petitioner had filed earlier petition in which he had filed additional affidavit that the inquiry officer had submitted his report and that he had been exonerated of all the charges by report dated 11-6-1999 and earlier writ petition was listed before this Court on 15-6-1999 and this Court directed the Govt. to proceed expeditiously and take final decision. The Vice Chairman of the Municipal Board submitted another complaint against the petitioner that when the case listed before this Court on 15-6-1999 a statement was made on behalf of the petitioner that he has been exonerated of all the charges by the inquiry officer, to which the Vice Chairman expressed his utter surprise since no such order was issued and the Govt. was yet to receive the copy of the report. Shri Rafiq contended that in view of the totality of the circumstances, referred to above, the very assumption of the petitioner that he had been exonerated was false and the contention of the petitioner on the very face of it is wholly devoid of substance. 9. was yet to receive the copy of the report. Shri Rafiq contended that in view of the totality of the circumstances, referred to above, the very assumption of the petitioner that he had been exonerated was false and the contention of the petitioner on the very face of it is wholly devoid of substance. 9. In my considered view, the petitioner has failed to adduce any evidence on record to prove his contention that he has been exonerated of all the charges by the inquiring authority in its report which has also not been produced whereas, on considering of the totality of the circumstances appearing out of complaints against the petitioner referred to in the reply to the writ petition which has also not been rebutted in any manner, the Govt. has rightly and justifiably well within its competence directed to hold de novo judicial enquiry against the petitioner vide Its order dated 28-6-1999 (Annexure 5). I am also of the view that when the inquiry did not reach its logical conclusion and its report was leaked out as is clear from Annexure R- 1, and the very confidentially of the inquiry having been lost, the State Govt. was within its domain to direct initiation of judicial inquiry de novo. In these peculiar circumstances once the inquiry is pending, It is not open to the petitioner to challenge the suspension order on the ground that the order has been an outcome of mala fide of the State Govt. had no jurisdiction to direct to the de novo Inquiry. Since earlier inquiry had not reached to its logical conclusion there is no bar to the State Govt. to direct initiation of the judicial Inquiry in accordance with law. The apprehension of the petitioner that once the order has been passed by the State Govt. on 22-5-1999 It is likely that outcome of the judicial inquiry will not be in his favour, is wholly misconceived and devoid of any substance. There Is no question of any delay since had not reached to its logical conclusion on account of its leakage, initiation of fresh inquiry is not barred. But, having regard to the fact that the term of the petitioner will be expiring in the year 2000, it will be in the interest of justice to direct for conclusion of the del novo inquiry expeditiously. 10. But, having regard to the fact that the term of the petitioner will be expiring in the year 2000, it will be in the interest of justice to direct for conclusion of the del novo inquiry expeditiously. 10. I have examined the ratio of decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in (1) Parmanand Paliwal v. Btate of Rajsthan (1998) 1 WLC.237); (2) B. Bala Krishan Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board f 1997) 8 Sew LR 347 (AndhPra). (3)Nandlal v. State (1996) 2 WLC 497, (4) Rameshwari Devi Mewara v. State of Rajasthan (1999) 1 WLC 420 ( AIR 1999 Raj 47 ) and (5) Abdul Latif v. Commissioner, Gorakhpur, AIR 1968 All 44 , 11. In my view, the ratio of the aforesaid decisions do not help the petitioner In any manner in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. 12. Learned Additional Advocate General placed reliance upon the decisions in; (1) Jan Mohd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1992) 2 WLC(Raj) 463 :(AIR 1993 Raj86),(2) Union of India v. H. C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 and (3) Krishna Chandra Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1589 . 13. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel ( AIR 1964 SC 364 ) (supra) the Apex Court held that finding of fact recorded by an enquiry officer entrusted with the work of enquiry into misconduct of a Govt. servant are not binding on the Govt. The Govt. is competent to take a different view of the evidence. A similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in K.C. Tandon’s case ( AIR 1974 SC 1589 ) (supra). In Jan Mohd’s case ( AIR 1993 Raj 86 ) (supra) the Division Bench of this Court held that proceedings commenced when preliminary enquiry report submitted to the Govt. is considered by the Government and the Government applies its mind to it and comes to the conclusion that further probe In the matter is essential and for that purpose issued a show cause notice to the delinquent as to why the definite charges be not framed against him and be referred to a Judicial officer. That has been held to be the stage from where the proceedings start against the delinquent and the Govt. has the power to suspend a Chairman or the Member. 14. That has been held to be the stage from where the proceedings start against the delinquent and the Govt. has the power to suspend a Chairman or the Member. 14. This viewed from the aforesaid decisions; I do not find any error of law, arbitrariness, illegality and violation of Section 63 of the Act in the impugned orders of suspension and for initiation of de novo judicial inquiry. 15. As a result of the above discussion the writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. However, in view of the fact that the term of the petitioner is due to expire next year, I deem it appropriate to direct that the pending judicial inquiry before the inquiring authority be conducted expeditiously after affording the petitioner full opportunity of hearing, and no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner in either way as a result of dismissal of this writ petition or from the observations made In the Judgment and also because the inquiry is being conducted by a judicial officer and no allegations of biasness of mala fides can be attributed to the inquiring authority. The pending inquiry is directed to be concluded as early as possible but not beyond six months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order.