Judgment I.P.Singh, J. 1. This is an application under sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short the Code). It is directed against the order dated 25.10.1997 passed in Case No. 916 of 1996 u/s 144 Cr.P.C. Tr.No. 478 of 1997 u/s 145 Cr.P.C. learned Executive Magistrate, Bagaha, District West Champaran by which he dropped the proceeding running under section 146(1) of the Code and set aside the order of his predecessors in office passed on 29.8.1997 attaching the disputed land under section 146(1) of the Code. 2. It appears that the petitioner had filed an application on 3.8.1996 before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bagaha for initiating a proceeding under section 144 of the Code with respect to Kheshra Nos. 227, 228 and 231 measuring 19 Kathas 14 Dhurs situated in village-Ojhawalia. In this petition the petitioner claimed that the aforesaid land was mortgaged in favour of his father Deo Nandan Mishra in the year 1966 by one Sakaldeo Mishra of village Mahuwar Tola Ojhawalia, P.S. Samara. Accordingly the possession over the aforesaid land was handed over to the mortgagee Deo Nandan Mishra. On his death the present petitioner being his son is coming in possession of this land. However, opposite party threatened the petitioner to dispossess him from the disputed land with the help of brute force. On this ground the petitioner under section 144 of the Code was filed. 3. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bagaha by his order dated 3.8.1996 initiated a proceeding under section 144 of the Code restraining both the parties from going over the disputed land and asked both the parties to file their show cause in the matter. Though the petitioner filed his show cause on 26.9.1996 the opposite party did not appear as a result of which the case was heard ex-parte on 26.9.1996 and the proceeding was converted into one under section 145 of the Code by the order of this date. Inspite of this the opposite party did not appear and finally on 29.8.1997 the learned Magistrate attached the disputed land under section 146(1) of the Code. 4. On 15.10.1997 the opposite party filed a petition before the learned Magistrate for dropping the proceeding and also for withdrawing the order of attachment passed on 29.8.1997. Inspite of this the opposite party did not appear and finally on 29.8.1997 the learned Magistrate attached the disputed land under section 146(1) of the Code. 4. On 15.10.1997 the opposite party filed a petition before the learned Magistrate for dropping the proceeding and also for withdrawing the order of attachment passed on 29.8.1997. In this petition the opposite party pointed out that a title suit with respect to the disputed land was pending before the Civil Court. This suit was filed by opposite party no.1 in which the brother- in-law (Bahnoi) of the petitioner, namely Hari Shankar Mishra is the main contesting defendant. It was numbered as T.S.No. 90/95 and was with respect to the present disputed land. The opposite party had contended that the petitioner of the present case had been set up by the contesting defendant, namely, Hari Shanker Mishra to file the petitioner under section 144 of the Code while in T.S.No. 90/95 plaintiff-opposite party no.1 got injunction order in his favour from the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Bagaha by his order dated 3.8.1996. In this connection it may be mentioned that according to opposite party no.1 the present petitioner, namely, Madan Mishra is nobody else than the brother-in-law of the contesting defendant, Hari Shanker Mishra. Opposite party had claimed to have purchased the disputed land on 26.6.1995 from one Yasoda Devi. In the suit Hari Shanker Mishra the contesting defendant disclosed that he got the mortgage redeemed. When the plaintiff-opposite party no.1 got the information about the initiation of the proceeding under section 144 of the Code he filed a petition on 25.2.1997 in T.S.No. 90/95 for adding the present petitioner as a party to the said suit. The said petitioner was, however, rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge by his order dated 16.7.1997. 5. The petitioner has contended that he is not a party to T.S.No. 90/95 and, therefore, no relief was claimed against him. However, the learned Executive Magistrate by the impugned order dated 25.10.1997 dropped the proceeding under section 145/146(1) of the Code holding that since the defendant, Hari Shanker Mishra, in T.S.No. 90/95 is the Bahnoi of the petitioner no proceeding before him simultaneously with the proceeding before the Civil Court can continue. Accordingly by the impugned order he set aside the order of attachment passed by his predecessors in office on 29.8.1997. 6. Accordingly by the impugned order he set aside the order of attachment passed by his predecessors in office on 29.8.1997. 6. In this petition the petitioner has contended that the impugned order is based upon mis-quotation of the Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court as well as the Honble High Court because they are not applicable to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as the petitioner is not a party to T.S.No. 90/95 nor any relief was sought against him. The learned Executive Magistrate wrongly held that the mortgaged money might have been paid orally to the petitioner though no evidence to that effect could be brought on the record. The impugned order is based on conjectures and surmises. The learned Executive Magistrate should have held that the mortgaged money has not yet been paid to the petitioner. The learned Executive Magistrate should also have held that since the present petitioner is not a party to T.S.No. 90/95 the proceeding under section 145/146(1) of the Code could not be dropped. Opposite party no.1 can not claim possession over the disputed land on the strength of the sale deed dated 26.6.1995 executed by one Yasoda Devi. The impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of laws and the learned Executive Magistrate has exceeded his jurisdiction by passing the same. On these grounds amongst others it has been contended that the impugned order be set aside. 7. The only point for decision before me is whether this application is fit to be allowed or not. 8. I have heard the parties in detail. The pendency of T.S.No. 90/95 has not been denied by either party. It is also not in dispute that the petition for initiation of a proceeding under section 144 of the Code was filed by the petitioner on 3.8.1996. From this it would appear that this petition was filed during the pendency of T.S.No. 90/95, However, the learned Sub-Divisionai Magistrate started the proceeding under section 144 of the Code and subsequently the same was converted under section 145 of the Code. It was only when the opposite party filed a petition for dropping the proceeding as also for withdrawing the order of attachment passed under section 146(1) of the Code on 29.8.1997 that the parties were heard and the impugned order dated 25.10.1997 was passed. It was only when the opposite party filed a petition for dropping the proceeding as also for withdrawing the order of attachment passed under section 146(1) of the Code on 29.8.1997 that the parties were heard and the impugned order dated 25.10.1997 was passed. The learned Executive Magistrate while passing the order has placed reliance on a decision of the Honble Supreme Court as also a decision of this Court to which I will refer in due course. 9. The main thrust of the argument on behalf of the petitioner is that since he is not a party to T.S.No. 90/95 the ratio of two decisions of the Honble Supreme Court as also this Court will not apply to his case. His main grievance appears to be is that the learned Executive Magistrate has misquoted the observations made by the two Honble Courts since they are not applicable to his case inasmuch as he is not a party in T.S.No. 90/95 and no relief was claimed by him in the said title suit. 10. I, however, do not find any force in these submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner for the reasons mentioned below. 11. In the case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant V/s. State of U.P. and others (A.I.R. 1985 S.C.472) it appears that a civil litigation was pending before the Civil Court wherein the question of possession was also involved. From the facts of the said case it would appear that in respect of the same property there was a suit for possession and injunction being Title Suit No.87 of 1975 filed before the Civil Judge of Ballia wherein the question of title was gone into and by judgment dated February 28, 1981, the said suit was dismissed. The appellant before the Honble Supreme Court was defendant in that suit. According to the appellant close relations of respondents 2-5 were the plaintiffs and as per the counter affidavit filed before the Honble Supreme Court it was clear that an appeaf against the order of dismissal was still pending disposal before the appellate court. It was held that when a civil litigation is pending for the properly wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated there was no justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under section 145 of the Code. It was held that when a civil litigation is pending for the properly wherein the question of possession is involved and has been adjudicated there was no justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under section 145 of the Code. The parallel proceeding should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the civil court the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when the question of possession is being examined by the civil court and parties were in a position to approach the Civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during the pendency of the dispute. It was further held that multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. It may be noted that in this case also close relations of respondents 2 to 5 were the plaintiffs. This will mean that respondents 2 to 5 themselves were not the plaintiffs in the said suit. 12. This question came up for consideration before this Court also in the case of Madan Singh and others V/s. State of Bihar & another [ 1991(1) B.L.J. 234 : 1990(2) PLJR 754 ]. This was a single bench decision of B. Prasad, J. in which it was held that in view of the pendency of the civil suit a parallel proceeding in criminal court should not be allowed to continue. Subsequently the proceeding under section 145 of the Code was quashed. It is important to mention in this connection that in this case also opposite party no.2 had filed a petition before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Siwan for initiating a proceeding under section 144 of the Code. When the petitioners had appeared in the said proceeding they contended that opposite party no.2 had filed this application on behalf of Chandeswar Singh and five others who had already filed Title Suit No. 34/89 against the petitioners with respect to the suit land in the court of Sub-ordinate Judge, Siwan. An injunction petition filed by them for restraining the petitioners from going over the land in dispute was rejected by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge and this fact was concealed by opposite party no.2 in his petition before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. An injunction petition filed by them for restraining the petitioners from going over the land in dispute was rejected by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge and this fact was concealed by opposite party no.2 in his petition before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. There also one of the plaintiffs happen to be the nephew of opposite party no.2. 13. In the present petition the petitioner has contended that he is not a party to the suit. This is, however, of no avail inasmuch as he happens to be the brother-in-law of the contesting defendant. Moreover having come to learn about the suit it was open to him to pray before the Civil Court for being added as a party to the suit, if really he felt that his presence in the civil court was necessary. It further appears that when opposite party no.1 filed a petition before the Civil Court to make this petitioner a party in T.S.No. 90/95 the same was dismissed as will appear from paragraph 8 of this petition. From what has been stated above it is clear that opposite party no.1 had himself tried to make the present petitioner as a party to the civil suit but his prayer was rejected. It was, however, open to the present petitioner to appear before the Civil Court and to pray for being impleaded as party to the said suit. This does not appear to have been done. On the other hand the petitioner during the pendency of the title suit filed a petition on 3.8.1996 for starting a proceeding under section 144 of the Code. In any view of the matter it is not in dispute that both the civil suit as well as the present proceeding under section 145 of the Code relate to the same land. As per the decision in the case of Ram Sumer Puri (supra) it has been held that when the subject matter of the proceeding under section 145 of the Code as also the suit for possession and injunction were one and the same the ratio of this decision will apply and, therefore, the proceeding under section 144 of the Code can not be allowed to continue. There also the close relations of respondent nos. 2 to 5 were the plaintiffs. There also the close relations of respondent nos. 2 to 5 were the plaintiffs. I, accordingly, hold that the ratio of two decisions of the Honble Courts mentioned above clearly go to show that they are fully applicable to the facts of the present case. 14. In the result I do not find any merit in this application. It is, accordingly, dismissed.