Honble PALSHIKAR, J.–This is a petition by unsuccessful workman whose dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was rejected by the learned Labour Court, Udaipur. (2). Facts giving rise to the petition stated briefly are that the petitioner was a workman employed in Raw & Finishing Production Pvt. Limited Company from 17.2.1977. According to the petitioner, his services were terminated from 1.5.81. It would be necessary in the context of the present case to note verbatim, the averments and claim of the petitioner in this regard. The respondents started rese-nting petitioners claim of regularisation and got annoyed with the petitioner and consequently, without any information effected removal of the petitioner from service with effect from 1.5.1981. According to the petitioner therefore, the employer effected removal of the petitioner from service. According to the workman therefore, it is the positive act of removal of the petitioner by respondents which creates the cause of action. It is then alleged that this removal was in violation of the provisions of Sec. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore, the petitioner is liable to be reinstated with all consequential benefits. The petitioner was non-suited by the learned Labour Court on the ground that the petitioner has abandoned the service and it is not a case of termination of service by the employer. This award is impugned in this petition by the petitioner workman. (3). Shri R.S. Saluja, appearing on behalf of the petitioner assailed the award as legal and unsustainable as the definition of word ``retrenchment in the Industrial Disputes Act is incorrectly appreciated by the learned Labour Court. Since the question as to what is meant by word ``retrenchment often comes for considera-tion before this Court, it would be proper, if the definition is considered in details and case law attending the subject is scrutinised. (4). Since the question as to what is meant by word ``retrenchment often comes for considera-tion before this Court, it would be proper, if the definition is considered in details and case law attending the subject is scrutinised. (4). The word ``retrenchment has been defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in Section 2(oo) as under; ``2(oo) ``Retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the Service of workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or [``(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being ter-minated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or] (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health. (5). The Supreme Court of India first analysed the definition in Section 2(oo) as quoted above and analysed in the case of Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd. vs. K.N. Joglekar (1). The Honble Supreme Court analysed the word ``retrenchment to consist of four essential requirements and they were; (a) termination of the service of workman; (b) by the employer; (c) for any reason whatsoever and; (d) otherwise than as a punishment. (6). It will be seen from the analysis as made by the Honble Supreme Court that termination of service of the workman by the employer is an essential requirement of retrenchment. This dicta of the Supreme Court in Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd.s case (supra) has not been reversed any time thereafter. Several cases on this question have been decided by the Supreme Court of India and by different High Courts of India and the controversy was again taken up by the Supreme Court for adjudication in a bunch of appeals commonly decided on 4.05.1990. The decision in the 19 appeals is reported in (1990) 3 Supreme Court Cases 682 (2). The matter was taken up for adjudication by constitution Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of Five Honble Judges, the judgment was unanimous. The decision in the 19 appeals is reported in (1990) 3 Supreme Court Cases 682 (2). The matter was taken up for adjudication by constitution Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of Five Honble Judges, the judgment was unanimous. There, the Supreme Court took up this aspect of definition of retrenchment and considered the arguments of several learned advocates appearing for both the sides and several cases decided by the Supreme Court itself on the question of what is meant by the word ``retrenchment. (7). In para 13 and 14, it has been observed by the Supreme Court as under; ``13. On the above diverse facts two rival contentions are raised by the parties. The learned counsel for the employers contend that the word `retrenchment as defined in S. 2(oo) of the Act means termination of service of a workman only by way of surplus labour for any reason whatsoever. The learned counsel representing the workmen contend that `retrenchment means termination of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, other than those expressly ex-cluded by the definition in S. 2(oo) of the Act. ``14. The precise question to be decided, therefore, is whether on a proper construction of the definition of ``retrenchment in S. 2(oo) of the Act, it means termination by the employer of the service of a workman as surplus labour for any reason whatsoever, or it means termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, and those expressly excluded by the definition. In other words, the question to be decided is whether the word ``retrenchment in the definition has to be understood in its narrow, natural and contextual meaning or in its wider literal meaning. (8). It will be seen that in this case, the Supreme Court took up for consideration the precise question as to what is the proper construction of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It should be noted at the stage that the adjudication was taken up by a Five Members Bench of Supreme Court. A pronouncement made by this judgment is thus final decision as to what is meant by retrenchment as defined by Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It should be noted at the stage that the adjudication was taken up by a Five Members Bench of Supreme Court. A pronouncement made by this judgment is thus final decision as to what is meant by retrenchment as defined by Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. After elaborately discussing the legislating intend in defining retrenchment as also nothing different decisions in the issue, the Supreme Court of India has come to the conclusion that retrenchment means termination by em-ployer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever. It will thus be seen that the Supreme Court has also taken into consideration the decision on the point reported in ( AIR 1957 SC 121 ) (supra). I have carefully gone through the entire decision of the Supreme Court where all the judgments of the Supreme Court have been considered and the Supreme Court has come to the conclusion as aforesaid that retrenchment as defined by Sec. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 means termination by the employer of the service of a workman for whatsoever reasons. I would like to elaborate here that in doing so, the Supreme Court has taken into consideration its earlier judgment in AIR 1957 SC 121 (supra), where it is laid down by the Supreme Court that termination of the service of workman by the employer is essential ingredient of definition of retrenchment as contained in Sec. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In fact, the judgment in AIR 1957 SC 121 (supra) is affirmed by the Supreme Court in the above quoted judgment. It will be seen that now the term retrenchment means termination by the employer of the service of the workman for whatsoever reasons. Even today, therefore, operating and overriding clause which must be established in order to hold that retrenchment has taken place, is that there must be termination of service by the employer for whatsoever reasons. In the present case, such termination is alleged to have taken place on 1.5.81. (9). Even today, therefore, operating and overriding clause which must be established in order to hold that retrenchment has taken place, is that there must be termination of service by the employer for whatsoever reasons. In the present case, such termination is alleged to have taken place on 1.5.81. (9). This matter regarding what is meant by the retrenchment within the meaning of Sec. 2(oo) was again considered by the Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Haryana vs. Om Prakash and another (3), where their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court observed thus; ``Retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) means termina-tion by the employer of the service of the workman for any reason whatsoever. Therefore, it contemplates an act on the part of the employer which puts an end to service to fall within the definition of the expression ``retrenchment in Section 2(oo) of the Act. There was nothing of the sort in the instant case. It was the workman who cea-sed to report for duty and even after he ceased to report for duty, it is not his case that at any point of time he reported for duty and he was refused work. He straightaway proceeded to invoke the provisions of the Act and, therefore, this is a case in which the employer has done nothing whatsoever to put an end to his employment and hence the case does not fall within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act. Therefore, the case does not attract Section 2(oo), nor does it satisfy the requirements of Section 25-F. (10). In this case also, the Supreme Court of India has accepted the definition of retrenchment to mean termination of service of the workman for any reason whatsoever. Thus, it will be seen from the decisionS reported in AIR 1957 SC 121 , 1990(3) SCC 682 AND 1998(8) SCC 733 (supra) that the definition of retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act is unchanged, it means, termination by the employer of the service of the workman for any reason whatsoever and contemplates an act on the part of the employer which puts an end of the service. In view of this position of law since 1957 to 1998, I will have to see whether in the present case, such an act on the part of the employer of terminating the service of the workman is established. (11). In this case, the petitioner has failed to prove termination of his service by the employer. There is no termination order on record. The petitioner claims that he was terminated from service on 1.5.1981. However, there is no order of termination nor is there any proof on record to show that the petitioner sought to report on duty and was prevented by the employer from doing so which act of prevention may amount to termination of service. In the absence of any such evidence, finding by the learned Judge that it is a case of abandonment cannot be said to be illegal. It will be seen that the petitioner claims termination of service with effect from 1.5.1981, however, has moved the labour court on 19.1.1985 i.e. after about five years of alleged termination. It will be seen that there is nothing on record to prove why nothing was done between 1.5.81 to 19.1.85 in regard to challenging the alleged termination in any event. A perusal of the record will show that there is nothing on it to prove any action on the part of the employer to terminate the service of the employee and consequently, it cannot be said to be retrenchment made in violation of the provisions of Section 2(oo) requiring any interference either by the learned Labour Court or by this Court. The learned Labour Court has exercised its jurisdiction properly. The question as to whether the petitio-ner abandoned his service or did not report on duty is a question of fact found in favour of the employer by the Labour Court, which finding cannot by any stretch of imagination be called perverse. (12). In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed.