Judgment P.K.Deb, J. 1. This Revision petition is under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 against the judgment and decree passed in Title (Eviction) Suit no. 3 of 1990 by the Munsif IInd, Samastipur. 2. The suit house forming the subject matter of the eviction suit related to a part of the building situated in the town of the Dalsinghsarai under Ward No.3 of Municipality holding No. 692 which is a pucca shop facing the main road measuring 20 north to south x 10 east to west. The plaintiff/Opposite party filed the suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity as contemplated under Section 11(1) (C) of the B.B.C. Act. It is the case of the plaintiff that by amicable arrangement in the family since the year 1950 the plaintiff is the exclusive owner and in possession of the houses in the building alongwith others and that defendant is a month to month tenant at a rental of Rs. 150/- per month and he is running a shop of bicycle and its spare parts. It is the case of the plaintiff that at the time of induction of tenancy the defendant agreed that he would vacate the suit premises as and when personal necessity would arise to the plaintiff. The induction was in the year 1985. and till March 1989, rent was paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. But in the month of April when the plaintiff demanded the suit house to be vacated the defendant stopped payment of monthly rent. But the suit has not been filed on the ground of defaulter but it has been filed on the ground of personal necessity inasmuch as that the plaintiff needs the suit premises for starting a business of electronic goods in the suit premises which according to the plaintiff is most suitable and convenient for the purpose as the electric generating set belonging to the plaintiff had already been set up in the"nearby residential house of the suit premises. 3. Defendant on appearance after taking leave as required under Section 14 of the Act filed the written statement contending inter alia that the suit is not maintainable that the same is barred by. principle of limitation, waiver, estoppel and acquisition (sicacquiescence ?) -etc. etc. 3. Defendant on appearance after taking leave as required under Section 14 of the Act filed the written statement contending inter alia that the suit is not maintainable that the same is barred by. principle of limitation, waiver, estoppel and acquisition (sicacquiescence ?) -etc. etc. It has been stated that the present suit has been filed in the garb of eviction suit though actually plaintiff wants to get his title declared to the suit premises through this eviction process. According to the defendant the other cosharer of the plaintiff, namely, Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary is the real owner of the house in question and the suit cannot proceed without impleading Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary in the suit. His further plea is that there was never any relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant rather the defendant is the tenant of Bijaywant Kumar Chaudhary and he is paying rent after valid discharge of receipt to Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary. The allotment of the house in favour of the plaintiff by private arrangement in the year 1950 as alleged by the plaintiff has been totally denied. According to the defendant in a subsequent partition suit on a compromise decree Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary has got full right title and interest in the suit house. Various other pleas were also made to the effect that the holding had been duly mutated in the municipality in the name of Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary and that taxes etc. are paid by Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary. On the ground of personal necessity it has been stated that the plaintiff has got various other properties and he mostly resides at Patna where he has got a flourishing business and he has no necessity of any house at Dalsinghsarai for running any business. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties several issues were framed but the main issues were related to relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant and as to whether the personal necessity as alleged by the plaintiff was a bonafide and genuine one. During the pendency of the suit Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary wanted to get himself impleaded in the suit but the same was rejected and such rejection maintained up to this Court. Various documents were filed from both the parties which has been specifically mentioned and described in the impugned judgment itself. During the pendency of the suit Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary wanted to get himself impleaded in the suit but the same was rejected and such rejection maintained up to this Court. Various documents were filed from both the parties which has been specifically mentioned and described in the impugned judgment itself. A huge number of witnesses have been examined by both the parties. From the plaintiff side 23 witnesses were examined while from the side or defendant 29 witnesses have been examined. D.W. 23 Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary had also been examined for and on behalf of the defendant as the defendant wanted to set him up as the owner of the suit property. During the pendency of the suit the document filed by the plaintiff, namely, rent receipts, Ext.1 and the signature of the defendant Ext-1/A showing payment of rent by the defendant to the plaintiff for three months in the year 1989 had been challenged to be forged and fabricated document and hence at the instance of the plaintiff the same document was went to the Handwriting Expert with the admitted signature of the defendant and the handwriting expert came to the finding in his report that the signature in Ext-1 i.e. Ext.1/A is that of the defendant only. In support of that report the Handwriting expert has also been examined. After considering both oral and documentary evidence learned Court below came to the finding by the voluminous impugned judgment that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant and that Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary had no nexus with the suit property and he had just been set up for evading the eviction suit and also for the purpose of grabbing of the suit property. It has further been alleged by the learned Court below that the plaintiff has got the personal necessity as alleged by him and, as such, the eviction as been decreed in favour of the plaintiff. It has further been alleged by the learned Court below that the plaintiff has got the personal necessity as alleged by him and, as such, the eviction as been decreed in favour of the plaintiff. When the revision was preferred before this Court under Section 14(8) of the Act then a single Bench of this Court vide order dated 20.11.98 held that the impugned judgment reveals that no issue was framed on the partial eviction and, as such a direction was sent to the learned Court below for framing an issue of partial eviction and decide that issue after giving opportunity of adducing evidence of both the parties and then sent back the decision alongwith other records to this Court. On the basis of that order the issue of partial eviction had been considered by the learned Court below. It has been decided that the partial eviction would suffice the need of the plaintiff and, as such, he asked for dividing the suit house half and half to cater the needs of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Against such finding a counter affidavit had been filed from the side of the Opposite party the landlord challenging such finding of the learned Court below. The main point involved in this suit is about the establishment of the factum of relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant. Voluminous document had been filed by both the parties as there was a stiff contest regarding the ownership over the suit property between the plaintiff and non defendant Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary. It has been submitted at the very first instance by the learned counsel appearing for and on behalf of the petitioner that complicated question of title has been decided and dealt with by the learned Court below when the same is not permitted in the narrow scope of summary proceeding under Section 14 of the B.B.C. Act. On the point of this established principle some rulings of this Court had been referred to which were also referred before the trial Court. On the point of this established principle some rulings of this Court had been referred to which were also referred before the trial Court. It is true that if complicated question of title is involved then the Court should debar itself from deciding the same in the narrow scope of summary proceedings but if such title has been challenged only to frustrate the eviction suit then incidentally for the establishment of the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant such title can be decided in the eviction process also. This has already been established law by various judgments of this Court and that of the Apex Court. Moreover establishment of title may not be very necessary for the purpose of deciding the issue of landlord and tenant if it can be shown that the plaintiffs status as a landlord comes within the purview of vast definition of landlord as contemplated under Section 2 of the B.B.C. Act but it has also been held by Division Bench of this Court to the effect that if a person having no ownership over the suit property can also maintain a eviction suit if his status comes within the purview of definition of landlord under Section 2 of the B.B.C. Act, on other causes of eviction except that of the personal necessity because in case of personal necessity it must be proved that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises to recover possession from the tenant. So keeping those principles in mind the relationship of landlord and tenant in the present case for the purpose of eviction on the ground of personal necessity is required to be considered. It is an admitted fact that the plaintiff Srimant Kumar Choudhary, D.W. 23 Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary were the co-sharers as they hail from the same ancestral origin. According to the plaintiff there was amicable settlement between the co-sharers and the suit property alongwith others had fallen into the share of the plaintiff and his father Ramashray Choudhary and that Ramashray Choudhary had given the suit building to the plaintiff for management and also for realisation of rent. In that way according to the plaintiff he is the owner and a landlord and, as such, the suit is maintainable. In that way according to the plaintiff he is the owner and a landlord and, as such, the suit is maintainable. On the other hand it is the piea of the defendant that D.W. 23 Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary got the suit property in his allotment in partition suit No. 121 of 1971 on a compromise being arrived at between the co-sharers. But it appears that such compromise decree was ultimately turned down on an initiative being made from the side of the plaintiff. There was an Ice factory in the suit premises and the said Ice-factory was run by the plaintiff and the same has been admitted by D.W.23 Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary but he took the plea that the plaintiff Srimant Kumar Choudhary was running the Ice factory in the suit premises as his tenant but after closing the Ice factory the plaintiff had sublet to the defendant and, as such, Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary was contemplating to take steps against the defendant for such subletting. Thus the possession over the suit premises since before induction of the defendant in the suit premises is admitted and that there was relationship of tenant and landlord between the plaintiff and the defendant is also admitted by Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary to whom the defendant tried to set up title. D.W.23, Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary ih his statement before the Court had varied from his earlier statement given in the intervention petition and those contradiction had been brought on record and had been very ably deciphered by the learned Court below. Thus even if the case of the defendant of setting up of the title of Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary is taken to be true then also on own admission of D.W. 23 Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary the suit premises were in possession of the plaintiff although he claimed as a tenant of him while the plaintiff stated and proved by several documents that he was doing Ice factory on is own right and then inducted the defendant as a tenant over the same. So between the plaintiff and the defendant there was relationship of landlord and tenant had been admitted by Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary and, as such, i.e. no scope to go for detailed findings as to the ownership over the suit premises. So between the plaintiff and the defendant there was relationship of landlord and tenant had been admitted by Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary and, as such, i.e. no scope to go for detailed findings as to the ownership over the suit premises. Regarding settlement or induction of tenant by the plaintiff to the defendant there is not only documentary evidence, namely, rent receipts Ext.1 but there is also oral evidence by three witnesses in favour of the plaintiff who were present at the time of giving settlement of the defendant in the suit premises. Thus the settlement of the suit premises to the defendant by the plaintiff had been independently proved by oral evidence from the side of the plaintiff together with the admission as already stated above by Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary, D.W.23, for and on behalf of the defendant. Besides that there is counter foil rent receipt Ext.1 which was signed by the defendant in valid discharge of receipts on payment of rent. Thus the relationship had been established and the learned Court below has rightly deciphered the evidence. 4. Such decisions arrived at by the learned Court below does not suffer from any non-reading or mis-reading of the evidence on record and, as such, there is little scope to interfere with such decisions under Section 14(8) of the B.B.C. Act. The argument placed that the pleading does not contain as to the factum of the year of commencement of tenancy but it appears from the evidence adduced from the side of the landlord that the tenancy was created in the year 1985 and such evidence of the landlords side gets support from the deposition of Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary D.W.23. 5. Regarding the issue of personal necessity it has been vehemently argued by referring to the decision of the Apex Court as reported in AIR 1981 S.C. 1113 (M.M. Quasim V/s. Manohar Lal) to the effect that for the purpose of eviction on the ground of personal necessity as envisaged under Section 11(1)(c) the definition of Landlord as per section 2 of the Act shall be restricted to the owner of the suit premises having right against whole world to occupy the building to the effect that in the present case it could not be proved by the plaintiff that he was the owner of the building. The plaintiff claimed to have got suit house in his allotment during partition in the year 1950. It was also proved by evidence that the house in question was given in management by the father of the plaintiff to the plaintiff for all purposes including the realisation of rent. The partition decree on compromise as referred by the other co- sharer Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary had been refuted by the plaintiff to the effect that the said compromise decree was set aside. That the suit house was in possession of the plaintiff doing Ice cream factory is admitted by Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary before the petitioner defendant was inducted into it. According to the plaintiff he was doing Ice cream factory on his own right over the suit premises. On the other hand Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary stated that the plaintiff doing business of Ice cream factory as his tenant. Nothing has been submitted documentary except the vague statement. It has further been stated by Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary that the plaintiff had sublet the defendant for which he was going to take action. So plaintiffs possession over the suit premises before induction of the defendant is admitted. So he being the landlord he is entitled to get the eviction on the ground of personal necessity. Even if the contention of Bijaywant Kumar Choudhary is taken to be true that the plaintiff has sublet the defendant then alo the relationship of landlord and tenant remains in between the plaintiff and the defendant and the plaintiff is definitely entitled to get eviction on the ground of personal necessity as envisaged under Section 11(c) of the B.B.C. Act. Regarding the bonafide of personal necessity the plaintiff has stated that he needs the suit house badly for starting the business of electronic goods and he has got every knowledge about the business and he will get all facilities as the Generator set was set up just by the side of the suit house. It has been argued for and on behalf of the petitioner that the plaintiff is an old man of 71 years of age and he being issueless and when he has got further flourishing business at Patna he cannot have any necessity for the suit house for starting another business. I am not convinced with such submission. It has been argued for and on behalf of the petitioner that the plaintiff is an old man of 71 years of age and he being issueless and when he has got further flourishing business at Patna he cannot have any necessity for the suit house for starting another business. I am not convinced with such submission. A landlord knows best what necessity he has got; only because he has got another business he cannot be debarred from starting a new business when there is no evidence to the effect that the plaintiff has got some other business at Samastipur or Lakhisarai, when it is there that the residential house of the plaintiff is by the side of the suit house. Moreover, it is an admitted fact that the plaintiff is a monied man and he has got source to start a new business of electronic goods. Hence it has rightly been held by the learned Court below that the personal necessity of the plaintiff is genuine and bonafide. There is no scope to interfere with such finding of the learned Court below. 6. Regarding partial eviction the decision of the Court below is perverse on the face of it. It has already been observed in the order of the learned Court below that the defendant was not agreeable for partial eviction. Moreover, it appears that the learned Court below has wrongly construed the site plan of the suit premises. It is small suit house having an opening towards the road side measuring 10 while in length it is 20. For the business for opening in the road side is a must. In that way if partition is made half and half then the opening will be for both the sides only 5 which can in no case cater the needs of either of the plaintiff or the defendant because of the nature of their business. Learned Court below wrongly held that the opening is 20 and, as such, making half and half both the plaintiff and defendant would get opening of 10. The whole order of partial eviction is perverse on the face of it as already mentioned above. On this partial eviction as opposed by the landlord- opposite party by filing counter affidavit it has not been challenged from the side of the defendant- petitioner. The whole order of partial eviction is perverse on the face of it as already mentioned above. On this partial eviction as opposed by the landlord- opposite party by filing counter affidavit it has not been challenged from the side of the defendant- petitioner. In that way the impugned judgment and decree of the eviction suit is proper and justified and the decision of partial eviction is a perverse one. 7. In the result, the Revision petition is hereby rejected, the Judgment and decree of eviction is hereby upheld and the decision of partial eviction is set aside on the ground of perversity. In the facts and circumstances no order as to costs.